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1 
Can family policies affect  
fertility? 
 
Fertility rates are plunging and have reached unprecedentedly low levels in 
almost the entire developed world (Frejka & Sardon 2004; Frejka & Sobotka 
2008). During the first six years of the new millennium the period total fer-
tility rate (PTFR) in Europe averaged 1.4 children (Eurostat 2010).1 This 
figure is well below the rate of 2.1 children per woman that is required if a 
population is to survive in the long run in the absence of immigration.2 The 
consequences of such low fertility rates will be dire in the long run. First, 
populations will grow older as the number of newborns dwindles. Then, 
populations will begin to shrink drastically as the elderly begin to die off. If 
fertility rates remain at their current levels until 2100, the populations of 
Italy, Spain, and Germany, for example, in the absence of immigration, will 
drop to only 14, 15, and 17 percent respectively, of what they are today 
(McDonald 2000a). Although immigration can seem to be an obvious way 
out of the problem (e.g., see Malmberg 2006), it is not a viable solution in the 
long term. Immigrants also grow old and die; therefore, immigration can only 
postpone population aging and decline temporarily (United Nations Popula-
tion Division 2000; McDonald & Kippen 2001; Coleman 2006). In short, 
unless people have more children, it will be impossible to stop the pending 
aging and decline of the population. 
                                                          
1
 The period total fertility rate (PTFR or TFR) is an estimation of the number of children that a hypothetical 
average woman in a population can be expected to have during her lifetime, based on the number of children 
women in different age groups in the population have during a year. 
2
 2.1 is the average number of children each woman needs to have in order to keep the population stable in a 
low-mortality setting. In high-mortality settings, the average number of children needed is higher.   
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It is therefore not surprising that politicians are asking whether changes in 
family policies can increase fertility rates.3 This is also the overall question of 
this study. The research community has yet to come to a consensus on 
whether policy changes can bring about the desired changes to fertility rates. 
(For overviews of, and opinions on, the research on policies’ effect on fertili-
ty, see Sleebos 2003; Neyer 2003 Demeny 2005; McDonald 2006; Gauthier 
2007; Björklund 2007.) Many scholars see fertility decline as an inevitable 
consequence of cultural change, about which policies can do little. These 
scholars argue that modern people’s desire for self-realization and their reluc-
tance to enter into lifelong commitments simply make them unwilling to 
make the sacrifices that having children involves (van de Kaa 1987; 2001, 
2002; Lesthaeghe 1995; Lesthaeghe & Moors 2000). Accordingly, it does not 
matter what politicians do; people will not have children regardless.  
Other, more economically oriented, scholars argue that people’s unwill-
ingness to have children is a rational response to the increasing costs of re-
production that have followed in the wake of the increase in opportunities for 
women in the labor market (Becker 1991). As the costs of reproduction can 
be reduced by generous family policies, these scholars are mostly optimistic 
about policies’ ability to raise fertility (McDonald 2006; Björklund 2007). In 
other words, it matters what politicians do; if they implement policies that 
recompense families for the increasing costs of reproduction, people will go 
on having children.    
This study firmly sides with those who argue that generous family poli-
cies can raise fertility. Thus, it agrees that the ultimate source of low fertility 
is the increased costs of reproduction that have followed in the wake of ex-
panded opportunities for women in the labor market, and it agrees that poli-
cies can raise fertility by reducing these costs. However, the study’s main 
message is that those scholars who are optimistic about policies’ ability to 
raise fertility have not recognized their full potential to do so, because they 
have failed to acknowledge the individualized nature of many fertility deci-
sions.  
For a long time the literature on the effect of policies on fertility has been 
dominated by Gary Becker’s new home economics (see Gauthier 2007). 
Central to Becker’s theory (Becker 1991) is the assumption that fertility deci-
                                                          
3
 It is an open question whether politicians’ concern with falling fertility rates is warranted from a normative 
perspective. Normative arguments can be made in favor of both reducing and increasing population size (e.g., 
see Parfit 1984, Chapters 17–19; Tännsjö & Ryberg (Eds.) 2004; Neyer 2011; Olah 2011). The question of 
whether politicians’ concern with falling fertility rates is normatively warranted is not the topic of this study, 
however. I am just interested in answering the empirical question of whether, by implementing generous 
family policies, politicians can encourage women to have more children.   
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sions are primarily taken within unions, by partners who altruistically share 
the burdens and benefits of reproductive investments with each other. In line 
with this assumption, researchers have primarily focused on studying how 
family policies that reduce altruistic spouses’ costs of reproduction affect 
within-union fertility.4 Although such a focus undoubtedly has its merits and 
is often warranted, this study argues that it misses a fundamental fact about 
fertility decisions: namely, that fertility decisions are closely interrelated with 
decisions about union formation and union dissolution. Many fertility deci-
sions are taken by individuals long before they form unions and can be cer-
tain that their partners will share the burdens of raising potential children 
with them. In addition, in a time of high union dissolution rates, far from all 
fertility decisions within unions are taken by partners who are altruistically 
inclined toward each other. In short, fertility decisions are often taken in 
situations in which Becker’s assumption of family altruism is unlikely to 
hold, and where individuals’ incentives to have children do not necessarily 
coincide with altruistic partners’ incentives to have children. In such situa-
tions, individuals are likely to be more sensitive to how policies would affect 
their costs of reproduction in the event that they end up on their own than 
they are to how policies would affect altruistic spouses’ costs of reproduc-
tion. Consequently, the previous research’s focus, on how policies that re-
duce altruistic spouses’ costs of reproduction affect within-union fertility, is 
too narrow to capture the entire effect that policies have on fertility.  
 More specifically, this study argues that policies can increase fertility in 
two ways that the previous research has failed to notice; namely, 1) by in-
creasing women’s incentives to form unions, and 2) by increasing women’s 
incentives to have children in unstable unions. The purpose of this study is to 
show that policies’ effect on fertility will appear much clearer with individu-
al-level fertility data if these two ways in which policies can affect fertility 
are given due attention, and the focus is shifted from families’ to individuals’ 
(or more correctly, individual women’s) incentives to have children.5 Thus, 
                                                          
4
 At least to the extent that they have been interested in individual-level fertility patterns. 
5
 In the empirical and in much of the theoretical parts of my study, I focus mainly on women and their union 
formation and fertility decisions. Men and their characteristics are included in the analyses only to the extent 
that they are hypothesized to influence women’s decisions; otherwise they are not studied. There are both 
theoretical and pragmatic reasons for this focus. First, my argument mainly concerns women as it is an empiri-
cal fact that it is mainly women who bear the brunt of the costs of reproduction – and thus it is women who 
take the greatest individual risks when having children. Second, women today have de facto and in most 
countries also de jure veto power in fertility decisions. In most countries women can terminate unwanted 
pregnancies if they choose to. Men cannot do so in any country in the world. Women, thus, have more power 
than men over fertility decisions – at least in the developed world. Third, for practical reasons it is easier to 
study women’s fertility as biological age confines their fecundity to a fairly short part of their lives. Men, in 
contrast, can procreate until the end of their lives, and therefore it takes longer to establish with certainty how 
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the optimistic message conveyed by the study is that if only the causal paths 
in which policies can affect fertility are understood better, it will become 
obvious that generous family policies can raise Europe’s low fertility rates; 
the policies need only to aim to reduce individuals’ costs of reproduction. In 
other words, this study disentangles the causal mechanisms through which 
policies affect women’s fertility decisions and shows how a more detailed 
understanding of such effects can help us understand policies’ full potential 
as means of raising fertility.  
 
The argument 
My argument, that fertility decisions are often more individualized than the 
previous research has acknowledged, can be subdivided into two more spe-
cific arguments.  
The first of these arguments is that the previous research has failed to rec-
ognize that family policies can affect fertility by mediating the negative ef-
fect of union instability on fertility. The new home economics idea of family 
altruism assumes families to be run by an altruist head (usually male), whose 
utility is dependent on the other family members’ utility. Because he is so 
inclined, the altruist will distribute the family’s resources for the good of all 
in the family. Knowing this, other family members are assumed to pool their 
resources and adjust their behavior to maximize the altruist’s utility. If they 
are harmed by their individual contributions, they will be “compensated by 
changes in contributions from the altruist that make [them] better off” (Beck-
er 1981, p. 6). In short, family members are assumed to be indifferent to how 
the costs of reproduction are distributed within the family – and how family 
policies affect that distribution. What matters is how reproductive invest-
ments and family policies affect the family’s total utility.  
In recent years Becker’s idea of family altruism has come under criticism 
for not giving a realistic picture of how families function, and several schol-
ars have suggested replacing it with various game-theoretic bargaining mod-
els of family life (e.g., see Manser & Brown 1980; McElroy & Horney 1981; 
Lundberg & Pollak 1993, 1994, 1996; Folbre 1994; Braunstein & Folbre 
                                                                                                                             
many children a man has fathered during his lifetime. Fourth, most previous studies on individuals’ fertility 
decisions have tended to focus on women. Thus, my study is neither worse nor better than most previous 
studies in that respect. This is not to say that men’s fertility decisions are uninteresting to study. A full study of 
how my arguments relate to men’s fertility decisions, however, has to wait for the future because of a lack of 
time and space. As the focus of this study is on women, I most often use feminine pronouns in my discussions, 
for example, talking about actions “she” takes and “her fertility decisions”; however, sometimes for the sake of 
variety I have chosen to use more neutral terms to describe individual women and their motivations and 
fertility decisions, for example, referring to “individuals” and “people’s incentives to have children.”  
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2001; Iversen & Rosebluth 2006). These models presuppose spouses to pri-
marily act in their own interests, and so it is unrealistic to assume that family 
members will pool their resources and adjust their behavior to maximize the 
family head’s utility. Instead, they assume spouses to use the resources under 
their individual control (for example, their labor market incomes) to bargain 
with each other over which investments to make and how to distribute their 
payoffs. The spouses’ bargaining power is ultimately decided by their options 
outside the union – that is, the payoff they would receive if they decided to 
leave their partner. Under such circumstances it is not wise to make invest-
ments that weaken one’s bargaining position by worsening one’s outside 
options.  
From a game-theoretic bargaining perspective, women who live in unsta-
ble unions therefore have an incentive to self-insure against a separation by 
not having children and continuing to work in the labor market (Peters 1986). 
While they must usually bear the full cost of the human capital investments 
necessary for having children, women receive only a part of the value of 
these investments if their union ends in a separation. In contrast to the as-
sumptions of the new home economics theory of fertility, women are, hence, 
likely to be very sensitive to the distribution of the costs of reproduction 
within the family – and how it is affected by family policies. For example, it 
can be assumed that family policies that reduce the primary caretaker’s cost 
of reproduction directly would be more effective in increasing women’s 
willingness to have children than would family policies that reduce the fami-
ly’s costs of reproduction by compensating the family’s primary earner with 
a reduced tax rate. This is true even if both kinds of policies offer equal 
amounts of compensation to the family as a unit.  
Family policies that allow parents to combine work and children (hence-
forth, “dual-earner policies”), such as subsidized child care and wage-related 
parental leave benefits, reduce the primary caretaker’s costs of reproduction 
in a direct way. They do so by reducing the time the primary caretaker (as-
sumed here to be the mother) must spend caring for the family’s children, and 
by compensating her individually for the time she still wants to spend caring 
for them. Dual-earner policies also make it easier for lone parents to pursue 
careers without neglecting their children’s need for care. Because of these 
characteristics, dual-earner family policies can be expected to be more effec-
tive at raising fertility than family policies that presuppose a more traditional 
division of household labor, such as joint taxation and long, low-paid mater-
nity leaves. This could explain why several studies based on aggregated fer-
tility data have found dual-earner family policies to be more effective than 
other family policies at raising fertility.  
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If the above argument is correct, generous dual-earner policies should, in 
addition to having a direct positive effect on fertility, also have an indirect 
positive effect on fertility by reducing the negative effect of union instability 
on fertility. Other generous family policies should, in contrast, have only a 
direct positive effect on fertility. Previous studies, however, have focused 
only on the direct effects of the generosity of family policies on fertility, 
without considering that the effects could be dependent on the stability of the 
unions in which women live (see Figure 1.1).  
 
Figure 1.1. Traditional model for studies on the effect of family policies on individual-
level fertility 
 
Comment: The arrow indicates a positive effect. 
 
Previous studies, therefore, have likely missed the positive effect that gener-
ous dual-earner policies have on fertility by mediating the negative effect of 
union instability on fertility. The practical implication of my first argument, 
thus, is that studies on the effect of policies on fertility should consider that 
dual-earner policies affect fertility by mediating the negative effect of union 
instability on fertility (see Figure 1.2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The generosity of family 
policies 
 
(Within-union) fertility 
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Figure 1.2. Model suggested by the first argument 
 
Comments: Thick arrows indicate positive effects. Lined arrows indicate negative effects. Arrows on 
arrows indicate interaction effects, that is, effects that reduce or strengthen the original effect. The 
interaction effect in the figure, thus, indicates that generous dual-earner policies reduce (have a 
negative effect on) the negative effect of union instability on within-union fertility.  
 
The second argument put forward in this study is that the previous research 
has failed to recognize that family policies can affect fertility by affecting the 
likelihood of women living in unions. The desire for children has historically 
been, and continues to be, a major motivation for union formation (Becker 
1973; Buss 2007). People who want to have children, for example, are large-
ly restricted to finding a partner and establishing a union with that partner 
before they can have children. Because of this, the costs of reproduction can 
be assumed to weigh heavily in union formation decisions. All else being 
equal, low costs of reproduction should increase, and high costs of reproduc-
tion should reduce, the incentives for potential spouses to form a union. If the 
potential spouses would not benefit from having children after entering a 
union, the likelihood that they would not benefit from forming the union at 
all – and thus will abstain from forming it – increases significantly. This must 
mean that high costs of reproduction do not necessarily manifest themselves 
in low fertility among women in unions; they may also manifest themselves 
in a lower likelihood of women forming unions. Similarly, family policies 
that affect the costs of reproduction are not only likely to affect the fertility 
decisions of people who are living in unions, but also the union formation 
decisions of people who are living as singles. It is therefore improbable that 
all policy-related effects on fertility can be captured by directly estimating 
policies’ effects on the fertility of people who live in unions. Instead, parts of 
the effect on fertility should be sought by examining the effect policies have 
The generosity of dual-earner 
policies 
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on union formation decisions. Even though very few children are born out-
side unions in Europe today (Kiernan 1999a, 1999b, 2004; Heuveline et al. 
2003; Sobotka & Toulemon 2008), previous studies have not made an at-
tempt to make this connection. To the extent that previous studies have con-
centrated on individual-level fertility patterns, their focus has instead primari-
ly been on how family policies affect within-union fertility. This focus has 
likely led them to underestimate the positive effect of generous family poli-
cies on fertility. Thus, the practical implication of my second argument is that 
studies should consider that the effect of family policies on fertility could 
manifest as an effect on the likelihood of people forming unions (see Figure 
1.3).  
 
Figure 1.3. Model suggested by the second argument 
 
Comment: The arrows indicate positive effects. 
 
On its own, the second argument implies that previous studies have underes-
timated the effect of generous family policies on fertility in general. Howev-
er, in combination with the first argument, it implies that the underestimation 
has been particularly grave in the case of dual-earner policies. Since much of 
the positive effect of dual-earner policies on fertility is dependent on such 
policies reducing the negative effect of union instability on fertility, parts of 
their positive effect on fertility are likely to manifest as a higher likelihood of 
people forming unstable unions. Union instability, therefore, is likely to be 
higher in countries with generous dual-earner policies. Studies focusing on 
within-union fertility that fail to account for this are likely to miss much of 
the positive effect that generous dual-earner policies have on fertility. This is 
because the part of the positive effect such policies exert on fertility – by 
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reducing the negative effect of union instability on fertility – is likely to be 
masked by the negative effect of union instability on fertility upon which it is 
dependent. At best, the two effects will cancel each other out (as the positive 
effect of policies on fertility, for natural reasons, cannot exceed the negative 
effect of union instability on fertility upon which it is dependent). But if 
generous dual-earner policies do not compensate fully for the negative effect 
union instability has on fertility, generous dual-earner policies could even 
appear to have a negative effect on within-union fertility. Hence, the total 
positive effect of generous dual-earner policies on within-union fertility can 
only be captured by controlling for the negative effect of union instability on 
fertility, and for the role that the generosity of dual-earner policies plays in 
mediating that effect. Previous individual-level studies have not done so. 
Therefore, they have not only missed the positive effect of generous dual-
earner policies on union formation, but also much of such policies’ positive 
effect on within-union fertility. Together, the two arguments, thus, imply that 
studies on the effect of family policies on fertility should consider that dual-
earner policies are likely to affect both union instability and the effect that 
union instability has on fertility (see Figure 1.4).   
 
Figure 1.4. Final model suggested by the arguments 
 
Comments: Thick arrows indicate positive effects. Lined arrows indicate negative effects. Arrows on 
arrows indicate interaction effects.  
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To sum up, fertility decisions seem to be much more individualized affairs 
than the new home economics and the previous research on the effect of 
policies on fertility have assumed. Failing to see this, previous individual-
level fertility studies have been blind to policies’ ability to affect fertility by 
reducing the negative effect of union instability on fertility and by increasing 
women’s incentives to form unions. This has likely led earlier researchers to 
underestimate the positive effect of generous family policies on fertility in 
general and the effect of generous dual-earner policies on fertility in particu-
lar.  
Studies using aggregated fertility data, however, have likely not underes-
timated these effects to the same extent as studies using individual-level 
fertility data. By nature, the former studies incorporate the fertility of all 
women, regardless of their union status. Although they might not intend to do 
so, such studies therefore also incorporate the indirect effect of family poli-
cies on fertility that goes via the effect family policies have on union for-
mation. They also include all policy effects on the fertility of women who 
live in unions – including those who live in unstable unions. This can likely 
explain why it has been difficult to find a positive effect of generous dual-
earner policies on fertility using individual-level fertility data, whereas stud-
ies based on aggregate-level fertility data have found such policies to be 
much more effective at raising fertility than other family policies.  
In other words, the study’s critique mainly targets individual-level stud-
ies, which have had difficulty finding an effect of generous family policies on 
fertility. The aggregate-level studies, which have found a strong positive 
effect of generous family policies on fertility, are not affected by the critique. 
Thus, the study clearly shifts the evidence in favor of the conclusion that 
generous family policies can have a positive effect on fertility. 
 
The study  
I test my arguments by conducting multilevel statistical analyses of fertility 
and union formation patterns and how they vary in relation to the different 
family policy contexts of 22 European countries. Although they are not alone 
in struggling with low fertility rates, European countries offer more opportu-
nities than non-European countries for testing my arguments. The main rea-
son for this is the European Social Survey (ESS) that is used throughout this 
study. The ESS provides high-quality, up to date, standardized, individual-
level fertility and union history data for most European countries. Unfortu-
nately, there is a lack of similar-quality data sources for countries outside 
Europe. Although the choice of confining the study to Europe is guided pri-
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marily by data availability concerns, Europe also provides ample opportuni-
ties for testing the arguments. Despite obvious cultural similarities, family 
policies, fertility rates, union instability, and union formation patterns vary 
considerably throughout the continent. Moreover, Europe has struggled with 
low fertility rates for longer than any other continent. It is in Europe that the 
problem has its origins, and it is in Europe that politicians are most eager to 
solve the problem.  
The study starts, in Chapter 2, with a presentation of the major contending 
theories of why fertility has fallen in the developed world during the twenti-
eth century, and of the empirical evidence for and against their validity. The 
conclusion of the chapter is that the two major contending theories can ex-
plain fertility decline up to the mid-1980s, but that they cannot explain why 
fertility patterns since then have been reversed.  
Chapter 3 presents the new home economics analysis of the relationship 
between family policies and fertility. The upshot of the chapter is that there 
are theoretical reasons to assume, and plenty of empirical evidence that 
proves, that generous family policies increase fertility. This means that fami-
ly policies can potentially explain the reversal in fertility patterns that has 
occurred since the 1980s. However, it is also concluded that the positive 
evidence is largely restricted to studies that use aggregated fertility measures. 
In particular, it has been difficult to prove the effectiveness of generous dual-
earner policies with individual-level fertility data, even though studies based 
on aggregate-level fertility data show dual-earner policies to be more effec-
tive than other family policies at raising fertility.  
Chapter 4 presents my arguments and contends that they can explain the 
inconsistencies in the previous research findings as well as shed light on two 
hitherto unnoticed causal paths in which policies can affect fertility.   
Chapter 5 presents the design of the study. It also defines and describes 
“the generosity of family policies” and other key concepts of the study.   
Chapter 6 empirically tests my first argument, by asking whether family 
policies that reduce the costs of reproduction affect the likelihood of women 
forming unions.  
Chapter 7 empirically tests whether family policies that reduce the nega-
tive consequences of union disruptions on parents’ economic well-being 
increase the likelihood of women forming unstable unions (i.e., it tests the 
implications that follow from the first and second arguments combined).  
Chapters 8 and 9 empirically test my first argument, by asking how union 
instability and the generosity of dual-earner policies affect women’s achieved 
and planned fertility. 
Chapter 10 sums up the findings and discusses their broader implications. 
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2 
Theories of fertility decline 
 
Theories of fertility decline In this chapter I describe the shift toward low and 
below-replacement fertility that occurred in the late twentieth century and the 
main contending explanations for why it occurred. The chapter starts with a 
brief description of the history and most important characteristics of fertility 
decline. I then present the new home economics explanation for the decline 
in fertility and the empirical evidence for it. Thereafter, I present the prevail-
ing cultural explanations of fertility decline and the empirical evidence sup-
porting them. The chapter concludes that the prevailing explanations of fertil-
ity decline alone cannot explain fertility trends in recent years and therefore 
need to be complemented. 
 
The history of fertility decline  
The shift toward low and below-replacement fertility, now commonly labeled 
the “Second Demographic Transition” (SDT), started in the industrialized 
world in the 1960s when women began to postpone childbirth and drastically 
reduce the number of children they had (Frejka & Sobotka 2008).6 Since 
then, fertility rates have been falling constantly in almost all industrialized 
countries, with period total fertility rates dropping below the reproduction 
level for the EU27 as a whole for the first time in the late 1970s (Eurostat 
2010). The downward trend has continued in most countries and shows little 
                                                          
6
 This is to distinguish it from the First Demographic Transition (FDT). The FDT refers to the historical 
declines in mortality and fertility that occurred from the eighteenth century onward in several European 
populations. It is commonly assumed to have ended in a balance between births and deaths (Notestein 1945; 
Caldwell 1976). 
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tendency to stabilize (Frejka and Sardon 2004).7 In 2007, Iceland was the 
only country in Europe with a replacement fertility rate (Eurostat 20010).   
To fully understand the changes that have been taking place, it is useful to 
distinguish between the quantum and timing (or tempo) of fertility. The quan-
tum of fertility refers to the number of children people have, while the timing 
of fertility refers to when they have their children. What has happened re-
garding the quantum of fertility is, above all, that women no longer have 
many children. Third- and higher-order births are increasingly uncommon, 
and families with more than four children are on the brink of disappearing 
(Frejka & Sardon 2004; Frejka & Sardon 2007; Frejka 2008; Frejka & 
Sobotka 2008). Childlessness is also on the rise. However, the rise is modest 
compared to the decrease in higher-order births (Kohler et al. 2002; Hakim 
2003; Sobotka 2004; Frejka and Sardon 2004; Frejka & Sardon 2007; Sobot-
ka 2008). In many countries, and especially in countries with the lowest low 
fertility in Eastern and Southern Europe, there has also been a marked de-
crease in second-order births (Kohler et al. 2002; Frejka and Sardon 2004, 
Frejka & Sardon 2007; Sobotka 2008). 
In tandem with the changes in the quantum of fertility there has also, 
since the 1980s, been a radical trend toward later childbearing in Western 
Europe, and this trend shows little sign of stopping (Frejka and Sardon 2004; 
Billari et al. 2007; Frejka & Sobotka 2008). In particular, first births have 
been delayed. The mean age at first birth for women in Spain, for instance, 
rose by 4.1 years from 25 years in 1980 to 29.1 years in 2000 (Kohler et al. 
2006). In 2003, the mean age at first birth was more than 30 years in several 
European countries, among them Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, Ire-
land, and Switzerland (Frejka & Sobotka 2008).8  
Postponement decreases the chances of further births, as fecundity (i.e., 
the biological ability to become pregnant) decreases with age (Billari et al. 
2007). Births cannot be postponed indefinitely due to biological limitations. 
                                                          
7
 Based on a study of cohort fertility rates, Frejka and Sardon (2004) conclude that fertility decline has come to 
a halt only in the U.S. and possibly the Netherlands.  
8
 This increase in the mean age at first birth means that populations decrease and age as fewer generations live 
and work together when the spacing between generations increases. In other words, the postponement of births 
itself aggravates population aging and the shrinking and aging of the labor force (see Lutz & Skirbekk 2005). 
In contrast to the problems generated by below-replacement fertility, however, these problems will stabilize 
when postponement stops, and they will no longer be aggravated. The postponement of first births has contrib-
uted to the low period total fertility rates that countries have experienced during the last decades. The hypo-
thetical measurement of periodic total fertility rates is sensitive to changes in the timing of fertility (Sobotka 
2004). Consequently, demographers have expected period total fertility rates to recuperate somewhat, when 
the postponement stabilizes at a higher age (ibid).  
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Thus, it could be suspected that postponement is one of the factors driving 
fertility decline.  
However, seen from a historical perspective, the mean ages at first birth 
in Europe today are not unusually high. Late marriage and childbearing is 
actually a marked characteristic of the European marriage pattern that has 
dominated in Western Europe from at least the fifteenth century, and it has 
coexisted with high, or even natural, fertility regimes during most of this time 
(Hajnal 1965, 1983; Chesnais 1992; Therborn 2004).9 Rather, it is the low 
mean ages at first birth in the mid-twentieth century that are the historical 
exception. So, even if fecundity falls with age, the postponement of first 
births alone does not explain why completed fertility has fallen.  
What is unique with the present situation is that the high mean ages at 
first birth are combined with an unprecedented level of reproductive control, 
and that women (and men) have chosen to use this ability to control in order 
to reduce fertility.  
The onset of the Second Demographic Transition coincides with the in-
troduction of modern contraceptives, and especially the pill (Hakim 2000; 
2003). Together with other contraceptive novelties and liberalized abortion 
laws, the pill created an environment in which women for the first time in 
history came to have total control of their reproduction (Westhoff & Ryder 
1977; Goldin & Katz 2002; Hakim 2000, 2003).  
Contraceptives had been available even before the onset of the Second 
Demographic Transition, however, and fertility control was widespread and, 
of course, a necessary precondition for the First Demographic Transition to 
happen (Chesnais 1992). Consequently, the modest increase in the choice of 
contraceptive means, and the possible decline in unwanted fertility that fol-
lowed, has not been argued to explain more than a minor part of the decline 
in fertility that has taken place since that time. Instead, explanations of fertili-
ty decline have tended to emphasize broader structural economic and cultural 
factors.  
These contending theoretical perspectives on fertility decline are present-
ed below.  
 
                                                          
9
 “Natural fertility” refers to the fertility of a population that is not practicing any form of birth control (Henry 
1961). 
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The new home economics theory of fertility 
decline  
The new home economics theory of fertility, which has dominated the dis-
cussion in economics in recent decades, assumes families to be run by an 
altruist head, whose utility is dependent on the other family members’ utility. 
It is assumed that the other family members will pool their resources and 
adjust their behavior to maximize the altruist’s utility. In other words, fami-
lies are assumed to function as homogeneous units. Such families’ fertility 
decisions are treated similarly to a consumer’s choice of whether to buy a 
normal consumption good (like a car or a house). To cite Gary Becker, “For 
most parents, children are a source of psychic income or satisfaction, and, in 
the economist’s terminology, children would be considered a consumption 
good” (Becker 1960). The basic assumption of the new home economics 
analysis of fertility, then, is that families choose to have a certain number of 
children if they perceive that that specific number of children will maximize 
the family’s utility. 
To complicate matters, a family must not only decide on how many chil-
dren it should have, but also on the quantity of resources it wants to spend on 
each child – for example, on housing, education, and clothing. Children come 
in different price classes. Given a specified budget, a family could either opt 
for a small number of costly children (quality) or a large number of inexpen-
sive children (quantity). Families must therefore consider what kind of 
tradeoff they want to make between the quantity and quality of children be-
fore opting to have a certain number of children (Becker 1960).  
 Thus, a family’s fertility decisions depend on three factors: i) its prefer-
ence regarding the tradeoff between the quality and quantity of children and 
the relative cost of investing in quantity vs. quality (the more quality matters, 
the fewer children the family can afford, and the more it costs to invest in 
quantity in relation to quality, the fewer children the family can afford to 
have), ii) the family’s budget constraints (i.e., how large a budget, in terms of 
income and wealth, the family has to spend on children and other goods), and 
iii) the price of children relative to other consumer goods the family desires. 
If families choose to have fewer children than they used to have, they thus do 
so either i) because their preference regarding the tradeoff between quality 
and quantity has changed (either because the relative price of quality vs. 
quantity has changed or their preference itself has changed), or ii) that their 
budgets have become smaller, or iii) because children have become relatively 
more costly in relation to other desired goods. Explanations of why fertility 
has fallen during the second half of the twentieth century tend to focus on the 
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third factor – and to some extent on this factor’s influence on families’ pref-
erences regarding the quality-quantity tradeoff.  
To understand the dominant economic explanation of fertility decline it is 
necessary to understand what happens to consumer demand when real in-
come rises. Rising incomes have two effects on consumer demand. First, a 
rise in income has an “income effect” that causes consumers to buy more of 
all normal goods. Second, a rise in income has a “price effect” that increases 
the price of time-consuming activities relative to other goods. Any activity 
requiring our time comes with an “opportunity cost” that reflects what we 
could have done with our time instead of spending it on the activity. The 
normal way to estimate this opportunity cost is to measure it by the wage 
rate; that is, by how much a person would have earned in wages if he/she had 
worked instead of carrying out the activity in question.  
If children are a normal good, and families’ preferences for, and the rela-
tive price of, the quantity-quality tradeoff remain unchanged, the income 
effect should cause families to have more children when their incomes in-
crease, as consumers usually respond by increasing their consumption when 
their incomes increase.10 However, children are more time-intensive than 
most other goods, as children need care and attention; that is, the opportunity 
cost constitutes a higher proportion of the cost of children than it does of the 
costs of most other goods. As a consequence, the cost of children increases 
relative to the costs of less time-consuming goods when the income of a 
family increases (Mincer 1963; Becker 1991). This price effect might out-
weigh the income effect in some situations, even if other goods are poor 
substitutes for children. In other words, families might find themselves in a 
situation in which they see their incomes increase, and as a result deem that 
they would be better off working and earning money that they can spend on 
consumer goods rather than having and caring for a(nother) child (Becker 
1991).  
Rising wages also increase parents’ incentives to invest in the quality of 
children, because rates of return on investments in education and other hu-
man capital increase. A raise in the wage rate, however, does not cause a 
corresponding increase in the incentives to invest in the quantity of children. 
Thus, overall, rising wages increase the relative attractiveness of investments 
in quality in the quality-quantity tradeoff as the price of quality is lowered 
                                                          
10
 It is theoretically possible, and even likely, that the preference for “high-quality” children goes up as wages 
rise, in the same way that people tend to buy more expensive cars instead of buying greater quantities of 
lower-quality cars when they experience an increase in income. In a similar way, it is possible to explain the 
fact that rich people do not have more children than poor people, even though they could afford to (see Becker 
1960).  
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relative to that of quantity (Becker & Lewis 1973; Becker & Tomes 1986; 
Becker 1991). Families might, in other words, be tempted to adjust their 
fertility downwards in order to secure a good education – that is, good future 
earning prospects – for the children they have.     
According to the new home economics analysis of fertility, these two in-
tertwined mechanisms can help explain why fertility has fallen so drastically 
during the late twentieth century. More specifically, it attributes the decline 
in fertility to women’s increased earning opportunities and increasing payoffs 
from education (Becker 1991; Robinson 1997).   
Today, women’s earning opportunities are greater than they were half a 
century ago, both in absolute terms and relative to men’s earning opportuni-
ties (Becker 1991). It has been argued that this increase in women’s earning 
opportunities is the result of the equal opportunities revolution and the 
growth of the service sector and other parts of the labor market that provide 
white-collar occupations suited for women (Galor & Weil 1996; Hakim 
2003). For most of history, child care and household tasks were considered 
the responsibility of women, while paid labor was the responsibility of men. 
During this period women had few opportunities to find well-paid jobs out-
side the home. As a result, women were “free” to care for children at a very 
low opportunity cost, while men were free to earn an income without having 
to care for children (Becker 1991). This gendered division of labor resulted in 
a situation in which families had no incentives, in the form of price effects, to 
abstain from having children. In other words, the income effect dominated 
the price effect.  
The equal opportunities revolution and the growth of the service sector 
changed the situation. Legal and informal barriers to women’s entry into 
higher education and the labor market were abolished. The simultaneous 
growth of the service sector and other parts of the labor market that provide 
white-collar jobs suited for women meant that women could also find jobs 
and thereby take advantage of their newly won rights (Galor & Weil 1996; 
Hakim 2003). In short, women’s earning prospects increased radically.  
According to the new home economics, families responded to this new 
situation by reducing fertility and increasing wives’ educational attainment 
and labor market supply. In other words, “the growth in the earning power of 
women during the last hundred years in developed countries is a major cause 
of both the large increase in labor force participation of married women and 
the large decline in fertility” (Becker 1991, p. 140).  
During the time period in which female earning prospects increased, eco-
nomic development was helping to increase the return on investments in 
education because of increases in the demand for human capital (Galor & 
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Weil 2000). Thus, incentives to invest in the quality of children also in-
creased. In short, this development made the relative cost of investing in the 
quality of children fall in relation to cost of investing in the quantity of chil-
dren. This change in the relative price of quality and quantity is assumed to 
have further aggravated the negative effect of women’s increased earning 
opportunities on fertility (Becker 1991).11 It can also explain why invest-
ments in the quality of children have increased as fertility rates have dropped, 
at least, judging from the increase in educational attainment in cohorts born 
during the period.   
The inverse relationship between women’s income prospects and fertility 
can also explain why highly educated women today have fewer children than 
women with lower levels of education. Jobs that require high qualifications 
tend to be better paid than ordinary jobs. Because of this, highly educated 
women face higher opportunity costs for child-care tasks, in terms of forgone 
earnings and lost career opportunities, than women with low educational 
attainment. Investments in the quality of children relative to investments in 
the quantity of children also pay off better for families with high educational 
attainment (Becker & Tomes 1976).        
It is difficult to measure women’s earning opportunities directly. Eco-
nomic analyses of empirical fertility patterns have therefore tended to use 
female educational attainment and female labor force participation as indica-
tors of female earning potentials and the resulting opportunity costs of having 
children. The overall opportunity structure is assumed to be captured by the 
macro patterns of both variables, while the individual opportunity structure is 
assumed to be captured by educational attainment at the micro (individual) 
level. Given these operationalizations and the hypotheses presented above, 
the new home economics analysis expects that there should exist a negative 
association between female earning prospects and fertility at both the micro 
and macro levels, which should manifest itself in 
• a negative correlation between female labor force participation 
and fertility at both the micro and macro levels, and 
                                                          
11
 Whether it is really necessary to assume that the price of quality decreased relative to the price of quantity to 
explain why fertility fell so drastically during this period is a question open to debate. The answer depends, in 
part, on whether children are perceived as goods with or without close substitutes. If, contrary to Becker, one 
assumes that the demand for children can be replaced by the satisfaction of demands for other goods, it seems 
unnecessary to assume that the price of quality has fallen in relation to the price of quantity. The rise in 
women’s earning opportunities could then explain the decrease in fertility by itself, as the increase in earning 
opportunities makes children costlier in relation to other goods. Even if one assumes that the satisfaction of 
demands for other goods constitutes an inferior substitute for the satisfaction of the demand for children, a rise 
in female wages still seems able to explain why fertility has fallen (e.g., see Robinson 1997) – although not 
why investments in the quality of children have increased. I will, consequently, focus on the price-of-time 
explanation in my further discussion.  
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• a negative correlation between female educational attainment 
and fertility at both the micro and macro levels. 
 
Female labor force participation and fertility 
The assumption that fertility rates should correlate negatively with female 
labor force participation rates is consistent with macro-level time-series data 
since the 1960s, but not with recent cross-country data (Kögel 2006). The 
inconsistency between the cross-country data and the expected negative cor-
relation between the female labor force participation rate and the total fertili-
ty rate, however, is new. Up to the mid-1980s the cross-country correlation 
coefficient between the two indicators was negative (Ahn & Mira 2002; 
Rindfuss et al. 2003). But sometime after 1985 the sign of the coefficient 
turned positive and has remained so ever since (Esping-Andersen 1999; 
Brewster & Rindfuss 2000; Ahn & Mira 2002; Rindfuss et al. 2003; Del 
Boca et al. 2003, Castles 2003).  
This unexpected change in the cross-country correlation challenges the 
expectation of an inverse relationship between the female labor force partici-
pation rate and the fertility rate. Kögel (2004; 2006), however, shows that the 
female labor force participation rate has a negative and significant effect on 
fertility if country dummies that allow for cross-country heterogeneity in the 
magnitude of the association as well as country-specific effects on fertility 
are introduced in pooled series and cross-country data regressions (for similar 
findings, see Engelhardt et al. 2004). More specifically, Kögel finds that the 
effect varies among three groups of countries. The negative effect is largest 
in Mediterranean countries and smallest in Scandinavia, while it is intermedi-
ate in scope in all other OECD countries. Although Kögel’s findings confirm 
the existence of a negative association between the female labor force partic-
ipation rate and the total fertility rate, his study points to a weakening of the 
association over time. Kögel concludes that this heterogeneity in the effect of 
the female labor force participation rate on fertility together with country-
specific effects on fertility can very likely explain why the cross-country 
association changed its sign in the mid-1980s. Female labor force participa-
tion rates have always been relatively low in Mediterranean countries, while 
they have been relatively high in Scandinavian countries. When female labor 
force participation increased in both regions during the 1970s and 1980s, the 
impact of the larger effect of female labor force participation on fertility in 
Mediterranean countries caused the total fertility rate to drop more rapidly in 
those countries, until it dropped below the total fertility rates of Scandinavian 
countries. As a result, the cross-country correlation between the female labor 
force participation rate and the total fertility rate changed its sign. In sum, the 
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findings on the association between the female labor force participation rate 
and the total fertility rate on the macro level thus indicate that the negative 
association varies both over time and across countries. 
Studies focusing on the effect of female labor market participation on fer-
tility at the micro level generally suggest a negative correlation between the 
two variables, but there are exceptions to this rule (Matysiak & Vignoli 
2008). Several individual studies report insignificant, or even positive, effects 
of labor force participation on the progression to births of different parities 
for specific countries (e.g., see Santow & Bracher 2001; Vikat 2004). In an 
attempt to reconcile and evaluate the contradictory findings, Matysiak & 
Vignoli (2008) carry out a meta-analysis of 30 articles on the effect of labor 
force participation on fertility, and 29 articles on the effect of fertility on 
labor force participation. Their findings suggest that there is a high variation 
in the analyzed effects across Esping-Andersen’s typology of welfare re-
gimes, which distinguishes between social democratic, liberal, conservative, 
and familialistic welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999). More spe-
cifically, their study suggests that the effect of women’s labor force participa-
tion strongly prolongs the progression to births of different parities in famili-
alistic, liberal, and conservative welfare regimes, while the effect is not as 
accentuated in social democratic welfare regimes (Matysiak & Vignoli 2008). 
Moreover, their multivariate findings regarding the effect of childbearing on 
labor force participation suggest that children have the strongest negative 
effect on maternal employment in conservative welfare regimes. The weakest 
effect is found in social democratic regimes, while the effect is of moderate 
strength in liberal welfare regimes.12 The effect of labor force participation 
on fertility and the effect of motherhood on labor force participation, thus, 
mirror each other. These micro-level findings reinforce the impression of 
Kögel’s macro-level findings; for some reason, the association between labor 
force participation and fertility among OECD countries is most negative in 
the familialistic Mediterranean welfare regimes and least negative in the 
social democratic countries in Scandinavia, while other countries and welfare 
regimes are found somewhere in between these two extremes.  
 
Education and fertility 
Several studies focusing on the European context have found that women 
with tertiary educations have the same (Van Peer 2002), or even higher, ideal 
family sizes as women with lower educational attainment (Testa & Grilli 
                                                          
12
 This part of their study does not cover other types of welfare regimes, due to the lack of studies on such 
regimes.  
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2006; Testa & Toulemon 2006; Heiland et al. 2005). Despite this, the as-
sumption of a negative correlation between women’s educational attainment 
and fertility is generally supported by micro-level studies on OECD coun-
tries. Women with tertiary educations have fewer children than women with 
low educational attainment in Western Europe (Lutz & Goujon 2001). Stud-
ies on the effect of women’s educational attainment on completed fertility for 
cohorts born between approximately 1930 and 1950 reveal that this pattern is 
stable over time and across such diverse countries as Sweden, Norway, West 
Germany, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and Denmark (Björklund 2006; 
Kravdal 2004).  
Educational attainment has also been shown to delay the transition to both 
the first birth (Gustafsson et al. 2002; Kravdal 2004; Billari & Philipov 2004) 
and higher-order births (Kohler et al. 2002; Kreyenfeld 2002). However, 
educational attainment has also been shown to shorten the spacing between 
births of higher parities in Norway (Kravdal 2004; see also Kravdal & Rind-
fuss 2008). In sum, the new home economics analysis of fertility seems to fit 
well with the empirical evidence on the association between educational 
attainment and fertility.13  
                                                          
13
 Many studies, however, emphasize that educational enrollment (i.e., being a student) matters more than 
educational attainment for fertility outcomes and fertility timing. That is, the time women spend enrolled in 
education programs is more important than the diploma women receive (and the skills they will have acquired) 
after completing their training (Blossfeld & Huinink 1991; Billari & Philipov 2004; Skirbekk et al. 2004). The 
overwhelming majority of women wait until they have finished their educations before they have their first 
child (Hobson & Kiernan 1995; Billari & Philipov 2004; Björklund 2006). Many of the findings relating to the 
effect of educational enrollment on fertility come from sociological research and expectations (Billari & 
Philipov 2004). The finding that educational enrollment matters for fertility outcomes, however, does not in 
itself contradict economic theory. Seen as human capital accumulation, an education is more effective if it is 
completed uninterrupted. By making educational investments early in life, individuals ensure that the return 
will be received for as many years as possible. This logic predicts that the likelihood of individuals opting for 
additional educational investments decreases as they age (Light 1995). Students who interrupt their educations 
to have children could thus be expected to decrease their investment in both human capital and wage labor. 
Evidence that an interrupted education is actually costly both in terms of human capital accumulation and 
future wages in this way is provided by Blackburn et al. (1993). Moreover, the value of an education tends to 
deteriorate over time, because educations become outdated. The return on educational investments is therefore 
greater for uninterrupted educations. In other words, it often makes economic sense to complete one’s educa-
tion before having children. The finding that educational enrollment has a negative effect on fertility is thus 
compatible with economic predictions. In addition to the findings reported above, there is a growing literature 
on the effect of different educational fields on fertility (Hoem 1994; Kalmijn 1996; Lappegård & Rønsen 
2005; Hoem et al. 2006a, 2006b). The main finding of these studies is that the effect of educational attainment 
on fertility varies significantly between educational fields. However, without more detailed analyses of the 
conditions experienced by various educational groups, it is hard to link these findings directly to economic 
assumptions regarding the association between fertility and education. Differences could reflect different 
earning prospects and sensitivity to career interruptions (i.e., economic incentives) as well as sociological 
factors.   
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Billari and Philipov (2004), however, show that the strength of the asso-
ciation between educational attainment and the time of a first birth varies 
between countries in Western Europe. In the Nordic social democratic wel-
fare regimes of Finland, Norway, and Sweden, between 30 and 40 percent of 
women conceive before the end of their education, while the corresponding 
figures in other countries are well below half of those in the Nordic states.  
 
The female and male wages and fertility 
Studies that use the female and male wages for testing the economic analysis 
of fertility show that the female wage has a negative effect and the male wage 
a positive, or no, effect on fertility (e.g., see Butz & Ward 1979; Heckman & 
Walker 1990; Macunovich 1996; Merrigan & St. Pierre 1998).14 In most 
studies, the negative effect of women’s wages is found to be greater than the 
positive effect of men’s wages (Butz & Ward 1979; Heckman & Walker 
1990; Macunovich 1996; Merrigan & St. Pierre 1998). Consequently, an 
increase in the female wage rate is not compensated for by a corresponding 
increase in the male wage rate. Some recent studies, however, have reported a 
positive effect of female earnings on fertility in Sweden (Andersson 2000), 
and other studies report a declining negative effect of the female wage on 
fertility over time in the U.S. (Macunovich 1996). However, it is not apparent 
from the abovementioned studies whether the effect of the female wage on 
fertility varies across time and countries in a systematic pattern.15  
 
                                                          
14
 Fertility has also been shown to exert a negative effect on the female wage in cross-country studies (Po-
lachek & Xiang 2009). 
15
 What can be said, however, is that the relative female wage – defined as the ratio of employed women’s 
wages to employed men’s wages – cannot explain fertility differentials and differences in female labor force 
participation across Europe. Although the gender wage gap is lowest in Nordic countries, it does not vary 
much between Mediterranean countries and Central and Western European countries. Thus, the female wage 
gap does not correlate well with fertility patterns. Moreover, the gender wage gap does not correlate as ex-
pected with the FLFP (Kögel 2006). Most striking is that the gender wage gap is not unusually large in the 
Mediterranean countries, even though they have the lowest FLFP. This counterintuitive result is most likely 
due to non-random selection into paid labor, as the gender wage gap is negatively correlated with gender 
employment gaps (Olivetti & Petrongolo 2008). That is, women who choose to work in countries with low 
female labor force participation overwhelmingly tend to be highly educated and have high earning potentials, 
while the spectrum of women who choose to work in countries with high labor force participation rates is 
greater (ibid.). Whether these findings should be taken as evidence that the relative female wage is not a good 
measurement of female earning opportunities, or that economic theories have the relationship between the 
female wage and fertility and female labor force participation wrong, is an open question.  
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Cultural explanations of fertility decline  
There are various cultural explanations of fertility decline. A survey that 
covers all of them, and their different aspects, is beyond the scope of this 
study. In the following chapter I will describe the most important features of 
the main cultural explanations of fertility decline. More specifically, my 
focus will be on the theory of the Second Demographic Transition (hence-
forth, SDT) and theories on how religious decline has decreased fertility. I 
will start with a brief description of what it is that separates cultural explana-
tions of fertility decline from the new home economics analysis of fertility 
decline.   
The two basic tenets of cultural theories of fertility behavior are that i) 
explanations of fertility behavior must include explicit references to tastes, 
preferences, values, and/or norms and their content, and that ii) individuals 
vary in respect to which tastes, preferences, values, and norms they endorse. 
Whether the heterogeneity also results in a corresponding heterogeneity in 
fertility patterns depends on the opportunity structure. A change in fertility 
behavior does not need to be driven by value change, but could as well reflect 
“an effort to maintain existing values under changing conditions” (Casterline 
1999, p. 362). The SDT explanation of fertility decline even sees changes in 
the opportunity structure as necessary for cultural value change to be possi-
ble.16  
Thus, cultural explanations of fertility decline do not necessarily contra-
dict or refute the economic explanation, but are to some extent compatible 
with it. What really separates the former explanations from the latter is the 
assumption that the new incentives that were created by the equal opportuni-
ties revolution on their own cannot explain the demographic changes that 
have followed in its wake. Without an underlying willingness to exploit the 
new incentives, everything would have gone on as before. Often this argu-
ment is augmented by pointing out that the willingness to adopt the new 
                                                          
16
 This stance is summed up in the “Ready, Willing, and Able” (RWA) model of innovation and diffusion  
founded by A. J. Cole. According to proponents of SDT, for a demographic transition (to a new pattern of 
behavior) to occur, three conditions have to be fulfilled. First, the benefits of the new behavior must outweigh 
its costs, that is, there must be an economic readiness to adopt the behavior in question. Second, the new 
behavior must be culturally and ethically acceptable; people must be willing to embrace it. Third, people must 
be technologically and legally able to implement the new behavior. Birth control and abortion, for example, 
presuppose the existence of reliable contraceptive means and liberal abortion laws. Despite this broad ap-
proach, the SDT theory has mainly distinguished itself by emphasizing ideational change as the most interest-
ing aspect of the SDT, while taking economic and technological change as less interesting givens. 
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demographic behavior varies among groups with different ideational charac-
teristics. 
How value change affects agents’ fertility behavior, and how values inter-
act with changes in opportunity structures in shaping fertility outcomes, of 
course depends on the content of the tastes, preferences, values, and norms in 
question. If we disregard norms, we can roughly divide the preferences and 
values discussed in the literature into three main categories: i) preferences 
and values relating to family size and fertility control, ii) preferences and 
values affecting the demand for children relative to other consumption goods, 
and iii) preferences and values affecting union stability.17  
The first focus has been on preferences for family size and how they vary, 
and have varied, among groups with different ideational characteristics. The 
assumption is that individuals with certain ideational characteristics have a 
stronger preference for large families – that is, a stronger demand for a great-
er quantity of children – than individuals who lack the characteristics in ques-
tion. The focus on family size preferences has traditionally been a hallmark 
of studies concerned with religion and fertility (e.g., see Lehrer 1996; Adserà 
2006a, Adserà 2006b; Hayford & Morgan 2008), as religious teachings often 
request the faithful to “go forth and multiply.” In line with this, several re-
searchers and others have argued that a major reason for fertility decline in 
the developed world has been the drop in both the number of people who 
practice religion and the decline in the religious fervor among those remain-
ing (Buchanan 2002; Longman 2004; Norris & Inglehart 2004; Carlson 2005; 
Adserà 2006b; Westhoff & Frejka 2007, 2008). Religious adherence, the 
fervor of religiousness, and religious conservativeness have also been shown 
to be positively associated with achieved, as well as intended and ideal, fertil-
ity (Marcum 1981, 1988; Mosher & Hendershot 1984; Roof & McKinney 
1987; Williams & Zimmer 1990; Mosher et al. 1992; Lehrer 1996; Hout et al. 
2001; Westhoff & Frejka 2007, 2008; Heineck 2005; Newman & Hugo 2006; 
Goujon et al. 2007; Pearce & Davis 2006; Adserà 2006a, 2006b; Hayford & 
Morgan 2008). The decline in religiousness that has taken place in the devel-
oped world during the twentieth century is also closely associated with the 
drop in the fertility rate (Norris & Inglehart 2004). The decline-of-
religiousness argument is often augmented by emphasizing that religious 
teachings also raise the costs of fertility control (i.e., abortion and contracep-
tive use).18 Research also shows that members of denominations that take a 
conservative stance on abortion and contraceptives tend to have more chil-
                                                          
17
 This description of the literature is my own.  
18
 The relationship between religiousness and fertility has also been argued to involve other aspects, for 
example, preferences relating to relationship stability.  
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dren than adherents of more liberal denominations (Westhoff & Bumpass 
1973; Westhoff & Jones 1977, 1979; Mosher & Hendershot 1986; Gold-
scheider & Mosher 1991; Sander 1995).   
Although studies on the link between religiousness and fertility have also 
concerned themselves with how value change has affected union stability and 
the demand for children relative to other consumer goods, most of the re-
search in this area has been carried out within the framework of SDT theo-
ry.19 The theory of the Second Demographic Transition (van de Kaa 1987, 
1994, 2001, 2002, 2004; Lesthaeghe 1995; Lesthaeghe & Moors 2000, 2002; 
Lesthaeghe & Neels 2002; Lesthaeghe & Surkyn 2002; Surkyn & Lesthaghe 
2004; Lesthaeghe & Neidert 2006) sees fertility decline as one of the results 
of an “overwhelming preoccupation with self-fulfillment, personal freedom 
of choice, personal development and lifestyle, and emancipation, as reflected 
in family formation, attitudes towards fertility regulation and the motivation 
of parenthood” (van de Kaa 1996, p. 425). More specifically, it is argued that 
this value shift has resulted in three trends in household formation:20 
• A fall in the proportion of the population that is married 
• A rise in cohabitation  
• A rise in divorce 
 
These trends are followed by three fundamental changes in fertility behavior:      
• A decline in fertility, primarily caused by postponement and an in-
creasing mean age at first birth 
• A rise in definitive childlessness in unions 
• A rise in extra-marital fertility corresponding to both an increase in 
the likelihood of parenthood within cohabitation and an increase in 
the level of cohabitation  
 
Together, these trends are assumed to have resulted in a shift toward below-
replacement fertility (van de Kaa 2002; Lesthaeghe & Neidert 2006).  
                                                          
19
 The theory was launched in 1986 by Ron Lesthaeghe and Dirk J. van de Kaa., who give Phillipe Ariès 
(1980) credit for the inspiration to their theory. 
20
 Although the main causal flow is assumed to go from value orientations to household and fertility character-
istics, it should be pointed out that SDT theory assumes that the relationship is reciprocal; that is, household 
and fertility characteristics are also assumed to affect value orientations. This reciprocal relationship between 
value orientations and household and fertility characteristics is explained through selection and adaptation 
processes. People with post-materialist, secular, and emancipatory value orientations are assumed to select 
themselves into unconventional types of households, while persons living in unconventional households are 
assumed to adopt post-materialist, secular, and emancipatory value orientations that rationalize their living 
conditions. In other words, the SDT process includes feedback mechanisms that enforce small initial differ-
ences in value orientations to become large in the end. 
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In my view, it is possible to interpret the changes in value orientations 
and household formation that constitute the SDT in (at least) two ways that 
make them intelligible from an economic perspective. First, it is possible to 
interpret the growing occupation with self-fulfillment and personal freedom, 
and the resulting decline in fertility, as an indication that children have be-
come more substitutable by other goods, or have even come to be regarded as 
inferior goods (at least for some women). According to SDT theorists, “hav-
ing children is no longer considered a precondition to achieving happiness,” 
and childbearing today is more “a result of a carefully planned decision of a 
couple, who may consider various potential positive and negative effects of 
parenthood on their relationship, lifestyle and economic wellbeing” (Sobotka 
2008). In short, proponents of the SDT seem to suggest that children have 
become more substitutable with other goods, with lower fertility as the result.  
Second, it is also possible to interpret the drop in fertility that characteriz-
es the SDT as a rational response to the decrease in union stability that has 
followed in its wake. As described above, the SDT is characterized by a drop 
in the proportion of the population that is married, a rise in the proportion 
cohabiting, and a rise in divorce among those few who still marry (i.e., a 
decrease in union stability). With decreasing union stability, individuals are 
likely to be uncertain about whether they will spend their futures with their 
families or on their own. Under such circumstances, it is unrealistic to as-
sume, as the economic analysis of fertility does, that people will continue to 
equate their own well-being with that of their families. It is more realistic to 
assume that individuals adapt to this new situation by changing their behavior 
from acting altruistically toward their spouses to focusing more on their own 
well-being.  
Such a reorientation toward individualized household decisions is likely 
to lead to a decrease in joint investments in family projects – such as chil-
dren. This follows from the simple assumption that would-be parents are 
interested in full returns on their investments – such as children. If they deem 
that they risk losing a part of the payoff from their investments (i.e., the time 
they can spend with their children) to their spouse, because there is a signifi-
cant risk that their union will end in a divorce, they will be less willing to 
invest in children. Decreasing union stability also increases the costs of re-
production as investments in household production are costlier from an indi-
vidual perspective than from a family perspective. From a family perspective, 
the loss of future earning prospects that results from a parent staying at home 
to care for the family’s children can, to some extent be compensated for by 
the fact that the spouse who is not at home increases his/her labor market 
input. However, such compensation strategies are only effective as long as 
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the working spouse altruistically shares his/her income with the non-working 
spouse. Individuals will therefore be less willing to invest time in rearing and 
caring for potential children if they know that there is a significant risk that 
their spouses will default on their marriage contract and stop sharing their 
earnings with them. Thus, decreasing union stability both raises the expected 
monetary costs and lowers the expected emotional benefits of children, with 
low fertility as the result. (For a more detailed discussion of union instabil-
ity’s negative effect on fertility, see Chapter 4.)  
It has not been possible to test the SDT theory directly due to a scarcity of 
longitudinal data. However, ample research has been carried out on European 
cross-sectional data using a “footprints” model. This model is supposed to 
identify footprints in cross-sectional data of the selection and adaptation 
processes assumed to be associated with the SDT. In practice, researchers 
have investigated whether individuals who have chosen unconventional liv-
ing arrangements are more post-materialist and postmodern in their value 
orientations than individuals who have chosen more conventional living 
arrangements.  
The upshot of the findings (Lesthaeghe & Moors 2000, 2002; Lesthaeghe 
& Surkyn 2002; Surkyn & Lesthaeghe 2004) is that individuals whose living 
arrangements are unconventional clearly express more post-materialist and 
postmodern value orientations than individuals whose living arrangements 
are more conventional. Individuals who are single or who cohabit with a 
partner (especially those without children) constitute the most post-
materialist and postmodern groups in most countries. Individuals who cohab-
it and have children tend to be somewhat more traditional, but less so than 
men and women who are married and have no children. The most conserva-
tive group in all countries is composed of those who have children and who 
are married and who have not cohabited with a partner prior to their mar-
riage. Married men and women who have children and who have cohabited 
prior to their marriage are somewhat less traditional – with value levels on 
par with those of childless married men and women. In most states, people 
who have divorced also hold less traditional values than married men and 
women.  
Hence, childlessness seems to be a phenomenon that is universally asso-
ciated with a more unconventional outlook on the world. Also, post-
materialist and postmodern-oriented women have fewer children, and later in 
life, than their more conservative sisters in most countries in Europe (van de 
Kaa 2001). However, post-materialist and postmodern women do not seem to 
want to have fewer children than their more conservative counterparts do 
(ibid.).  
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In addition to the broader studies referred to above there are also numer-
ous studies on how more specific values, which can be related to the value 
orientations that the SDT theory concerns itself with, affect fertility. These 
studies largely confirm the assumption of a negative association between 
modern value orientations, such as a focus on career, consumption, and gen-
der equality, and intended and achieved fertility – especially where women 
are concerned (Thornton et al. 1983; Morgan & Waite 1987; Goldscheider & 
Waite 1991; Kaufman 2005; Cunningham et al. 2005; Barber & Axinn 2005; 
Pearce & Davis 2006; Frejka & Westhoff 2008; however, see Thomson 2002; 
Torr & Short 2004; and Jansen & Liefbroer 2006 for divergent conclu-
sions).21 Overall, the SDT theory, thus, gains support at the micro level.  
Findings at the macro level give an impression similar to those for eco-
nomic theories. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the cross-country correla-
tion between selected behavioral indicators of the SDT, such as the total 
divorce rate, the proportion of extramarital births and the first-marriage rate, 
and the period total fertility rate was negative (Castles 2003; Billari & Kohler 
2004). However, the cross-country correlation turned positive for Western 
Europe at least as early as 1990, and has continued to be so ever since (ibid.; 
Sobotka 2008). Research on the correlation between value orientations and 
fertility reveals that the cross-country correlation between post-materialist 
value orientations and fertility is also positive today. Thus, the world of the 
SDT was also turned upside down in the 1980s and 1990s.22  
 
Reversed correlations: Proof that fertility 
decline is not inevitable?  
The economic and the cultural explanations of fertility decline seem to give 
the impression that fertility decline and below-replacement fertility are the 
inevitable consequences of economic and cultural modernization. This view 
was largely given support by the empirical evidence well into the 1980s. 
                                                          
21
 It should be pointed out that many of the divergent conclusions mentioned, which might seem of considera-
ble importance, tend to include in their studies controls for the perceived costs and benefits of parenthood, 
fertility intentions, and attitudes toward parenthood. That is, they include factors that might be influenced by 
gender-egalitarian attitudes and attitudes toward career and consumption goods. Thus, they do not necessarily 
contradict those studies that find a direct negative influence of the latter factors on fertility.  
22
 This turn of events can to some extent be explained by the fact that women in countries that were forerun-
ners of the SDT who postponed having children started to recuperate some of their births in the 1990s, at the 
same time as women in SDT-lagging countries started to postpone having children as they entered the first 
stages of the SDT. But even if such postponement effects are taken into account, the correlation between SDT 
indicators and the total fertility rate today remains positive (Sobotka 2008).  
BEDROOM POLITICS 
 
 42
However, in the late 1980s and the early 1990s the developed world was 
turned upside down. According to cross-country data, from then on, the fertil-
ity rate has been positively associated with the female labor force participa-
tion rate, the divorce rate, the cohabitation rate, and the prevalence of post-
modern and post-materialist value orientations (Castles 2003 – see also 
Myrskylä, Kohler & Billari 2009).  
Moreover, surveys in countries with below-replacement fertility show 
that fertility intentions have not fallen as dramatically as fertility rates, but 
continue to linger above the replacement rate in the overwhelming majority 
of countries (van de Kaa 2001). Thus, fertility rates do not seem to have 
dropped because young people want to have fewer children than they used to 
want, but because they do not realize their fertility intentions to the same 
degree as in the past (ibid.). Moreover, people have fewer children than in-
tended only in some countries. In Norway, Sweden, Iceland, and France, 
women actually achieve, or come close to achieving, their fertility intentions. 
Fertility outcomes, thus, vary considerably more than fertility intentions (van 
Peer 2002). In short, the negative effect on fertility of economic and cultural 
changes seems to vary considerably between countries. 
This fact has been taken as evidence that fertility decline is not inevitable, 
but that the negative effects of cultural and, especially, economic moderniza-
tion on fertility can be cushioned by institutions that reduce the incompatibil-
ity between having children and leading a modern life. Most of these at-
tempts to explain the reversal of the correlation between the aspects of mo-
dernity and the fertility rate have focused on the role of family policies. More 
specifically, they argue that generous family policies can reduce the oppor-
tunity costs of having children and thereby reduce the negative effect of 
women’s increasing earning opportunities on fertility. As long as only some 
countries implement such generous family policies and the countries that do 
so are the ones in which women’s earning opportunities are greatest, it is 
possible to end up with a situation in which the female labor force participa-
tion rate becomes positively associated with the fertility rate. Many research-
ers argue that this is what has happened in the developed world in recent 
decades. In the next chapter I present this argument in more detail and dis-
cuss whether it really can explain the empirical findings on the association 
between the generosity of family policies and fertility.  
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3 
Family policies and fertility: 
Theory and evidence 
 
In this chapter I present the new home economics analysis of the relationship 
between policies and fertility and scrutinize the empirical research on the 
effect of family policies on fertility. The upshot of the chapter is that there 
are both theoretical and empirical reasons for assuming generous family 
policies to have a positive effect on fertility. However, in its present form, the 
new home economics analysis of the relationship between policies and fertili-
ty cannot satisfactorily explain the relative effectiveness of family policies at 
raising fertility. Neither can it explain why it has been more difficult to prove 
the relative effectiveness of dual-earner family policies at raising fertility 
using individual-level fertility data, whereas it has been easier to do so using 
aggregated fertility data.  
 
Theoretical assumptions  
The new home economics analysis of fertility, which “is at the core of the 
assumed relationship between policies and demographic behavior” (Gauthier 
2007), is generally positive about family and labor market policies’ ability to 
raise fertility. This optimism has led to a fast-expanding empirical literature 
on the topic.23 In recent years, much of this research has come to focus on 
policies that reduce the negative effect that women’s increasing earning op-
portunities have supposedly had on fertility.   
                                                          
23
 Here, I only focus on the literature on how policies can be thought to (and how they can actually) affect 
fertility among adults in the developed world. This means that I both neglect the vast literature on how policies 
affect teenage fertility in the U.S. and U.K. and the huge literature on how effective policies have been at 
lowering fertility in the developed world.   
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The new home economics analysis of the relationship between policies 
and fertility builds on an extension of the more general economic analysis of 
fertility. Families are assumed to be made up of internally altruistic consum-
ers who strive to maximize their expected utility when making fertility deci-
sions. From the fact that children are perceived as being comparable to nor-
mal consumer goods, it follows that any reduction in the cost of having chil-
dren and any increase in family income that is not related to the value of 
parents’ time (i.e., women’s earning opportunities) is expected to increase the 
demand for children (Becker 1991; Cigno 1991). Policies that reduce the 
costs of having children, or increase family income, thus, could be expected 
to increase the demand for children. 
An increase in the demand for children, however, does not necessarily 
translate into an increase in fertility – that is, an increase in investments in the 
quantity (number) of children. With the exception of the decision on whether 
or not to have a first child, it could as well translate into an increase in spend-
ing on existing children – that is, investments in the quality of children 
(Becker & Lewis 1973). Thus, policies that reduce the costs of children, or 
that raise family income, cannot automatically be assumed to increase fertili-
ty.  
However, there are several reasons for assuming such policies to have a 
positive impact on the quantum of fertility. First, parents can only invest in 
the quality of existing children. Policies that reduce the costs of children can 
therefore be assumed to have a positive impact at least on the demand for a 
first child. Second, by introducing free public schooling, most developed 
countries have made investments in children’s education virtually costless for 
families. Giving their children a good education is likely the most important 
investment that parents can make toward raising the quality of their chil-
dren.24 The introduction of free public schooling, therefore, is likely to have 
satisfied parents’ demand for investing in the quality of children. Because of 
this, policies that further reduce the costs of children are likely to have a 
mainly positive effect on the demand for the quantum of fertility.  
Although, as pointed out above, policies could theoretically raise fertility 
both by increasing families’ incomes and by reducing the costs of reproduc-
tion, research on how specific policies affect fertility has focused mainly on 
the latter kind of policies. The main reason for this focus is the increase in 
women’s earning opportunities, which are assumed to explain why fertility 
has dropped so drastically in recent years. For natural reasons, this explana-
                                                          
24
 This is especially true if we follow Becker’s (1991) suggestion that parents tend to invest in their children’s 
educations because they have an interest in their children’s utility and they expect educational investments to 
earn high interest rates for their children.  
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tion highlights the importance of the costs of reproduction, as it ascribes the 
drop in fertility to the rise in the costs of reproduction that has followed from 
the rise in women’s earning opportunities.  
So how can policies reduce the costs associated with having children? 
Economists tend to separate the costs of children into three components, of 
which two are related to the female wage (Walker 1995; Björklund 2006). 
The first component, which is not directly related to the female wage, is the 
direct costs associated with raising children, such as costs for clothing, food, 
education, and so on. These direct costs can either be reduced by state subsi-
dies for the commodities in question (e.g., as publicly financed education and 
food stamps), or by more general policies that increase the budgets of fami-
lies with children, such as child benefits and tax cuts. As noted above, such 
policies reduce the cost and the need to invest in the quality of children.25 
However, they do not reduce the rising opportunity cost of women’s time, 
which is assumed to have caused the fertility decline in the developed 
world.26  
The first of the two cost components that are directly related to the female 
wage is the forgone earnings of the parent who must withdraw from the labor 
market to care for the family’s children. The second is the loss of human 
capital accumulation, and the resulting loss of future earning potential, that 
the caring parent experiences when he/she interrupts her career to care for the 
family’s children. Even if these costs are intimately related to each other, it is 
useful to separate them in order to understand how they can be reduced by 
means of policies.  
The loss of forgone earnings can be reduced by parental leave benefits, 
joint taxation, and subsidized child care. Parental leave benefits directly re-
place (all or parts of) the wages parents lose when they leave the labor market 
to care for their children, while joint taxation indirectly lowers the cost of 
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 This is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that publicly financed education systems considerably lower the 
amount of money parents need to invest in order to assure their children a good education and, thus, virtually 
make educational investments in children a non-issue for parents. In publicly financed education systems, all 
children compete on equal terms. 
26
 This is a truth that needs modification. Although these policies are intended only to meet the direct costs of 
having children, they can also indirectly work to reduce the negative impact of women’s earning opportunities 
on fertility in those cases in which they increase a family’s budget and they overcompensate for the actual 
direct costs of having a child. In such a situation the overcompensation would, in effect, work as a recompense 
for the loss of forgone earnings caused by the increase in women’s earning opportunities. The effect of policies 
aimed at covering the direct costs of having children is not, however, dependent on women’s earning opportu-
nities, but is assumed to work to raise fertility even in contexts in which women do not have good earning 
opportunities. But even this is a truth that needs modification as, for example, subsidies for public schooling 
mean not only that parents do not need to spend money on their children’s education, but also that their 
children are looked after by the state, with no cost to the parents.  
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parental care by reducing the tax rate of the working spouse. Although they 
are differently structured, these policies make it affordable for families to let 
one parent stay at home and care for the family’s children. As a consequence, 
they reduce both the cost of investments in the quantity and quality of chil-
dren, as parental care is a prime example of an activity that raises the quality 
of children (Becker & Lewis 1973; Gornick & Meyers 2003, 2008).  
Subsidized child care indirectly reduces the loss of forgone earnings re-
sulting from parental care, by reducing the time parents need to spend caring 
for their children. It does so by paying professional care workers to take care 
of the family’s children, so that the parents are free to work. Although the 
rationale is the total opposite of the one that motivates the provision of paid 
parental leaves and joint taxation, it does not necessarily aim, or work, to 
reduce the quality of the family’s children. Well-educated professional child-
care workers can provide high-quality child care, even if such care is not a 
perfect substitute for parental care during a child’s infancy (Gornick & Mey-
ers 2003, 2008).  
The availability of part-time jobs has also been argued to reduce the costs 
of forgone earnings resulting from parental care (Castles 2003; Adserà 2004, 
2005; d’Addio & d’Ercole 2005a, 200b). Part-time jobs offer parents the 
opportunity to take time away from their jobs to care for their children, with-
out entirely giving up their careers. Part-time jobs, however, do not compen-
sate parents for the time they take away from their jobs to care for their chil-
dren.  
The loss of human capital accumulation and the consequent loss of future 
earning opportunities that such a loss incurs cannot be met by joint taxation 
and paid parental leaves. Job-related skills and job experience are time-
sensitive investments, in that they deteriorate over time. The only way to 
prevent their value from decreasing is to keep them up to date by working 
and studying. Consequently, subsidized child care and the provision of part-
time jobs are the only child-related policies that are effective at reducing the 
losses of human capital accumulation resulting from parental care. This is 
because they are the only policies that reduce the time that parents need to 
spend caring for their children. Of these policies, only subsidized child care 
can reduce the entire amount of time parents need to spend caring for their 
children. Subsequently, only subsidized child care can be expected to be truly 
effective in helping parents minimize the loss of human capital accumulation 
resulting from parental care.  
The new home economics analysis of the relationship between policies 
and fertility does not distinguish between, or concern itself with, how policies 
affect the distribution of individual costs within the family. Spouses are as-
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sumed to act altruistically toward each other and are not assumed to care 
about who within the family receives the compensation. It is, accordingly, 
fully in line with the economic analysis to expect that paid parental leaves 
and joint taxation, so long as they are of equal compensation, will have simi-
lar effects on fertility, even though the former policy distributes the compen-
sation for forgone earnings more evenly between the spouses. In parallel, the 
new home economics analysis assumes that families will respond to policy 
incentives by dividing responsibilities for work and child care between fami-
ly members in the way that most benefits the family as a whole. For example, 
it is assumed that a family will respond to parental leave incentives by letting 
the parent with the lower wage use the parental leave option, while the high-
er-earning spouse continues to work. The reason is that such a division of 
labor minimizes the family’s loss of human capital accumulation, and thus, 
the family’s future income.27 The fact that such a division of labor compels 
the lower-earning spouse to bear the brunt of the costs of the family’s chil-
dren, and that a more equitable division of labor would have resulted in a 
more equitable distribution of the loss of human capital accumulation, is not 
assumed to affect how the family and its individual members respond to the 
different policies. 
To sum up, the new home economics analysis of the relationship between 
policies and fertility assumes that policies that increase family income and 
lower the cost of having children will increase the demand for children. With 
the exception of the first birth, in theory it is not obvious whether this in-
creased demand for children will result in an increase in the demand for the 
quantity (number) or the quality of children. However, in practice, many 
countries have implemented policies that render unnecessary the most im-
portant investments in the quality of children, above those provided for by 
the state. In such countries it is reasonable to expect family policies that in-
crease families’ budgets and reduce the opportunity costs of having children 
to have a positive impact on fertility.  
Is there also reason to assume that some policies are more effective than 
others at raising fertility? If we avoid the question of how cost-effective poli-
cies are, and instead focus on which components of the costs of having chil-
dren weigh heaviest in parents’ fertility decisions, the question in essence 
boils down to how parents value time with their children against the loss of 
human capital that spending such time incurs. That is, the question boils 
down to whether parents prefer to get paid to stay at home with their children 
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 The reasoning behind this expectation is that the loss of human capital accumulation, other things being 
equal, is more costly to the family if it is the higher-earning spouse, rather than the lower-earning spouse, who 
loses human capital.  
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(paid parental leaves and/or joint taxation) or if they prefer that the state pay 
professional child-care workers to take care of their children so that they can 
be free to pursue their careers. The answer is likely to depend on whether the 
care that the state provides is a good substitute for parental care. If it is, sub-
sidized day care can be expected to be a more effective policy than paid pa-
rental leaves and joint taxation, as it is the only policy that reduces the loss of 
human capital accumulation. If the care that the state provides is not a good 
substitute for parental care, it is likely that paid parental leaves and joint 
taxation will be more effective than subsidized child care. A plausible as-
sumption is that the substitutability between state-provided care and parental 
care essentially depends on two factors: the quality of care workers and the 
age of the child. It can be expected that the substitutability would rise as the 
number and qualifications of professional care workers the state hires is in-
creased. On the other hand, the younger a child is, the less substitutable these 
sources of care can be expected to be (Gornick & Meyers 2003; 2008). Thus, 
paid parental leaves and joint taxation are likely to be the more effective 
policies during a child’s first months of life, whereas subsidized high-quality 
child care is likely to become the more effective policy as the child grows 
older.  
In addition to explaining why some countries have higher fertility rates 
than others, subsidized child care can potentially also explain the positive 
association between the female labor force participation rate and the fertility 
rate that has prevailed in recent years. The argument is that subsidized child 
care, in addition to reducing the negative effect of women’s earning opportu-
nities on fertility, also increases mothers’ labor force participation. Subsi-
dized child care, in other words, can be expected to be positively associated 
both with women’s fertility and labor force participation.28 Thus, it is not 
strange that the fertility rate correlates positively with the female labor force 
participation rate in cross-country comparisons. This conclusion is consistent 
with the observation that female labor force participation rates are negatively 
associated with fertility rates within countries over time, as long as subsi-
dized child care does not fully meet the opportunity costs that result from the 
rise in female earning opportunities.  
The reason why the female labor force participation rate and the fertility 
rate have not always been positively correlated is that women have only 
fairly recently gained access to the labor market and higher education in 
many countries. The strength of the effect of subsidized child care on fertility 
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 At least that is the case if the positive effect on the labor market participation of mothers outweighs the 
negative effect on women’s labor force participation that subsidized child care causes by increasing women’s 
fertility.  
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is dependent on women’s earning opportunities. As long as women did not 
have the opportunity to enter higher education and participate in the labor 
market to the same extent as today, the lack of subsidized child care did not 
result in low fertility. Only after women gained entry to these institutions has 
the unequal implementation of subsidized child care made an impact on fer-
tility rates. This is more the case in countries that do not implement generous 
child-care subsidies than in countries that do. Thus, the unequal implementa-
tion of subsidized child care can, together with the growth of women’s earn-
ing opportunities, in theory explain the change in the association between the 
female labor force participation rate and the total fertility rate that occurred 
during the 1980s. 
Although this description indicates that policies, in theory, should have 
not only a direct, but also an indirect, positive effect on fertility that is de-
pendent on women’s earning opportunities, most studies on the topic (with 
some notable exceptions) tend to test only policies’ direct positive effect on 
fertility. Women’s earning opportunities (i.e., their labor market attachment 
and educational attainment) mostly function as control variables. Seldom are 
the two variables interacted. 
 
Empirical evidence  
Are policies effective at raising fertility in the way that the new home eco-
nomics analysis assume them to be? To answer this question, below I inves-
tigate the evidence on the relationship between those policies that most di-
rectly influence the costs of reproduction – that is, family policies – and fer-
tility.  
Policies can have an impact on both the timing and the level of fertility; 
that is, they can have an impact on when parents choose to have their chil-
dren and an impact on how many children they choose to have. A policy that 
affects the timing of fertility could influence the level of fertility, but it does 
not have to.29 Further, a policy that affects the absolute level of fertility can 
affect the timing of births, although it does not need to do so. In practice, it is 
hard to distinguish between timing and level effects; however, I discuss them 
separately below.  
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 It is likely, however, that a policy that affects the timing of fertility also affects the level of fertility indirect-
ly to some extent. Fecundity falls when women get older, and therefore women will not always be able to 
recuperate the births they have forgone early in life, even if they want to. Thus policies that encourage women 
to have their children earlier in life increase the likelihood that women will realize their ideal and intended 
fertility, and are consequently likely to increase the level of fertility. 
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The empirical evidence firmly suggests that policies can have an effect on 
the timing of having children (Björklund 2006; 2007). Studies focusing on 
policies that raise economic incentives to space children more closely togeth-
er in time (i.e., speed-premium policies), for example, show that the introduc-
tion of such policies decreased the time between having a second, a third, and 
a fourth child in Sweden, and the time between having a second and third 
child in Austria (Hoem 1993; Hoem et al. 2001; Andersson et al. 2006; Björ-
klund 2006).30 Taken together, the evidence strongly favors the conclusion 
that policies can have a considerable effect on the timing of fertility. 
The evidence on whether policies can have an impact on the level of fer-
tility is more mixed, and there is no consensus on what conclusions can be 
drawn from it (for reviews of the research, see Sleebos 2003; Neyer 2003, 
2006; Neyer & Andersson 2008; Grant et al. 2004; Demeny 2003; McDonald 
2006; van de Kaa 2006; Björklund 2007; Gauthier 2007).  
Studies on how fertility patterns differ between welfare regimes (Esping-
Andersen 1999; Korpi 2000) observe that social democratic (Nordic) and 
liberal (Anglo-Saxon) welfare regimes have had relatively high period total 
fertility rates from the 1990s and onward, whereas conservative (Central 
European) welfare regimes have had low period total fertility rates, and fa-
milialistic (Mediterranean) welfare regimes have had very low period total 
fertility rates during the same period (Chesnais 1996; Esping-Andersen 1999; 
Esping-Andersen et al. 2002; Castles 2003; Neyer 2003, 2006). Female labor 
force participation rates follow a similar pattern (ibid.) The effect of labor 
force participation on fertility, and the effect of fertility on labor force partic-
ipation, are also weaker at the micro level in social democratic and liberal 
welfare regimes than in conservative and familialistic welfare regimes (see 
Chapter 2). Researchers tend to explain these patterns by observing that the 
former regimes, in contrast to the latter, implement “dual-earner” policies 
that make it easier for women to combine career and children (e.g., see Hob-
son & Olah 2006). Social democratic regimes do so in the form of state-
subsidized high-quality child care and generous wage-related parental leaves, 
whereas liberal welfare regimes do so in the form of affordable market-
provided child care, flexible working hours, and part-time jobs.  
At first sight this analysis seems to support the new home economics 
analysis of the relationship between policies and fertility. Fertility should be 
higher in countries that implement policies that lower the opportunity costs of 
having children than in countries that do not implement such policies. There 
is, however, a caveat. Fertility rates in conservative welfare regimes, which 
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 Also, educational policies can have a considerable influence on when women have their children, depending 
on whether the policies encourage short or lengthy periods of study (Lutz & Skirbekk 2005). 
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implement more traditionally oriented “breadwinner” family policies, are low 
or extremely low. The compensation for the costs of reproduction that these 
breadwinner policies offer families are in some cases equal to or larger than 
the compensation that dual-earner policies offer families in social democratic 
and liberal welfare regimes (e.g., see Bradshaw, Finch, & Soo 2005).31 Fur-
ther, they tackle both the opportunity costs of having children, through joint 
taxation, and the direct costs of having children, via child and family bene-
fits. The assumption that the generosity of dual-earner policies is responsible 
for the observed differences in fertility and female labor force participation 
rates between welfare regimes is also problematic, as it is not backed up by 
direct evidence on how individual policies are associated with fertility out-
comes. 
The extensive literature on the direct impact of policies on fertility (for 
overviews see Sleebos 2003; Grant et al. 2004; Björklund 2007; Gauthier 
2007) includes relatively few cross-sectional studies (see Table 3.1). Even 
fewer econometric studies combine time-series and cross-sectional approach-
es, and of these, almost all use aggregate fertility measures for the dependent 
variable (i.e., the period total fertility rate or the cohort total fertility rate). 
Hitherto, only four comparative studies have directly studied policy effects at 
the individual level (Adkins 2003; Hilgeman & Butts 2004; Del Boca et al. 
2003; Adserà 2011). In contrast, research on policy effects in specific coun-
tries includes numerous studies using individual data as well as aggregate 
fertility measures.  
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 It is obvious from more meticulous studies on how policies affect the cost of having children that the 
ranking obtained in terms of generosity “bear little relationship” to Esping-Andersen’s welfare regime types 
(Bradshaw & Finch 2002). Although it is true that social-democratic welfare state regimes are among the most 
generous in compensating parents for the cost of having children, several other states, for example, Austria, 
Germany, and Luxembourg, are at least as generous, or even more generous, in compensating parents for the 
costs of having children in terms of forgone earnings and direct spending (child benefits, tax cuts, housing 
benefits, school costs, health costs – but not parental leaves and child-care costs). Despite this, countries such 
as Austria, Germany, and Luxembourg have lower fertility rates than their social-democratic counterparts. 
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Table 3.1 Cross-country studies on family policies’ effect on fertility  
Study Dependent variable Policy variables Estimation 
technique 
Findings 
Adkins (2003) CEB (to individuals) - Tax and cash benefits MLP Pos. sig. Effect 
Adserà (2004) Age-specific PTFRs 
PTFR 
- Maternity leave 
- Part-time employment 
- Public employment 
TSCS Positive sig. effect of all policies (part-time employment only among older women) 
Adserà (2011) Individuals’ transition to a first, second, and 
third birth 
- Maternity leave 
- Part-time employment 
- Tax and cash benefits 
EHA Positive sig. effects of all policies 
Blanchet & Ekert-Jaffe 
(1994) 
PTFR - Tax and cash benefits TSCS Positive sig. Effect 
Bradshaw, Finch & Soo 
(2005) 
PTFR  - Tax and cash benefits  CS No sig. Effect 
Castles (2003) PTFR - Child-care enrollment CS Positive sig. Effect 
d’Addio & d’Ercole (2005b)  PTFR - Part-time employment 
- Tax and cash benefits 
- Paid parental leave 
TSCS 
 
Positive sig. effect of part-time employment, tax, and cash benefits Positive sig. effect of parental 
leave replacement level 
Negative sig. effect of the length of parental leave 
d’Addio & d’Ercole (2005a) PTFR - Part-time employment 
- Tax and cash benefits 
- Paid parental leave 
- Child-care enrollment 
CS Positive sig. effects of all policies 
Del Boca et al. (2003) Likelihood of having a(nother) child (individu-
als) 
- Child-care enrollment 
- Part-time employment 
EVA Positive sig. effect of part-time employment 
No sig. effect of child-care enrollment 
Ekert (1986) PTFR - Tax and cash benefits TSCS Positive sig. Effect 
Ferrarini (2006) PTFR - Tax and cash benefits 
- Paid parental leave 
TSCS Positive sig. effects of both tax and cash benefits and paid parental leave 
Feyrer, Sacerdote & Stern 
(2008) 
PTFR - Public spending on    
child care  
- Cash and tax subsidies  
- Paid maternity leave 
- Public spending on family 
services 
CS Positive sig. effect of spending on child care and cash and tax subsidies Neg. sig. effect of maternity 
leave 
Gauthier & Hatzius (1997) PTFR - Cash benefits 
- Paid maternity leave 
TSCS Positive sig. effect of family benefits 
No sig. effect of maternity leave 
Hilgemann & Butts (2004) CEB (to individuals) - Child-care enrollment 
- Paid parental leave 
MLP Positive sig. effect of child-care enrollment 
No sig. effect of parental leave 
Kögel (2006) Tempo adj. PTFR - Child-care enrollment CS Positive sig. Effect 
Nizalova (2000) 
 
PTFR  - Maternity leave TSCS Negative sig. effect of length of maternity leave 
Winegarden & Bracy (1995) PTFR - Paid maternity leave TSCS Positive sig. Effect 
Abbreviations: CEB: Children Ever Born; CS: Cross-Section; EVA: Event History Analysis; MLP: Multilevel Poisson; TSCS: Time Series Cross-Section; PTFR: Period Total Fertility Rate; Sig: Significant
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Cash benefits, tax exemptions, joint taxation, and fertility 
Family cash benefits and tax exemptions (including joint taxation) have been 
found to have a positive effect on fertility in several studies, although the 
estimated magnitude of the effect varies between the studies. In a cross-
sectional time-series study on 11 Western European countries for the years 
1969–1983, Blanchet and Ekert-Jaffe (1994) find that a 25 percent increase in 
spending on family benefits would raise fertility by 0.04 children per woman 
in the long run. In a similar study of OECD countries for the years 1970–
1990, Gauthier and Hatzius (1997) find that a 25 percent increase in family 
cash benefits on average would raise fertility by 0.07 children. In a more 
recent pooled cross-sectional time-series study on 16 OECD countries for the 
period 1980–1999, d’Addio and d’Ercole (2005b) find that such an increase 
in family cash benefits would raise fertility by 0.05 children. While Gauthier 
and Hatzius – who find the largest effect – argue that the positive effect is 
weak, it could be argued that it is in fact rather substantial (Björklund 2007). 
d’Addio and d’Ercole’s results, for example, indicate that a 100 percent in-
crease in the monthly payment of child benefits, from 1050 SEK (ca. 100 
EUR) to 2100 SEK (ca. 200 EUR), would increase the fertility rate in Swe-
den by 0.2 children.32  
The positive effect of child cash benefits on fertility has been confirmed 
by findings on how cash benefits affect the TFR and by individual fertility in 
studies done in the U.S., the U.K., Canada, France, and Israel (Hyatt & Milne 
1991; Milligan 2002, 2005; Zhang et al. 1994; Barmby & Cigno 1990; Cigno 
& Ermisch 1989; Ermisch 1988; Buttner & Lutz 1990; Duclos et al. 2001; 
Laroque & Salanie 2005a, 2005b; McNown & Ridao-Cano 2004; Milligan 
2005; Cohen, Dehejia & Romanov 2007; Schellekens 2009).  
Studies on how tax exemptions for families with children affect fertility 
show significant positive effects on completed fertility, as well as period total 
fertility rates, in the U.S., Canada, and France (Whittington et al. 1990; 
Georgellis & Wall 1992; Zhang et al. 1994; McNown & Ridao-Cano 2004; 
Laroque & Salanie 2005a, 2005b). Cross-sectional time-series studies incor-
porating the real value of tax exemptions with child cash benefits also find a 
significant and positive effect on period total fertility rates (Bradshaw, Finch 
& Soo 2005; Ferrarini 2006). 
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 The level of the Swedish child benefit is on par with the average level in the sample.  
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Overall, the empirical evidence on the effect of child benefits, tax exemp-
tions, and joint taxation on fertility is rather compelling. The overwhelming 
majority of studies clearly speak in favor of generous policies of such types 
having an undisputed positive effect on fertility.  
 
Parental and maternity leave and fertility 
Cross-country studies on how parental and maternity leaves affect fertility 
usually separate the effect of the length of leaves and the effect of the eco-
nomic compensations that leaves offer (d’Addio & d’Ercole 2005b). The 
effect of the length of leaves has been found to be everything from positive 
(Winegarden & Bracy 1995; Adserà 2004) to insignificant (Gauthier & Hat-
zius 1997) to negative (Nizalova 2000; d’Addio & d’Ercole 2005b). Studies 
on the effect of the level of compensation of leaves have found both insignif-
icant (Gauthier & Hatzius 1997) and positive (d’Addio & d’Ercole 2005b) 
effects on fertility. Generally, studies that combine the length and the com-
pensation level to measure the generosity of leaves report positive results on 
the total fertility rate, and especially on age-specific total fertility rates of 
older women (Adserà 2004; Ferrarini 2006). Ferrarini (2006), for example, 
reports that the level of fertility is 0.26 children higher in countries with the 
most generous parental leaves compared to countries with leaves of medium 
generosity. Castles (2003) and Hilgemann and Butts (2004), however, do not 
find any significant association between the provision of parental leave and 
fertility, either at the country level or at the individual level.  
Country-specific studies generally report a positive relationship between 
generous parental and maternity leave programs and the time to births of 
various parities as well as completed fertility (Buttner & Lutz 1990; Hoem 
1993; Lalive & Zweimöller 2005; Hoem, Prskawetz & Neyer 2001; Olah 
1998, 2003; Averett & Whittington 2001). However, some studies also report 
insignificant findings (e.g., see Hardoy & Schone 2004).  
The contradictory evidence on the effect of paid parental leave on fertility 
can likely be explained in part by the fact that the methods for measuring the 
generosity of paid parental leaves vary considerably from one study to anoth-
er. Even so, the evidence is not nearly as uniform as that on the effect of child 
benefits, tax exemptions, and joint taxation on fertility.  
 
Subsidized child care and fertility 
Due to a lack of comparative data, relatively few studies have examined how 
the provision of subsidized child care affects fertility at the country level, and 
none of the few studies that do so use time-series data. However, those cross-
country studies that exist find a strong positive association between child-
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care enrollment for children below the age of three and fertility (Castles 
2003; Sleebos 2003; Hilgeman & Butts 2004; Kögel 2006), and in a macro-
level study Kögel (2006) reports that purchased child care, together with 
female labor force participation rates and female long-term unemployment 
rates, can account for a high R2 of 0.87 of the cross-country variation in 
average fertility rates in Western Europe during the period 1995–2000.33  
Hilgeman and Butts (2004), who did the only comparative study that uses 
individual-level data, find that fertility can be expected to increase by 2 per-
cent for each percentage-point increase in the provision of child care for 
children below age three. This means, for example, that Italy could raise 
fertility by 0.27 children by increasing the provision of child care for young 
children from its current level of 6 percent to 30 percent. Further, if the gov-
ernment increases the level of child-care enrollment to a level equal to that in 
Denmark (64 percent), the fertility rate in Italy would rise by an impressive 
0.97 children. However, Hilgeman and Butts also find that the effect of pur-
chased child care does not compensate fully for the negative effect of female 
labor force participation. While a one percentage-point increase in child-care 
enrollment increases fertility by 2 percent, a one percentage-point increase in 
the female labor force participation rate decreases fertility by approximately 
4 percent. As women have been found to respond to the availability of subsi-
dized child care by increasing their labor force participation (Blau 2000; 
Gornick & Meyers 2003; Jaumotte 2003), the extreme effects reported by 
Hilgeman and Butts (2004) should therefore not be taken at face value. The 
net effect on fertility of an increase in the provision of child care would to 
some extent be offset by the increase in the female labor force participation 
rate that it, in all likelihood, would cause. Moreover, the positive effect of the 
provision of child care that Hilgeman and Butts (2004) find is only signifi-
cant at the 10-percent level, which makes their results questionable. 
Studies on individual countries often contradict the positive results of the 
cross-country studies. Hank and Kreyenfeld (2003), Kravdal (1996), and 
Andersson et al. (2004) find only weak or insignificant effects of the price, 
quality, and availability of child care in similar studies on the time to differ-
ent parities across German, Swedish, and Norwegian municipalities. Lehrer 
and Kawasaki (1985), Del Boca (2002), Blau and Robins (1989), Olah 
(1998), and Bonoli (2008), however, find significant positive effects of pub-
lic child-care availability on fertility across Italian regions, U.S. states, Swiss 
cantons and, over time, in Sweden and Hungary.  
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 Kögel uses a measure of the TFR adjusted for the postponement of births based on Sobotka (2004) in order 
to account for the effects of timing of fertility. It could be argued that this adjustment makes his findings more 
credible as evidence on the effect of child care on the level of fertility.   
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One explanation for the insignificant results could be that the within-
country variation in child-care coverage in most of the studies is small. It is 
simply a fact that the variation in child-care coverage tends to be greater 
across countries than within countries. The lack of significant results in stud-
ies using individual-level fertility data is, nonetheless, surprising given the 
strong positive correlation between the availability of subsidized child care 
and fertility found in studies using aggregated measures of fertility. Because 
of these results there is reason to doubt whether the policy of providing sub-
sidized child care is actually as effective at raising fertility as is often sug-
gested.     
 
Part-time and flex-time jobs and fertility 
Studies on how the availability of part-time and flex-time jobs affect fertility 
generally find positive effects on fertility. Castles (2003), for example, re-
ports a positive cross-country association between the percentage of employ-
ees working flex-time and the total fertility rate across OECD countries. 
Other cross-country studies working with time series report a positive associ-
ation between the percentage of part-time jobs in the labor market and fertili-
ty (Adserà 2004, 2005; d’Addio & d’Ercole 2005b).  
 
Overall impression of the impact of family policies on fertility 
The evidence on policies’ effect on the level of fertility is not entirely con-
sistent, but nonetheless rather compelling at first sight.34 Generous child 
benefits, tax rebates, joint taxation, and the provision of part-time jobs all 
seem to have a positive impact on the level of fertility. If the effect is weak, 
as van de Kaa (2006) and Gauthier (2007) argue, or rather substantial, as 
McDonald (2006) and Björklund (2007) argue, is a question of interpretation.  
Only paid parental leaves and subsidized child care can reasonably be 
doubted to have a positive effect on fertility. For some reason it has been 
difficult to prove that such dual-earner policies raise fertility. It has been 
especially hard to do so with individual-level fertility data.35  
The fact that it has been so hard to prove generous dual-earner policies’ 
ability to increase fertility is rather surprising. If anything, such policies 
could be expected to be more effective than other family policies at raising 
fertility. At least this is true for the provision of subsidized child care, which 
in a more direct way than most other policies reduces the indirect opportunity 
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 At least it is obvious that policies have an impact on the timing of fertility. Child benefits, tax rebates, 
parental leave provisions, and other transfers seem to shorten the time to births of various parities. Diverse 
labor market institutions, such as the provision of flex- and part-time jobs, seem to have a similar effect.  
35
 This is especially true with respect to subsidized child care.  
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costs of having children that have been argued to be the main reason for the 
decline in fertility in the developed world in recent decades. The few, mostly 
aggregate-level, studies that find a positive effect of generous dual-earner 
policies on fertility, moreover, seem to indicate that the effect is of a greater 
magnitude than that of other family policies.  
D’Addio and d’Ercole’s (2005b) finding, that a 25 percent increase in 
child benefits and tax transfers would increase fertility by 0.05 children, for 
instance, implies that the Swedish state could raise fertility by 0.2 children 
per woman by increasing the monthly child benefit from 1050 SEK (ca. 100 
EUR) to 2100 SEK (ca. 200 EUR); that is, from 201,600 SEK (ca. 20,000 
EUR) to 403,200 SEK (ca. 40,000 EUR) for the total time the child is eligible 
for the benefit. To increase fertility by 1 child, the child benefit would need 
to be raised to 6300 SEK (ca. 600 EUR) per month, that is, to 1,209,600 SEK 
(ca. 120,000 EUR) for the time the child is eligible for the benefit. Such in-
creases would in fact be tremendously expensive for governments to imple-
ment as they would not only need to spend more money on each existing 
child, but also pay child benefits for all new children who are born due to the 
raise in benefits. Sweden’s total spending on child benefits amounted to 0.7 
percent of the country’s GDP in 2005 (OECD family database). Thus, to raise 
the fertility rate by 0.2 children by increasing the generosity of child benefits 
would cost the country approximately an additional 0.8 percent of its GDP. 
To raise fertility by 1 child would cost the country an additional 5.3 percent 
of its GDP.36  
It is somewhat harder to estimate how cost-effective parental leaves are at 
raising fertility, but the positive findings suggest that the effect is substantial. 
Adserà’s (2004) findings, for example, suggest that 10 extra weeks of paren-
tal leave that fully compensate the recipient for the loss of earnings would 
raise fertility by around 0.1 children. This means that the Swedish state could 
raise fertility by 0.2 children by giving parents 20 weeks of fully paid paren-
tal leave per child in addition to the 40 weeks of fully paid parental leave for 
which parents are eligible today. In 2005, the total cost of Sweden’s parental 
leave system amounted to 0.8 percent of the country’s GDP. Thus, Sweden 
would have to increase its expenditure on parental leaves by almost 0.5 per-
cent of its GDP in order to raise its fertility rate by 0.2 children.   
The provision of affordable, high-quality child care seems to be the most 
cost-effective policy option for governments that want to increase fertility. 
The observed effect of the provision of child care is very great according 
both to Kögel (2006) and Hilgeman and Butts (2004). If Hilgeman and Butts 
                                                          
36
 This figure does not include the negative effect on the country’s economy resulting from women withdraw-
ing from the labor market to care for the newborn children.  
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are correct in assuming that Italy could increase its fertility rate by almost 
one child if it increased the availability of child care to the same level as 
Denmark’s, it would be less expensive for the Italian government to raise its 
fertility rate by increasing child-care enrollment than by raising the level of 
child benefits or increasing the length and pay rate of parental leaves.37 In 
1998, Denmark spent 2.2 percent of its GDP on child care and other services 
to families, while Italy spent only 0.3 percent of its GDP on such subsidies. If 
spending on subsidies translates into enrollment rates, this means that Italy 
could achieve replacement fertility by increasing its spending on child-care 
subsidies by a value of 1.9 percent of its GDP.38  
The estimates of the relative effectiveness of policies presented above 
should be taken with caution. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to conclude that 
the provision of subsidized child care seems to be the most effective policy 
by which to combat low fertility, followed by the provision of parental leaves 
with high replacement rates, and, in third place, child benefits, joint taxation, 
and other similar policies. More indirect policies, such as the provision of 
flex-time and part-time jobs, also seem to be effective at increasing fertility, 
but the cost-effectiveness of such policies is harder to measure.  
To sum up, the evidence on the relationship between the generosity of 
family policies and fertility is somewhat contradictory. It has been relatively 
easy to prove that generous family benefits, tax cuts, and joint taxation for 
families with children can increase fertility. In contrast, it has been relatively 
hard to prove that generous dual-earner policies can increase fertility – espe-
cially with individual-level fertility data. However, the few macro-level stud-
ies that have found a positive effect of generous dual-earner policies on fertil-
ity seem to indicate that such policies can increase fertility in a more cost-
effective way than other family policies. Hence, those family policies that 
seem most effective at raising fertility are those whose effectiveness at rais-
ing fertility seem hardest to prove – at least with individual-level fertility 
data. The question is whether the new home economics analysis of the rela-
tionship between family policies and fertility can explain the relative cost-
effectiveness of policies at raising fertility. It is also an open question wheth-
er the analysis can explain why it has been so difficult to prove the effect of 
the most cost-effective policies with individual-level fertility data.   
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 As was noted, it is likely that the positive effect on fertility would be set off somewhat due to the increase in 
female labor force participation that almost certainly would follow such an increase in the provision of child 
care.   
38
 It is likely that the GDP would increase as a result of the increase in female labor force participation rates 
that would follow in the wake of such an expansion of the child-care sector. The reform would, thus, finance 
itself to some degree.  
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Two puzzles 
The relative cost-effectiveness of subsidized child care in battling low fertili-
ty can partially be explained by pointing out that it is the only family policy 
that can reduce the entire loss of human capital accumulation resulting from 
parental care for children.39 Another likely explanation for the relative cost-
effectiveness of the provision of subsidized child care is that it benefits from 
the advantage of large-scale production. It is simply more cost-efficient to 
have one care worker care for ten children than it is to have the parents care 
for their children individually. However, neither of these explanations can 
explain why it has been more difficult to prove the positive effect of subsi-
dized child care on fertility with individual-level fertility data than with ag-
gregate-level fertility data.  
If the relative cost-effectiveness of subsidized child care is easy to ex-
plain, it is more difficult to explain why paid parental leave is a more cost-
effective policy than family benefits, tax cuts, and joint taxation for families 
with children. All the latter policies, and especially the last two, reduce the 
loss of forgone earnings that having children brings about, in a similar way to 
how paid parental leave reduces parents’ loss of forgone earnings. According 
to the new home economics analysis of fertility, both types of policies should 
therefore have an equally positive effect on fertility. The fact that they, de-
spite this, appear to have different effects on fertility is hard to reconcile with 
the theory. The new home economics analysis of fertility is also unable to 
explain why it has been relatively difficult to prove the positive effect of paid 
parental leave on fertility, whereas it has been relatively easy to do so with 
the other policies.  
The new home economics analysis of fertility can, thus, neither fully ex-
plain why dual-earner policies seem to raise fertility more effectively than 
other family policies nor why it has been so difficult to prove the effective-
ness of such policies with individual-level fertility data. In the next chapter I 
argue that it cannot explain these puzzles because it has overlooked the inti-
mate relationship between fertility decisions and decisions about union for-
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 This feature of child care should not be overemphasized. For example, to some extent it can be expected that 
the loss of human capital that results from caring for a child during its first years will be countered by the fact 
that the spouse who stays at home to care for the child (assumed here to be the mother) tends to increase her 
productivity in (other areas of) home production, so that the working spouse can concentrate more effectively 
on his job.This effect is accentuated by the fact that it tends to be the highest-earning spouse who specializes in 
wage labor, and the lowest-earning spouse who specializes in home production. Thus, the family’s total loss 
from caring activities, measured in terms of human capital accumulation, is likely to be less than it appears to 
be at first sight. 
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mation and union dissolution. This intimate relationship means that fertility 
decisions are much more individualized affairs than previous studies have 
acknowledged. By overlooking this fact, the previous research has missed 
two important ways in which family policies can affect fertility; namely, by 
affecting incentives for women to form unions, and by affecting incentives 
for women to have children within unstable unions. This oversight can ex-
plain why previous studies have had difficulty proving the effectiveness of 
dual-earner policies at raising fertility using individual-level fertility data. 
The individualized nature of fertility decisions can also explain why dual-
earner policies are more effective than other family policies at raising fertili-
ty.  
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4 
The argument 
 
Previous studies on policies’ effect on fertility have largely overlooked the 
fact that fertility decisions are closely intertwined with decisions about union 
formation and union dissolution. I argue in this chapter that, because of this, 
researchers have missed two important ways in which policies can affect 
fertility. First, they have failed to notice that policies can increase fertility by 
reducing the negative effect of union instability on fertility. Missing this 
point has made them blind to the fact that dual-earner policies can be more 
effective than other family policies at raising fertility, because such policies 
are more effective than others at reducing the individual disincentives to have 
children that come with union instability.  
Previous studies have also failed to notice that family policies can affect 
fertility by affecting union formation. Because of this, they have focused 
mainly on the effect of family policies on within-union fertility. To the extent 
that they have concentrated on individual-level fertility patterns, these studies 
have therefore missed a large part of family policies’ effect on fertility. How-
ever, studies using aggregated fertility measures include the fertility of all 
women, disregarding their union status. Such studies have therefore not 
missed the part of the effect of policies on fertility that goes via the effect 
policies have on union formation. This can explain why it has been more 
difficult to prove family policies’ effectiveness at raising fertility when using 
individual-level fertility data than it has been using aggregate-level data. 
 The fact that it has been especially difficult to prove the effectiveness of 
generous dual-earner policies using individual-level fertility data can be ex-
plained by pointing out that much of the positive effect such policies have on 
fertility is likely to manifest itself in a high likelihood of women forming 
unstable unions. To the extent that previous studies have not controlled for 
the negative effect union instability has on fertility, much of the positive 
effect generous dual-earner policies have on fertility is therefore likely to 
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have been masked by the positive effect of such policies on union instability. 
Overall, my arguments make it likely that previous studies, at least to the 
extent that they have used individual-level fertility data, have underestimated 
generous family policies’ positive effect on fertility. 
 
Critique of the new home economics  
analysis of the family  
In recent years many economists have started to question the validity of 
Becker’s assumption of family altruism; that is, the assumption that the head 
of a family may be regarded as an altruist who cares about the utility of all 
family members, and that all other family members, knowing this, will pool 
their resources and adjust their behavior to maximize the family head’s utili-
ty, as this will ensure that their own utility is maximized (see Becker 1974, 
1981). These critics (e.g., see Manser & Brown 1980; McElroy & Horney 
1981; Folbre 1994; Lundberg & Pollak 1993, 1994, 1996; Ott 1995; Braun-
stein & Folbre 2001) have suggested substituting Becker’s altruist model 
with various game-theoretic bargaining models. Such models presuppose 
spouses to act primarily in their own interests and not in the interest of all of 
the family’s members, and therefore they deem it as unrealistic to assume 
spouses to pool their resources and adjust their behavior to maximize the 
family head’s utility. Instead, bargaining models assume spouses to use the 
resources that are under their individual control, for example, their labor 
market incomes, to bargain with each other over which investments to make 
and how to distribute their payoffs.40  
As family members in Becker’s altruist model pool their resources with 
the aim of maximizing the family’s utility, bargaining power is irrelevant. 
The allocation of resources within the family is independent of the share of 
the family’s resources that the spouses control separately. Because of this, 
investment decisions, such as the decision to invest in a child, have no strate-
gic implications for the future allocation of resources within the family, but 
only affect the family’s total output of goods. However, in bargaining mod-
els, the allocation of resources within the family is dependent on the relative 
bargaining power of the spouses, which is dependent on the extent of the 
resources they control separately. Therefore, investment decisions can have 
major implications for the future distribution of resources within the family. 
This is illustrated by pointing out that the allocation of goods is decided by 
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 Similar criticisms have been put forward in sociology as well (e.g., see Brines 1993, 1994; Coltrane 2000) 
and political science (eg. Iversen & Rosenbluth 2006). 
                                      THE ARGUMENT 
 63
negotiation after the spouses have made their investments. Investments that 
affect the relative bargaining positions of the spouses, by changing the extent 
of the resources they control, can therefore result in one spouse being worse 
off than he/she would have been if the investments had not been made. This 
can be true even in cases where the investments increase the spouses’ com-
bined output of goods. In the absence of a binding, costlessly enforceable, 
contract regulating the distribution of produced goods, the spouse whose 
bargaining position is made stronger by the investments could demand a 
larger share of the couples’ produced goods than he/she could have done if 
the investments had not been made. Because of this, Pareto-efficient out-
comes in game-theoretic bargaining models presuppose that spouses can 
make credible binding, costlessly enforceable commitments on the future 
allocation of resources before they invest in joint production (Ott 1995). 
Without such credible commitments the incentives to engage in joint produc-
tion would be low for the spouse who is most likely to engage in household 
labor.   
The reason for this is that the relative bargaining power of the spouses is 
dependent on the utility they would receive if they were to choose not to 
cooperate. Non-cooperation is often (although not always) interpreted as 
divorce. The prospects facing spouses in the event they end up divorced (i.e., 
the point at which they can credibly threaten not to cooperate) are, thus, im-
portant for the distribution of resources they end up agreeing on. In the ab-
sence of a credible commitment to a previously agreed-upon distribution of 
goods, spouses will therefore avoid making investments that will worsen 
their prospects following a divorce (e.g., investments that would reduce their 
labor market incomes). Below I will show how this rationality is likely to 
make women reluctant to have children in the face of increasing union insta-
bility.  
 
Union instability and fertility 
Spouses make investments that affect both the future value of their marriage 
and the alternatives they face in the event of a divorce. Becker et al. (1977) 
note that some of these investments, such as houses, cars, and career skills, 
would be equally valuable if the marriage were to end in a divorce. Other 
investments, however, would be much less valuable outside marriage, be-
cause they cannot be capitalized on in the market to the same extent as cars 
and career skills. Children and child-related skills are prime examples of such 
“marital specific investments.” 
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One reason that children are “less valuable” outside marriage is that par-
ents typically must share, or be denied, custody of their children in the event 
of a divorce (ibid; Lillard & Waite 1993). In other words, a divorce reduces 
the time parents can spend with their children. This loss of contact with chil-
dren has been shown to lead to increased parental role strain and distress 
(Umberson & Williams 1993; Rogers & White 1998; Amato 2000).  
A second reason why investments in children are “less valuable” outside 
marriage is that investments in the nonmarket skills that are necessary for 
giving children a bright future (i.e., for producing “high-quality” children), 
such as child care, lose value when the marriage ends. A spouse who has 
invested in marital-specific human capital, such as child care, cannot expect 
to capitalize on these investments outside the marriage (Becker et al. 1977). 
The only way to capitalize on such investments is to find a new partner (e.g., 
see Sweeney 1997; Morrison & Ritualo 2000; Ozawa & Yoon 2002; De 
Graaf & Kalmijn 2003; Jansen et al. 2009). If a woman’s union ends in a 
divorce and she is unable to find a new partner, she risks losing all returns on 
her spouse’s accumulated human capital, while she still must pay the full 
price, in forgone earnings and loss of human capital accumulation, for the 
child care she has provided (Peters 1986). In contrast, the (presumably male) 
spouse who has invested in labor market human capital can expect to capital-
ize on his investments in the market. Studies also show that mothers tend to 
suffer more than fathers economically from a divorce (Joshi 1998; Poortman 
2000; McManus & DiPrete 2001; Uunk 2004; Andreß et al. 2006).   
A third reason that children are “less valuable” outside marriage is that it 
is more costly for divorced women who have custody of their children to 
enter the labor market than it is for divorced women who do not have chil-
dren (Peters 1986; Gornick et al. 1998; Drobnic 2000; Poortman 2000; Uunk 
2004; Raeymaeckers et al. 2008). For example, a lone mother must find and 
pay someone to care for her children during her working hours. Alternatively, 
she must demand flex- and/or part-time working hours of her employer so 
that she can find the time she needs to care for her children. Of course, the 
cost of entering the labor market is also high for parents who live together. 
However, the cost is not as great as it is for lone parents, as parents who live 
together can share child-care responsibilities with each other (Drobnic 2000; 
Mandel & Semyonov 2005; Jansen et al. 2009).   
To the extent that parents include their children’s utility as part of their 
own utility functions, a fourth reason why children are “less valuable” out-
side marriage is that children who grow up in the context of an emotionally 
and economically stressful divorce tend to fare worse than children who grow 
up in stable unions (Amato & Keith 1991; Meyer 1997; Amato 2000). Chil-
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dren with divorced parents, for example, have been shown to score lower 
than children with married parents on measures of psychological adjustment 
(Forehand et al. 1994; Kurdek et al. 1994) and long-term health (Tucker et al. 
1997).41 Many, but not all, of these problems can be explained by pointing 
out that children whose parents have divorced tend to fare worse economical-
ly than children whose parents remain married (e.g., see McLanahan & 
Sandefur 1994; Morrison & Cherlin 1995; Aseltine 1996). Lone parenthood, 
whether it is a consequence of divorce or not, has also been shown to be one 
of the most important determinants of child poverty (Bradbury & Jäntii 1999, 
2001; Misra et al. 2007; OECD 2007; Gornick & Jäntii 2009).  
The fact that children are “less valuable” outside marriage has few conse-
quences for women’s incentives to have children if their unions are stable and 
spouses can make credible commitments to the future distribution of goods 
within the family. However, if there are no guarantees against union dissolu-
tion (e.g., legal obstacles to divorce, or social norms that punish husbands 
who choose to divorce their wives), women who are living in unstable unions 
have strong incentives not to have children (for a discussion on the relative 
importance of laws and norms in preventing marital break-up, see Posner 
2000). It is only rational for the wife to specialize in child care if she can 
expect to capitalize on the short- and long-term returns of her husband’s 
efforts in the labor market. If her husband divorces her, she cannot do so, but 
must bear the full costs of her investments in the family’s children, while she 
is likely to receive only a part of their value. Knowing this and that their 
future bargaining position in the union will be affected negatively by having 
children, women in unstable unions are likely to engage in strategic behavior 
by limiting the number of children they have and investing more in labor 
market work in order to insure themselves against a potential divorce (Peters 
1986).  
To the extent that this strategic behavior can be anticipated, it would be 
theoretically possible to reduce women’s perceived need to self-insure 
against the possibility of divorce by compensating them for their marital-
specific investments in the event of a divorce (ibid.). For example, before 
they marry, a couple can agree upon a settlement payment to be made should 
divorce occur. However, unilateral divorce laws make it difficult to enforce 
such settlements if they have not been put on paper. It can also be very hard 
to agree on the value of the efforts that each spouse puts into the marriage – 
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 In contrast, children raised within high-conflict marriages have been shown to be better off if their parents 
divorce rather than stay married (Amato & Booth 1997). However, only a minority of divorces are preceded by 
a high level of marital conflict, which is why the average divorce is likely to make children worse off psycho-
logically (ibid.)  
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both in advance and in retrospect (Peters 1986; Folbre 2001, pp. 22–54). 
Therefore, contrary to what many assume (e.g., see Parkman 1992; Ellman 
1989), alimony payments are not likely to reduce all disincentives to have 
children that follow from union instability (Singer 1994). It should also be 
pointed out that most states implement laws that strictly limit the scope of the 
legally enforceable agreements spouses can make to reduce women’s incen-
tives to adopt the strategy of limiting their fertility (Posner 2000). Moreover, 
few states will enforce agreements that regulate the distribution of labor and 
goods within ongoing unions (ibid; Lundberg & Pollak 2007). To cite Shel-
ley Lundberg and Robert Pollak (2007, p. 13), “Enforceable agreements 
concerning the future division of labor and allocation within the family may 
not be feasible for modern couples”. Therefore, women’s incentives to invest 
in children and child-related activities are inversely related to their divorce 
risks. Hence,  
 
H1. Union instability should reduce fertility.  
 
Several studies confirm this expectation (e.g., see Becker, Landes & Michael 
1977; Thornton 1977, 1978; Lillard & Waite 1993; Lehrer 1996; Myers 
1997; Vuri 2001; Rijken & Liefbroer 2009). There is also a vast literature 
confirming that the risk of divorce is positively associated with women’s 
labor force participation (Johnson & Skinner 1986; Peters 1986; Gray 1995; 
Montalto & Gerner 1998; Austen 2004; Papps 2006). Below I argue that this 
literature can help explain why generous dual-earner policies seem more 
effective than other generous family policies at raising fertility.  
 
Dual-earner policies, union instability, and 
fertility  
The interrelationship between union instability and women’s incentives to 
have children and work has gained little attention in the literature on how 
family policies affect fertility.42 This is rather surprising, as economists such 
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 An important exception is the extensive literature on how divorce laws affect incentives to invest in marital-
specific capital, such as children, vis-à-vis incentives to invest in labor market participation (e.g., see Peters 
1986; Parkman 1992). The emphasis in this literature, however, has mostly been on women’s labor force 
participation. Another important exception is the literature on single motherhood in the U.S., which argues that 
welfare programs targeted at single mothers can make it attractive for women with poor incomes and poor 
marriage market prospects to choose single motherhood (e.g., see Neal 2004). The findings from this literature, 
however, have not been discussed in relation to the effect of broader family policies on the fertility of other 
socioeconomic groups in the U.S. or in other countries.  
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as Lundberg and Pollak have for some time pointed out that increasing union 
instability likely means that “an efficient level of fertility […] may require a 
mechanism for insuring mothers against future losses due […] to the ‘family 
gap’ between the wages of mothers and the wages of women without chil-
dren” (Lundberg & Pollak 2007, p. 14; see also Lundberg & Pollak 1996). As 
I will argue below, dual-earner policies provide such insurance. Dual-earner 
policies also reduce most other individual disincentives to have children that 
follow from union instability. Other family policies do not cushion the nega-
tive effects of union instability on women’s incentives to have children to the 
same extent. I argue that this can explain why generous dual-earner policies 
have been found to be more effective at raising fertility than other generous 
family policies have.  
Family policies can do little about the fact that union instability reduces 
the time parents can expect to spend with their children. It is simply not pos-
sible to share the custody of a child with a former spouse without losing time 
with the child. However, dual-earner policies can do something about the 
three other individual disincentives to have children that follow from union 
instability.  
Subsidized child care reduces the amount of time during which parents’ 
need to provide care for their children. As a consequence, both parents are 
free to earn an income for themselves even when their children are small (for 
reviews of the positive effect of subsidies for child care on mothers’ labor 
force participation, see Anderson & Levine 1999; Gornick & Meyers 2003; 
Jaumotte 2003; Morgan & Zippel 2003; Immervoll & Barber 2006; Uunk et 
al. 2005; OECD 2007). This feature of subsidized child care not only reduces 
parents’ loss of forgone earnings and career opportunities during the time 
they stay together, it also assures the parents that they do not need to give up 
their jobs if they end up divorced and must raise their children on their own. 
No other policy offers parents an equally generous income guarantee in the 
event of a divorce. Research from the U.S., Canada, and Western Europe also 
shows that child-care subsidies increase the labor supply of single mothers 
(Anderson & Levine 1999; Michalopoulos & Robins 2000; Gornick & Mey-
ers 2003; Uunk et al. 2005; Raeymaeckers et al. 2008) and, as a consequence, 
reduce their welfare dependency (Poortman 2000; Connelly & Kimmel 2003; 
Gornick & Meyers 2003; Uunk 2004; Dewilde 2006; Del Boca & Vuri 2007; 
Whiteford & Adema 2007; Raeymaeckers et al. 2008; Jansen et al. 2009). To 
sum up, subsidized day care i) reduces the need for high-risk marriage-
specific investments in child care during marriage, and ii) reduces the cost 
lone mothers must pay for entering and remaining in the labor market after a 
divorce. By doing so, subsidized child care reduces two of the disincentives 
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to have children that follow from union instability. In addition, the availabil-
ity of professional child care has been shown to help divorced mothers adjust 
to the role demands they meet as mothers and workers (Goldberg et al. 1992).  
Paid parental leaves offer parents the opportunity to be paid individually 
for providing care for their children. This not only reduces the caring parent’s 
loss of forgone earnings during the time the parents’ union lasts (e.g., see 
Waldfogel 1998a), it also guarantees both parents that they can afford to 
provide care for their children if they end up divorced. In short, paid parental 
leaves reduce the negative effect of union instability on fertility by reducing 
the cost of high-risk marriage-specific investments in child care both for the 
duration and after the disruption of a union. Other policies that aim at making 
it affordable for parents to care for their children, for example, joint taxation 
and tax rebates for families, do not do this. Instead, they presuppose one 
spouse to earn the family’s income while the other spouse stays at home and 
cares for the family’s children. Joint taxation and tax rebates for families with 
children, consequently, do not offer individual spouses the same guarantee 
that they can afford to provide care for their children should they end up 
divorced.  
Parental leaves of short and medium length (up to a year in length) have 
also consistently been shown to increase labor force participation among 
mothers in the years before and after the leave period (see Winegarden & 
Bracy 1995; Ruhm 1998; OECD 2001, Gornick & Meyers 2003 and Jau-
motte 2003 for reviews of the findings), and thus strengthen the position of 
mothers in the labor market rather than weaken it (see also Waldfogel 1998a, 
1998b).43 The reason is that mothers do not need to quit their jobs in order to 
find the time to care for their children. Thus, paid parental leaves i) reduce 
the cost of marriage-specific capital investments in child care during mar-
riage, and ii) reduce the cost of providing such care after a divorce.    
Subsidized day care and paid parental leaves also reduce the non-
egoistically oriented disincentives to have children that follow from union 
instability. They do so by contributing to the well-being of children whose 
parents have divorced. In part, this has to do with the fact that they increase 
mothers’ labor force participation (read: their income) and, as a consequence, 
reduce child poverty (Bradbury & Jäntii 1999, 2001; Connelly & Kimmel 
2001; Vleminckx, K. & T. Smeeding 2001; Gornick & Meyers 2003; Jau-
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 Longer unpaid leaves, however, tend to decrease women’s labor force participation (Gornick & Meyers 
2003). The reason why shorter leaves, rather counterintuitively, work to increase mothers’ labour force partici-
pation is that mothers who do not have legal parental leave options tend to quit their jobs when they have 
children in order to be able to stay at home with them. Wage-related parental leaves, moreover, increase the 
incentives to work before having children. 
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motte 2003; Kamerman et al. 2003; Uunk 2004; Dewilde 2006; Whiteford & 
Adema 2007; Raeymaeckers et al. 2008; Gornick & Jäntii 2009; Jansen et al. 
2009; cf. Immervoll & Barber 2006 for a more nuanced view on the effects 
of single mothers’ labor force participation on their incomes). It also has to 
do with the fact that paid parental leaves make it affordable for divorced 
parents to provide care for their children. Research shows that paid parental 
leaves contribute to children’s well-being by reducing infant and early child-
hood mortality (Winegarden & Bracy 1995; Ruhm 2000; Gornick & Meyers 
2003; Tanaka 2005). More indirect evidence shows that maternal full-time 
employment during the first year after birth (the time period that moderate 
parental leaves cover) is harmful to children’s health (Hill et al. 2001; Gor-
nick & Meyers 2003; Berger et al. 2005; Gregg et al. 2005; Tanaka 2005), 
and associated with lower cognitive test scores (Waldfogel et al. 2002; Ruhm 
2004; Gregg et al. 2005; Waldfogel 2006), and higher levels of problem 
behaviors, among children below school age (Baker et al. 2008 – though see 
Burchinal & Clarke-Stewart 2007).44 In short, subsidized child care and paid 
parental leaves reduce the negative effects of a divorce on children’s well-
being.45 Thus, they reduce the weight individuals must give, in their delibera-
tions, to the risk that their potential children will grow up in the context of an 
emotionally and economically stressful divorce. 
To sum up, generous child-care subsidies and paid parental leaves reduce 
women’s incentives to lower their fertility in order to self-insure against the 
consequences of a divorce. In countries that implement such policies, women 
do not need to bear the full cost of the human capital investments associated 
with having children. Women who foresee the possibility of a union disrup-
tion can, for example, work more without having fewer children than they 
would otherwise. At the same time, they do not need to be as anxious about 
the time after a divorce as would women living in countries that do not im-
plement such policies. This also means that investments in children do not 
alter the relative bargaining positions of spouses in countries that implement 
generous dual-earner policies to the same extent as they do in countries that 
lack such policies. Hence, 
 
H2. Generous dual-earner policies should reduce the negative effect of 
union instability on fertility.  
                                                          
44
 In contrast, mothers’ employment away from home is not detrimental to older children if it is combined with 
high-quality child care, but can in fact contribute to their development (Kamerman et al. 2003).     
45In addition, the combined generosity of dual-earner policies has been found to reduce infant mortality and 
child poverty (Engster & Olofsdotter Stensöta 2011). Others researchers have also noted that family poverty 
rates are lower in dual-earner regimes (Kangas & Palme 2000; Korpi 2000).   
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Other family policies do not reduce the individual disincentives to have chil-
dren that follow from union instability to the same extent as dual-earner poli-
cies. Breadwinner family policies, such as joint taxation, only make it less 
costly for families to have children if the wife stays at home to care for the 
family’s children. The direct compensation that such policies offer for the 
wife’s forgone earnings, moreover, primarily goes to the husband. Joint taxa-
tion, for example, mean that the husband gets a lower tax rate on his wage 
during the time that his wife opts out of the labor market to care for the fami-
ly’s children. The only compensation the wife receives for her invested time 
is the part of the husband’s wage he is willing to share with her. Breadwinner 
family policies, thus, encourage and presuppose women to make marital-
specific investments that are individually costly in terms of forgone earnings 
and lost career opportunities. This feature of breadwinner family policies 
makes it likely that their uptake will worsen both women’s prospects in the 
event of a divorce and their relative bargaining position within marriage. 
Research shows, for example, that both joint taxation (Gustafsson & Jacob-
sson 1985; Gustafsson 1992; Jaumotte 2003) and long low-paid and unpaid 
maternity leaves reduce women’s labor force participation (OECD 2001; 
Morgan & Zippel 2003; Gornick & Meyers 2003; Jaumotte 2003). Hence, 
such policies will probably not make women less likely to reduce fertility to 
self-insure against a divorce.  
Breadwinner policies, moreover, mainly reduce the costs of reproduction 
during marriage. They do not offer divorced (lone) parents the same degree 
of compensation as they offer married parents. A woman who foresees a 
divorce cannot expect to benefit at all from a joint taxation scheme if she 
does not remarry. Neither can she afford to be at home with her children for 
any longer time period with the limited compensation traditional maternity 
leaves offer (as such leaves presuppose that a woman has a husband who 
earns a full-time wage). 
Because breadwinner policies actually increase women’s dependency on 
their husbands during marriage and offer little compensation in the event of a 
divorce, it is likely that such policies will not alleviate the economic stress 
facing lone parents. Thus, breadwinner policies do not do much to reduce 
would-be parents’ fears that their potential children will grow up in an eco-
nomically stressful environment in the event of a divorce.  
To sum up, breadwinner policies i) do not reduce the need for high-risk 
marital-specific investments during marriage, ii) do not offer individual com-
pensation, or else they offer only miniscule individual compensation, for 
high-risk marital-specific investments during marriage, iii) do not reduce the 
difficulties individuals with children face after a divorce when trying to enter, 
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or maintain contact with, the labor market, iv) do not reduce the cost of 
providing care for children after a divorce, and v) as a consequence of i), ii), 
iii), and iv), do not reduce the economic and psychological stress experienced 
by children of lone parents. This can explain why generous dual-earner poli-
cies have been found to be more effective than generous breadwinner policies 
at raising fertility.  
Also, other, more gender-neutral, traditional family policies, such as child 
benefits, do little to reduce the individual disincentives to have children that 
come with union instability. Although such policies have been shown to 
reduce families’ economic difficulties (Immervoll et al. 2001; Misra et al. 
2007), they have not the same potential to reduce lone mothers’ economic 
difficulties as have dual-earner policies.46 In addition, child benefits i) neither 
reduce the need for, nor the cost of, marital-specific investments in children, 
ii) do not help lone mothers enter, or maintain contact with, the labor market, 
and iii) do not reduce the cost of providing care for their children after a 
divorce. Thus, at a maximum, child benefits can only somewhat reduce the 
economic difficulties lone mothers and their children face after a divorce. 
The effects family policies have on the individual costs of having children in 
unstable unions are summed up in Table 4.1.       
Although only dual-earner policies reduce the negative effect of union in-
stability on fertility, all family policies can be expected to have a direct posi-
tive effect on fertility, as they reduce the costs of reproduction for individuals 
in stable unions. Hence,  
 
H3. Generous family policies should increase fertility.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
46
 This conclusion is limited to ordinary child benefits. It should be noted, however, that benefits targeted to 
lone mothers with economic difficulties, that is, those on social welfare, can help them out of outright poverty. 
Such targeted benefits can, in the short term, be very important for the economic well-being of women in 
precarious economic situations (e.g., see Uunk 2004; Whiteford & Adema 2007). However, social welfare also 
reduces divorced women’s incentives to be economically active in the short term, and therefore may prolong 
their welfare dependency and increase their poverty in the long run (Duncan et al. 1988). Thus, the long-term 
income effects of such targeted benefits are dubious.  
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Table 4.1. The effects of family policies on the individual costs of having children in 
unstable unions  
 
 
Dual-earner policies 
 
Breadwinner policies/ 
Child benefits 
Lost time with children  
 
No effect No effect 
Need for marital-specific invest-
ments in children during marriage 
Reduce Do not reduce 
Individual cost of marital-specific 
investments in children during 
marriage 
 
Reduce 
 
Do not reduce 
Cost of entering and maintaining 
contact with the labor market after a 
divorce 
 
Reduce 
 
Do not reduce 
Cost of providing care for children 
after a divorce 
Reduce Do not reduce 
Negative divorce effect on children’s 
economic and psychological well-
being  
 
Reduce 
 
Do not reduce/Reduce somewhat 
 
As long as union instability is high in most countries, the argument presented 
above can explain why generous dual-earner policies seem more effective 
than other, more traditional, generous family policies at raising fertility, tak-
ing a cross-national perspective. I argue below that it can also help explain 
why it has been so hard to prove the effectiveness of dual-earner policies 
with individual-level data, whereas it has been easier to do so with aggregate-
level fertility data. My argument is that the positive effect of generous family 
policies on fertility must not necessarily manifest as a positive effect on the 
fertility of women living in unions. Because the desire for children is an 
important motivation for union formation, it could also manifest itself as a 
positive effect on union formation. Both effects are likely to increase fertility, 
but by focusing on the former effect, previous individual-level studies are 
likely to have missed much of the effect of policies on fertility. Studies based 
on aggregate fertility data do not suffer from this oversight. This can likely 
explain why the latter studies have found it easier than the former studies to 
find that generous dual-earner policies have a positive effect on fertility. 
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Family policies and women’s incentives to 
form unions  
If asked, most modern people would almost certainly say that union for-
mation decisions are primarily driven by a demand for love, sex, and intima-
cy. The generosity of family policies would hardly be seen as an important 
reason why people choose to live together. However, the desires for love, 
sex, and intimacy are not the only reasons people form unions. The desire for 
children has historically been, and continues to be, a major motivation for 
union formation (Becker 1973; Buss 2007). Although it has probably de-
creased somewhat in importance over time, it is also likely to remain a major 
motivation for union formation for the foreseeable future (Burch & Matthews 
1987; Edlund 2006; Stevenson & Wolfers 2007). An individual who wants to 
have children, for example, is largely restricted to finding a partner and estab-
lishing a union with that partner before he/she can have children.47  
The fact that very few people have children without living with a partner 
(see below) creates a bond between the desire for children and union for-
mation that is stronger than that between the desire for love, sex, and intima-
cy and union formation. While it is difficult to have children without living 
with a partner, partners can have loving relationships, sex, and intimacy 
without living together. To see union formation as a transition from single-
hood to cohabitation or marriage is to downplay an important fact about 
relationships – that the choice to live together, in the overwhelming majority 
of cases, is taken within an already existing relationship.48 In the majority of 
cases in which two individuals choose to cohabit and/or marry, what happens 
is not that a new relationship is formed between two individuals; rather, two 
partners’ existing relationship is taken to a qualitatively new level. Thus, the 
desire for love, sex, and intimacy often leads to a relationship long before the 
partners decide to live together. This desire might have been the primary 
motivation for the relationship to begin with, but it is not necessarily the 
primary motivation for the couple’s decision to move in together and start a 
                                                          
47
 Even those seeking alternatives such as adoption and artificial insemination are mostly presumed to have 
partners. For example, in most countries it is more difficult for singles than couples to adopt children, if 
singles are allowed to adopt at all. Moreover, most people who adopt children have tried to have biological 
children before turning to adoption, which might be an indication that biological children are more highly 
valued than adopted children (Fisher 2003). 
48
 The only real exception to this picture is also the one that has received the most attention in the previous 
research – the “shotgun marriage” (e.g., see Alesina & Giuliano 2006). It has been an established truth in the 
field that pregnancies resulting from occasional sexual encounters in the past have led those involved to enter 
into a so-called “shotgun marriage” in order to save the woman from the shame of living as an unmarried 
mother. With currently available contraceptive techniques, however, shotgun marriages are an outdated 
phenomenon as the couple can choose to terminate the pregnancy (Sobotka & Toulemon 2008). 
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household. In the latter decision, the desire for children is likely to be at least 
as important as the desire for greater intimacy.  
Traits and characteristics that are positive for bearing and raising children 
have long been considered to be decisive for partner selection (Simpson & 
Gangestad 1992; Buss 2007). Evolutionary theorists in particular have em-
phasized the urge to reproduce as an important feature of human nature and 
behavior, of which mating is perhaps the most important. Studies also show 
that individuals rank parental qualities and preferences for children highly 
when they evaluate prospective partners (Simpson & Gangestad 1992; Regan 
& Berscheid 1997; Goodwin & Tinker 2002; Buss 2007). In short, there are 
both strong theoretical reasons and ample empirical evidence supporting the 
idea that the “demand” for children is one of the most important motivations 
for union formation.    
The demand for children is also at the centre of what is perhaps the most 
influential theory on union formation in the social sciences – the new home 
economics analysis of marriage. Although it focuses primarily on marriages, 
the new home economics theory of marriage can reasonably be generalized to 
apply to union formation at large.49 In its classic version it perceives marriage 
decisions as cost-benefit analyses, in which potential spouses weigh the costs 
and benefits of marriage against the costs and benefits of living alone (Becker 
1973; 1991). This choice basically boils down to how valuable the goods and 
services that can be produced in a potential marriage are in relation to the 
goods and services that potential spouses can produce on their own if they do 
not marry. If the former outweigh the latter, and there are no alternative mar-
riage prospects from which the potential spouses would benefit more, they 
choose to marry.  
The new home economics analysis of marriage acknowledges that love, 
sex, and intimacy can motivate decisions to marry. The main motivation for 
marrying, however, is assumed to be that spouses in a marriage can use their 
comparative advantages in production to maximize their joint production of 
market and nonmarket goods. As specialization is assumed to increase 
productivity, most marriages are hypothesized to build on a traditional divi-
sion of labor in which the spouses specialize in the productive spheres in 
which they have a comparative advantage over each other. One spouse (typi-
cally the man) is assumed to specialize in the production of market goods, 
whereas the other spouse (typically the woman) is assumed to specialize in 
                                                          
49
 Actually, this is in line with the original intentions of the theories that underpin the marriage market litera-
ture. In his 1973 classic essay on the topic, Becker already defined a household as any family constellation in 
which partners live together (his definition, in other words, includes cohabiting partners). However, in the 
empirical literature, households have overwhelmingly become associated with married partners.   
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the production of nonmarket goods. Characteristic examples of nonmarket 
goods and services are cleaning, laundry, homemade meals, and – above all – 
children.  
The productive advantage of specialization stems from the fact that most 
individuals who live alone must support themselves by working in the labor 
market. Consequently, they cannot specialize as efficiently as spouses can in 
the production of nonmarket goods. Thus, an advantage of marriage is that it 
allows one spouse to specialize in, and increase the production of, nonmarket 
goods while being supported by the spouse who specializes in the production 
of market goods. As all individuals need a limited amount of nonmarket 
goods, the division of labor that occurs within a marriage also means that the 
spouse who specializes in the production of market goods (i.e., the husband) 
can do so more effectively than individuals who live alone, as he receives the 
nonmarket goods he needs from his wife. Thus, married spouses have an 
advantage over unmarried individuals within their respective spheres of pro-
duction. As the head of the family is assumed to act altruistically toward the 
other family members, what matters is the family’s total production of market 
and nonmarket goods.  
For it to be rational for two people to marry, the total production of goods 
within their potential marriage must outweigh the value of the goods that they 
could produce on their own if they chose not to marry. The most important 
goods individuals can produce on their own are their market incomes (i.e., 
wages). If the incomes of two potential spouses are high enough, one or both 
could benefit more from continuing to work and instead buy the “nonmarket” 
goods and services they need in the market. All else being equal, increases in 
income opportunities therefore reduce the relative attractiveness of marriage 
and increase the relative attractiveness of living alone. The lower-earning 
spouse’s wage is especially likely to have a negative effect on the incentives 
to marry as specialization pays off better the more specialized the potential 
spouses are to begin with.  
 Given this, it is not surprising that the dominant explanation for the ob-
served decline in marriage rates in recent decades is the same as the explana-
tion for fertility decline – namely, the expansion of women’s earning oppor-
tunities. When women’s earning opportunities opened up during the 1950s 
and 1960s, the relative value of marriage declined, and women responded to 
the new incentives by participating in the labor force to a higher degree than 
in the past, and by postponing or forgoing marriage (Becker 1973; 1991; 
Oppenheimer 1988; Kalmijn 2007). Accordingly, the literature assumes a 
negative correlation between women’s earning opportunities (labor force 
participation) and marriage rates. Several researchers (e.g., see Wilson & 
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Neckerman 1986; Oppenheimer 1994; McLanahan & Casper 1995) have 
argued that this negative marriage trend has been aggravated by the fact that 
men’s wages have simultaneously dropped – both in real terms and relative to 
women’s wages – with the result that there are fewer “marriageable” men 
available today than has been the case historically. That is, today there are 
fewer men who earn the wages that would make it beneficial for women to 
marry and specialize in housework.  
The relative attractiveness of union formation is also affected by the value 
of investments in nonmarket goods. This value is, in turn, dependent on a 
number of factors, such as the cost of substitutes for nonmarket goods, such 
as bought meals, in the market (e.g., see Greenwood & Guner 2004; Goldin 
2006). However, by far the most important factor determining the value of 
investments in nonmarket goods is the opportunity cost of the production of 
the goods in question, and that opportunity cost is largely decided by wom-
en’s wages. The value of investments in nonmarket goods is thus likely to 
closely track women’s earning opportunities, and therefore there is every 
reason to assume women’s wages to be negatively related to their incentives 
to marry.50   
There are other types of unions besides marriage. However, all else being 
equal, a relatively low marriage rate should imply that relatively few women 
are living in unions. If we remain true to the original intentions in the new 
home economics literature and do not discriminate between marriage and 
cohabitation, there is even more reason to assume that the marriage rate 
should be positively correlated with the union formation rate. Given the as-
sumed close association between women’s earning opportunities and their 
incentives to marry, it is therefore reasonable to expect a negative association 
between women’s earning opportunities and their likelihood of forming un-
ions. Hence,  
 
H4. Good earning opportunities for women should reduce their likelihood 
of living in unions.  
 
As noted above, the desire for children is a major motivation for union for-
mation. However, not only are children one of the most desired nonmarket 
goods unions can produce, they are also one of the costliest investments 
spouses can make, especially in terms of opportunity costs. The relative value 
of investments in children is therefore likely to be highly correlated with the 
overall relative value of investments in the nonmarket goods unions can pro-
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 There are possible exceptions to this rule – see, for example, Neal (2004). 
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duce. The cost of reproduction can, because of this, be assumed to be a factor 
weighing heavily in people’s union formation decisions. To the extent that 
unions are necessary for producing children, all else being equal, low costs of 
reproduction should increase, and high costs of reproduction should reduce, 
potential spouses’ incentives to form a union. If two potential spouses feel 
that they will not benefit from having children because the division of labor 
necessary for such an investment would be too costly, not only are they un-
likely to have children, they are also unlikely to form a union since a major 
reason for forming a union is to make possible a division of labor that can 
produce children and other nonmarket goods. If the potential spouses would 
not benefit from having children after they have entered the union, the likeli-
hood that they would not benefit from forming the union at all increases.  
This means that the negative effect of women’s increased earning oppor-
tunities on fertility must not necessarily manifest itself in lower fertility 
among women in unions. It could also manifest itself in a lower likelihood of 
women forming unions. It also means that the effect of family policies that 
reduce the costs of reproduction must not necessarily manifest as an in-
creased likelihood of women in unions having children, but also could mani-
fest as an increased likelihood of women forming unions. Hence, 
 
H5. Generous family policies should increase the likelihood of women liv-
ing in unions.  
 
Given that the effect of dual-earner policies on women’s incentives to enter 
unions is largely dependent on such policies reducing the negative effect of 
women’s earning opportunities on their incentives to have children and enter 
unions, we should also expect that,  
 
H6. Generous dual-earner policies should mainly increase the likelihood 
of women living in unions by increasing the likelihood of women with 
good earning opportunities living in unions. 
 
The theoretical assumption of a positive association between union formation 
and fertility is strongly supported by the empirical evidence.  
Less than 10 percent of all first births in Europe take place outside unions 
(Kiernan 1999a, 1999b, 2004; Heuveline et al. 2003; Sobotka & Toulemon 
2008). Second and third births outside unions are even less common (ibid.). 
The cross-national correlation between the overall fertility rate and the num-
ber of women in unions is also positive and fairly strong (R .36), and it be-
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comes even stronger (R .67) if the U.K. and Ireland – two extreme outliers – 
are excluded (see also Sevilla Sanz 2009).51 
 
Figure 4.1. The percentage of women aged 18–45 in unions and the total fertility rate  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Comments: Pearson’s R .36 (increases to .67 if Ireland and the U.K. are excluded). Data on the total fertility 
rate represents the average yearly total fertility rates between 2002 and 2006 (source: Eurostat). A woman is 
counted as living in a union if she is married or if she cohabits with a partner with whom she is intimate. Data 
on the number of women in unions has been extracted from rounds 2 (2003–2004) and 3 (2005–2006) of the 
European Social Survey (author’s calculation).  
 
Given these facts, and the fact that young people form and break unions at 
different ages and rates in European countries, one would expect much of the 
research on how policies affect fertility to explore how policies affect union 
formation and union dissolution. However, overall rates of union formation 
and union dissolution and their interrelationship with policies and fertility are 
underexplored topics in the demographic literature (although see Baizán et al. 
2003, 2004; Blossfeld et al 2005; Sevilla Sanz 2009). First, most studies tend 
to be of the descriptive type. They seldom test hypotheses on possible causes 
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 The U.K. and Ireland are the only countries in the sample in which single motherhood is common and where 
more than 10 percent of first births take place outside unions (Kiernan 1999a; 1999b; 2004). In these countries, 
child-bearing follows a different logic from that in most countries in Europe. It is therefore reasonable to 
exclude them from the sample. 
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for observed differences between countries (e.g., see Schoenmaeckers & 
Lodewijckx 1999; Billari et al. 2001; Kiernan 2002; Kiernan 2004; Anders-
son 2003; Prioux 2006). To the extent that they do so, they focus almost 
exclusively on comparisons between two or three countries, which does not 
allow for separating the effects of different variables from each other (e.g., 
see Mulder et al. 2002 and Baizán et al. 2004). 
Second, and more important, the majority of studies do not focus on un-
ion formation and union disruption as such, but on the likelihood of particular 
forms of unions being formed and disrupted. That is, they focus on when and 
whether individuals cohabit and marry and how likely such unions are to last 
(e.g., see Kalmijn 2007). Overall rates of union formation and union dissolu-
tion and their relationship with fertility have received little attention (alt-
hough see Baizán et al. 2003, 2004; Blossfeld et al 2005; Sevilla Sanz 
2009).52  
Third, the few existing studies that discuss how policies affect living ar-
rangements have focused almost exclusively on how policies affect the tim-
ing of young adults leaving the parental home (Aassve et al. 2002; Billari et 
al. 2001; Holdsworth 2000; Mulder et al. 2002; Mulder 2006; see also Dalla 
Zuanna 2001 and Billari & Liefbroer 2007 for cultural explanations of home-
leaving patterns). The focus in these studies has either been on policies af-
fecting youth unemployment and youth wages and their effects on home 
leaving, or on policies and factors that affect the availability and cost of hous-
ing. The findings of the studies suggest that the age at which young adults 
leave the parental home is important for determining when they enter into 
their first unions, but that the effect varies between countries. Thus, there are 
both theoretical reasons and empirical evidence confirming that the age on 
leaving the parental home and the factors that affect it influence people’s 
likelihood of living with partners. Despite this, no study has explored how 
important the age on leaving the parental home is in relation to other factors – 
for example, family policies – in explaining contemporary union formation 
patterns in Europe.  
Only one cross-country study on the impact of policies on union for-
mation and fertility patterns exists to my knowledge (Blossfeld et al. 2005). 
The study, carried out by Hans-Peter Blossfeld and colleagues, concentrates 
on how welfare regimes shape the impact of labor market activity status on 
young people’s union formation and entry into parenthood in a number of 
industrialized countries. The upshot of the findings is that employment uncer-
                                                          
52
 This is likely to depend in part on the fact that the major economic theories in the field were developed when 
marriages constituted the overwhelming majority of households and cohabitation was still a marginal phenom-
enon.  
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tainty, which has risen in most countries, has a negative effect on men’s and 
women’s union formation and entry into parenthood in welfare regimes that 
allow women to combine a career with children. It also finds that unemploy-
ment uncertainty has a positive effect on women’s entry into unions and 
parenthood in conservative and more family-oriented welfare regimes, in 
which it is impossible to sustain a career while raising children. However, the 
study does not explore whether welfare regimes have an independent impact 
on the overall likelihood of young people entering unions and parenthood. 
Neither does it disentangle the impact of individual policies on young peo-
ple’s union formation. It does, however, show that young people’s labor 
market status has a uniform impact on their union formation and entry into 
parenthood in most of the studied countries. Thus, it seems to confirm that 
union formation and first births are endogenous processes in most countries 
(ibid; see also Blossfeld & Mills 2001).  
Even though both theory and empirical evidence indicate that union for-
mation decisions and fertility decisions are closely interrelated, previous 
studies on the relationship between policies and fertility have largely neglect-
ed the interrelatedness between the two decisions. By remaining blind to the 
fact that the positive effect of policies on fertility could manifest itself in high 
union formation rates as well as high fertility within unions, some of these 
studies are likely to have underestimated the effect of policies on fertility. 
The oversight does not constitute a problem for studies using aggregate-level 
fertility measures, as total fertility rates reflect all women’s fertility decisions 
regardless of their union status. It does, however, constitute a problem for 
studies using individual-level fertility data that only include women who live 
in unions (for examples of such studies, see Olah 1998; Hoem et al. 1999; 
Andersson et al. 2004). It also constitutes a problem for studies that, although 
they include women who live as singles, focus on second- and higher-order 
births (for examples of such studies, see Kravdal 1996; Hoem et al. 1999). As 
the overwhelming majority of women live in unions at the time they have 
their first child, such studies miss the fact that the samples of women who 
can have second- and higher-order births are likely to vary both in size and 
characteristics from one country to another. Actually, all studies that include 
singles are likely to underestimate the effect of policies on fertility as long as 
they control for women’s union status. The reason is that such controls will 
eat up the part of policies’ positive effect on fertility that is dependent on the 
policies’ positive effect on union formation. The only ways to avoid underes-
timating policies’ effect on fertility with individual-level data is to study the 
direct effect of policies on union formation, or to study the effect of policies 
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on women’s fertility without controlling for their union status. Previous stud-
ies have not done so. 
This could partially explain why many studies using individual-level fer-
tility data have failed to find substantial effects of the generosity of family 
policies on fertility, whereas studies using aggregated fertility data have been 
more successful in doing so. However, previous individual-level fertility 
studies’ focus on the fertility of women living in unions cannot explain why 
such studies have found it much more difficult to prove the effectiveness of 
dual-earner policies than the effectiveness of other family policies. It only 
makes it likely that many previous individual-level fertility studies have 
underestimated the effect of all family policies, including dual-earner poli-
cies, on fertility.  
To understand why it has been particularly difficult for previous individu-
al-level fertility studies to find a positive effect of generous dual-earner poli-
cies on fertility, we need to go back to the argument that dual-earner policies 
are likely to be more effective than breadwinner policies at raising fertility, 
because they more effectively reduce the negative effect of union instability 
on fertility. Together with the discussion above, this argument implies that 
much of the positive effect of generous dual-earner policies on fertility is 
likely to manifest itself in a positive effect on the likelihood of women living 
in unstable unions. All else being equal, union instability should therefore be 
higher in countries with generous dual-earner policies. This higher level of 
union instability is likely to hide a part of the positive effect of generous 
dual-earner policies on fertility in studies concentrating on within-union 
fertility. The reason that generous dual-earner policies, despite this, are likely 
to increase fertility is that the unstable unions would never have been realized 
in countries that lack generous dual-earner policies.  
 
Dual-earner policies and union instability  
I have argued that women who foresee the possibility of a union disruption 
are likely to work more and have fewer children than they would otherwise, 
as they have an incentive to self-insure against the consequences of lone 
motherhood. However, to the extent that the likelihood of union disruption 
can be anticipated, women’s best insurance against the consequences of lone 
motherhood would be to abstain from entering unstable unions at all.53 In-
stead, they would do better to wait and search for a partner with whom they 
can form a stable union. Investments in unions that are not likely to pay off 
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 This assumes that there are no other expected returns from the union that can compensate for the costs of the 
expected divorce. 
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are bad investments. Thus, the factors driving union instability do not neces-
sarily have to manifest themselves in highly unstable unions and low fertility 
within unstable unions. To the extent that the risk of union instability can be 
anticipated, they could also manifest themselves in a low likelihood of wom-
en entering unstable unions (see Peters 1986 for a similar argument). 
This means that generous dual-earner policies can be expected not only to 
increase the likelihood of women in unstable unions having children, but also 
to increase the likelihood of women entering unstable unions at all. Knowing 
that generous dual-earner policies reduce their incentives to self-insure 
against a divorce, women in countries with generous dual-earner policies will 
not only be more willing to have children in unstable unions, they will also 
be more willing to enter such unions, because they can afford to have chil-
dren in them. Even marital-specific investments in unstable unions can pay 
off in countries with generous dual-earner policies. In the absence of gener-
ous dual-earner policies the only way to self-insure against the risk of divorce 
is to engage in information gathering about potential partners until one is 
found with whom a permanent union can be formed.54 Women in countries 
that do not implement generous dual-earner policies are therefore likely to 
form stable unions only after long information gathering processes. This 
means that the samples of women in unions in countries that do, and do not, 
implement generous dual-earner policies will differ considerably. In the for-
mer countries, relatively many women will live in comparatively unstable 
unions. In the latter countries, relatively few women will live in comparative-
ly stable unions. 
As Ermisch (1986) notes, policies that improve the financial situation of 
lone mothers also have a negative effect on the stability of existing unions 
(see also Bishop 1980). This is because such policies reduce women’s finan-
cial dependency on their husbands. Together with the fact that women will be 
reluctant to form unstable unions in countries that lack generous dual-earner 
policies, this means that union instability, all else being equal, is likely to be 
higher in countries with generous dual-earner policies.  
Generous dual-earner policies are also likely to increase union instability 
for two other reasons. First, as argued in the section on dual-earner policies 
and the likelihood of women living in unions, the positive effect of generous 
dual-earner policies on union formation is likely to manifest itself primarily 
in a higher likelihood of women with high earning opportunities living in 
                                                          
54
 The search for suitable partners is usually carried out under uncertainty and with imperfect information of 
the match-quality of potential partners (Becker 1974). As a consequence, potential partners cannot know for 
certain whether a potential union will be stable or will end in a divorce. The potential partners may or may not 
complement each other well. 
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unions. Second, generous dual-earner policies increase the earning opportuni-
ties of mothers with young children by increasing their labor force participa-
tion. These observations indicate that generous dual-earner policies should be 
positively associated with the earning potentials of women in unions. As the 
new home economics analysis of marriage assumes union stability to be 
inversely related to women’s earning potentials, this also means that gener-
ous dual-earner policies, all else being equal, should be positively associated 
with union instability.  
One reason why the new home economics analysis of marriage assumes 
union stability to be inversely related to women’s earning potentials is that 
unions in which the woman has a high earning potential are less efficient than 
unions in which the woman has a low earning potential (Goldin 1990; Becker 
1991). It is simply less rewarding for women with high earning potentials to 
specialize in the production of nonmarket goods, and that being the case, the 
partners have few economic motives to remain in the union, other than to 
avoid the costs associated with a divorce.  
In most cases, women also risk greater economic losses than men in a di-
vorce, as women tend to have invested more than men in marital-specific 
human capital (Smock 1993, 1994; 2000; Joshi 1998; Poortman 2000; 
McKeever & Wolfinger 2001; McManus & DiPrete 2001; Uunk 2004; An-
dreß et al. 2006). Therefore, on average, women are likely to be more reluc-
tant than men to accept a divorce for economic reasons. However, women 
who have invested their human capital in the labor market are not as econom-
ically dependent on their husbands as are housewives who have invested their 
human capital in marital-specific skills. Women from the former group are 
therefore not as likely as women from the latter group to stay with their part-
ners for economic reasons if the quality of their union is poor (Ermisch 1986; 
Goldin 1990; Becker 1991; Kalmijn 2007). Most empirical studies on the 
topic also confirm that women’s labor force participation and relative earn-
ings are positively associated with their divorce probabilities (Poortman & 
Kalmijn 2002; Blossfeld & Mueller 2002; Jalovaara 2003; Kalmijn et al. 
2004, 2007; Kalmijn 2007 – though see Oppenheimer 1997). Hence,  
 
H7. Women with relatively high earning opportunities (i.e. women who 
work and study) should be more likely than women with relatively low 
earning opportunities (i.e. women outside the labor market) to live in un-
stable unions.  
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Given that generous dual-earner policies increase the likelihood of women in 
unions having high earning opportunities, we therefore have an additional 
reason, aside from the one presented above, for assuming that, 
 
H8. Generous dual-earner policies should increase the likelihood of 
women living in unstable unions.  
 
The generosity of dual-earner policies is not the only determinant of union 
instability. Several cultural factors have also been shown to be important for 
predicting union instability. Religiousness is one. Christianity and most other 
major religions condemn divorce. Religious individuals therefore have to pay 
a heavier psychological price for a divorce than their secular sisters. In line 
with this expectation, church members, frequent church attendees, and indi-
viduals who marry within their own denominations have been shown to be 
less likely to divorce than more secular individuals (Lehrer & Chiswick 
1993; Lehrer 2004; Kalmijn et al. 2004; Kalmijn et al. 2005).  
Also, liberal values that are not directly related to religiousness, for ex-
ample, gender-egalitarian and post-materialist values, have been shown to 
increase the risk of union disruption (Axinn & Thornton 1992; Lillard et al. 
1995). They have been shown to do so both directly and indirectly, by in-
creasing the chance of individuals choosing to cohabit instead of marrying. 
Cohabiting unions are more likely than marriages to end in a separation 
(ibid.; Hoem & Hoem 1992; Kiernan 2000; Heuveline & Timberlake 2004). 
There are, for example, more legal obstacles (i.e., costs) associated with 
dissolving a marriage than with dissolving a union built on cohabitation. 
However, the most important reason why unions built on cohabitation are 
more likely than marriages to end in separation is that cohabiters differ from 
married individuals in their value orientations (Axinn & Thornton 1992; 
Lillard et al. 1995; Clarkberg et al. 1995). Differences in value orientations 
can also explain why marriages in which at least one spouse has experienced 
unmarried cohabitation are more likely to end in divorce than marriages in 
which neither spouse has lived with a partner without being married (Axinn 
& Thornton 1992; Hoem & Hoem 1992; Lillard et al. 1995; Kiernan 2002; 
Liefbroer & Dourleijn 2006).  
Although there is no necessary connection between the cultural and eco-
nomic factors that affect divorce probabilities, both indicators correlate high-
ly with each other. The female labor force participation rate, for example, 
correlates positively with indicators of secularism and post-materialist value 
orientations (Inglehart & Norris 2004). Similar patterns can be found at the 
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micro level.55 All macro indicators of union instability, moreover, correlate 
positively with the generosity of dual-earner policies. Thus, there are not only 
theoretical, but also empirical, reasons for assuming a positive correlation 
between generous dual-earner policies and union instability.  
As the positive effect of generous dual-earner policies on fertility is de-
pendent on the fact that dual-earner policies reduce the negative effect of 
union instability on fertility, the generosity of dual-earner policies is likely to 
have a stronger effect on within-union fertility in countries with generous 
dual-earner policies.  
This can likely explain why it has been so difficult to find a positive ef-
fect of generous dual-earner policies on fertility using individual-level data. 
The samples of women in unions simply differ too much systematically be-
tween countries for it to be possible to detect the effect without taking the 
different sample characteristics into account. Women in unions in countries 
that implement generous dual-earner policies cannot be compared to the 
smaller and more select group of women who live in unions in countries that 
do not implement such policies. If they are compared, the negative effect of 
union instability on fertility will mask the positive effect of generous dual-
earner policies on fertility. All else being equal, it is unlikely that there are 
any countries in the developed world in which union instability is high and 
the generosity of dual-earner policies is low and thus could help reveal the 
positive effect of generous dual-earner policies on fertility. Therefore, it is 
not surprising that so few studies using individual-level data have found a 
positive effect of dual-earner policies on fertility. To detect the positive effect 
of generous dual-earner policies on fertility using micro-level data, one must 
control for the fact that union instability is much higher in countries with 
generous dual-earner policies.56 
In a worst-case scenario the sample differences could even cause gener-
ous dual-earner policies to be negatively associated with within-union fertili-
ty. It suffices that the positive effect of generous dual-earner policies does not 
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 Married women who have never lived with a partner without being married, for example, tend to be more 
specialized into care work and housework than married women who have cohabited (Batalova & Cohen 2002). 
This empirical pattern can to some extent be explained by pointing out that women with more liberal, less 
religious, and more gender-egalitarian value orientations choose to cohabit, whereas women with more tradi-
tional value orientations choose to marry directly, and that these values affect their household behavior  (i.e. by 
a selection effect) (Axinn & Thornton 1992; Clarkberg et al. 1995; Batalova & Cohen 2002). It can also be 
explained by saying that women who take on traditional gender roles (i.e., those who marry) rationalize their 
behavior by adopting more traditional value orientations. 
56
 This conclusion is equally valid for studies that explore how variation over time in the generosity of dual-
earner policies affects fertility. 
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reduce all of the negative effect of union instability on fertility for such a 
scenario to happen. 
However, as long as the differences in union stability depend on the fact 
that generous dual-earner policies increase women’s willingness to form 
unstable unions instead of remaining single, this is no reason to doubt that 
generous dual-earner policies have a positive effect on fertility. All things 
considered, women who are living in unstable unions are more likely to have 
children than women who are living as singles.  
Neither do the systematic differences in union instability that depend on 
cultural factors unrelated to, but correlated with, the generosity of dual-earner 
policies threaten the conclusion that generous dual-earner policies should 
increase fertility. On the contrary, in any country that has implemented gen-
erous dual-earner policies, the fertility rate is higher than it would be had they 
not done so.   
However, the negative effect of generous dual-earner policies on the sta-
bility of already existing unions is likely to dilute such policies’ positive 
effect on fertility. This is partly because union instability reduces within-
union fertility, and partly because union instability reduces women’s likeli-
hood of living in unions by increasing their likelihood of union disruption. In 
theory, the latter effect could even outweigh the positive effect that generous 
dual-earner policies have on women’s likelihood of living in unions, by in-
creasing their likelihood of union formation.57 Thus, it is an open question 
whether generous dual-earner policies has a more positive effect on fertility 
than more traditional family policies. It is even an open question whether 
generous dual-earner policies have a positive effect on fertility at all. Every-
thing hinges on two empirical questions: 1) How strong is the positive impact 
of dual-earner policies on women’s likelihood of union formation in relation 
to their positive impact on women’s likelihood of union dissolution? 2) How 
effective are generous dual-earner policies at reducing the negative effect of 
union instability on fertility and to what degree is union instability driven by 
factors other than the generosity of dual-earner policies? 
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 The fact that generous dual-earner policies increase women’s options outside marriage also constitutes 
reason for doubting their effect on union formation. As Rasul (2003) argues, policies that increase the likeli-
hood of divorce can dilute the value of marriage and discourage people from marrying. However, as Alesina 
and Giuliano (2006) argue, such policies also lower the costs of entering bad marriages, and so they are 
equally likely to have a positive effect on people’s willingness to marry.   
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A summary of the argument  
This chapter started with a criticism of Becker’s idea of family altruism. It 
was proposed that it is more realistic to assume that spouses prioritize their 
own interests before those of their partners, instead of assuming that they act 
altruistically toward each other. From this it follows that women in unstable 
unions have an incentive to self-insure against the possibility of a divorce by 
working more and having fewer children than they would otherwise. If they 
do not, they must pay the full price of the marital-specific investments that 
are necessary for having children, whereas they risk receiving only a part of 
the value of these investments in the event of a divorce.  
This can explain why generous dual-earner policies have been found to be 
more effective at raising fertility than generous breadwinner policies have 
been. In contrast to breadwinner policies, dual-earner policies reduce the 
need for, and cost of, child-related marital-specific investments. Generous 
dual-earner policies, moreover, also assure parents that they can provide for 
their children’s needs in the event of a divorce. In short, they reduce wom-
en’s incentive to reduce fertility as a means to self-insure against the possibil-
ity of a divorce. Given that other family policies do not do so, it is not sur-
prising that previous studies have found dual-earner policies to be more ef-
fective than other family policies at raising fertility.   
Because fertility and union formation decisions are closely interrelated, 
generous dual-earner policies are also likely to increase women’s willingness 
to enter unstable unions. In the absence of generous dual-earner policies, 
women’s best strategy to self-insure against a divorce is to avoid entering an 
unstable union and continue searching for a stable union. Therefore, both 
union formation rates and union instability should be higher in countries with 
generous dual-earner policies.  
The fact that union stability is likely to be higher in countries that have 
implemented generous dual-earner policies can explain why it has been par-
ticularly difficult to prove the effectiveness of such policies at raising fertility 
using individual-level fertility data. Previous studies using this type of data 
have mainly focused on how policies affect the fertility of women who are 
living in unions. They have done so without accounting for the fact that the 
effect of dual-earner policies is likely to vary with union stability, or that 
union instability varies between countries. Thus, these studies have likely 
missed both dual-earner policies’ positive effect on union formation and their 
relatively strong positive effect on the fertility of women who are living in 
unstable unions. Studies using aggregated fertility data do not suffer from 
these weaknesses, as they, by nature, incorporate all direct and indirect policy 
effects on fertility, disregarding how they manifest themselves at the individ-
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ual level. It is therefore unsurprising that the former studies have found it 
more difficult than the latter to find a positive effect of generous dual-earner 
policies on fertility. The argument is presented in its entirety in Figure 4.2.  
To sum up, the interrelatedness between fertility decisions and decisions 
about union formation and union dissolution stressed in this chapter can po-
tentially explain both why dual-earner policies seem more effective than 
other policies at raising fertility and why it has been so difficult to prove the 
effectiveness of such policies with individual-level fertility data, whereas it 
has been easier to do so with aggregate-level fertility data. Thus, it can solve 
the two paradoxes that were observed in the review of the research on the 
effect of family policies on fertility. The argument presented in this chapter 
also implies that, overall, previous individual-level fertility studies have un-
derestimated the positive effect of generous family policies on fertility.  
 
Figure 4.2. Dual-earner policies’ effect on union formation, union instability, and fertility 
 
Comments: Thick arrows indicate positive effects. Dashed arrows indicate negative effects.  
 
As was noted at the end of the chapter, however, it is not certain that the 
positive effect dual-earner policies have on fertility, by affecting women’s 
union formation and within-union fertility, outweighs the negative effect such 
policies have on fertility, by increasing union instability. The argument’s 
credibility, thus, hinges on the empirical question of how strong the effects 
on women’s union formation, within-union fertility, and union instability are 
relative each other. In the next chapter, I develop a strategy to answer this 
question and test the overall validity of the argument.   
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4 
The design of the study  
 
This chapter discusses how to test the hypotheses presented in Chapter 4. 
First, I consider how to define and operationalize the main variables – unions, 
union instability, and the generosity of dual-earner and other family policies. 
I then discuss suitable data for testing the hypotheses. Thereafter, I consider 
the overall design of the study. The chapter concludes with a brief presenta-
tion of the layout of the different parts of the empirical study and a discussion 
of how they relate to each other.    
 
The main dependent and independent  
variables  
Chapter 4 evolved around three issues. First, it was discussed how union 
instability and the generosity of family policies, and then especially dual-
earner policies, shape women’s fertility decisions. Second, it was discussed 
how the generosity of family policies shapes women’s union formation deci-
sions. Third, it was discussed how the generosity of dual-earner policies 
affects union instability. In order to test the hypotheses that concluded the 
discussion it is therefore necessary to define and measure “unions,” “union 
instability” and “the generosity of dual-earner and other family policies.” I 
start by discussing how to define and measure “unions.”  
 
Unions 
As has been pointed out, I define a “union” as an intimate relationship in 
which the partners live together in a household. A union is not to be equated 
with a household (e.g., see Ellickson 2008). Neither is it to be equated with 
an intimate relationship. Two individuals can share a household without 
living in a union, and they can also have an intimate relationship without 
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sharing a household. To be counted as living in a union, an individual must 
both have an intimate relationship and live in a household with the intimate 
partner.  
Even though the legal differences between unions built on cohabitation 
and unions built on marriage are smaller today than they have been historical-
ly, most countries still make a clear legal distinction between the two types of 
unions. Despite this, I do not distinguish between them when I define unions. 
The reason is that both kinds of unions represent a willingness to engage in 
joint household production with an intimate partner. The economic incentives 
to engage in joint household production might differ between the two kinds 
of unions, but they still signal a readiness to engage in joint household pro-
duction – for example having children – at some level (e.g., see Kornhauser 
1993). Intimate relationships in which the partners do not share the same 
household do not signal a similar readiness to have children.  
To be able to measure whether an individual lives in a union there is thus 
a need for data on whether the individual is married or cohabits with a partner 
without being married.  
 
Union instability   
I define “union instability” as the likelihood of a partner in a union choosing 
to leave his/her partner. As far as marriages are concerned, this likelihood is 
equivalent to the likelihood of divorce. In cases where unions are built on 
cohabitation, it is equivalent to the likelihood of the partners breaking up 
their relationship and moving apart permanently.  
 It is not possible to measure the likelihood of union disruption directly, 
so it must be estimated indirectly. Numerous studies have identified factors 
that affect the likelihood of union disruption and divorce. I have chosen to 
use some of these factors as proxies for union instability. More specifically, I 
have chosen to use women’s union histories as indicators of the stability of 
their current unions. First, I make a distinction between women who cohabit 
and women who are married. It is an established fact that unions built on 
cohabitation are less stable than unions built on marriage (Hoem & Hoem 
1992; Manting 1994; Teachman et al. 1991; Trussell et al. 1992; Ermisch & 
Francesconi 2000; Smock 2000; Manning et al. 2004; Liefbroer & Dourleijn 
2006). This can partially be explained by observing that unions built on co-
habitation are less costly to break up than unions built on marriage (e.g., see 
Oppenheimer 1988). The legal costs of breaking up unions built on marriage, 
for example, are higher than those of breaking up unions built on cohabita-
tion. Social norms also tend to condemn divorce more, and thus divorce is 
also more costly in social terms than are other forms of union disruption. In 
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addition, people tend to invest less in unions built on cohabitation than in 
marriages, and therefore the loss of investment when the union is dissolved is 
often lower in unions built on cohabitation (Rindfuss & Vandenheuvel 1990; 
Kornhauser 1993¸ Clarkberg 1999). Because of these characteristics, cohabi-
tation is often viewed as a kind of trial marriage, which does not signal the 
same degree of commitment as marriage (e.g., see Balakrishnan et al. 1987; 
Bennett et al. 1988; Oppenheimer 1988; DeMaris & Rao 1992; Klijzing 
1992; Lillard et al. 1995; Clarkberg 1999; Ermisch & Francesconi 2000).  
The most important explanation for why unions built on cohabitation are 
less stable than unions built on marriage, however, is not the different charac-
teristics of the two types of unions, but the different characteristics of the 
people who choose either to cohabit or marry. Because cohabitation repre-
sents less commitment than marriage, it is a family form that tends to attract a 
disproportionate number of individuals who lack strong commitments to their 
relationships and/or have relatively unconventional views on family obliga-
tions. People who have stronger commitments to their relationships and/or 
who have more traditional views on family obligations tend to be more at-
tracted by marriage. Consequently, cohabiters on average tend to express less 
commitment to their relationships and in general be more accepting than 
married people of terminating intimate relationships. These selection effects 
can explain much of the difference in the likelihood of union disruption be-
tween cohabiters and married people (Balakrishnan et al. 1987; Bennett et al. 
1988; Teachman et al. 1991; Thomson & Colella 1992; Axinn & Thornton 
1992; DeMaris & Rao1992; DeMaris & MacDonald 1993; Lillard et al. 
1995; Berrington & Diamond 1999; Liefbroer & Dourleijn 2006).  
In addition to distinguishing between unions built on cohabitation and 
marriage, I also distinguish between marriages in which the wife has experi-
enced unmarried cohabitation and those in which she has not. Several studies 
have shown that marriages in which one or both partners have experienced 
unmarried cohabitation are more likely to end in divorce than those where the 
partners have not experienced unmarried cohabitation, regardless of whether 
they had cohabited with the partners to whom they are married, or to other 
partners (Balakrishnan et al. 1987; Bennett et al. 1988; DeMaris & Rao 1992; 
Haskey 1992; Hoem & Hoem 1992; Trussell et al. 1992; Bracher et al. 1993; 
Manting 1994; Hall & Zhao 1995; Lillard et al. 1995; Berrington & Diamond 
1999; Teachman 2003; Kamp Dush et al. 2004; Amato 2010 – although see 
Schoen 1992). This can mainly be explained by the same selection effect that 
explains why cohabiters are more prone than married people to break up their 
unions. Married women and men who have experienced unmarried cohabita-
tion tend to be less committed to their relationships and have less traditional 
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views on divorce than married woman and men who have not experienced 
unmarried cohabitation (Balakrishnan et al. 1987; Bennett et al. 1988; 
Teachman et al. 1991; Thomson & Colella 1992; Axinn & Thornton 1992; 
DeMaris & Rao 1992; DeMaris & MacDonald 1993; Lillard et al. 1995; 
Berrington & Diamond 1999; Liefbroer & Dourleijn 2006; Stanley et al. 
2006; Amato 2010). The experience of cohabitation, in short, functions as a 
proxy both for partners’ degree of commitment to each other and for their 
general attitudes toward divorce.  
Some researchers argue that the cohabiting experience in itself has an ad-
ditional positive effect on the likelihood of future divorce, because people 
who cohabit tend to rationalize their lifestyle and experiences by adapting 
less traditional values (Booth & Johnson 1988; Thomson & Colella 1992; 
Axinn & Thornton 1992). Others have instead argued that the cohabiting 
experience should reduce the likelihood of divorce, by weeding out bad un-
ions before marriage (Brüderl et al. 1997; Brüderl & Kalter 2001). Even if 
the effect of the experience of cohabitation on the likelihood of divorce is 
negative, however, it is clearly dominated by the selection effect, as numer-
ous studies show that the experience of cohabitation increases married indi-
viduals’ likelihood of divorcing.58 
The resulting categorization of union instability distinguishes between 
three types of unions, with union stability being higher for each category: i) 
unions built on cohabitation, ii) marriages in which the woman has experi-
enced unmarried cohabitation, and iii) marriages in which the woman has not 
experienced unmarried cohabitation.  
In addition, I also distinguish between unions according to how many 
children the woman in the union has had. Previous research has shown that 
unions that result in children tend to be more stable than unions that do not, 
especially when the children are young (Teachman et al. 1991; Bracher et al. 
1993; Hall & Zhao 1995; Lillard et al. 1995; Andersson 1997; Berrington & 
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 It should be noted that some studies (e.g., see Schoen 1992 and Liefbroer & Dourleijn 2006) argue that this 
phenomenon is not universal and that former cohabiters do not have a lower likelihood of divorce than those 
who have never cohabited in some countries (especially those with “average” levels of cohabitation). Howev-
er, these results do not necessarily threaten the operationalization of union instability used in this study. The 
reason is that the mentioned studies control for the duration of the total union (including the time married 
women and men have cohabited prior to their marriage), whether parents have experienced a divorce, and the 
age at the start of the union. Due to a limitation of data, my study does not control for these factors, which 
have all been proven in previous research to increase the likelihood of union dissolution. Because they are all 
positively correlated with unmarried cohabitation prior to marriage (especially the first and last factors), some 
of the effects of these variables are captured by my operationalization of union instability. Thus, the experi-
ence of cohabitation is very likely to be positively associated with the likelihood of union dissolution in my 
data set even if the association in fact would have turned out to be spurious if more control variables had been 
used in the regressions.  
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Diamond 1999). One reason for this is that it is mainly stable unions that 
result in children. Another reason is that children tend to increase the value of 
a union, and in that way increase the incentives to stay in the union (and also 
increase the cost of dissolving it). The distinction made above, therefore, is 
likely to be a better indicator of union instability the fewer children a woman 
has. It is likely to be most valid for childless women and then decline in va-
lidity for each child that a woman has.  
Although it might seem crude, my operationalization of union instability 
has the advantage of summing up many of the factors that have been proven 
to affect union instability in previous research. First, it is to a large extent 
identical with the distinctions made between different kinds of unions in the 
Second Demographic Transition literature. Thus, it neatly sums up the influ-
ence of a range of ideational factors that have been proven, or argued, to 
affect the likelihood of union disruption. It is also easier to identify and statis-
tically handle the resulting categorization of demographic behaviors than it 
would be to handle all ideational and relational indicators of union instability 
individually.  
Second, it is possible to link the categorization with several economic fac-
tors that have been shown, or argued, to affect union instability. In addition to 
the factors mentioned above (that it is less costly to break up unions built on 
cohabitation and that children increase the value of a union), cohabitation has 
also been shown to be positively associated with women’s labor force partic-
ipation (Kalmijn 2007). Women’s labor market attachment has been shown 
to be positively associated with the likelihood of union disruption in many 
studies (e.g,. see Bracher et al. 1993; South 2001; Teachman 2002; Kalmijn 
2007). 
Although the associations described above have been proven in previous 
research, in Chapter 6 I show that they are also reflected in the data set used 
in this study. The likelihood of women cohabiting is closely associated both 
with women’s value orientations (religiosity) and their economic independ-
ence (labor force participation).     
In addition to its close proximity to ideational and economic factors that 
have been proved to affect union instability, my operationalization also has 
the advantage of focusing on observed demographic behavior. Individuals 
who choose to cohabit, regardless of whether they choose to marry later on, 
by their choice reveal a willingness to break traditional norms. In a similar 
way, individuals who choose to marry before they move in with their partners 
demonstrate a readiness to adhere to traditional norms. In short, the choice of 
family form, in a very direct way, reveals an individual’s willingness to break 
from or adhere to traditional norms regarding family life. Other factors that 
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are commonly used to predict union instability, for example, women’s labor 
force participation and church attendance, do not do so in such a direct way. 
One example of this is that almost half of all women work, even in countries 
such as Italy, Spain, Greece, and Ireland, in which divorce is almost unheard 
of. In contrast, very few women cohabit or have experienced unmarried co-
habitation in such countries. Although both the cohabitation rate and the 
female labor force participation rate correlate highly with the divorce rate, the 
cohabitation rate, thus, seems to better track the actual level of the divorce 
rate.     
This close association between the cohabitation rate and the divorce rate 
is not surprising. Most theories assume various types of norm-breaking fami-
ly behavior to reflect responses to similar underlying ideational and/or eco-
nomic conditions. Observed norm-breaking behavior in one area of family 
life, such as cohabitation, is therefore likely to be closely associated with 
norm-breaking behavior in other areas of family life, for example, divorce. 
An individual who has chosen to break traditional norms of family behavior 
once is likely to do so in the future, also. Cohabitation and past experience of 
cohabitation are therefore likely to be better indicators of union instability 
than indicators that are supposed to more directly measure the numerous 
ideational and economic factors that have been suggested to be the ultimate 
source of union instability. At least they are so as long as the latter indicators 
do not very accurately capture the dimensions they are supposed to capture.  
This conclusion is emphasized by the fact that the previous research has 
found demographic factors (i.e., observed demographic behavior) to be more 
important than socioeconomic factors in predicting divorce. Cohabitation and 
past experience of cohabitation, together with the number and age of chil-
dren, are among the most important such factors. Only the age at the start of 
the union, parents’ experience of divorce, and the duration of the union are 
predictors of similar importance.59 Cohabitation, the experience of cohabita-
tion, and the number of children a woman has had are, in short, among the 
most reliable predictors of union instability available.  
                                                          
59
 Unfortunately, the latter indicators are unavailable in the data set I use (see below). They are, however, all 
positively associated with cohabitation and past experience of cohabitation, and therefore much of their effect 
on the likelihood of divorce is captured by my operationalization of union instability. Cohabiting unions tend 
to start at younger ages than marriages, and individuals whose parents have experienced a divorce are more 
likely to cohabit than those people whose parents have not divorced. Marriages in which at least one partner 
has experienced unmarried cohabitation also tend to have lasted a shorter time than marriages in which neither 
partner has cohabited (for the simple reason that many of the marriages in which the partners have cohabited 
started out as cohabiting unions).    
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To measure union instability there is, thus, a need for data on how many 
children a woman has had, whether she cohabits, is married and has cohabit-
ed, or if she is married and has not experienced unmarried cohabitation.  
Although cohabitation and past experience of cohabitation are very good 
proxies for union instability, there is one theoretical problem with interpret-
ing their possible effects as effects of union instability proper. This problem 
is that cohabitation and past experience of cohabitation do not represent only 
an increased likelihood of union disruption, they also represent all the values, 
traits, and experiences they are assumed to sum up. This makes it difficult to 
tell with certainty whether the found effects really are effects of the likeli-
hood of union disruption. In theory, the effects could also be caused by other 
factors associated with the values, traits, and experiences in question. This 
ambiguity is, unfortunately, unavoidable. The results presented in the follow-
ing chapters are therefore potentially open to other interpretations than the 
story I tell. However, in the absence of a better story, I hold mine to be the 
most credible. 
 
The generosity of dual-earner policies 
To qualify as a dual-earner policy a family policy should reduce the individu-
al costs of reproduction by helping parents combine work and family respon-
sibilities. In other words, it should make marital-specific human capital in-
vestments in children less costly, or unnecessary. To be more specific, dual-
earner policies should compensate parents individually for the forgone earn-
ings and lost human capital accumulation that having children entails, with-
out forcing the parents to neglect their children’s need for care. To the extent 
that parents need to provide care for their children, dual-earner policies 
should compensate them individually for their forgone earnings. Otherwise, 
dual-earner policies should strive to make it easier for the parents to work, in 
order to minimize their forgone earnings and loss of human capital accumula-
tion. To sum up, dual-earner policies should help parents maintain the in-
come and earning prospects they had before they had children (i.e., eliminate 
the family gap between women’s and men’s wages; see Waldfogel 1998b), 
without making their children suffer.60    
For reasons discussed in Chapter 4, only two policies live up to these cri-
teria: paid parental leaves with high (wage-related) replacement rates, and 
subsidies for high-quality child care. In theory, the provision of part-time 
jobs also helps parents combine work and child-care responsibilities. Despite 
                                                          
60
 My definition of dual-earner policies is close to Gornick & Meyers’ (2004) definition of “dual-earner/dual-
carer” family policies. The emphasis is as much on how policies affect children’s well-being as on how they 
affect parents’ ability to combine work and family duties.  
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this, I have chosen not to count it as a dual-earner policy.61 The reason is that 
the availability of part-time jobs is not entirely up to the state, but also de-
pends on private actors in the labor market. Thus, the availability of part-time 
jobs is not necessarily a good indicator of the generosity of government poli-
cies. It could also reflect factors outside government control, such as the 
willingness and ability of private employers to provide part-time jobs. Part-
time employment has also been shown to contribute to the wage penalty 
women experience when having children (Waldfogel 1997). Because of this, 
I have chosen to treat the provision of part-time jobs separately from other 
dual-earner policies.   
An important issue that arises when trying to measure the generosity of 
dual-earner policies is whether to measure the generosity of policies individ-
ually or to estimate the policies’ combined generosity. I have opted for the 
latter solution. Family policies tend to come as parts of comprehensive family 
policy packages (Gauthier 1996, 2002; Sainsbury 1996; Korpi 2000; Esping-
Andersen et al. 2002; Gornick & Meyers 2004; Engster & Olofsdotter 
Stensöta 2011). The generosity of individual policies in such packages says 
something about how much the policies reduce the individual costs of repro-
duction in a country. However, to get the complete picture it is necessary to 
estimate how the combined generosity of all policies in the package affects 
the costs of different work-care strategies. This is because policies affect each 
other’s value.  
For example, some policies can reduce the value of other policies. Parents 
who choose to put their children into state-provided child care, for example, 
cannot use parental leave benefits for the time they do so, and vice versa. As 
a consequence, the combined generosity of policies is often lower than the 
generosities the individual policies seem to indicate taken separately. This 
fact often makes it difficult to measure how generous individual policies 
really are. For example, Denmark, which offers parents relatively short paid 
parental leaves, compensates parents by providing them with affordable high-
quality subsidized child care. As a consequence, child-care enrollment rates 
are extremely high in Denmark. In Sweden, which offers parents longer paid 
parental leaves, parents can stay home for a couple of months more and thus 
                                                          
61
 It has been argued that the provision of part-time jobs is a strategy that implicitly assumes spouses to agree 
to a traditional division of labor and therefore should be characterized as a breadwinner policy and not a dual-
earner policy (e.g., see Waldfogel 1997 and Gornick & Meyers 2004). Despite this criticism, I primarily see 
the provision of part-time jobs as a kind of dual-earner policy. The reason is that it reduces the individual costs 
of reproduction. It does not do so entirely, but neither do paid parental leaves nor subsidized child care. The 
difference between these latter policies and the provision of part-time jobs is in practice a question of the 
degree of compensation that the policies offer. In some cases, the latter policy actually offers parents better 
compensations than the former policies for the individual costs of reproduction.  
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do not need to use child-care facilities to the same extent as Danish parents. 
This has led to child-care enrollment rates that are lower than those in Den-
mark. On the basis of these differences in child-care enrollment rates it could 
be tempting to conclude that Denmark has more generous child-care subsi-
dies than Sweden. However, in reality Swedish child-care subsidies are likely 
to be nearly as generous as the Danish ones. A more reasonable interpretation 
of the statistics is that Swedish parents prefer to use their longer parental 
leaves instead of sending their children to child-care centers.  
Although parents, because of the different policy incentives, follow 
somewhat different work-care strategies in Denmark and Sweden, the indi-
vidual costs of reproduction are likely to be rather similar in both countries. 
The fact that Swedish parents choose to stay at home a couple of months 
more than Danish parents is not likely to have a profound impact on their 
experienced costs of reproduction. Thus, family policy packages that include 
different individual policies can offer parents similar degrees of compensa-
tion for the individual costs of reproduction.  
Family policies do not necessarily need to overlap. They can also com-
plement each other so that their total value becomes greater than it would be 
if each policy were to stand by itself. The reason is that individual policies 
can be rendered useless if they do not come as part of a larger package of 
policies that complement them. A drastic example would be a country that 
had very generous subsidies for child care, but at the same time did not offer 
parents the right to parental leave. In such a country, parents would need to 
quit their jobs to be at home with their children. However, if they did that, 
they could not use the generous child-care subsidies offered by the state. 
Although no country supports such policies in reality, the example clearly 
illustrates how dual-earner policies are dependent on each other for their 
value. Mothers have also been argued to face fewer career disruptions in 
countries in whih they can make a smooth transition from a paid parental 
leave to public child care services (Gornick et al. 1997; OECD 2007).  
This interdependence makes it important to measure the combined gener-
osity of dual-earner policies – that is, paid parental leaves and subsidies for 
child care. To do so I have constructed a dual-earner index, which measures 
the combined generosity of paid parental leave and subsidies for child care 
during a child’s first three years of life. The reason for focusing only on the 
child’s first three years is that an overwhelming majority of the children 
above the age of three in Europe are enrolled in professional child care 
(OECD 2007). It is those dual-earner policies affecting the child’s first three 
years of life that are most varied in terms of their generosity.  
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The generosity of parental leave benefits is calculated by multiplying the 
length of the parental leave (in number of weeks, with an upper limit of 52 
weeks) with its replacement level (in percentage of the average wage). The 
product is then divided by 52 (the maximum number of weeks that a leave 
can have, according to how I count it). The resulting figure represents the 
percentage of her wage a woman receives (with the assumption that she earns 
100 percent of the average wage in a country) if she stays at home with her 
child for one year.62  
 
Generosity of parental leaves = Replacement rate (in % of average in-
come) * Duration (in weeks divided with 52 (maximum 52))  
 
The reason for limiting the time period to a year is that longer parental leaves 
have been shown to reduce women’s labor force participation and incur huge 
losses of human capital accumulation (Gornick & Meyers 2003). It could, 
because of this, be questioned whether the provision of parental leaves that 
go beyond one year really should be defined as a dual-earner policy. I have 
chosen not to do so. In practice, this has the consequence of decreasing the 
value of long low-paid parental leaves. Very few highly paid parental leaves 
extend for more than a year, and those that do so seldom go more than a 
month or two beyond the one-year period. The largest consequence of my 
limitation, therefore, is to disqualify low-paid parental leaves from being 
counted fully as dual-earner policies. The kinds of long low-paid maternity 
leaves that can be found in countries such as Austria and Germany, which 
sometimes offer compensations for more than three years, are only counted 
during the first year they offer compensation. Additional years are not count-
ed.63      
The generosity of subsidized child care is measured by two dimensions: 
availability and cost (or rather how much the state reduces the cost). The 
availability dimension is measured as the percentage of 0- to 3-year-old chil-
dren in child care in a country. The cost dimension is measured by how much 
                                                          
62
 Thus, I assume that parents do not share the cost resulting from that one of them (usually the woman) take 
up parental leave. This assumption is questionable as it is not unreasonable to expect parents to share the 
income shortfall resulting from one of them taking up parental leave. However, from a substantial point of 
view it does not matter much which assumption we use when calculating the degree of compensation parental 
leaves offer. The two assumptions lead to versions of the dual-earner index that correlate as highly as .98.  
63
 An alternative strategy would be to follow Morgan and Zippel (2003) and others and exclude low paid and 
flat rate parental leaves of long duration entirely from the equation. However, although such leaves do not 
offer the same degree of compensation as wage related parental leaves they nonetheless offer mothers some 
compensation. Thus, the difference between the two types of leaves is a matter of degree. Because of this, I 
have chosen to follow a less radical strategy than the one adopted by Morgan and Zippel.        
             THE DESIGN OF THE STUDY 
 99
a couple, earning 100 percent and 67 percent of the average wage, retain (in 
percent) of their wage after paying for having one child in child care. The 
availability and the cost dimensions are then multiplied. The resulting figure 
represents the percentage of children between the ages of 0 and 3 attending 
publicly financed child-care facilities and the degree to which their places are 
financed by the state. In other words, it indicates how much the state reduces 
parents’ forgone earnings in a country by offering them affordable, high-
quality child care.  
 
Generosity of subsidized child care = (100 – Cost in % of a typical fami-
ly’s wage) * (Coverage: % of 0- to 3-year-old children in child care)  
 
The reason for calculating what it would cost a family to put their child in 
child care instead of calculating what it would cost a single parent to put 
his/her child in child care is that most children, including those in unstable 
unions, during their first three years live with their parents. I assume that 
parents share the cost of their children’s child care during this period.64 This 
means that the resulting figure also indicates how much child- care policies 
reduce the average family member’s forgone earnings during the child’s first 
years of life.  
In a final stage, the parental leave index and the child-care index are 
combined into a single index. In this combined “dual-earner index,” the 
child-care index is given three times the weight of the parental leave index. 
This is to account for the fact that the parental leave index only measures 
how much dual-earner policies reduce the cost of forgone earnings during a 
child’s first year, whereas the child-care index measures how much policies 
reduce the costs of forgone earnings during the child’s first three years. The 
sum is then divided by 3 to estimate the yearly compensation rate offered to 
parents.  
 
Generosity of dual-earner policies = (Generosity of parental leaves + 
generosity of subsidized child care + generosity of subsidized child care 
+ generosity of subsidized child care) / 3 
 
The resulting figure represents how much compensation, in percent, the state 
offers parents for their forgone earnings during the first three years of a 
                                                          
64
 If we instead assume that parents do not share the cost, and construct an index based on the assumption that 
one parent has to pay the entire cost of his/her children’s child care, the generosity of the dual-earner index 
declines. However, the resulting index correlates highly (.98) with the index used throughout the study, why it 
is not likely that the results would have changed had this alternative way of calculating the cost been used.  
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child’s life. The interdependency of policies is accounted for by the fact that 
less generous paid parental leaves can be compensated for by high child-care 
enrollment rates and vice versa. The high Danish child-care enrollment rates, 
for example, likely depend in part on Denmark’s offering parents relatively 
few weeks of paid parental leave (in relation to what the most generous coun-
tries offer parents). In estimating how dual-earner policies affect women’s 
forgone earnings it is the sum of the two policies that is interesting, not the 
relative generosity of parental leave and child care policies.65   
The dual-earner index only measures how much dual-earner policies 
compensate parents for their forgone earnings during the child’s first three 
years. It does not directly measure the extent to which dual-earner policies 
prevent parents’ loss of human capital accumulation. Neither does it directly 
measure the degree to which dual-earner policies increase children’s well-
being by making it affordable for their parents to be at home with them dur-
ing their first year of life. Child-care enrollment rates, however, reveal the 
extent to which parents work and could afford to work. Similarly, the gener-
osity of paid parental leaves gives a hint of how long parents can afford to 
stay at home with their children if they want to. Thus, the degree to which 
dual-earner policies prevent human capital losses and make it affordable for 
parents to be at home with their children is likely to be highly correlated with 
the generosity of the dual-earner index. The only thing the index does not 
capture is the relative importance of preventing the loss of human capital 
accumulation and making it affordable for parents to be at home with their 
children. However, assuming that it is important that policies do both, the 
dual-earner index is likely to approximate all dimensions of the generosity of 
dual-earner policies rather well.  
No index quite like the dual-earner index has been used in the previous 
research on the effect of policies on fertility. However, the indicators that 
make up the index (the generosity of paid parental leaves and the provision 
and cost of child care) have been used individually in several other studies 
(e.g. Castles 2003; Kögel 2006). In addition, various indexes measuring the 
combined generosity of dual-earner policies have been used in studies on 
other topics (e.g. Korpi 2000; Engster & Stensöta 2011). Two differences 
between my index and previously used “dual-earner indexes” should be em-
phasized. First, I give the child-care indicator three times the weight of the 
parental leave indicator. Other studies tend to give both indicators equal 
                                                          
65
 This is not entirely true as most parents likely want to be at home with their children for some time and work 
some time during their children’s first three years of life. In the extreme case where a country does not offer 
parents any paid parental leave, or does not offer them any subsidized child care, the relative generosity of 
policies is therefore likely to matter greatly. However, such extreme cases do not exist in the data.   
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weight (e.g. Engster & Olofsdotter Stensöta 2011), even though subsidies for 
child care reasonably reduce the costs of reproduction considerably more 
than paid parental leave does. Parental leave with a high replacement rate is 
seldom paid for more than a year, whereas subsidized child care is provided 
for several years. I argue that the fact that I account for this makes it likely 
that my index gives a better picture of the combined generosity of paid paren-
tal leave and subsidized child care than alternative calculations used in the 
previous research. Second, previous studies have tended to focus only on the 
coverage of child care, whereas the cost dimension is often neglected (e.g. 
Korpi 2000; Castles 2003; Kögel 2006). I argue that this neglect of the cost 
of child care could distort the picture of how generous government child-care 
subsidies are. A realistic estimate of how much subsidized child care reduces 
the costs of reproduction should include the cost of purchased child-care 
services as well as its availability (however, in reality the two dimensions are 
highly correlated). Overall, the dual-earner index is therefore likely to better 
capture the generosity of dual-earner policies than alternative indexes used in 
the previous research.66 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
66
 It should be noted that the dual-earner index builds on a combination of the degree of compensation that 
states offer parents and the degree to which parents choose to use the compensations offered by the state. The 
parental leave component is based on the degree of compensation that states offer parents. Parents do not 
necessarily need to use this compensation fully. For example, parents in a country that offers parents one year 
of fully paid parental leave could choose to take only six months of leave and leave the other six months 
unused. The child-care component, in contrast, is partially based on the degree to which parents actually use 
state-subsidized child care, as it counts the number of children actually enrolled in child care. Although it 
might seem wrong to compare theoretical maximums with the degree to which parents use the theoretical 
compensations offered to them in this way, the problem is smaller than it appears. The reason is that enroll-
ment rates in child care among children under three years old in many countries is partly a function of the 
degree to which parents choose to use their right to paid parental leave and vice versa. In countries with 
generously paid parental leaves, the natural alternative to using subsidized child care is to use the right to paid 
parental leave, as all other alternatives would be immensely costly. Therefore, it can be assumed that parents 
actually use close to the theoretical maximum of paid parental leave for which they are eligible in countries 
with generous dual-earner policies. However, it is possible that the generosity of the dual-earner index can be 
somewhat overestimated in countries in which the generosity of paid parental leave is low, where other options 
(such as working part-time or having grandparents care for the children) might be economically preferable. 
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Figure 5.1. The generosity of dual-earner policies 
 
Comments: The graph illustrates the average generosity of the dual-earner index 2002–2005. For 
sources of data: see Appendix C.  
 
Figure 5.1, which illustrates the average generosity of dual-earner policies in 
the years 2002–2005, shows that the generosity of dual-earner policies varies 
considerably between countries. Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Iceland 
implement the most generous dual-earner policies, with replacement rates 
over 65 percent. In second place are Belgium, France, and Finland, with 
replacement rates between 40 and 50 percent. The least generous dual-earner 
policies are found in Southern and Central Europe, where replacement rates 
range between 10 and 30 percent. The average replacement rate in the sample 
is 34 percent. In no country except Denmark, in which the replacement rate is 
86 percent, are dual-earner policies so generous that they replace almost all 
of the parents’ forgone earnings.  
To account for the phenomenon of decreasing returns I use the log of the 
dual-earner index in all statistical analyses presented in the following chap-
ters. 
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The generosity of family benefits  
The generosity of family policies that are not defined as dual-earner policies 
is measured by a “benefits index.” This index measures the combined gener-
osity of family benefits, tax cuts, and other monetary transfers to families 
with children – that is, all policies that aim at increasing the budgets of fami-
lies with children. Although, family benefits, tax cuts, and transfers to fami-
lies with children can be differently structured in different countries, with the 
most obvious difference being that family benefits are also paid in the event 
of a divorce whereas joint taxation does not contribute to single parents’ 
economic well-being, I have chosen not to measure them separately. There 
are two reasons for this. First, family benefits and joint taxation are policies 
that aim to increase families’ budgets without increasing the labor force par-
ticipation of mothers. Although the two policies work differently in the event 
of a divorce, they do not help women retain their economic autonomy during 
the time they stay in their unions. Even to the extent that family benefits help 
women economically in the event of a divorce, they do not assure them any-
thing near the same degree of economic compensation as dual-earner poli-
cies. In no country in Europe do family benefits reach close to the replace-
ment levels offered by generously paid parental leaves and generous subsi-
dies for child care. This, of course, does not prevent them, in combination 
with dual-earner policies, from contributing to lone parents’ economic well-
being. But it does hinder them from providing lone parents with an income 
guarantee in the absence of generous dual-earner policies. For that reason I 
equate family benefits with joint taxation benefits.  
Second, and equally important, the generosity of family benefits and taxa-
tion schemes for families in which both spouses work is highly correlated 
with the generosity of family benefits and taxation schemes for families in 
which the wife does not work (R. .75). Both seem to reflect a policy dimen-
sion of being generous toward families with children by offering them bene-
fits and tax cuts. Given the small number of countries available for testing my 
hypotheses (see below), I have chosen to use just one of them to measure the 
generosity of family benefits. 
The resulting benefits index measures the generosity of child benefits and 
tax cuts for families in which both parents work. It is calculated by compar-
ing the income of a typical family with children with that of a similar family 
without children. My typical family consists of two parents and two children 
under the age of six, in which one parent earns 100 percent, and the other 67 
percent, of the average wage. This family’s total income, including family 
benefits and tax reductions, is then compared to that of a similar family with-
out children using OECD’s tax-benefits calculator.  The resulting difference 
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in income between the two family types, measured in percent, constitutes the 
benefits index. Similar indexes have been used in several studies on the im-
pact of family policies on fertility (e.g,. see d’Addio & d’Ercole 2005 a and 
b; Ferrarini 2006).  
Even though the generosity of family benefits for families with children 
in which one partner does not work correlates highly with the generosity of 
family benefits for families with children in which both partners work, the 
former families, as a general rule, receive more family benefits and experi-
ence more generous tax cuts than the latter families in most countries in Eu-
rope. Thus, the actual level of compensation that states offer families with 
children is not necessarily equivalent to the level of the benefits index, even 
though it is highly correlated with it. However, the relative ranking of how 
generous family benefits are in different countries is not likely to be affected 
by this.  
 
Figure 5.2. The generosity of family benefits, tax cuts, and other transfers for families 
with children 
 
Comments: The graph illustrates the average generosity of the benefits index 2002–2005. The 
source of all data is OECD’s tax-benefits calculator.  
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Figure 5.2, which illustrates the average generosity of family benefits in the 
years 2002–2005, shows that the generosity of family benefits, tax cuts, and 
transfers for families with children varies considerably between countries. 
The most generous family benefits are found in Central European countries, 
with Luxembourg, Hungary, Belgium, Austria, and Germany being the most 
generous. All of these countries offer families with children in which both 
parents work family benefits, tax cuts, and transfers at a value that corre-
sponds to more than 10 percent of the families’ income. Most other countries 
offer families benefits, tax cuts, and transfers that correspond to between 5 
and 10 percent of families’ incomes. The average compensation rate in the 
sample is 7 percent. The correlation between the generosity of the dual-earner 
index and the generosity of the benefits index is a mere .17. Nordic countries, 
which implement the most generous dual-earner policies, for example, only 
offer parents family benefits of average compensation.  
The compensation rates offered by the benefits index, which range be-
tween 1 to 14 percent, are considerably lower than the replacement rates 
offered by dual-earner policies, which range from 12 to 86 percent. However, 
it should be remembered that family benefits, tax cuts, and transfers are paid 
for a longer period than dual-earner policies. The dual-earner index only 
measures how generous dual-earner policies are during a child’s first three 
years. Although child-care subsidies are paid for a longer time period, they 
cease to be paid when children start school at the age of six or seven. In con-
trast, child benefits are often paid until children turn 18. Thus, the lower 
compensation level of the benefits index is more generous than it might first 
seem. The compensation levels of the two family policy indexes therefore 
cannot be directly compared. 
In the statistical analyses presented in the following chapters I use the log 
of the benefits index to account for the phenomenon of decreasing returns.  
 
The availability of data and its implications 
for the study’s design 
Two important issues about the availability of data arise when trying to test 
the hypotheses presented in Chapter 4. The first is that there is limited data 
available on the provision and cost of state-subsidized child care. For most 
countries there is reliable data for these policy dimensions for only a few 
years after the year 2000. The existing data also shows little variation over 
time. This lack of data strictly limits the time frame and methods that can be 
used for testing the argument. More specifically, the time frame of the study 
is limited to the years 2000–2008. 
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The second issue is that there are relatively few data sets that provide the 
comparative individual-level data needed for testing the hypotheses. This is 
particularly true for the years for which child-care data is available. The Fam-
ily and Fertility Surveys and the European Community Household Panel that 
have been used in most recent research on demographic behavior in Europe, 
for example, date from the early and late 1990s respectively and therefore 
cannot be used together with the available child-care data. To my knowledge, 
only one data set provides suitable individual-level data on women’s union 
and fertility histories for a large number of countries for the years for which 
child-care data is available: the second and third rounds of the European 
Social Survey (ESS).  
The ESS is “an academically-driven social survey designed to chart and 
explain the interaction between Europe’s changing institutions and the atti-
tudes, beliefs and behavior patterns of its diverse populations,” with the ob-
jective of “providing conceptually well-anchored and methodologically bul-
let-proof data on changing social attitudes and values with optimal compara-
bility” between countries (http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/) Although 
not intentionally designed for fertility studies, the second and third rounds of 
the ESS contain representative data from more than 20 European countries on 
women’s union statuses, fertility histories, and (to a limited extent) union 
histories as well as important control variables.  
Although it is the best data set available for testing the hypotheses pre-
sented in Chapter 4, the ESS comes with some problems. First, it contains 
limited information on women’s union histories and even less retrospective 
information on some important control variables. As a consequence the 
event-history analytical techniques that are usually preferred in demographic 
analyses cannot be used. It does not, however, render all types of causal tests 
impossible. For example, the data contains enough information for mapping 
some of the most important aspects of women’s union histories at least a few 
years back in time. This information is enough for constructing a panel that 
can be used for testing how union instability and the generosity of dual-
earner policies shape fertility outcomes (see Chapter 8 for more details). The 
hypotheses relating to the likelihood of women living in stable unions and 
unstable unions can, however, only be tested indirectly by a footpaths model, 
similar to that used in the research on the SDT. In other words, it is only 
possible to trace the patterns that could be expected, given the hypotheses, by 
mapping correlations between policies, individual characteristics, and union 
statuses in cross-sectional data. Although this seems to constitute a problem 
for the validity of the results presented below, I argue in Chapters 6 and 7 
that the problem is not as huge as it might seem at first sight. This is due to 
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the relative stability of family policy regimes. Most European countries have 
until very recently implemented family policies with roots that are decades 
old. Family policy regimes, in other words, have long been path-dependent.  
Second, the ESS only contains data from European countries. Developed 
countries outside Europe are not included. This fact limits the generalizability 
of the study somewhat. At the same time, it also makes comparisons between 
the countries that are included in the study more valid. The reason is that 
professional child care in European countries is mainly provided by the state, 
whereas professional child care is often bought in the market in Anglo-Saxon 
countries outside Europe (OECD 2007). Although state-provided and market-
bought child care fulfill similar needs, it is more difficult to estimate the cost 
and availability of the latter due to the fractured nature of the market. In the 
latter countries, the availability and costs of child care also reflect factors 
other than government policies. The dual-earner index, therefore, constitutes 
a more reliable measure of the generosity of dual-earner policies in countries 
in which the state is the main provider of professional child care.   
These problems notwithstanding, the ESS provides the best comparable 
individual data on a range of demographic behaviors in Europe for the years 
for which child-care data is available.    
There are only two alternatives to using the ESS in testing the hypotheses 
in Chapter 4 (for an overview of research strategies for establishing the effect 
of policies on fertility, see Björklund 2007).67 The first is to use national data 
sets to compare how individuals time union and fertility decisions in a few 
countries that differ with respect to how generous their family policies are 
(for an example of this strategy, see Blossfeld et al. 2005). The problem with 
such a strategy is that it is hard to control for how important various factors 
are at influencing the decisions in question. Unless it can be shown that the 
countries have similar values on all control variables (which is highly unlike-
ly), it simply has to be assumed that eventual differences between the coun-
tries can be ascribed to differences in the generosity of the family policies 
they implement.  
The other strategy is to use national data sets to compare how changes in 
the generosity of family policies within countries affect union and fertility 
decisions, by comparing how individuals behave before and after the changes 
take place (e.g., see Lalive & Zweimöller 2005; Milligan 2002, 2005). Alt-
hough this strategy eliminates the problem that control variables can take on 
different values in different countries, it still presents the problem that the 
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 Cross-section time series studies, for example, cannot be carried out due to the limited availa-
bility of data. 
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value of control variables can vary over time. Thus, it risks leading to biased 
estimates because of omitted variable bias.68  
Another problem is that within-country changes in family policies must 
be large enough to make a difference for individuals and families. It is un-
likely that small adjustments in the generosity of existing family policy pack-
ages will have a major effect on union and fertility decisions. Family policy 
change will have to be radical to make a difference. Even though such radical 
breaks in family policy can be found in some countries, the within-country 
variation is nevertheless considerably smaller than the between-country var-
iation. Most countries implement family policies with deep historical roots 
that fit into coherent family policy packages. They very seldom adopt family 
policies that do not fit into these policy packages. Family policy reforms tend 
to take the form of small adjustments of the generosity of long-since imple-
mented policies. As a result, it is likely to be difficult to track any major 
changes in demographic behavior by investigating policy reforms over time 
within countries.69  
The problems described above can be overcome to some degree by com-
bining the two strategies and studying how a change in family policies in a 
country affects existing demographic differences between the country and 
other countries. Such a difference-in-difference strategy can, for example, 
control for general time trends in demographic behavior that are impossible 
to control for in single-country studies (e.g., see Björklund 2006).   
However, it is as difficult to use control variables when using difference-
in-difference strategies as it is when using the abovementioned strategies. 
Thus, one simply has to assume that changes in demographic behavior can be 
attributed to the change in family policies. It is not possible to control for 
changes in other important variables. Another drawback of the strategy is that 
most family policy changes, as pointed out above, tend to be adjustments to 
long-established family policy packages and therefore are not likely to cause 
radical shifts in demographic behavior.  
The choice of using the ESS, as mentioned above, also has its problems. 
The most obvious is that there is little or no variation over time in the gener-
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 Similar studies that explore how different samples of women respond to policy reforms that offer  different 
incentives for different groups of women using difference-in-difference strategies are more reliable, although 
they also suffer from the problem of omitted variable bias (e.g., see Hoem 1993; Hoem et al. 2001; Olah 
1998). 
69
 For the same reason, it is difficult to draw conclusions on studies of regional policy variation in countries. 
The existing regional policy variation is simply likely to be too small in most countries. This could explain 
why so few studies have found the regional variation in the availability and cost of subsidized child care within 
countries to have an effect on fertility (e.g., see Kravdal 1996; Hank & Kreyenfeld 2003; Andersson, 
Duvander & Hank 2004).  
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osity of family policies in the resulting data set. Even in the panel studies, 
almost all variation is between countries. Although the generosity of policies 
changes in some countries between the second and third rounds of the ESS, 
the changes are small. Because of this, the results are mainly driven by the 
between-country variation. The within-country variation contributes little to 
the analyses (even though it contributes somewhat to the panel study on fer-
tility). As a consequence, there is a risk that the effect of family policies is 
confounded by unobserved country characteristics that affect demographic 
behavior. The found demographic patterns could, for example, reflect cultural 
or other country-specific characteristics. However, there are two reasons for 
doubting that this is the case. First, in order to confound the results, the unob-
served country-specific characteristics must be systematically correlated with 
the generosity of family policies. If they are not, they cannot distort the re-
sults.      
Second, it is possible to control for at least some of the cultural and eco-
nomic traits that are specific to countries and that can be thought to influence 
union and fertility decisions. This fact decreases the risk of unobserved char-
acteristics affecting the results.    
Another problem with using the ESS, with its short time frame, is that the 
causal relationship between family policies and union decisions cannot be 
determined with certainty. Correlation does not equal causation in cross-
sectional data. The found correlations therefore cannot automatically be as-
sumed to reflect causal relationships. I nonetheless argue that they are likely 
to do so. The reason is the stability of family policy regimes. Current family 
policy regimes reflect long-standing differences between countries’ family 
policies. Family policy patterns have only started to change significantly in 
the last ten or so years. Women are therefore likely to have experienced fami-
ly policy conditions in the past that are similar to those they experience to-
day.  
Causality is not an issue to the same extent in the models of women’s fer-
tility decisions, as the data used for the fertility models is not only cross-
sectional in nature, but also contains variation over time. As the fertility 
models also control for women’s past fertility histories, the results can be 
given a causal interpretation.  
Overall, the choice between using the ESS, with its shortcomings, and 
other data sets and analytical strategies boils down to which uncertainties to 
prefer. The choice to use alternative data sets would reduce the problem of 
finding variation over time. The choice of using the ESS reduces the problem 
of finding variation between countries. As most previous studies have pre-
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ferred the former uncertainties and the advantages that come with them, there 
is a need for studies that opt for the latter. This is where my study fits in.  
 
The outlines of the study 
The empirical study that follows is divided into four chapters, with distinc-
tive themes. Together, they cover all parts of the model that concluded Chap-
ter 4. The theme of the first chapter (Chapter 6) is women’s likelihood of 
living in unions. More precisely, the chapter asks and answers three ques-
tions. First, it asks whether women’s earning opportunities (attachment to the 
labor market) reduce their likelihood of living in unions (as hypothesis 4 
claims). Second, it asks if generous family policies increase women’s likeli-
hood of living in unions (as hypothesis 5 claims). Third, it asks whether gen-
erous dual-earner policies mainly increase women’s likelihood of living in 
unions by increasing the likelihood of women with high earning opportuni-
ties living in unions (as hypothesis 6 claims). Due to a lack of data, the hy-
potheses regarding women’s union formation and union dissolution that were 
presented in Chapter 4 are not tested directly. Instead, the chapter tests the 
combined effects of women’s earning opportunities and the generosity of 
family policies on women’s likelihood of living in unions. The hypotheses 
tested in the chapter are summed up in Figure 5.3. 
 
Figure 5.3. Hypotheses tested in Chapter 6 
Comment: The dashed arrows indicate negative effects.  
 
The generosity of family 
policies 
The likelihood of women living 
in unions 
 
Women’s earning opportunities 
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The theme of the second empirical chapter (Chapter 7) is women’s choice of 
type of union, with the focus being on how women’s earning opportunities 
and the generosity of family policies affect the likelihood of women living in 
unstable unions. Specifically, the chapter asks two questions. First, it asks 
whether women with relatively high earning potentials are more likely than 
women with relatively low earning opportunities to live in unstable unions 
(as hypothesis 7 claims). Second, it asks whether generous dual-earner poli-
cies have an independent additional positive effect on the likelihood of wom-
en living in unstable unions (as hypothesis 8 claims). It also tests to examine 
the extent to which religiosity affects the same likelihood. The hypotheses 
tested in the chapter are summed up in Figure 5.4.  
 
Figure 5.4. Hypotheses tested in Chapter 7 
 
 
Comment: The thick arrows indicate positive effects.  
 
The theme of the third empirical chapter (Chapter 8) is women’s fertility 
decisions. The focus is on how the generosity of family policies and union 
instability interacts in shaping the likelihood of women experiencing a first-, 
second-, and higher-order births. Three specific questions are asked. First, the 
chapter asks whether union instability reduces women’s likelihood of having 
a first, second, and third child (as hypothesis 1 claims). Second, it asks 
whether generous dual-earner policies reduce the negative effect of union 
instability on women’s likelihood of having children of different parities (as 
hypothesis 2 claims). Finally, it asks whether generous family policies have a 
direct positive effect on women’s likelihood of having children of different 
parities (as hypothesis 3 claims). The hypotheses tested in the chapter are 
summed up in Figure 5.5.  
The generosity of dual-earner 
policies 
 
Union instability 
 
Women’s earning opportunities 
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The aim of the fourth empirical chapter (Chapter 9) is to validate the find-
ings of Chapter 8 by investigating how the generosity of family policies and 
union instability shape women’s fertility plans. The questions posed in the 
chapter are identical to those in Chapter 8, with the exception that the de-
pendent variable is not women’s likelihood of having a child, but their likeli-
hood of planning to have a child in the future. Because of the similarity with 
the questions in Chapter 8, the hypotheses tested in the chapter are summed 
up in Figure 5.5. 
 
Figure 5.5. Hypotheses tested in Chapters 8 and 9 
 
Comments: Dashed arrows indicate negative effects. Thick arrows indicate positive effects. 
 
In addition, Appendix A explores the link between the generosity of dual-
earner policies and women’s, and then especially mothers’, labor force partic-
ipation (see Figure 5.6).   
 
Figure 5.6. Hypotheses tested in Appendix A 
  
Comment: Thick arrows indicate positive effects. 
 
 
The generosity family policies 
 
Union instability 
 
Fertility 
Women’s labor force participa-
tion 
 
The generosity of dual-earner 
policies 
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Together, the four chapters and the Appendix A make up the empirical part 
of the study. More specific discussions of the design of the studies and varia-
bles used in the chapters are included in each chapter.  
The findings of the empirical chapters are wrapped up and put in a larger 
perspective in a concluding chapter. However, all findings and their direct 
theoretical implications are briefly discussed in the empirical chapters. The 
order of the chapters has been decided by the normal ordering of events as 
they take place. Usually, a woman first decides on whether to live with a 
partner and how to do so. Then she decides whether she wants to have chil-
dren with her partner. Of course, the order of events is different in some 
cases. More important, the decisions are intertwined with each other (indeed, 
that is one of the main thrusts of this study). However, the chapters have to 
be ordered, and the usual ordering is the one that comes most naturally to 
mind.  
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6 
The likelihood of women living 
in unions 
 
Women form unions at different ages and rates in European countries. In 
Chapter 4, I argued that these patterns can be explained by the generosity of 
family policies. The aim of this chapter is to test my argument. In the first 
part of the chapter I briefly repeat the argument and the empirical implica-
tions following from it. Next, I examine aggregate union formation patterns 
and their association with family policies. Then, I discuss method and data 
for testing the argument on individual-level fertility data. I then go on to test 
how family policies are associated with the likelihood of women living in 
unions, based on individual-level data from rounds 2 and 3 of the European 
Social Survey. I conclude with a brief discussion of the results and their im-
plications.  
 
Hypotheses 
I argued in Chapter 4 that union formation decisions are intimately related to 
fertility decisions and that, because of this, it is reasonable to expect a nega-
tive association between women’s earning opportunities and their likelihood 
of living in unions. Hence, we should expect that:  
 
H4. Good earning opportunities for women should reduce their likelihood 
of living in unions.  
 
Because family policies, and especially dual-earner policies, can reduce the 
opportunity costs of reproduction (i.e., the main obstacle to union formation 
following from women’s earning opportunities), I also argued that: 
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H5. Generous family policies (especially, generous dual-earner policies) 
should increase the likelihood of women living in unions. 
 
 
Given that dual-earner policies’ positive effect on women’s union formation 
is dependent on women’s earning opportunities, I finally proposed that: 
 
H6. Generous dual-earner policies should mainly increase the likelihood 
of women living in unions by increasing the likelihood of women with 
good earning opportunities living in unions. 
 
One of the most used indicators of women’s earning opportunities is their 
attachment to the labor market. Thus, it follows from the three hypotheses 
above that:  
• All else being equal, we should expect women who participate in 
the labor force or intend to do so – to be less likely to live in un-
ions than women outside the labor market (H4). 
• All else being equal, we should expect women in countries with 
generous family benefits and generous dual-earner policies to be 
more likely to live in unions than women in countries with less 
generous family policies (H5). 
• All else being equal, we should expect women with who partici-
pate in the labor force or intend to do so – to be more likely to 
live with partners in countries with generous family policies. In 
other words, we should expect the difference in the likelihood of 
living in unions between women who do and who do not partici-
pate in the labor market to be smaller (or even non-existent) in 
countries with generous family policies (H6).  
 
Below I test whether these implications can be verified. I start by exploring 
aggregate union patterns and their association with dual-earner policies. 
 
Aggregate union patterns 
The expected negative association between the female labor force participa-
tion rate and the percentage of women in unions (H4) does not manifest itself 
in aggregate union patterns. In fact there is a strong positive bivariate asso-
ciation (Pearson’s R .50) between the log of the female labor force participa-
tion rate and the percentage of women in unions (results not shown). For 
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some reason, women’s earning opportunities seem positively associated with 
their likelihood of living in unions.   
However, as expected, the log of the dual-earner index correlates well 
with the number of women, aged 18 to 45, in unions (Pearsons R. 58). Rela-
tively many women of childbearing age are living in unions in countries with 
high scores on the dual-earner index (see Figure 6.1 below). In Denmark, for 
example, which scores 4.5 on the logged dual-earner index, over 70 percent 
of the women aged 18 to 45 live in unions. In contrast, only 55 percent of the 
women in the same age category live with partners in Italy, which only scores 
3 on the logged dual-earner index. Hypothesis H5, that generous family poli-
cies should increase the likelihood of women living in unions, is, thus, par-
tially consistent with aggregate union patterns.  
 
Figure 6.1. The generosity of dual-earner policies and the percentage of women (aged 
18–45) in unions 
      
 
Pearsons R: .58 
Comments: The graphs show how the average percentage of 18- to 45-year-old women living in 
unions between 2002 and 2006 (calculated from rounds 2 (2003–2004) and 3 (2005–2006) of the 
European Social Survey) correlates with countries’ average scores on the dual-earner index 1999–
2006 (source: see Appendix C).  
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There is, however, no corresponding strong positive association between the 
benefits index and the percentage of women living in unions (results not 
shown), and therefore the hypothesis is only partially confirmed. Aggregate 
union patterns are, however, consistent with hypothesis H6, that generous 
dual-earner policies should mainly increase the likelihood of women living in 
unions by increasing the likelihood of working women and women who are 
students living in unions. The log of the dual-earner index is strongly posi-
tively correlated (R. 76) with the percentage of working women and women 
who are students living in unions (see Figure 6.2 below), whereas it is actual-
ly negatively correlated (R. –18) with the percentage of women outside the 
labor market living in unions (results not shown). Generous dual-earner poli-
cies, in other words, only seem to be positively correlated with the likelihood 
of working women and women who are students living in unions.  
 
Figure 6.2. The generosity of dual-earner policies and the percentage of working wom-
en and women who are students (aged 18–45) living in unions  
 
Pearson’s R. 76           
Comments: The graphs show how countries’ average scores on the dual-earner index 1999–2006 
(source: see Appendix C) correlate with the average percentage of 18- to 45-year-old working 
women and women who are students living in unions in 2002–2006 (calculated from rounds 2 
(2003–2004) and 3 (2005–2006) of the European Social Survey). 
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To sum up, while aggregate union patterns do not support H4, they give H5 
and H6 some indirect support.  
However, the abovementioned correlations do not constitute final evi-
dence on the validity of any of the hypotheses. They do not prove that wom-
en’s earning opportunities and the generosity of family benefits are not asso-
ciated with women’s likelihood of living in unions. Neither do they prove 
that generous dual-earner policies increase the likelihood of women living in 
unions. Correlation does not equal causation. Furthermore, the risk of ecolog-
ical fallacies is huge, especially in the case of bivariate correlations at the 
country level. The question is how the hypotheses fare in tests with individu-
al-level fertility data. 
 
Data and method 
To test my hypotheses, below I estimate multilevel logistic regression models 
of women’s likelihood of living in unions. The data I use comes from the 
second and third rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS2 and ESS3) 
carried out between 2003 and 2006.  
 
Design of the study  
Although the ESS provides reliable high-quality data, it has one major draw-
back: the data it provides is cross-sectional in nature and does not account for 
variation over time. Hence, it is impossible to identify with certainty how the 
effects work. The results presented below, therefore, only reveal correlations 
between the dependent variable and the independent variables. For example, 
many of the unions in the data were formed years before the dual-earner 
index was measured. The assumed effect, thus, precedes the cause in many 
cases. In some cases it precedes it by several years. Thus, it could be doubted 
whether verifications of the implications above can prove that H4, H5, and 
H6 are correct. All causal interpretations of the results must be treated with 
great caution. Despite this, I argue that there are reasons to see verifications 
of the implications as evidence that the effect goes in the argued direction. 
The first reason is that family policy regimes have remained quite stable 
over time, even though there has been a general trend toward more generous 
family policies in all regimes in recent years (Gornick et al. 1997; Gauthier 
2002; Lynch 2006; Medulders & O’Dorchai 2007; Engster & Olofsdotter 
Stensöta 2011 – but see Thévenon 2011). Only a few countries – essentially 
Nordic social democratic welfare states such as Sweden and Denmark – have 
implemented dual-earner policies on a large scale. These countries, however, 
have done so consistently for quite a long time. Other countries – especially 
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liberal welfare states and Southern European welfare states, such as the U.K., 
Ireland, Spain, Greece, and Italy, to mention some of the most extreme cases 
– have never implemented generous dual-earner policies. Conservative wel-
fare regimes, such as the Netherlands and Germany, often place themselves 
somewhere in between these two extremes (Gauthier 1996; Gornick & Mey-
ers 2004, Korpi 2000).70 Thus the dual-earner index is likely to correlate 
strongly with, and clearly reflect, long-standing historical between-country 
variations in family policy regimes. The broad country cluster pattern in 
spending on family benefits has also remained rather stable over the years. 
Liberal and Southern European welfare states, such as the U.K., Ireland, 
Italy, and Spain, have never spent much on family benefits. To the extent that 
they have been generous, they have only been so toward vulnerable families. 
In contrast, Central European conservative welfare states, such as Germany 
and Austria, have always been very generous in granting benefits to families 
with children. Nordic social democratic welfare states have usually placed 
themselves somewhere in between these two extremes. Thus, the variation in 
the generosity of family benefits, which the benefits index measures, is also 
likely to correlate highly with, and clearly reflect, long-standing historical 
between-country variations in family policy regimes.   
The second reason for supposing the effect to go in the assumed direction 
is that how women balance between work and family is likely to reflect his-
torical considerations and choices to some degree. Decisions on education, 
labor market participation, and family formation tend to be taken simultane-
ously and be path-dependent. Once a woman has invested in an education 
and started to participate in the labor market, she is likely to experience in-
creasing returns from further investments in education and paid work. Once a 
woman has chosen to focus on her career instead of on her family, she is 
likely to stay committed to her choice. Likewise, a family in which the wom-
an has decided on a career as a housewife is likely to benefit from increasing 
returns if the woman specializes even more in housework. Women who have 
at some point decided to prioritize their families are, thus, likely to still do so 
today. Given this, it is likely that the present balance between family in-
volvement and labor market participation reflect past decisions on family and 
work to some degree.  
The third reason for assuming the effect to go in the expected direction is 
that current union statuses do not only reflect past union formation decisions, 
they also reflect decisions to stay in unions. It is legally possible for individ-
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 However, there is considerable heterogeneity within this group, reflecting long-standing differences in 
national policies. France and Belgium, for example, have historically implemented more generous dual-earner 
policies than Germany and Austria. 
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uals to unilaterally break up their unions in most European countries (Gonzá-
lez & Viitanen 2009). Therefore, if the risks and costs of a union outweigh 
the costs of breaking it up, partners will be more likely to terminate it. This is 
especially true for cohabiting unions, as they tend to be less costly to break 
up than marriages (there are not the same legal obstacles to breaking up a 
cohabiting union as there are to breaking up a marriage). It is, given this, not 
implausible to interpret individuals’ unions as continually ongoing decisions 
that it is worth staying with their partners. Such decisions are not only likely 
to be affected by previous investments in the union, they are also likely to be 
affected by factors that affect union formation decisions in general. If dual-
earner policies affect the latter decisions, by making it less costly to enter 
unions, they are also likely to affect the former decisions, by making it less 
costly to continue living in unions.71 The likelihood of women living in un-
ions is not only a product of women choosing to enter unions; it is also a 
product of women choosing to stay in unions.  
There is also a fourth reason for assuming the causal flow to go from pol-
icies to the likelihood of women living in unions; it is that it theoretically is 
more appealing to assume that family policies affect the likelihood of women 
living in unions than to assume that the likelihood of women living in unions 
affects family policies. Although a case can be made that countries in which 
many women live in unions are more likely to adopt generous family poli-
cies, for example, because governments in countries with relatively many 
families might be more likely to give in to family demands, it is hard to sub-
stantiate it with empirical evidence. Historically, it is countries with weak 
family structures and low fertility rates that have adopted generous family 
policies. The most generous countries when it comes to family policies (i.e., 
Nordic social democratic and Central European conservative welfare states) 
have historically had relatively low fertility and marriage rates. Less gener-
ous countries, such as Southern European and liberal welfare states, have 
historically had relatively high fertility and marriage rates. This impression is 
only strengthened by the observation that countries today are motivated to 
increase spending on family policies by a desire to increase fertility rates. As 
long as policy variables and women’s labor market decisions reflect historical 
trends, this makes it likely that the causal path goes from the generosity of 
family policies to the likelihood of women living in unions, and not vice 
versa.  
Together, these reasons make it realistic to interpret verifications of the 
implications presented above as tentative evidence that women’s earning 
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 Admittedly, as was pointed out in Chapter 4, the generosity of dual-earner policies also reduces the costs of 
breaking up unions.  
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opportunities and family policies have the effects that H4 to H6 assume them 
to have. However, to reduce the risk of temporary fluctuations in the generos-
ity of policies and economic conditions distorting the results, all contextual 
variables presented below are measured as the average of the values the vari-
ables take on during the four years prior to the year in which the respondents 
were interviewed. This does not solve the problem, but it reduces the influ-
ence of yearly fluctuations somewhat. The reason I have chosen to use a four-
year period instead of a longer time period is that no reliable data exists, 
especially for the dual-earner index, for longer time-periods.  
 
The dependent variable 
The dependent variable is defined using a dichotomous variable, coded as 1 if 
a woman is married or cohabits with a partner, and as 0 if she does neither.  
 
Country-level independent variables 
The generosity of policies is measured by the dual-earner index and the fami-
ly benefits index. In addition to the two family policy indexes I also control 
for three other country-level factors that have been argued to influence union 
formation or affect the costs of reproduction (which, I argue, affect union 
formation): namely, the total unemployment rate (as a percentage of the total 
workforce), the availability of part-time work (as a percentage of the total 
workforce) and the age on leaving the parental home (as a percentage of all 
women in the relevant age group in a country who live with their parents). 
The association between the unemployment rate and the costs of repro-
duction – and hence the likelihood of women living in unions – is ambigu-
ous. Insofar as it is women who are affected by the unemployment rate, it is 
likely to increase women’s incentives to enter and stay in unions. This is 
because the risk of future unemployment reduces women’s expected earning 
prospects and, hence, also their expected costs of reproduction. However, to 
the extent that it is men who are affected by the unemployment rate, it is 
likely to reduce women’s incentives to enter and stay in unions, because a 
reduction in men’s earning prospects lowers the expected benefits for women 
should they invest in children. The fewer men there are with incomes that 
allow them to establish and support traditional breadwinner families, the 
harder it will be for women to find men with whom they can establish unions 
that would allow them to stay at home and raise children. Which of these 
effects dominates the other is an open question. However, recent empirical 
research indicates that a high unemployment rate reduces fertility (Adserà 
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2004, 2005), so we might expect a similar negative effect on the likelihood of 
women living in unions.   
The availability of part-time work reduces women’s costs of reproduction 
by increasing their chances to stay in the labor market if they have children. 
Thus it is likely that the availability of part-time work will be positively asso-
ciated with women’s likelihood of living in unions.    
The age on leaving the parental home is undoubtedly one of the most im-
portant factors affecting women’s likelihood of living in unions. Several 
studies have also concentrated on explaining why young people leave the 
parental home at such different ages in Europe and to what extent home-
leaving patterns are associated with the likelihood of young people entering 
their first unions (Aassve et al. 2002; Billari et al. 2001; Holdsworth 2000; 
Mulder et al. 2002; Mulder 2006; Dalla Zuanna 2001; Billari & Liefbroer 
2007). The findings of these studies suggest that the age at which adults leave 
the parental home affects the age at which young people enter into their first 
unions, but that the effect varies between countries. Although, no study has 
systematically investigated the relative importance of the age on leaving the 
parental home vis-à-vis other factors in explaining the likelihood of women 
living in unions, the expectation is that the average age at which young peo-
ple leave the parental home will be negatively correlated with the likelihood 
of women living in unions.  
The direct control for the age on leaving the parental home is also likely 
to account for much of the effect of other variables affecting both the age on 
leaving the parental home and union formation in general. An example of this 
is the price of housing, which is likely to both increase the age on leaving the 
parental home and reduce the likelihood of women living in unions. High 
housing costs make it costlier for an individual both to establish a single 
household and to establish a household together with a partner. Youth unem-
ployment, in a similar way, makes it harder for young people to earn the 
income needed both for living alone and for living together with a partner. To 
the extent that the age on leaving the parental home is determined by such 
economic factors, it functions as a kind of general control variable, which 
indirectly controls also for other important factors affecting the likelihood of 
women living in unions.     
 
Individual-level control variables 
Women’s earning potential is measured by whether the respondent’s main 
activity during the last week has been paid work or studies, or activities out-
side the labor market (including looking after children). It is assumed that 
women who are working and studying have higher earning potentials than 
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women outside the labor market, because their future earning opportunities 
are greater than those of women who voluntarily or involuntarily find them-
selves outside the labor market. Women students have invested heavily in 
their careers by educating themselves and actually often have more to lose on 
having children than working women do, as the value of an education often 
deteriorates faster than the value of working experience (Trussel 1976).   
Educational attainment has also been shown to be a good proxy for wom-
en’s earning potentials. However, it is likely that much of educational attain-
ment’s value as a proxy for women’s earning potentials will be eaten up by 
the more direct control for women’s labor market attachment. Nonetheless, it 
is assumed that women’s educational attainment will be negatively associated 
with their likelihood of living in unions. 
In addition, I control for other individual-level variables that have been 
argued to influence the likelihood of women living in unions, namely, age, 
frequency of church attendance, self-estimated religiousness, religious de-
nomination (Protestant, Catholic, Orthodox, other, or none), and whether the 
respondent lives in an urban or rural area (e.g., see Kalmijn 2007).  
Age is assumed to have a positive curvelinear relationship with the likeli-
hood of women living in unions.  
The association between the various indicators of religiousness and the 
likelihood of women living in unions is not straightforward. However, sever-
al studies show that religious women marry earlier, and in greater numbers, 
than secular women (Kalmijn 2007). Thus, if marriage were the only type of 
union to exist, we should expect a positive association between religiousness 
and the likelihood of women living in unions. However, religiousness might 
only affect women’s choice of type of union. In several studies, religiousness 
has been shown to have a negative effect on women’s likelihood of cohabit-
ing (ibid.), and it is possible that this negative effect takes out its positive 
effect on their likelihood of marriage.  
There are two reasons for assuming that women who live in rural areas 
are more likely to live in unions than women who live in urban areas. First, 
housing prices tend to be lower in rural areas than in urban areas. The cost of 
establishing a household suited for bringing up children is, consequently, 
relatively low in rural areas (Felson & Solaun 1975). Second, we know from 
previous studies that women and men who plan to have children tend to 
move from urban areas to rural areas for various reasons (see Kulu & Vikat 
2008 for a review of the literature). Together, these circumstances give us 
reason to assume that women living in rural areas will be more likely to live 
in unions than women living in urban areas. Summarized statistics of all 
variables are provided in  
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Table 6.1. Summation of variables  
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
In a union 14808 .64 .48 0 1 
Age 14808 32.3 7.7 18 44.9 
Age*age 14808 1102 487 327 2018 
Living in rural area 14808 .36 .48 0 1 
Living in urban area 14808 .64 .48 0 1 
No university education 14808 .73 .44 0 1 
University education 14808 .27 .44 0 1 
Church <1/month 14808 .75 .43 0 1 
Att. Church 1/month 14808 .25 .43 0 1 
Religiousness 14808 4.8 2.9 0 10 
 No denomination 14808 .40 .49 0 1 
Protestant 14808 .14 .35 0 1 
Catholic 14808 .37 .48 0 1 
Orthodox 14808 .04 .19 0 1 
Other 14808 .05 .21 0 1 
Essround  14808 2.4 .49 2 3 
Outside labor market 14808 .29 .45 0 1 
In paid work 14808 .59 .49 0 1 
In education 14808 .12 .33 0 1 
(log)Dual-earner index 14808 3.31 .55 2.30 4.46 
(log)Benefits index 14808 1.77 .53 0 2.73 
(log)Unemployment rate 14808 1.85 .58 .64 2.93 
(log)Part-time work 14808 2.64 .75 .74 3.82 
(log)Living with parents 14808 1.82 .61 .86 2.78 
Comments: Unweighted means. Reference categories in italics. For construction of variables and 
sources of data: see Appendix C.  
 
Sample restrictions 
As my argument focuses on the type of union formation that is relevant for 
fertility, the sample has been restricted to include only women of childbear-
ing age (i.e., women aged 18 to 45).  
In a first stage, the purpose of which is to establish what effect family 
policies and women’s labor market status have on women’s overall likeli-
hood of living in unions, all women in the relevant age group are included in 
the models regardless of their labor market status.  
In a second stage, I run two new models to account for the problem of en-
dogeneity, which arises from the assumption that generous dual-earner poli-
cies not only increase the likelihood of working women living in unions, but 
also the likelihood of women working.  
First, I rerun the models from the first stage without controls for labor 
market status. The resulting models capture both the direct (supposedly posi-
tive) association between dual-earner policies and the likelihood of women 
living in unions and the indirect (supposedly negative) association between 
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the two, which depends on the association between dual-earner policies and 
the likelihood of women in unions working.  
Second, I restrict the sample to include only women who do not have 
children under the age of six and who work or are students. One reason for 
this restriction is that working women and women who are students are likely 
to be affected more by the indirect costs of reproduction because of their 
greater earning opportunities. They are, thus, likely to be more responsive to 
policy incentives than women outside the labor market.  
The reason for including only women who do not have children below 
school age is that such a restriction avoids the endogeneity problem men-
tioned above. Dual-earner policies only increase women’s likelihood of 
working because they make it easier for mothers with small children to main-
tain their careers. When the children start school, the need for child care is 
drastically reduced. Appendix A shows that there is no significant association 
between the generosity of dual-earner policies and the likelihood of women 
who do not have children below school-age working. This fact makes it pos-
sible to avoid the endogeneity problem and separates the two effects from 
each other by excluding women who have children under the age of six from 
the models.      
Finally, I also run a model of the likelihood of women outside the labor 
market living in unions. I do so to establish whether the effect of policy vari-
ables on women’s likelihood of living in unions differs between working 
women and women outside the labor market.  
 
Statistical models 
For several reasons, I use multilevel modeling to test my hypotheses 
(Snijders & Bosker 1999; Raudenbush & Bryk 2002; Hox 2002; Gelman & 
Hill 2006). Multilevel modeling, originally developed in educational science, 
is based on the fact that observations often fall into hierarchically ordered 
clusters. For example, students can be nested within schools, citizens within 
nations, and employees within business organizations. In these situations, 
because of clustering effects, the number of effective observations is smaller 
than if cases were truly independent of each other. Unlike ordinary logistic 
regression, multilevel modeling takes clustering into account by estimating 
intra-class correlations at each hierarchical level. In doing so, it produces 
more correct standard errors for all coefficients included in the analysis.  
Second, multilevel modeling allows me to calculate the proportion of var-
iation in the dependent variables attributable to contextual-level and individ-
ual-level factors, respectively. Specifically, for each dependent variable I will 
begin my empirical analyses by estimating a model that includes only indi-
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vidual-level variables together with a random error term for each hierarchical 
level; that is, countries and individuals. The size of the error term variance at 
the country level indicates the degree to which yet-unspecified country-level 
factors affect women’s relationship decisions. Strong intra-class correlations 
indicate that women in the same country are similar to each other, controlling 
for their individual attributes, so country-level factors are potentially influen-
tial. Following this, I include the country-level variable of main interest (i.e., 
the dual-earner index) in the model, to see whether it reduces the between-
country variation. Finally, I estimate a full model that includes all contextual 
and individual-level control variables. 
The multilevel models of women’s likelihood of living in unions include 
14808 women from 22 countries.72 The models of the likelihood that women 
who do not have children below school age and who work or study live in 
unions include 8292 women from 22 countries, whereas the models of the 
likelihood of women outside the labor market living in unions only include 
2253 women from 22 countries. Formally, the first measure the probability 
that individuals, i, nested within countries, j, live in unions, Y=1, given a 
number of covariates, X1…Xn (below represented with their names) and an 
intercept B0. The models also include a random intercept, uij, which repre-
sents country-specific likelihoods of women living in unions.73  
 
                                                          
72
 Simulation studies have shown that sample size affects the robustness of the results in multilevel modeling. 
The overall conclusion is that estimates of regression coefficients are unbiased, but that variance components 
and their standard errors tend to be biased downward (underestimated) when the number of level 2 units is less 
than 30 (Maas & Hox 2005). The problem seems even more accentuated in multilevel logistic models 
(Moineddin et al. 2007). Using multilevel logistic modeling with only 22 groups (or 20 groups as in Chapter 9) 
at the highest level is to stress the limits of multilevel modeling. However, the only alternative to using multi-
level modeling would be to use ordinary regression with standard errors clustered by country. That would be 
an easier test for my hypotheses than using multilevel modeling, as statistical significance is easier to achieve 
using the former technique. Results based on multilevel modeling with fewer than 30 – and sometimes fewer 
than 20 – groups are also regularly published in political science and sociology journals. Despite the possible 
bias of variance components and their standard errors, I have therefore chosen to use multilevel modeling. 
However, variance components and their standard errors should be interpreted with some caution as they likely 
are biased downward.   
73
 Technical note: The models have been run with gllamm in Stata10 (see Rabe Hesketh, Skrondal & Pickles 
2004; Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal 2005).   
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In all models, cases have been weighted by the design weights (dweights) 
provided by the ESS. The design weights account for differences in sampling 
design between countries and correct standard errors and point estimates. 
However, I have chosen not to weight the cases with the population weights 
(pweights) that are also provided in the ESS and that account for countries’ 
different population sizes. The main reason I do not do so is that the popula-
tion weights would distort the estimates of the standard errors and render the 
whole idea of using multilevel modeling meaningless. In multilevel model-
ing, standard errors should reflect sampling design and not population size 
(Asparouhov 2004). As countries have not been chosen randomly, all coun-
tries are assigned equal weights (1) in the regressions. There is also another, 
more substantial, reason why I only weight my cases with the design weights, 
which is that the main interest of this chapter lies in exploring and explaining 
differences in likelihoods between countries, rather than estimating some 
overall average likelihood for all countries that are included in the models 
(see van Bavel 2010 for a similar argument). The questions guiding this 
chapter concern whether women’s likelihood of living in unions varies be-
tween countries and between women within countries, and the extent to 
which potential variations can be explained by family policies and women’s 
labor market attachment; the question is not how likely an average woman, 
from the 22 countries included in my model, is to live with a partner.  
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The overall likelihood of women living in 
unions 
Are women’s earning potentials negatively associated with their likelihood of 
living in unions as H4 suggests? According to Model 1 in Table 6.2, working 
women are significantly less likely than women outside the labor force to live 
in unions.74  
The impression that women’s earning potentials are negatively associated 
with their likelihood of living in unions is further strengthened by the obser-
vation that women who have a university education have a lower predicted 
probability of living in unions than women who do not have a university 
education. Even though the difference between the two groups is significant 
only at the 10-percent level, it is nonetheless telling. Women with high earn-
ing potentials seem less willing to enter unions than women with low earning 
potentials.   
These findings contrast starkly with the positive correlation between the 
female labor force participation rate and the number of women in unions 
found at the country level. Labor force participation is, in other words, nega-
tively associated with women’s likelihood of living in unions within coun-
tries, even though a relatively large number of women live in unions in coun-
tries with high female labor force participation rates. This observation makes 
it likely that the main explanation for differences in women’s likelihood of 
living in unions should be sought after in factors other than the female labor 
force participation rate. 
The random part (i.e., the country-specific intercepts) of Model 1, moreo-
ver, shows that women’s likelihood of living in unions varies considerably 
between countries. Thus, a significant part of the variation can be attributed 
to country-level factors, such as policies. Can part of this observed variance 
be explained by dual-earner policies, as H5 suggests?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
74
 The results in Table 6.2, as well as in the following tables, show odds ratios. Odds ratios are notoriously 
hard to interpret intuitively. For ease of interpretation, instead of reporting and discussing the odds ratios, I 
have chosen to discuss all results directly in terms of their substantial meanings for the likelihood of having 
a(nother) child. In my discussion of the results I only mention these likelihoods, and not the odds ratios they 
are based upon. It could, however, be of interest for the reader to know that an odds ratio of more than 1 
increases, and an odds ratio of less than 1 decreases, the likelihood of the outcome in question.       
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Table 6.2. Odds ratios of women living in unions  
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Individual level  
   
Age 2.10 (.07)*** 2.10 (.07)*** 2.10 (.07)*** 2.42 (.10)*** 
Age*Age .99 (.00)*** .99 (.00)*** .99 (.00)*** .99 (.00)*** 
Living urban  .73 (.04)*** .73 (.04)*** .73 (.04)*** .70 (.04)*** 
University education .86 (.07)+ .85 (.07)* .85 (.07)* .79 (.07)** 
Monthly church  1.33 (.11)*** 1.34 (.11)*** 1.34 (.11)*** 1.34 (.11)*** 
Religiosity .99 (.01) .99 (.01) .99 (.01) .99 (.01) 
Protestant 1.30 (.13)** 1.27 (.12)** 1.24 (.12)* 1.20 (.11)+ 
Catholic 1.15 (.10)+ 1.15 (.10)+ 1.18 (.10)+ 1.17 (.10)+ 
Orthodox 1.06 (.26) 1.18 (.23) 1.22 (.24) 1.25 (.22) 
Other 1.16 (.13) 1.16 (.13) 1.16 (.13) 1.23 (.13)* 
In education .23 (.04)*** .22 (.04)*** .22 (.04)***   
In paid work .60 (.06)*** .59 (.06)*** .60 (.06)***   
     
Country level   
  
(log)Dual-earner index   1.45 (.11)*** 1.27 (.09)** 1.18 (.09)* 
(log)Benefits index      1.17 (.08)* 1.18 (.09)* 
(log)Part-time work      1.00 (.13) .99 (.14) 
(log)Unemployment rate     1.11 (.14) 1.13 (.14) 
(log)Percentage living with parents     .76 (.10)* .78 (.11)+ 
     
Random part   
  
Intercept level 2 .29 (.05)*** .21 (.04)*** .17 (.04)*** .17 (.04)*** 
     
Observations 
    
Individuals  14808 14808 14808 14808 
Countries 22 22 22 22 
Log likelihood -7291.234 -7284.787 -7279.657 -7450.03 
AIC 14612.47 14601.57 14599.31 14936.06 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+
 p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
When the dual-earner index is introduced in Model 2 it becomes significantly 
positively associated with the odds of women living in unions. At the same 
time, the between-country variation is reduced by 25 percent (from .29 to 
.21). The fit statistics (the log likelihood and Aikike’s information criteria) 
also show that the model fit is improved over Model 1. Although the strength 
of the association decreases considerably with the introduction of the coun-
try-level control variables in Model 3, the association remains significant and 
positive.  
Figure 6.3 illustrates the strength of the association for women outside the 
labor market, working women, and women who are students.  
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Figure 6.3. The dual-earner index and the likelihood of women living in unions 
 
Comments: Builds on Model 3 in Table 6.2. The graphs show the effect of the dual-earner index, the 
benefits index, and labor market status when all other variables are kept at their mean. The shaded 
areas show the 83-percent confidence intervals. This means that confidence intervals that do not 
overlap show likelihoods that are significantly different from each other at the 5-percent level.75  
 
The figure shows that working women in the country with the most generous 
dual-earner policies (Denmark) have a .1, or 16 percent, higher probability of 
living in a union compared to working women in the country with the least 
generous dual-earner policies (Switzerland). Alternatively formulated, each 
log-unit increase on the dual-earner index is associated with approximately a 
.05 (or 7.3 percent) increase in the predicted probability of working women 
living in unions.   
                                                          
75
 It is an established truth in the statistical community that two 95-percent confidence intervals can overlap 
and yet be significantly different from one antoher at the 0.05 level. To cite Austin and Hux (2002): “When 
one compare two means, the probability that one mean would lie in the upper 2.5th percentile of that means 
sample distribution, while the other simultaneously lies in the lower 2.5th percentile of its sampling distribu-
tion, is substantially less than 5%. Hence despite having overlapping 95% confidence intervals, one can reject 
the null hypothesis with a P value that is substantially less than .05.” In the literature, it is therefore recom-
mended to use overlapping 83-percent confidence intervals to judge whether effects are significantly different 
from each other at the 0.05 level (Schenker & Gentleman 2001; Austin & Hux 2003; Payton, Greenstone & 
Schenker 2003; Maghsoodloo & Huang 2010).  
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Women outside the labor market and women who are students are also 
more likely to live with a partner in countries with generous dual-earner 
policies. However, because women outside the labor market originally have 
higher, and women who study have lower, predicted probabilities of living in 
a union, the difference in predicted probabilities is smaller (.06 or ca. 8 per-
cent) and larger (.11 or ca. 28 percent) in their cases. Each log-unit increase 
on the dual-earner index increases the likelihood of women outside the labor 
market living in unions by .027 (or ca. 4 percent), whereas it increases the 
likelihood that women students live with partners by .05 (or ca. 12.5 percent). 
Thus, H5 is supported by the data: generous dual-earner policies are positive-
ly associated with women’s likelihood of living in unions.  
The benefits index is also positively associated with women’s likelihood 
of living in unions (see figure 6.4). The total strength of the association is of 
approximately the same size as that for the dual-earner index. Working wom-
en in the country with the highest score on the benefits index (Luxembourg), 
in other words, have a predicted probability of living in unions that is .1, or 
16 percent, higher than the predicted probability that working women in the 
country with the lowest score on the benefits index (Poland) live in unions. 
However, it should be noted that the benefits index varies somewhat more 
than the dual-earner index. Whereas the dual-earner index only varies be-
tween 2.3 and 4.5, the benefits index varies between 0 and 2.7. Thus, a one-
unit log change on the dual-earner index is associated with a somewhat larger 
increase in the likelihood of women living in unions than is a one-unit change 
on the benefits index. Nonetheless, the results show that the dual-earner poli-
cies are not the only family policies that simultaneously reduce the cost of 
reproduction and increase the likelihood of women living in unions.  
The figure shows that working women in the country with the most gen-
erous dual-earner policies (Denmark) have a .1, or 16 percent, higher proba-
bility of living in a union compared to working women in the country with 
the least generous dual-earner policies (Switzerland). Alternatively formulat-
ed, each log-unit increase on the dual-earner index is associated with approx-
imately a .05 (or 7.3 percent) increase in the predicted probability of working 
women living in unions.   
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Figure 6.4. The benefits index and the likelihood of women living in unions  
 
Comments: Builds on Model 3 in Table 6.2. The graphs show the effect of the dual-earner index, the 
benefits index, and labor market status when all other variables are kept at their mean. The shaded 
areas show the 83-percent confidence intervals. This means that confidence intervals that do not 
overlap show likelihoods that are significantly different from each other at the 5-percent level.  
 
Women outside the labor market and women who are students are also more 
likely to live with a partner in countries with generous dual-earner policies. 
However, because women outside the labor market originally have higher, 
and women who study have lower, predicted probabilities of living in a un-
ion, the difference in predicted probabilities is smaller (.06 or ca. 8 percent) 
and larger (.11 or ca. 28 percent) in their cases. Each log-unit increase on the 
dual-earner index increases the likelihood of women outside the labor market 
living in unions by .027 (or ca. 4 percent), whereas it increases the likelihood 
that women students live with partners by .05 (or ca. 12.5 percent). Thus, H5 
is supported by the data: generous dual-earner policies are positively associ-
ated with women’s likelihood of living in unions.  
The benefits index is also positively associated with women’s likelihood 
of living in unions. The total strength of the association is of approximately 
the same size as that for the dual-earner index. Working women in the coun-
try with the highest score on the benefits index (Luxembourg), in other 
words, have a predicted probability of living in unions that is .1, or 16 per-
cent, higher than the predicted probability that working women in the country 
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with the lowest score on the benefits index (Poland) live in unions. However, 
it should be noted that the benefits index varies somewhat more than the 
dual-earner index. Whereas the dual-earner index only varies between 2.3 
and 4.5, the benefits index varies between 0 and 2.7. Thus, a one-unit log 
change on the dual-earner index is associated with a somewhat larger in-
crease in the likelihood of women living in unions than is a one-unit change 
on the benefits index. Nonetheless, the results show that the dual-earner poli-
cies are not the only family policies that simultaneously reduce the cost of 
reproduction and increase the likelihood of women living in unions.  
Several control variables are also significant. As expected, women who 
live in urban areas have a lower predicted probability of living in unions than 
women who live in rural areas. Whether this finding reflects higher costs of 
establishing households (i.e., higher housing costs) in urban areas or if it 
should be ascribed to selection processes, (i.e., women in unions preferring to 
live in rural areas and/or women who live as singles preferring to live in 
urban areas, or both), is hard to say.  
Women who attend church at least once a month have a higher predicted 
probability of living with a partner than women who attend church less often. 
Protestants and Catholics are also significantly more likely to live with part-
ners in comparison with women who do not have a religious denomination. 
This could be seen as a confirmation that the positive effect of religiousness 
on the likelihood of women marrying, and marrying early in life, is stronger 
than the negative effect of religion on women’s likelihood of cohabiting. 
Religiousness not only affects the type of union women choose to live in, but 
also women’s overall likelihood of living in unions. However, this impres-
sion is somewhat diluted by the fact that self-estimated religiousness is not 
significantly associated with women’s likelihood of living in unions. 
The only significant country-level control variable is the percentage of 
women who live with their parents, which strongly reduces women’s likeli-
hood of living in unions. Consequently, the factors that influence the age on 
leaving the parental home also affect women’s likelihood of living in unions. 
As discussed earlier, this is not surprising given that the two events are close-
ly interrelated. In some cases they even reflect one and same decision: that is, 
the decision to leave the parental home in order to live with a partner. As also 
previously mentioned, the main issues in discussions on the determinants of 
the age on leaving the parental home have been the cost of housing, youth 
unemployment, and culture-specific family norms (see Chapter 4). However, 
family policies might also affect the timing when young people leave the 
parental home, and a part of family policies’ effect on women’s likelihood of 
living in unions might go via the policies’ effect on the age when young 
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people leave the parental home. At least there is reason to suspect that this is 
the case when the decision to leave the parental home is taken at the same 
time as (or as a consequence of) the decision to start a new household with a 
partner. If such cases are common, the effect of family policies on the likeli-
hood of women living in unions can be suspected to be greater than what is 
revealed by the coefficients in Model 3. Further regressions (results not 
shown; available from the author on request) also show that the positive 
association between the dual-earner index and the likelihood of women living 
in unions increases if the age on leaving the parental home is excluded from 
the regressions. This behavior is explained by the fact that the generosity of 
dual-earner policies is highly correlated with the age on leaving the parental 
home. This is of course only to be expected if generous dual-earner policies 
lower the age on leaving the parental home.  
For some reason the availability of part-time work does not have an im-
pact on women’s likelihood of living in unions.    
So far the results both confirm the existence of a negative association be-
tween female labor force participation and women’s likelihood of living in 
unions (H4) and the existence of a positive association between generous 
family policies and women’s likelihood of living in unions (H5). However, as 
discussed in the methodology part of the chapter, generous dual-earner poli-
cies are not only likely to increase women’s likelihood of living in unions, 
but also their likelihood of working. Given that labor force participation is 
associated with a lower probability of women living in unions, the overall 
positive association between generous dual-earner policies and the likelihood 
of women living in unions could therefore be smaller than what is revealed 
by models that control for women’s labor market status.  
To account for this endogeneity problem and test how strong the overall 
association between the dual-earner index and the likelihood of women living 
in unions really is, I rerun Model 3 without controls for labor market status. 
The idea is that the resulting model will capture both the direct (assumed 
positive) association between policies and the likelihood of women living in 
unions and the indirect (assumed negative) association between the two, 
which depends of the association between policies and the likelihood of 
women participating in the labor market. The results are shown in Model 4 in 
Table 6.2.  
As could be expected, the overall positive association between the dual-
earner index and women’s likelihood of living in unions is somewhat weaker 
in the new model, but it remains significant at the 5-percent level. The posi-
tive association between the benefits index and the likelihood of women 
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living in unions, however, remains intact. All control variables also behave 
similarly to how they behave in Model 3.  
If the coefficient of the dual-earner index, which shows the change in 
odds ratios (1.18), is translated into predicted probabilities (see Figure 6.5), 
each log-unit change on the dual-earner index increases the predicted proba-
bility of women living in unions by about .035 (or 5 percent). Going from the 
country with the lowest score (Switzerland) on the dual-earner index to that 
with the highest score (Denmark) increases the predicted probability of wom-
en living in unions by .075. In other words, 12 percent more women are pre-
dicted to live in unions in the country with the most generous dual-earner 
policies than in the country with the least generous dual-earner policies.  
 
Figure 6.5. The dual-earner index and the likelihood of women living in unions  
 
Comments: Builds on Model 4 in Table 6.2. The graph shows the association between the predicted 
probability of women living in unions and the dual-earner index when all other variables are kept at 
their mean. The shaded area shows the 95-percent confidence interval. 
 
The total strength of the association between the benefits index and the like-
lihood of women living in unions, which is illustrated in Figure 6.6, is some-
what stronger than that between the dual-earner index and the same likeli-
hood. Women in the country with the most generous family benefits have a 
predicted probability of living in unions that is .1, or 16 percent, higher than 
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the predicted probability of women in the country with the least generous 
family benefits living in unions. However, it should be noted that a log-unit 
change on the dual-earner index is equally strongly associated with the likeli-
hood of women living in unions as a log-unit change on the benefits index. 
The latter index has a greater total effect on women’s likelihood of living in 
unions only because it varies more than the dual-earner index.  
 
Figure 6.6. The benefits index and the likelihood of women living in unions  
 
Comments: Builds on Model 4 in Table 6.2. The graph shows the association between the predicted 
probability of women living in unions and the benefits index when all other variables are kept at their 
mean. The shaded area shows the 95-percent confidence interval. 
 
To sum up, hypothesis H5 is robust for controls for the endogeneity problem. 
However, it still remains to be tested whether the positive association be-
tween generous family policies and women’s likelihood of living in unions 
depends on a positive association between generous family policies and the 
likelihood of working women living in unions. This I do next.  
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The likelihood of women in and outside the 
labor market living in unions 
Does the positive association between generous family policies and the like-
lihood of women living in unions mainly depend on a positive association 
between generous family policies and the likelihood of working women and 
women who are students living in unions? To test whether this is the case, I 
perform split-sample analyses among women with and without labor market 
attachment. The results from the models of the likelihood of women with 
labor market attachment living in unions are presented in Models 5 to 7 in 
Table 6.3. 
 
Table 6.3. Odds ratios of women living in unions: working women and women who are 
students who do not have children below school age 
 
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Individual level  
  
Age 1.78 (.08)*** 1.78 (.08)*** 1.78 (.08)*** 
Age*Age .99 (.00)*** .99 (.00)*** .99 (.00)*** 
Living urban  .79 (.05)*** .78 (.05)*** .78 (.05)*** 
University education .80 (.07)** .78 (.07)** .78 (.07)** 
Monthly church  1.09 (.10) 1.10 (.10) 1.12 (.10) 
Religiosity .97 (.01)* .97 (.01)* .97 (.01)* 
Protestant 1.20 (.19) 1.16 (.17) 1.10 (.16) 
Catholic 1.16 (.15) 1.17 (.15) 1.20 (.15) 
Orthodox 1.29 (.28) 1.40 (.26)+ 1.37 (.23)+ 
Other .98 (.18) .97 (.18) .98 (.18) 
    
Country level  
  
(log)Dual-earner index   1.61 (.17)*** 1.36 (.12)*** 
(log)Benefits index      1.26 (.12)* 
(log)Part-time work      1.00 (.12) 
(log)Unemployment rate     1.27 (.14)* 
(log)Living with parents     .71 (.09)** 
    
Random part  
  
Intercept level 2 .35 (.06)*** .24 (.04)*** .17 (.03)*** 
    
Observations 
   
Individuals  8292 8292 8292 
Countries 22 22 22 
Log likelihood -4376.192 -4368.932 -4362.354 
AIC 8780.383 8767.863 8762.709 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+
 p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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In line with the expectations, Model 7 shows that the dual-earner index is 
more strongly associated with the likelihood of working women and women 
who are students living in unions than with women’s overall likelihood of 
living with partners.  
Figure 6.7, which illustrates the association, shows that a working woman 
who does not have children below school age has a predicted probability of 
about .5 of living with a partner in the country with the least generous dual-
earner policies, when all other variables are held constant at their means. The 
predicted probability of a similar woman living in a union in the country with 
the most generous dual-earner policies is over .65.  
 
Figure 6.7. The dual-earner index and the likelihood of working women and women who 
are students living in unions  
 
Comments. Builds on Model 7 in Table 6.3. The graph shows the effects of the dual-earner index 
and women’s labor market status when all other variables are kept at the sample mean. The shaded 
areas show the 83-percent confidence intervals. This means that confidence intervals that do not 
overlap show likelihoods that are significantly different from each other at the 5-percent level.  
 
Thus, each log unit separating the two countries on the dual-earner index is 
associated with a .075 (15 percent) increase in the predicted probability of 
working women who do not have children below school age living in unions. 
This means that 30 percent more working women live with partners in the 
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country with the most generous dual-earner policies in comparison to the 
country with the least generous dual-earner policies. 
The positive association between the dual-earner index and the likelihood 
of women who are students living in unions is even stronger. The predicted 
probability that women who are students live in unions is .14 higher in the 
country with the most generous dual-earner policies compared to what it is in 
the country with the least generous dual-earner policies. As the predicted 
probability of women who are students living in unions in the latter country 
is only .28, this means that almost 50 percent more women who are students 
are predicted to live in unions in the country with most generous dual-earner 
policies compared to in the country with least generous dual-earner policies.  
The association between the dual-earner index and the likelihood of 
working women and women who are students living in unions in Model 7 is 
considerably stronger than the one found in the models in Table 6.2, which 
do not exclude women outside the labor market. To be more exact, the asso-
ciation is 50 percent stronger (.1 compared to .15) for working women and 25 
percent (.11 compared to .14) stronger for women who are students. Conse-
quently, it is safe to say that the strength of the positive association between 
the dual-earner index and the likelihood of women living in unions is strong-
er among working women and women who are students than among women 
outside the labor market.  
The association between the benefits index and women’s likelihood of 
living in unions is also stronger among women who are working and study-
ing than it is in the models that include women outside the labor market (see 
Figure 6.8). The predicted probability of working women living in unions is 
.15, or 33 percent, higher in the country with the most generous family bene-
fits compared to in the country with the least generous family benefits; the 
predicted probability of women who are students living in unions is .13, or 
nearly 50 percent, higher in the country with the most generous family bene-
fits. The difference in the magnitude of the effects between the models in-
cluding and excluding women outside the labor market is of about the same 
size as that for the dual-earner index. 
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Figure 6.8. The benefits index and the likelihood of working women and women who are 
students living in unions 
 
Comments: Builds on Model 7 in Table 6.3. The graph shows the effects of the dual-earner index, 
the benefits index, and labor market status when all other variables are kept at the sample mean. 
The shaded areas show the 83-percent confidence intervals. This means that confidence intervals 
that do not overlap show likelihoods that are significantly different from each other at the 5-percent 
level. 
 
Two interesting observations regarding the behavior of the control models 
should be mentioned. The first is that the association between participation in 
organized religiousness and the likelihood of living in a union seems to be 
weaker among women in the labor market. The frequency of church attend-
ance is not significantly associated with the likelihood of working women 
and women who are students living in unions, whereas self-estimated reli-
giousness is actually negatively associated with the same likelihood. For 
some reason, religious working women and religious women who are stu-
dents are less likely to live in unions than their more secular sisters. Perhaps 
this is a sign of the difficulty involved in simultaneously maintaining a career 
and adhering to religious teachings on women’s family duties.  
Also, the observation that the unemployment rate is positively associated 
with the likelihood of working women and women who are students living in 
unions, whereas it is not significantly associated with women’s overall likeli-
hood of living in unions, deserves mention. As was pointed out in the meth-
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ods discussion, unemployment reduces the opportunity costs of reproduction 
drastically, because of the resulting loss of the woman’s wage. Other things 
being equal, this fact might tilt women who expect to be, or fear becoming, 
unemployed in the future toward considering a union (with children) a rela-
tively attractive option. Thus, as the unemployment rate is likely a good 
proxy for women’s risk of unemployment, it is not surprising to find a posi-
tive association between it and the likelihood of women living in unions. 
However, one could wonder why only women who have jobs or who are 
currently or soon to be seeking one are affected by the unemployment rate. 
The reason most likely is that such women, in contrast to women outside the 
labor market, under normal circumstances have relatively good earning op-
portunities. Women who are, voluntarily or involuntarily, outside the labor 
market are likely to have relatively poor earning opportunities even during 
good labor market conditions and are, thus, in all probability less sensitive to 
labor market conditions when making their union decisions. This is easily 
illustrated by the fact that only women who have jobs risk losing their jobs in 
times of high unemployment. Women who actively plan on seeking jobs (i.e., 
women students) are also more sensitive to labor market conditions than 
women who have voluntarily chosen to stay outside the labor market, or who, 
even during normal circumstances, cannot manage to get a job.  
 In all, the results from Models 5 to 7 seem to confirm that the positive 
association between generous family policies and the overall likelihood of 
women living in unions mainly depend on a positive association between 
generous family policies and the likelihood of working women and women 
who are students living in unions. They also seem to confirm that working 
women and women who are students overall are more sensitive to economic 
factors than women outside the labor force. However, in order to draw such a 
conclusion with more certainty, it is necessary to also examine how variables 
are associated with the likelihood of women outside the labor market living 
in unions. Therefore, I also run a model of the likelihood of women outside 
the labor market living in unions. The results are presented in Model 8 in 
Table 6.5.   
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Table 6.5. Odds ratios of women living in unions: women outside the labor market who 
do not have children below school age  
 
Model 8 
Individual level  
Age 1.49 (.11)*** 
Age*Age .996 (.001)*** 
Living urban  .75 (.08)** 
University education .89 (.17) 
Monthly church  1.56 (.19)*** 
Religiosity .97 (.02) 
Protestant 1.76 (.33)** 
Catholic 1.21 (.22) 
Orthodox 1.15 (.24) 
Other 1.16 (.20) 
  
Country level  
(log)Dual-earner index   
(log)Benefits index    
(log)Part-time work    
(log)Unemployment rate   
(log)Living with parents   
  
Random part  
Intercept level 2 .14 (.11) 
  
Observations 
 
Individuals  2253 
Countries 22 
Log likelihood -1255.118 
AIC 2536.237 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+
 p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Model 8, which only includes individual-level variables, shows that educa-
tional attainment is not negatively associated with the likelihood of women 
outside the labor market living in unions. Although the coefficient of having 
a university education is slightly negative, it is not near to being statistically 
significant. This likely reflects the fact that women outside the labor market 
are not able to capitalize on their educations to the same extent as women 
who are established in the labor market. A woman’s education matters little 
for her earning potential if she nevertheless finds herself outside the labor 
market with few opportunities and little inclination to (re)enter it. It is also a 
fact that an education decreases in value with time if it is not kept up to date, 
for example, through work experience. It is, thus, no surprise to see a strong-
er association between educational attainment and the likelihood of working 
women and women who are students living in unions than between educa-
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tional attainment and the likelihood of women outside the labor market living 
in unions.   
The impression that economic incentives do not affect the relationship 
decisions of women outside the labor market is further strengthened by the 
fact that the likelihood of such women living in unions does not vary signifi-
cantly between countries. The random intercepts (presented in the random 
part of the model) are not even near conventional levels of significance (the 
coefficient is .14 with a standard error of .11). Because there is not a signifi-
cant variation between countries to explain, there is no need to continue ex-
ploring whether country-level characteristics are associated with the likeli-
hood of women outside the labor market living in unions. Only the likelihood 
of working women and women who are students living in unions is associat-
ed with country-level characteristics. Consequently, H6 is confirmed: the 
positive association between generous family policies and the overall likeli-
hood of women living in unions is totally dependent on a positive association 
between generous family policies and the likelihood of working women and 
women who are students (i.e., women with relatively large expected future 
earnings) living in unions.   
 
Concluding discussion  
This chapter has shown that working women and women who are students 
are less likely than women outside the labor market to live in unions. It has 
also shown that women are more likely to live in unions in countries that 
have implemented generous family policies. Finally, it has shown that the 
latter finding can be explained by the fact that working women and women 
who are students are more likely to live with partners in countries with gen-
erous family policies. These findings are compatible with my argument that 
good earning opportunities reduce women’s incentives to enter unions, but 
that the effect can be reduced by generous family policies that compensate 
mothers for their forgone earnings and lost career opportunities.   
The family policy explanation of women’s diverging likelihoods of living 
in unions tested in this chapter fares relatively well in relation to the major 
alternative to it: the age on leaving the parental home explanation (Aassve et 
al. 2002; Billari et al. 2001; Baizán, Aasve & Billari 2003, 2004; Holdsworth 
2000; Mulder et al. 2002; Mulder 2006). The mean age when adults leave the 
parental home is negatively associated with women’s likelihood of living in 
unions – and strongly so. However, it cannot offer a better explanation of the 
between-country variation in women’s likelihood of living with partners than 
the generosity of family policies. The age on leaving the parental home is 
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also likely affected by the generosity of family policies in many cases, such 
as when the decision to leave the parental home is taken as a consequence of 
a decision to start a family with a partner.76 Insofar as it has focused on indi-
vidual-level fertility patterns, the previous research, thus, seems to have 
missed a large part of family policies’ effect on fertility when it has neglected 
to study family policies’ effect on women’s incentives to form unions. When 
the latter effect is taken into account, it becomes apparent that generous fami-
ly policies can have a positive effect on fertility.  
The likelihood of women choosing to live in unions, however, is not the 
only aspect of women’s union formation decisions that matters for the focus 
of this study, which is the effect of family policies on fertility. Besides the 
decision of whether or not to enter a union, women also have to decide on the 
kind of union they want to enter into: one based on cohabitation or one based 
on marriage. This choice has important repercussions for their future fertility 
decisions. The question of how it is affected by family policies is the topic of 
the next chapter.  
 
                                                          
76
 Further regressions (not shown; available from author on request), that exclude the age on leaving the 
parental home and control directly for the cost of housing (measured as the percentage of their income that a 
typical family in a country spends on housing) and youth unemployment, suggest that family policies have a 
much stronger positive effect on women’s likelihood of living in unions than the results presented in this 
chapter indicate. Thus, there is some evidence that point to that generous family policies can make adults to 
leave their parental home early in life.   
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7 
The likelihood of women living 
in unstable unions 
 
Chapter 6 showed that the likelihood of women of childbearing age living in 
unions varies across Europe and that the variation can be partly explained by 
the generosity of family policies. However, the types of unions women enter 
into also vary across Europe. In some countries almost everyone cohabits 
before they marry – if they marry at all. In other countries nearly everyone 
forms their first union by marrying, and would never contemplate unmarried 
cohabitation. These different choices have profound consequences for the 
stability of the unions women enter into, as cohabitating unions are less sta-
ble than marriages. In Chapter 4, I argued that these patterns can be partly 
explained by the fact that generous dual-earner policies increase the likeli-
hood of women living in unstable unions. Chapter 7 aims to test this claim. 
First, I briefly restate my argument. Then follows an exploration of how 
aggregate patterns of cohabitation correlate with the generosity of dual-earner 
policies. After that, I go on to discuss method and data for testing the argu-
ment on individual-level data. Then follows a study on how family policies 
are associated with the likelihood of women in unions cohabiting based on 
individual-level data. The findings and their implications are wrapped up in a 
brief discussion at the end of the chapter.   
 
Hypotheses  
Women who are established in the labor market enjoy greater economic free-
dom than women outside the labor market, as they are not dependent on their 
partners for income. I argued in Chapter 4 that, because of this, they are less 
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likely than women outside the labor market to demand the economic security 
that comes with a stable union. Hence, 
 
H7. Women with relatively high earning opportunities (i.e. women who 
work and study) should be more likely than women with relatively low 
earning opportunities (i.e. women outside the labor market) to live in un-
stable unions.  
 
Generous dual-earner policies increase the likelihood of women in unions 
having high earning opportunities. Such policies also reduce the cost of leav-
ing a bad union. Because of this, I also argued in chapter 4 that, 
 
H8. Generous dual-earner policies should increase the likelihood of 
women living in unstable unions.  
 
Given the assumption that cohabiting unions are less stable than unions built 
on marriage two implications follow from the hypotheses above: 
• All else being equal, we should expect women in unions who 
work and study to be more likely to cohabit (as opposed to mar-
ry) than women in unions who are outside the labor market. 
• All else being equal, we should expect the likelihood of women 
in unions cohabiting to be higher in countries with high scores 
on the dual-earner index than it is in countries with low scores 
on the dual-earner index. 
 
An important question to ponder is whether the expected positive association 
between generous dual-earner policies and the likelihood of women in unions 
cohabiting will disappear entirely when it is taken into account that women in 
unions who work and study are more likely to cohabit than women in unions 
who do not work or study. It is, after all, in part based on the assumptions i) 
that generous dual-earner policies increase the likelihood of working women 
and women who are students living in unions, and ii) that such women are 
more likely than women outside the labor market to cohabit.  
However, there is a reason to doubt that controls for women’s labor mar-
ket status will make the positive association disappear entirely, and that is 
that generous dual-earner policies are necessary in order for a mother with 
small children to sustain her career and remain financially independent of her 
partner. It matters little for the woman’s financial independence, if she has a 
job, if she must give it up in order to care for her children. Under such cir-
cumstances the woman must rely on her partner for income, anyway. Only 
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generous dual-earner policies can guarantee financial independence to wom-
en who have children. Therefore, it is likely that generous dual-earner poli-
cies will be significantly positively associated with the likelihood of women 
in unions cohabiting even when controlling for women’s labor market status. 
 
Aggregate patterns of cohabitation 
In line with the findings of previous studies, aggregate patterns show a strong 
positive association between the log of the female labor force participation 
rate and the percentage of women in unions cohabiting (Pearson’s R: .78; 
results not shown). Aggregate data is, in other words, consistent with hypoth-
esis H7, that women with relatively good earning opportunities are more 
likely to cohabit than women with relatively low earning opportunities: co-
habitation is more widespread in countries with high labor force participation 
rates.  
 
Figure 7.1. The generosity of dual-earner policies and aggregate cohabitation patterns 
 
Pearson’s R: .75 
Comments: The graphs show how the average percentage of 18- to 45-year-old women in unions 
cohabiting between 2002 and 2006 (calculated from rounds 2 (2003–2004) and 3 (2005–2006) of 
the European Social Survey) correlates with countries’ average scores on the dual-earner index 
1999–2006 (source: see Appendix C).  
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The data is also consistent with hypothesis H8, that cohabitation should be 
more prevalent in countries with generous dual-earner policies (the correla-
tion is .75; see Figure 1). Women in countries with high scores on the dual-
earner index relatively often choose to live in unstable unions. In countries 
with low scores on the dual-earner index, women overwhelmingly choose 
more stable relationships. In Denmark, which scores 86 on the dual-earner 
index (corresponding to a score of 4.46 on the logged dual-earner index), for 
example, more than 32 percent of the women in unions between the ages of 
18 and 45 cohabit. The corresponding share of the women in unions cohabit-
ing in Greece, which scores 13 on the dual-earner index (corresponding to a 
score of 2.54 on the logged dual-earner index), is not even 5 percent.  
To sum up, aggregate patterns seem to indicate that generous dual-earner 
policies increase both the number of women in unions and the number of 
women in unions cohabiting. However, as was pointed out in Chapter 6, an 
aggregate pattern is one thing and an individual-level pattern is another. 
Therefore, next I discuss how to test my hypotheses on individual-level data.  
 
Data and method 
The individual-level study on the likelihood of women in unions cohabiting 
for the most part uses the same methods, data, and variables as were used in 
the analyses on the likelihood of women living in unions in Chapter 6. The 
data for the study comes from rounds 2 and 3 of the European Social Survey, 
and I use multilevel modeling to estimate my models. All units are weighted 
with design weights, but not with population weights. In addition, both the 
individual-level and country-level independent variables are identical to those 
used in the models presented in chapter 6. For the same reasons discussed in 
Chapter 6, all included policy indicators and macro-economic indicators are 
represented with their four-year average from the period directly preceding 
the year of the interview. The sources of all data are the same as in Chapter 6.  
  
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is coded as 1 if a woman cohabits with her partner 
without being legally married to him and as 0 if she is married. I have chosen 
to equate secular marriages with church marriages, so that only women who 
do not have marriage contracts count as cohabiting (the focus of my hypothe-
ses is on the economic aspects of the difference between marriage and cohab-
itation). 
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Country-level independent variables 
I use the same independent variables at the country level as in Chapter 6 
because they capture the economic conditions under which union formation 
decisions are taken. In addition to the expected positive association between 
generous dual-earner policies and the likelihood of women in unions cohabit-
ing, the expectation is that all policies that decrease women’s financial de-
pendence on their partners are likely to increase the likelihood of women 
cohabiting. In particular, the availability of part-time jobs could be expected 
to do so, because part-time jobs allow women to stay in the labor market 
while they have children.  
Family benefits only marginally reduce women’s financial independence 
from their partners. Therefore, we should, at most, expect a weak positive 
association between the benefits index and the likelihood of women in unions 
cohabiting.  
The association between the unemployment rate and the likelihood of 
women in unions cohabiting is harder to foresee as it theoretically both in-
creases and reduces women’s incentives to cohabit. In times of high unem-
ployment a marriage contract could work as an insurance against future un-
employment. If only women were affected by the risk of unemployment, the 
unemployment rate could therefore be assumed to be negatively associated 
with the likelihood of women in unions cohabiting. However, a high unem-
ployment rate also increases men’s risk of unemployment. To the extent it 
does so, it dilutes the value of potential marriage contracts and reduces wom-
en’s incentives to marry. Which of these effects dominates is an open ques-
tion. The unemployment rate could be positively, negatively, or not at all 
associated with the likelihood of women in unions cohabiting.      
Also, the association between the percentage of young people who live 
with their parents and the likelihood of women in unions cohabiting is am-
biguous. To the degree that a high age on leaving the parental home reflects 
high youth unemployment, the association is as ambiguous as that for the 
unemployment rate. To the degree that it reflects other economic obstacles to 
establishing an independent household, such as high housing costs, there is 
no reason to expect a significant association with the likelihood of women in 
unions cohabiting, as there is no obvious link with women’s financial inde-
pendence. Only to the extent that the age on leaving the parental home re-
flects cultural norms regarding living arrangements is there reason to assume 
an association with women’s incentives to cohabit. Cultural traditions tend to 
be more conservative in countries where the age on leaving the parental home 
is higher, thus, any found association with cohabitation in such a case is like-
ly to be negative.     
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Individual-level independent variables 
Regarding the individual-level control variables, there is reason to expect a 
positive association between women’s educational attainment and their like-
lihood of cohabiting. Women’s educational attainment is a good proxy for 
their earning potential, and with a high earning potential comes a relatively 
high degree of financial independence. Highly educated women, thus, do not 
need a marriage contract to the same extent as less educated women, hence 
they are likely to see cohabitation as an attractive alternative to marriage. 
However, it is likely that much of the usefulness of educational attainment as 
a proxy for women’s earning potential is eaten up by the more direct control 
for women’s labor market status.  
All variables measuring subjective and organized religiousness (i.e. par-
ticipation in religious activities) are expected to be negatively associated with 
the likelihood of women in unions cohabiting. Christianity and other major 
religions strongly condemn unmarried cohabitation and extramarital sexual 
relationships. Hence, religious individuals must pay a hefty psychological 
price for cohabiting (Lehrer 1996; Westhoff & Frejka 2007). Some research-
ers also argue that religious congregations, when given the chance, pressure 
their members into obedience to their teachings by punishing those who de-
part from their teachings (McQuillan 2004). There is no reason to assume 
unmarried cohabitation to be an exception to this rule. Hence, it can be ex-
pected that both subjective and organized religiousness, independent of each 
other, will be strongly negatively associated with the likelihood of women in 
unions cohabiting.  
Summary statistics are presented in Table 7.1. 
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Table 7.1. Summation of variables  
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Cohabiting 9550 .19 .39 0 1 
Age 9550 34.6 6.4 18 44.9 
Age*age 9550 1238 428 327 2018 
Living in rural area 9550 .40 .49 0 1 
Living in urban area 9550 .60 .49 0 1 
No university education 9550 .72 .45 0 1 
University education 9550 .28 .45 0 1 
Church <1/month 9550 .72 .45 0 1 
Att. Church 1/month 9550 .28 .45 0 1 
Religiousness 9550 4.89 3.00 0 10 
 No denomination 9550 .37 .48 0 1 
Protestant 9550 .16 .36 0 1 
Catholic 9550 .38 .49 0 1 
Orthodox 9550 .04 .19 0 1 
Other 9550 .05 .21 0 1 
Essround  9550 2.42 .49 2 3 
Outside labor market 9550 .34 .47 0 1 
In paid work 9550 .62 .48 0 1 
In education 9550 .03 .18 0 1 
(log)Dual-earner index 9550 3.33 .56 2.30 4.46 
(log)Benefits index 9550 1.78 .53 0 2.73 
(log)Unemployment rate 9550 1.85 .58 .64 2.93 
(log)Part-time work 9550 2.65 .74 .74 3.82 
(log)Living with parents 9550 1.84 .61 .86 2.78 
Comments: Unweighted means. Reference categories in italics. For construction of variables and 
sources of data: see Appendix C.     
 
Sample restrictions  
The sample of women is restricted, including only women who live in un-
ions. This restriction is made in order not to conflate the likelihood of cohab-
iting once one has decided to live with a partner with the likelihood of living 
with a partner in the first place. The likelihoods resulting from the combina-
tion of the likelihood of living in a union and the likelihood of living in a 
special type of union (i.e., cohabiting or living as married) are presented at 
the end of the chapter. Only women aged 18 to 45 are included in the models.  
Because of the close relationship between dual-earner policies and wom-
en’s labor market status, I run models both including and excluding labor 
market status. The idea is that the latter model will illustrate the overall asso-
ciation between the generosity of dual-earner policies and the likelihood of 
women in unions cohabiting, whereas the former models will illustrate the 
extent to which this overall association depends on a direct association be-
tween both likelihoods and the extent to which it depends on the indirect 
association that goes via generous dual-earner policies’ positive association 
with women’s likelihood of working.  
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Statistical models 
Formally, the models of the likelihood of women in unions cohabiting are 
structured as follows:77 
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 Technical note: The models have been run with gllamm in Stata10 (see Rabe Hesketh, Skrondal & Pickles 
2004; Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal 2005).   
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The overall likelihood of women in unions 
cohabiting  
Model 1 in Table 7.2 confirms that women in unions who work and study are 
more likely to cohabit than women in unions who do not work or study. The 
difference between the groups is considerable. If the odds ratios are translated 
into predicted probabilities, working women are over 30 percent more likely 
to cohabit than women outside the labor market. The predicted probability of 
women students cohabiting is more than 130 percent higher than that of 
women outside the labor market cohabiting.  
 
Table 7.2 Odds ratios of women in unions cohabiting 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Individual level   
  
Age .65 (.05)*** .66 (.05)*** .66 (.05)*** .62 (.05)*** 
Age*Age 1.005 (.001*** 1.005 (.001)* 1.005 (.001)*** 1.005 (.001)*** 
Living urban  1.17 (.10)+ 1.17 (.10)+ 1.17 (.10)+ 1.20 (.10)* 
University education 1.15 (.13) 1.15 (.13) 1.14 (.13) 1.25 (.14)* 
Monthly church  .39 (.03)*** .39 (.03)*** .40 (.03)*** .39 (.03)*** 
Religiosity .95 (.01)*** .95 (.01)*** .95 (.01)*** .95 (.01)*** 
Protestant .84 (.11) .84 (.11) .84 (.10) .81 (.09)+ 
Catholic .63 (.07)*** .64 (.07)*** .65 (.07)*** .60 (.04)*** 
Orthodox .39 (.15)* .42 (.17)* .50 (.21)+ .50 (.21)+ 
Other .28 (.09)*** .28 (.09)*** .28 (.09)*** .25 (.07)*** 
In education 3.17 (.72)*** 3.14 (.72)*** 3.13 (.71)***   
In paid work 1.74 (.22)*** 1.73 (.33)*** 1.74 (.22)***   
     
Country level 
    
(log)Dual-earner index   1.82 (.47)* 1.34 (.23)+ 1.56 (.34)* 
(log)Benefits index      1.27 (.45) 1.21 (.54) 
(log)Part-time work      1.41 (.29)+ 1.77 (.50)* 
(log)Unemployment rate     .99 (.32) 1.23 (.56) 
(log)Living with parents     .71 (.17) .76 (.18) 
     
Random part   
  
Intercept level 2 .68 (.10)*** .59 (.09)*** .40 (.06)*** .44 (.06)*** 
     
Observations 
    
Individuals  9550 9550 9550 9550 
Countries 22 22 22 22 
Log likelihood -3715.99 -3712.475 -3705.83 -3752.071 
AIC 7461.979 7456.949 7451.66 7540.142 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+
 p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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The implications following from H7 are, thus, confirmed. Women’s labor 
market attachment is positively associated with their likelihood of cohabiting 
once they have decided to live in a union. However, as the random part of the 
model shows, the likelihood of women in unions cohabiting varies signifi-
cantly between countries. Thus, there is room for dual-earner policies to 
make a difference, even after controlling for women’s labor market status.   
Model 2, which adds the dual-earner index to Model 1, shows an im-
proved model fit over Model 1 both according to Aikike’s information crite-
ria and the log likelihood. The random intercept at the country level (i.e., the 
variation in predicted probabilities between countries) is also reduced by 
about 13 percent. These improvements are explained by the fact that the dual-
earner index, when introduced, is significantly and strongly positively associ-
ated with the likelihood of women in unions cohabiting. However, Model 2 
does not include controls for other factors influencing the economic condi-
tions under which union decisions are taken. When such controls are included 
in Model 3, the positive association between the dual-earner index and the 
likelihood of women in unions cohabiting is reduced drastically, but does 
remain significant at the 10-percent level. The strength of the association, 
which is illustrated in Figure 7.2, is still considerable.  
Women in unions who are outside the labor market have a very low pre-
dicted probability, of just over .06, of cohabiting in the country with the low-
est score on the dual-earner index. The predicted probability of such women 
cohabiting in the country with the highest score on the dual-earner index is 
approximately .12. This means that 100 percent more women outside the 
labor market cohabit in the country with the highest score on the dual-earner 
index compared to in the country with the lowest score on the dual-earner 
index.  
The difference in predicted probabilities between working women cohab-
iting in the two countries is of equal magnitude. In the country with the low-
est score on the dual-earner index, working women in unions have a predict-
ed probability of cohabiting of about .1. In the country with the highest score 
on the dual-earner index, the same group has a predicted probability of co-
habiting of .19. In other words, the likelihood of working women cohabiting 
is more than 90 percent higher in the latter country. Put another way, each 
log-unit increase on the dual-earner index increases the predicted probability 
of working women cohabiting by about .04.  
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Figure 7.2. The dual-earner index and the likelihood of women in unions cohabiting 
 
Comments: Builds on Model 3 in Table 7.2. The graph shows the strength of the association be-
tween the dual-earner index and various labor market statuses and the likelihood of women in 
unions cohabiting when all other variables are kept at the sample mean. The shaded areas show the 
83-percent confidence intervals. This means that confidence intervals that do not overlap show 
likelihoods that are significantly different from each other at the 5-percent level.  
 
Women who are students have the highest predicted probability of cohabit-
ing. In the country with the lowest score on the dual-earner index, they have a 
predicted probability of cohabiting of .19, whereas the corresponding pre-
dicted probability that they cohabit is .3 in the country with the highest score 
on the dual-earner index. Thus, the predicted probability of women who are 
students cohabiting is almost 60 percent higher in the latter country. This 
means that each log-unit change on the dual-earner index increases the pre-
dicted probability of women students cohabiting by a little more than .05.  
It should be noted that the positive association between the dual-earner 
index and women in unions cohabiting is so strong that working women in 
the country with the highest score on the dual-earner index are almost as 
likely to cohabit as are women who are students in the country with the low-
est score on the dual-earner index. 
To sum up, it seems that hypothesis H8 – that the increased likelihood of 
women living in unions that comes with generous dual-earner policies should 
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go together with a higher likelihood of women in unions cohabiting – is cor-
rect even when controlling for women’s labor market status. Also, women 
outside the labor market seem more willing to enter cohabiting unions in 
countries with generous dual-earner policies. This indicates that generous 
dual-earner policies have an independent effect on women’s perceived need 
for a marriage contract in addition to the indirect effect they have by increas-
ing women’s labor market attachment. As previously discussed, this likely 
has to do with the fact that generous dual-earner policies are necessary to 
enable mothers with small children to exploit their labor market attachment 
and remain financially independent of their husbands in the event of a union 
dissolution.  
Generous dual-earner policies also seem to exert a significant indirect ef-
fect on women’s willingness to cohabit, via their positive effect on women’s 
labor market attachment. An indication of this is that the positive association 
between the dual-earner index and the likelihood of women in unions cohab-
iting increases and becomes significant at the 5-percent level when the con-
trols for labor market status are excluded in Model 4. 
Figure 7.3., which illustrates the association, shows that the likelihood of 
women in unions cohabiting is more than twice as high in the country with 
the most generous dual-earner policies as it is in the country with the least 
generous dual-earner policies. In other words, each log-unit increase on the 
dual-earner index increases the predicted probability of women in unions 
cohabiting by about .04. Thus, the combined direct and indirect effect of 
dual-earner policies on the likelihood of women in unions cohabiting is sub-
stantial.   
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Figure 7.3. The dual-earner index and the likelihood of women in unions cohabiting 
 
Comments: Builds on Model 4 in Table 7.2. The graph shows the strength of the association be-
tween the dual-earner index and the likelihood of women in unions cohabiting when all other varia-
bles are kept at the sample mean. The shaded area shows the 95-percent confidence interval. 
 
Only one country-level control variable is significantly associated with the 
likelihood of women in unions cohabiting: the availability of part-time work 
as a percentage of the total workforce. The strength of the significant associa-
tion is, on the other hand, considerable, especially in Model 4, which ex-
cludes the controls for women’s labor market status. Each log unit change on 
the index increases the expected odds of women in unions cohabiting by a 
factor of 1.77. As illustrated in Figure 7.4, this means that each log-unit 
change increases the predicted probability of women in unions cohabiting by 
about .035, when all other variables are held constant at their mean. In the 
country with the lowest availability of part-time work, the predicted probabil-
ity of women in unions cohabiting is only .07. In the country with the highest 
availability of part-time work, the corresponding predicted probability is 
higher than .18. The predicted probability of women in unions cohabiting is, 
in other words, more than 150 percent higher in the country in which part-
time work is most prevalent in comparison to what it is in the country in 
which part-time work is least available.  
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Figure 7.4. The availability of part-time jobs and the likelihood of women in unions 
cohabiting 
 
Comments: Builds on Model 4 in Table 7.2. The graph shows the strength of the association be-
tween the availability of part-time jobs and the likelihood of women in unions cohabiting when all 
other variables are kept at the sample mean. The shaded area shows the 95-percent confidence 
interval. 
 
The positive association between the availability of part-time work and the 
likelihood of women in unions cohabiting strengthens the impression that 
policies that help women retain their labor market attachment in the event 
they have children increase the likelihood of women cohabiting. The fact that 
they also do so after controls for women’s labor market status have been 
introduced in the models speaks for the conclusion that such policies have a 
direct positive effect on women’s financial independence in addition to the 
indirect positive effect they have via their positive effect on women’s labor 
market attachment. Women not only seem to give weight to their current 
earning potentials (financial independence) when deciding on whether to 
cohabit or marry, they also seem to give weight to how their future earning 
potentials (financial independence) will be affected by having children. In 
countries in which mothers have a relatively good chance to stay in the labor 
market and retain their financial independence, women are relatively willing 
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to cohabit. In countries in which mothers must give up their careers and fi-
nancial independence, women are less willing to cohabit.    
The most striking observation, relating to the individual-level control var-
iables, is the strong negative association between all indicators of religious-
ness and the likelihood of women in unions cohabiting. The hypothesis that 
religiousness increases the cost, and therefore lowers the probability, of co-
habitation seems to be supported. However, it should be pointed out that the 
causal relationship likely works in both ways. Religious women are likely to 
adjust their lifestyles to their teachings and avoid cohabitation, whereas 
women who cohabit are likely to adapt to and defend their choice of union 
status by becoming less religious. Nonetheless, the association is so strong 
that it is reasonably safe to assume religiousness to have an impact on wom-
en’s likelihood of cohabiting. Women who attend church at least once a 
month, for example, have 60 percent lower odds of cohabiting than women 
who do not attend church regularly. Also, subjective religiousness reduces 
the likelihood of cohabiting. For each step on the eleven-point scale on which 
respondents are asked to estimate how religious they are, the odds of cohabit-
ing are reduced by 5 percent. The combined negative association between 
church attendance and self-estimated religiousness and the likelihood of 
women in unions cohabiting is huge.  
Interestingly, women’s denominational belonging seems intimately relat-
ed to their likelihood of cohabiting. Practicing Protestant women are only 
slightly less likely to cohabit than women who do not belong to any denomi-
nation. In contrast, practicing Catholic and Orthodox women are much less 
likely to cohabit than women who do not belong to any denomination. This 
could mean that Catholic and Orthodox congregations are more effective in 
controlling their adherents’ relationship behavior. It could also mean that 
Catholic and Orthodox women have more conservative views on marriage 
than Protestant women. Whatever the reason, relatively few Catholic and 
Orthodox women cohabit.     
As expected, women’s educational attainment is positively associated 
with their likelihood of cohabiting. But the association is, somewhat surpris-
ingly, not significant, except for in Model 4. Furthermore, the significant 
association in Model 4 can likely be ascribed to the fact that educational 
attainment captures some of the effect of the excluded variables measuring 
women’s labor market status (highly educated women are more likely to 
work than less educated women). For some reason, highly educated women’s 
relative financial independence does not seem to matter for their choice be-
tween cohabitation and marriage. The most important factor affecting wom-
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en’s choice of type of union seems to be whether they have a foot in the labor 
market. 
 
Concluding discussion 
To conclude, relatively many women cohabit in countries with generous 
dual-earner policies and high availability of part-time jobs. In part, this can 
be explained by the fact that generous dual-earner policies and the availabil-
ity of part-time jobs increase women’s labor market attachment, and that 
women in paid work and education are more likely to cohabit than women 
outside the labor market. However, much of the positive association between 
said policies and women’s likelihood of cohabiting remains even after wom-
en’s labor force participation is controlled for. Policies shape women’s will-
ingness to cohabit in more direct ways than through the effect such policies 
have on women’s labor force participation. Both hypothesis H7, that women 
with relatively high earning potentials should be more likely to cohabit than 
women with relatively low earning potentials, and hypothesis H8, that the 
increased likelihood of women living in unions that comes with generous 
dual-earner policies should result in an increased likelihood of women in 
unions cohabiting, are thus confirmed. 
Religiousness also seems to play an important role in shaping cohabita-
tion patterns in Europe. Religious women are much less likely than secular 
women to cohabit. Cultural and psychological traits, thus, also seem to matter 
for women’s choice of type of union. Together, family policies and religious-
ness can explain much of the variation in cohabitation patterns in contempo-
rary Europe.  
Women who cohabit make up only a minority of the women in unions in 
European countries. For most women, cohabitation is only a first step toward 
marriage. In other words, cohabitation functions as a kind of trial marriage, 
where partners can evaluate whether it is a good idea to get married for real 
(Perelli-Harris et al. 2009). Only in Sweden, and to a lesser extent in other 
Nordic countries, does cohabitation seem to be a real – permanent – alterna-
tive to marriage (ibid.). Most women who cohabit during their lifetimes even-
tually get married. The likelihood of women in unions cohabiting, hence, 
reveals only a part of policies’ effect on union stability. Much of the union 
instability associated with cohabitation should instead be sought after in 
marriages that started out as cohabiting unions, or in marriages in which the 
partners have cohabited with others before they got married.  
Although the likelihood of women in unions cohabiting is relatively low, 
it is intimately linked with women’s overall likelihood of living in unions. As 
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Figure 7.5 shows, dual-earner policies mainly affect working women’s and, 
especially, student women’s likelihood of living in unions by affecting their 
likelihood of cohabiting. Only to a lesser extent do they affect the likelihood 
of such women living as married. Women students, for example, only have a 
.04 higher predicted probability of being married in the country with the 
highest score on the dual-earner index compared to in the country with the 
lowest score on the dual-earner index. The predicted probability of such 
women cohabiting is, in contrast, .1 higher in the former country than in the 
latter country.  
 
Figure 7.5. The dual-earner index and the likelihood of working women and women who 
are students living in unions, cohabiting, and living as married 
  
Comments: Builds on Model 3 in Table 6.2 in Chapter 6 and Model 3 in Table 7.2 in Chapter 7. The 
graphs show how the likelihood of women living in unions and living as married correlate with the 
dual-earner index when all variables are kept at the sample mean. 
 
Generous dual-earner policies also increase the likelihood of women outside 
the labor market cohabiting. Moreover, they do so without increasing their 
likelihood of living in unions. Together with the fact that the cohabitation 
rate is positively correlated with the number of married women who have 
cohabited, this fact makes it dubious whether generous dual-earner policies 
really has such a positive effect on fertility as its positive association with the 
likelihood of working women and women who are students cohabiting seems 
to indicate. As pointed out in Chapter 4, we know from previous research that 
unstable unions result in fewer children than stable unions. The fact that the 
unions women enter into in countries with generous dual-earner policies are 
less stable than the unions women enter into in countries with less generous 
dual-earner policies risks offsetting much of generous dual-earner policies’ 
positive effect on fertility. This risk is clearly illustrated by Figure 7.6, which 
shows how the likelihood of women living in unstable unions increases sim-
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ultaneously as the likelihood of women living in unions increases with high 
scores on the dual-earner index.  
 
Figure 7.6. The dual-earner index and the likelihood of women living in unions, cohabit-
ing, living as married, and living as married without having cohabited 
 
Comments: Builds on Model 4 in Table 6.3 in Chapter 6 and Model 4 in Table 7.2 in Chapter 7, plus 
regressions not shown. The figure shows how the various likelihoods correlate with the dual-earner 
index when all other variables are kept at the sample mean.    
 
The figure shows that almost all of generous dual-earner policies’ positive 
effect on women’s likelihood of living in unions can be ascribed to the fact 
that such policies increase the likelihood of women cohabiting. It also shows 
that the likelihood of married women never having cohabited is halved with 
high scores on the dual-earner index. In the country with the lowest score on 
the dual-earner index, the predicted probability of a married woman not hav-
ing cohabited is higher than .4. The corresponding likelihood in the country 
with the highest score on the dual-earner index is only a little above .2. The 
overall likelihood of women being married, however, does not vary between 
the two countries. 
Given the modest increase in the likelihood of women living in unions be-
tween the countries, it is questionable whether generous dual-earner policies 
actually do increase fertility by increasing the likelihood of women living in 
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unions, as was argued in Chapter 4. One could even suspect the opposite to 
be true: that generous dual-earner policies lower fertility by reducing the 
likelihood of women living in stable unions.  
It should be noted that generous family benefits do not increase the likeli-
hood of women in unions cohabiting. At first sight, the positive association 
between the benefits index and the likelihood of women living in unions is, 
because of this, more likely to result in higher fertility than is the positive 
association between the dual-earner index and the likelihood of women living 
in unions. Thus, the conclusion that generous family policies in general have 
a positive effect on fertility is not threatened. Previous studies on the topic 
have likely underestimated the positive effect of generous family policies on 
fertility when they have avoided studying how family policies affect wom-
en’s likelihood of living in unions. It remains unclear, though, whether they 
have done so when they have avoided studying dual-earner policies’ effect on 
women’s likelihood of living in unions.  
However, as was argued in Chapter 4, the negative effect of union insta-
bility on fertility can likely be offset by generous dual-earner policies. If this 
is the case, generous dual-earner policies’ positive effect on the likelihood of 
women living in unions might avoid being offset by such policies’ destabiliz-
ing effect on unions. Thus, it is still possible that previous studies have un-
derestimated the positive effect of generous family policies on fertility when 
they have neglected to study such policies’ effect on women’s likelihood of 
living in unions. 
To establish whether previous studies have underestimated the positive 
effect of generous dual-earner policies on fertility, it is therefore necessary to 
investigate the association between union instability and fertility – and how it 
is affected by the generosity of dual-earner policies. That is what I do in the 
next two chapters. 
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8 
Union instability and women’s 
fertility decisions 
 
Women’s willingness to have children outside wedlock varies considerably 
between countries. In some countries, almost no women have children before 
they marry. In other countries, a majority of women have children without 
being married. I argued in Chapter 4 that this variation can be explained by 
the varying generosity of dual-earner policies. The overall aim of this chapter 
is to test this hypothesis. I do so by investigating what effect union instability 
and the generosity of dual-earner policies and the interaction between the two 
have on the likelihood of women having a first, a second, and a third child. 
The chapter starts with a brief review of my argument and a description of 
aggregate fertility patterns. Following that is a discussion on how to test the 
argument on micro-level data and the following empirical study. The chapter 
ends with a discussion of the empirical findings and their implications.  
 
Hypotheses 
I argued in Chapter 4 that union instability increases the risk of reproductive 
investments from an individual perspective. This is especially true from a 
woman’s perspective, as it is women who tend to bear the main burden of 
reproductive investments in terms of pregnancies and child-rearing. Hence,  
 
H1. Union instability should reduce fertility. 
 
Given that cohabitation and past experience of cohabitation have been proven 
to be good indicators of union instability (see Chapter 5), we could reformu-
late H1 as follows: 
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H1. Cohabitation and past experience of cohabitation should reduce fer-
tility; women who cohabit and those who are married but have previously 
cohabited should be less likely to have a(nother) child than women who 
are married and have never cohabited.  
 
Unlike most other family policies, generous dual-earner policies reduce 
women’s risk of having children in unstable unions. For example, they allow 
women to retain their financial independence when they become mothers. 
Because of this we should expect that, 
 
H2. Generous dual-earner policies should reduce the negative effect of 
union instability on fertility.  
 
Given that cohabitation and past experience of cohabitation are good predic-
tors of union instability, we could reformulate H2 as follows: 
 
H2. Generous dual-earner policies should reduce the negative effect of 
cohabitation and past experience of cohabitation on fertility: women who 
cohabit or who are married but have previously cohabited should be 
more likely to have a(nother) child in countries with generous dual-
earner policies than in countries with less generous dual-earner policies.  
 
In addition to this indirect positive effect on fertility, generous dual-earner 
policies are also, like other generous family policies, likely to have a direct 
positive effect on fertility because they reduce the costs of reproduction. 
Hence,  
 
H3. Generous family policies should increase fertility.  
 
It follows from the hypotheses above that: 
• All else being equal, we should expect women in unstable unions 
(i.e., women who cohabit or are married but have previously co-
habited) to have fewer children than women in stable unions 
(i.e., women who are married and have never cohabited).    
• All else being equal, we should expect the fertility gap between 
women in unstable and stable unions to be smaller – or even 
non-existent – in countries with relatively high scores on the du-
al-earner index.   
• All else being equal, we should expect women in countries with 
high scores on the dual-earner index (and other family policy in-
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dexes) to have more children than women in countries with low 
scores on the dual-earner index (and other family policy index-
es).  
 
Below I try to verify these implications with aggregate data.  
 
Aggregate fertility patterns  
Aggregate fertility patterns are largely consistent with hypothesis H3, that 
generous family policies should increase fertility. Both family policy indexes 
correlate positively with the total fertility rate. As expected, the strongest 
correlation is that between the log of the dual-earner index and the total fertil-
ity rate (Pearson’s R: .68; see Figure 8.1). 
 
Figure 8.1. The generosity of dual-earner policies and the total fertility rate  
 
Pearson’s R: .68    
Comments: The graph shows how the average total fertility rate 2002–2006 (source: Eurostat) 
correlates with countries’ average scores on the dual-earner index 1999–2006 (source: see Appen-
dix C).  
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tively high fertility rates, whereas countries with low scores on the dual-
earner index have relatively low fertility rates. The difference is huge in prac-
tical terms. Women, on average, have about 0.5 more children in the coun-
tries with the highest scores on the dual-earner index compared to the coun-
tries with the lowest scores on the dual-earner index.  
There is also a positive correlation between the log of the benefits index 
and the total fertility rate. The strength of the correlation, however, is very 
weak (Pearson’s R: .17; results not shown). If generous family benefits have 
a positive effect on fertility, the effect does not reveal itself particularly well 
in a bivariate correlation with the total fertility rate.  
The data provided by the ESS makes it possible to do a rudimentary test 
to determine if there is also a fertility gap between women living in stable 
and unstable unions, and if it exists, to what extent it varies between coun-
tries with different scores on the dual-earner index. To test whether this is the 
case, below I present figures on how many children 35- to 45-year-old wom-
en have had during their lives by their union status at the time of their inter-
view for the ESS. I separate the women into two groups, depending on 
whether the countries they live in score below or above the mean value of the 
dual-earner index (which largely coincides with the median value so that the 
groups contain an equal number of countries). The results are presented in 
Table 8.1 below.  
 
Table 8.1. Achieved fertility by union status (women aged 35–45) 
 Below mean level of 
the dual-earner index 
Above mean level of 
the dual-earner index 
Fertility difference 
Married (have not cohabi-
ted)  
2.10 2.18 +0.08 
Married (have cohabited) 1.82 2.24 +0.42 
Cohabiting 1.35 1.78 +0.43 
No union 0.96 1.31 +0.35 
All women 1.74 1.97 +0.23 
Comments: The table shows the average number of children women aged 35–45 have had during 
their lives by their union status at the time of their interview for the ESS. The women are divided into 
two groups depending on whether they live in countries that score above (mean score: 3.7) or below 
(mean score: 2.8) the average value (3.3) of the dual-earner index (1999–2006). The mean differ-
ence between the two groups’ scores on the dual-earner index is 0.9. All countries are weighted 
equally (i.e., provide one observation). Source of data: Rounds 2 and 3 of the European Social 
Survey. 
 
Although the generosity of dual-earner policies has increased in recent years, 
the pattern of relative generosity has, as has been pointed out earlier, been 
rather stable over time. Because of this it is fairly safe to conclude that wom-
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en in countries that today score above the mean value of the dual-earner in-
dex have historically experienced more generous dual-earner policies than 
women who live in countries that today score below the mean value of the 
dual-earner index. If my argument is correct, we should consequently expect 
fertility differences between women in stable and unstable unions to be less 
accentuated in the aforementioned countries.  
In line with the expectations, union instability correlates negatively with 
the number of children women had at the time for their interview, especially 
in countries that score relatively low on the dual-earner index. In countries 
that score below the average of the dual-earner index, cohabiting women 
have about 0.8, and married women who have cohabited have about 0.3, 
fewer children than married women who have not cohabited. In countries that 
score above the average, the corresponding differences are much smaller or 
even non-existent. Also, women who were not living in a union at the time of 
their interview for the ESS (i.e., single women who may or may not have 
lived in unions that had broken up before the time of their interview) have 
more children in countries with relatively generous dual-earner policies. On 
average, women who live in unstable types of unions or have had unions that 
ended before their interviews have 0.4 more children in the countries with 
relatively generous dual-earner policies. Given this, it is remarkable that the 
total number of children of women who live in the most stable type of union 
differs only somewhat between countries. This observation seems to support 
the conclusion that women in unstable unions have more children in coun-
tries with generous dual-earner policies, whereas women in relatively stable 
unions are not affected to the same extent by dual-earner policies in their 
fertility decisions. As the last row of the table shows, this also means that 
women in countries with generous dual-earner policies on average have more 
children (0.23 children to be exact) than women in countries with less gener-
ous dual-earner policies. The fact that the total fertility gap is somewhat 
smaller than the fertility gap for women in less stable unions can be ascribed 
to the fact that relatively many women live in the most stable types of unions 
in the latter countries. Nonetheless, women in the former countries on aver-
age have almost 0.25 children more than women in the latter countries.  
However, the comparisons of means between groups of women presented 
above cannot do more than lend some initial credibility to my argument. The 
comparison does not control for other factors that could potentially confound 
the results, and it strains the limit on how far back in time we can assume 
present-day conditions to mirror past conditions. Completed fertility is, after 
all, a product of women’s complete adult life histories, and for the oldest 
women in the sample, these life histories go back over 25 years. Therefore, 
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below I turn to test my argument in a more thorough way with individual-
level data.   
 
Data and method  
In order to test my hypotheses in a more thorough way, I next estimate multi-
level logistic regression models of the likelihood of women in unions having 
experienced a birth during the three-year period prior to the year they were 
interviewed for their participation in the second and third rounds of the Euro-
pean Social Survey.  
 
The dependent variable  
Despite its limitations, the ESS provides reliable and detailed yearly retro-
spective data on women’s fertility histories. This means that we can know for 
certain how many children a woman has had and the year(s) in which she 
gave birth to them. From this data it is possible to construct full fertility his-
tories for all women in the sample. For a certain year we can know how many 
children a woman has had up until that year and how many years it was since 
she last had a child. We can, moreover, know if she had a child during the 
year. This data makes it possible to estimate the likelihood of a woman giv-
ing birth in a certain year, given the previous number of children she has had. 
I have used this data to construct a dependent variable measuring the likeli-
hood of a woman having given birth in the three-year period prior to the year 
in which she was interviewed for her participation in the ESS, conditioned on 
her previous number of children.  
The likelihood of women having given birth within the three-year period 
prior to their interview for the ESS is modeled separately for women who had 
no children or one child at the start of the three-year period and women who 
had two or more children at the start of the three-year period. Only women 
who could potentially experience a birth of the parities in question at the start 
of the three-year period are included in the models. Hence, the models that 
estimate the likelihood of experiencing a first or a second birth include only 
women who were childless or had one child at the start of the three-year 
period. The models that estimate the likelihood of having a third- or higher-
order child include only women who had at least two children at the start of 
the three-year period.  
The reason for modeling the likelihood of a first and a second birth sepa-
rately from the likelihood of third- and higher-order births is that the effects 
of individual- and macro-level variables on fertility have been shown to dif-
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fer depending on how many children a woman has already given birth to. For 
example, studies have shown that highly educated women tend to wait longer 
than less educated women before having their first child, but that, after their 
first births, they proceed as quickly to higher-order births as less educated 
women (Kravdal 2004). To account for this, I have as far as possible modeled 
births of different parities separately so that the effects of all variables are 
allowed to vary between parities. Ideally, it would have been preferable to 
model births of all parities separately. However, the relatively small number 
of women of childbearing age that were interviewed for the ESS makes such 
a strategy unfeasible. To achieve the statistical power that comes with ade-
quate numbers of women it has been necessary to pool together women who 
had different numbers of children at the start of the three-year period.  
The choice to model first and second births together and separately from 
third- and higher-order births has been guided by two considerations. The 
first is practical and builds around the fact that the numbers of women in 
unions who had no children or only one child at the start of the three-year 
period are relatively small, taken separately. Considerably more women in 
unions had two children at the start of the period. By pooling together the 
women who had no children or one child at the start of the three-year period 
we get a group that is somewhat larger than the group of women who had 
two or more children at the start of the period.  
The second consideration is more theoretical and builds on the fact that 
third- and higher-order births are much less common than first and second 
births. Women who have three or more children are likely to be a very select 
group because they are so few. Women who have one or two children, in 
contrast, constitute a much broader group, which includes the majority of 
women in European countries. Because of this, the two groups are likely to 
differ considerably with respect to fertility-relevant characteristics. For this 
reason I have chosen to study the effect of family policies and other variables 
separately for the two groups. To account for the fact that women within the 
groups have different numbers of children, I have included dummy variables 
for the number of children each woman has at the start of the three-year peri-
od. To also account for the fact that some variables are likely to vary in effect 
between women with different numbers of children within the two separate 
groups, I have in some cases interacted independent variables with the num-
ber of children a woman has at the start of the three-year period (see the vari-
able description below for information on which variables have been inter-
acted).  
Ideally, it would have been best to investigate the fertility histories of the 
respondents from the day they turned 18 until the time they were interviewed 
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for the ESS. The main reason I, despite this, have decided to use a three-year 
period to measure fertility is that reliable data for many of my independent 
variables is unavailable or unreliable for longer time periods. Reliable com-
parative data on dual-earner policies, for example, is available only from the 
end of the 1990s for most of the countries included in the study.   
The reason I have decided on a three-year period instead of a four-, two-, 
or one-year period (which the data would have allowed for) has partly to do 
with statistical convenience. The distribution of the dichotomous variables 
measuring whether a respondent has experienced a first- and a second-order 
birth is rather skewed in favor of respondents not having given birth for peri-
ods shorter than three years. As for statistical reasons, it is preferable to have 
an evenly distributed dependent dichotomous variable, and the choice of a 
three-year period is convenient from a methodological point of view.  
A second reason for using a three-year period, instead of a longer or 
shorter time period, is that the second round of the ESS contains data on 
whether women intend to have a child in the three years after their interview. 
This use of three-year periods in research on fertility intentions is wide-
spread. In the next chapter I explore what effect family policies and union 
instability have on such fertility intentions. Using a three-year period as the 
dependent variable in this chapter allows for the results in the chapters to be 
directly compared to each other as well as with the previous research on 
fertility intentions.  
To sum up the discussion on the dependent variable, the first set of mod-
els presented below illustrates the likelihood of women in unions who have 
no children or one child at the start of the period having a first or a second 
child within the three-year period prior to the year of their interview for the 
ESS. The second set of models illustrates the likelihood of women in unions 
who have two or more children at the start of the period having a third or 
higher-parity child within the three-year period prior to the year of their in-
terview. 
 
Design of the study 
The models of the likelihood of women in unions giving birth during the 
three-year period preceding the year they were interviewed for their partici-
pation in the ESS could be compared to a two-stage panel study with infor-
mation collected before and after the three-year period. The only difference 
from an ordinary two-stage panel study is that the data for the first stage has 
been collected retrospectively at the second stage. Under normal circum-
stances the fact that data has been collected retrospectively could render 
causal interpretations of the effect of variables difficult. The data on women’s 
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fertility histories, however, is likely to be very reliable and not likely to entail 
retrospective adjustments.78 Therefore, the dependent variable fits all neces-
sary conditions for a two-stage panel design; it reliably measures whether an 
event does or does not occur during the three-year period under study, given 
a number of known conditions at the start of the period.  
In order to give the coefficients in the models a causal interpretation, the 
independent variables must also measure the state of affairs at the start of, 
and during, the three-year period in a reliable way. Therefore it is necessary 
to examine more closely the quality of the data available for the construction 
of independent variables.  
Before doing so, however, it is necessary to bring up another question. 
Namely, what does the dependent variable really measure? Does the depend-
ent variable only measure the timing of fertility, or does it also measure the 
quantum of fertility? The simple answer is that there is no real answer: we 
cannot know for certain if it measures the timing or quantum of fertility. A 
more nuanced answer is that at least the models of the likelihood of women 
having third- and higher-order children likely to some extent measure effects 
on the quantum of fertility. Third- and higher-order births are relatively un-
common in Europe. Therefore, in most cases, such births are reliable indica-
tors of the quantum of fertility. When it comes to first and second births, the 
question is more complicated. However, it should be noted that timing effects 
can also have an impact on the quantum of fertility. Women’s fecundity falls 
with age, and drastically so after they enter their mid-30s. If women wait too 
long to have children it is not certain they will be able to have the number of 
children they intend to. Only in some countries do women recuperate the 
births they postpone later in life. In other countries, women wait so long 
before they attempt to have children that age prevents them from having the 
children they once intended to have. Therefore, it is likely that at least some 
of the effects on the likelihood of women having a first and second child can 
be interpreted as effects on the quantum of fertility. However, caution should 
be observed when interpreting effects on women’s likelihood of having first 
and second children as effects on the quantum on fertility.     
 
Country-level independent variables 
All variables at the country level measure the conditions during and directly 
prior to the three-year period. They represent the average policy and labor 
                                                          
78
 The only minor exception to this judgment is the fact that women are asked to report only all surviving 
children they have given birth to. Thus, children who have died after birth are not included in the women’s 
fertility histories. The absence of this information, however, is likely to be a very minor problem given the low 
rates of infant and child mortality in contemporary Europe.  
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market conditions of the three-year period prior to the year of the interview, 
plus the year prior to the three-year period. Thus, the country-level variables 
represent four-year averages.79 The reason I have chosen to include the year 
preceding the three-year period in the four-year averages is to account for the 
fact that the decision to have a child must be taken approximately nine 
months before a birth occurs. Because of this, births occurring during the 
three-year period can, in some cases, reflect fertility decisions taken the year 
before the start of the three-year period. To capture the factors involved in 
such decisions it is necessary to account for conditions during the year prior 
to the three-year period. The choice to use four-year averages for all country-
level variables is thus a consequence of the ambition to capture the conditions 
women are likely to have taken into account when deciding on whether to 
have a(nother) child during the three-year period prior to their interview for 
the ESS. Since the country-level variables actually capture these conditions, 
it is possible to give their coefficients a causal interpretation.  
The generosity of family policies is measured by the log of the dual-
earner index, the log of the benefits index, and the log of the availability of 
part-time jobs. 
Two variables are used to measure labor market conditions: the log of the 
total unemployment rate and the log of the female labor force participation 
rate. The expected association between the unemployment rate and the likeli-
hood of women having a(nother) birth during the three-year period is ambig-
uous. Insofar as women are affected by the unemployment rate, it is likely to 
increase women’s incentives to have a(nother) child. This is because the risk 
of future unemployment reduces women’s expected earning prospects and, 
hence, also their expected costs of reproduction. However, to the extent that 
men are affected by the unemployment rate, it is likely to reduce women’s 
incentives to have a(nother) child. In cases where the male partner risks be-
coming, or actually becomes, unemployed, the income effect is likely to 
dominate the opportunity effect, so that the family cannot afford to have 
                                                          
79
 There are two exceptions to this rule, namely the child care availability and cost components of the dual-
earner index. Yearly data for the availability and cost of child care is not available for all years during the two 
four-year periods. Data on the availability of child care is only available for the years 1999/2000 and 2005. 
Data on the cost of child care is only available for the year 2005. Beacuase of this, the availability component 
is measured by the average of the figures for 1999/2000 and 2005 for women participating in round 2 of the 
ESS, and by the figures for 2005 for women participating in round 3. The cost component is measured by the 
figures from 2005 for all women. Although the lack of data is unfortunate, it should be noted that the availabil-
ity of child care in 1999/2000 correlates highly with the availability in 2005 (.8). There is a general trend 
towards greater availability, but the broad country patterns remain intact. In addition, it should be pointed out 
that the available data represent the year before and the year after the first four-year period. Thus, it suffices 
that the increase in child care availability is constant over the period for the used average to perfectly represent 
the average availability of child care during the period.         
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a(nother) child. Which effect dominates the other is an open question. How-
ever, recent research indicates that a high unemployment rate reduces fertility 
(Adserà 2004; 2011), hence the effect is likely to be negative.   
For reasons described below it is not possible to control for women’s in-
dividual earning opportunities in the models by measuring their attachment to 
the labor market. Therefore, I have chosen to include the female labor force 
participation rate as a proxy of women’s overall earning opportunities. Since 
women’s earning opportunities increase their costs of reproduction, the ex-
pectation is that the association between the female labor force participation 
rate and women’s likelihood of having a(nother) child will be negative.   
Finally, I have included the percentage of women who live with their par-
ents in a country as a proxy for other factors that could affect women’s re-
productive decisions, such as housing prices and youth unemployment rates. 
The expectation is that there will be a negative association between this vari-
able and the likelihood of women having a(nother) child.  
 
Individual-level independent variables  
If the country-level variables reliably measure policy conditions and econom-
ic conditions during the four-year period prior to the interview, the situation 
is somewhat different when it comes to the individual-level variables. The 
most important independent individual-level variables are women’s union 
status and union histories. Unfortunately, the individual data on union histo-
ries provided by the ESS only contains fully reliable information on the sta-
tus and duration of the union respondents lived in at the time they were inter-
viewed for their participation in the ESS. Unions preceding the union in 
which respondents were living at the time of their interview are only sketchi-
ly covered by the data (respondents who state that they are not living in a 
union at the time of the interview are asked if they have ever lived with a 
partner before the time of the interview and under what circumstances they 
have done so). This means that we can know only five things about women’s 
unions and union histories for certain. First, we can know whether a woman 
lived in a union at the time of her interview for the ESS. Second, in cases 
where the woman was living with a partner at the time of her interview, we 
can know how long the union had lasted at the time of the interview. Third, 
in cases where a woman did not live with a partner at the time of her inter-
view, we can know whether she had lived in a union before her interview. 
Fourth, in the event a woman was living in a union at the time of her inter-
view, we can know whether she was cohabiting or married. Fifth, in the event 
a woman was married at the time of her interview, we can know if she had 
ever cohabited with a partner without being married to him.  
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From this data it is possible to construct dummy variables measuring the 
type of union in which a woman lived at the time of her interview for the 
ESS. First, we can know if she cohabited or lived as married. Second, we can 
distinguish whether she lived as married without having experienced unmar-
ried cohabitation or whether she lived as married having experienced unmar-
ried cohabitation. Together, these distinctions make it possible to differenti-
ate between five types of unions and modes of single living: i) cohabiting 
unions, ii) unions built on marriage and in which the woman has experienced 
unmarried cohabitation, iii) unions built on marriage in which the woman has 
not experienced unmarried cohabitation, iv) women who did not live in a 
union at the time of their interview, but who have lived in a union sometime 
during their lives, and v) women who have never lived in a union. I use these 
distinctions to create a set of dummy variables that can be used as proxies for 
union stability. This set includes three dummy variables following the three 
first distinctions mentioned above. In line with the expectations discussed in 
Chapter 5, cohabiting unions are expected to be least stable, marriages in 
which the woman has cohabited are expected to be of average stability, and 
marriages in which the woman has not cohabited are expected to be most 
stable.  
The ESS also provides information on how many years a woman has 
lived in the union in which she was living in at the time of her interview for 
the ESS. From this information it is possible to construct a control variable 
measuring the number of years within the four-year period prior to the year 
of her interview during which she did not live with the partner she had at the 
time of the interview. This variable is used as a technical control to account 
for the fact that some women have not lived with their partners during the 
entire four-year period preceding the year of their interview (the variable is 
used in the regressions, but is not reported in the results).80 
So far the retrospective information on women’s union histories provided 
by the ESS is rather reliable. However, the ESS does not provide information 
on two other dimensions of women’s union histories that we ideally would 
want to know about. First, and most important, we cannot know whether a 
woman who does not live in a union at the time of her interview for the ESS, 
but who has lived with a partner previously, lived in a union during any of 
                                                          
80
 However, the data does not reveal whether a woman who has not lived the whole period with the partner she 
had had at the time of her interview lived alone, or with another partner, before she met her partner.  There-
fore, the years during the four-year period such women have lived without a partner are counted similarly for 
all women. The resulting variable is included as a technical control measuring the number of years during the 
four-year period a woman has not lived with the partner she had when being interviewed for the ESS (this 
variable is used in the regressions, but is not reported in the results). 
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years of the four-year period prior to her interview. Because of this, women 
who lived in a union that broke up during the period are left censored and 
counted together with the women who lived as singles during the whole peri-
od in a separate category. With the exception of the robustness tests (see 
below), this category of women is excluded from the models.81 
The second problem with the data provided by the ESS is that we cannot 
know whether a woman who was married at the time of her interview, but 
who has experienced unmarried cohabitation, married before or during the 
period under investigation. Such a woman may have lived a part of the inves-
tigated period in a cohabiting union. As it is not farfetched to assume that it is 
the most stable cohabiting unions that are turned into marriages, the lack of 
reliable retrospective data risks making cohabiting unions appear less likely 
to result in children than they really are.  
To circumvent these problems and test whether my results are robust for 
the exclusion of women whose unions ended before the end of the four-year 
period and the problem of distinguishing between married women who have 
cohabited before and during the period, I construct a second set of dummies 
measuring union stability. This second set also contains three dummy varia-
bles, which, in order of stability, distinguish between i) women who live as 
married and who have not experienced unmarried cohabitation, ii) women 
who cohabit or live as married and have experienced unmarried cohabitation, 
and iii) women who have lived with a partner but who were single at the time 
of their interview. The models using this set exclude only women who at the 
time of their interview stated that they had never lived with a partner. Thus, 
they solve the problem of the exclusion of women whose unions ended dur-
ing the investigated period. By merging married women who had experi-
enced unmarried cohabitation and women who were cohabiting into one 
group, the models also partially solve the problem of distinguishing between 
                                                          
81
 It might seem as if this omission potentially threatens to undermine my findings, as it is possible that results 
would have been different if this group of women had been included. However, I argue that this shortcoming 
only threatens to undermine null results. It does not threaten eventual confirmations of my hypotheses. Unions 
not lasting the entire four-year period can by definition be said to have been relatively unstable. The surviving 
unions used to model union stability’s effect on women’s likelihood of having children are, thus, more stable 
than unions were in general during the four-year time period. In other words, the surviving unstable unions can 
be seen as relatively stable unstable unions. In all likelihood, this means that it will be harder to detect an 
eventual negative effect of union instability on fertility among the unions used in the models presented below, 
than it would have been if the unions that broke up during the four-year period had also been included in the 
models. Likewise, it will in all likelihood be harder to detect an eventual positive effect of dual-earner policies 
on fertility among women who live in unstable unions. The exclusion of women who lived in unions that 
broke up during the four-year period thus makes the test for my hypotheses harder than it would have been if 
the women had been included in the models.  
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married women who have lived part of the period in cohabiting unions and 
those who have not. The simple solution is to treat all women who have start-
ed out as cohabiters uniformly (unless they were not living as singles at the 
time of their interview). Thus, it is possible to estimate the overall effect of 
starting out as a cohabiter (as opposed to starting out as married) on the like-
lihood of having children during the investigated period.    
Also, a limitation of most individual-level control variables is that the 
ESS mainly provides information on the status of the respondents at the time 
of their interviews and not on their past status. However, in most cases the 
problem of lacking information on the respondents’ past is not so grave as to 
warrant their exclusion from the models, although, caution with causal inter-
pretations is advised. The only exception to this rule is women’s labor market 
attachment. 
The information on women’s labor market attachment that is provided by 
the ESS is not suitable for modeling women’s fertility decisions four years 
back in time, as it only reports on women’s activities during the week prior to 
their interview. As it is well known from previous research that women who 
have given birth to a child tend to withdraw from the labor market during a 
longer time period, it would be impossible to use this information to model 
women’s fertility decisions without running into overwhelming endogeneity 
problems. For this reason I have chosen not to include control variables on 
women’s labor market attachment as proxies for their earning capacities in 
the models presented below. Instead, I have decided to use the female labor 
force participation rate to measure women’s overall earning opportunities.82  
To have at least some measure of women’s individual earning opportuni-
ties, I have included in the models women’s highest level of educational 
attainment at the time of their interview. This variable is also problematic, as 
it is measured at the end of the period and in some cases is likely to have 
changed during the period. However, the problem is not as large as it might 
seem. Most students know when they begin their studies what their future 
highest level of education will be. A student of medicine, for example, knows 
that, in all likelihood, she will be a medical practitioner in the future. This 
makes it likely that women take their future level of education into considera-
tion when deciding whether to have a(nother) child. If this is the case, it does 
not appear problematic to model women’s fertility decisions during the peri-
od as a consequence of their educational attainment at the end of the period. 
                                                          
82
 The ESS instructs interviewers to code women who are on parental leave as working if they have a job to go 
back to after the leave period ends. However, in many countries the only way for women to stay at home with 
their children is to quit their jobs, so the coding instructions provided by the ESS do not solve the discussed 
endogeneity problem.  
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Therefore, I include a dummy for women’s educational attainment, coded as 
1 if the woman has a university education and as 0 if she does not, as a con-
trol variable in the models below. The expectation is that women who have a 
university education will be less likely to give birth during the three-year 
period, because of their greater earning opportunities.   
For similar reasons as those for including women’s educational attain-
ment in the models, I also include a control variable measuring the educa-
tional attainment of the women’s partners. The idea is that this variable, 
which is coded as 1 if the partner has a university education and as 0 if he 
does not, will control for the impact of the partner’s earning opportunities on 
the couple’s fertility decisions. Men’s earning opportunities have been prov-
en to have a positive effect on their partners’ fertility in several studies. 
Therefore, the expectation is that women who have a partner with a universi-
ty education will be more likely than women who do not have a partner with 
a university education to have a child during the three-year period.   
If it is reasonable to model women’s fertility decisions as a consequence 
of their educational attainment at the time of their interview, it is more prob-
lematic to model their fertility decisions as a consequence of where they 
reside (whether in an urban or rural area) at the time of their interview. We 
know from previous research that high rural and low urban fertility, at least in 
part, is a consequence of selection mechanisms (Kulu & Vikat 2008). Fami-
lies who plan to have children move from urban areas to more rural areas for 
several reasons, and women who do not plan to have children often move 
from rural areas to urban areas. Given these facts, it could be doubted wheth-
er it is wise to include in the models controls for where women reside at the 
time of their interview. Nonetheless, I have done so to account for the fact 
that women in urban areas also tend to have fewer children for reasons other 
than the selection effect discussed above. Housing, for example, tends to be 
more expensive in urban areas than in rural areas, making it more costly to 
acquire adequate space for housing a(nother) child. However, the sign of the 
coefficient of the resulting variable should be interpreted with caution given 
the possibility of the effect going in both ways.  
Similar caution is warranted when interpreting the coefficients of varia-
bles measuring different aspects of religiousness. It is not unthinkable that the 
arrival of a child could increase the mother’s religiousness. Several studies, 
for example, have shown that women who have children tend to adopt more 
conservative values. However, it is likely that the subjective and behavioral 
aspects of religiousness are more prone than the more institutional aspects of 
religiousness to such change. The coefficients of the dummies measuring 
denominational belonging (Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, Other denomina-
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tion and No denomination) are therefore likely to provide reliable estimates 
of the influence of religiousness on fertility.  
In addition to the abovementioned control variables, the models also in-
clude dummy variables distinguishing between women with different num-
bers of children. The models of the likelihood of women in unions having a 
first and a second child include a dummy variable distinguishing between 
women who did not have a child at the start of the period and women who 
had one child at the start of the period. The models of the likelihood of wom-
en in unions having third- and higher-order children include a dummy distin-
guishing between women who only had two children at the start of the period 
and women who had three or more children at the start of the period.  
In one case I have chosen to interact the number of children women have 
with another individual-level variable – namely, union stability. As was 
pointed out in Chapter 5, the arrival of a(nother) child tends to stabilize a 
union. Therefore, union instability is likely to diminish with the number of 
children a woman has. It is also likely that only relatively stable “unstable” 
unions result in children in countries that lack generous dual-earner policies. 
In other words, the suitability of union status as a proxy for union stability is 
likely to lose in value for each child a woman has. Because of this, I have 
chosen to interact the dummies representing women’s union status with the 
number of children a woman has in the models of the likelihood of women 
having a first and a second child. I have not deemed it necessary to do so in 
the models of the likelihood of women having a third- or higher-order child, 
as it is reasonable to assume that the value of union status as a proxy for 
union stability is diluted when women have had two or more children.   
All models also include control variables for women’s age and women’s 
age squared at the start of the three-year period as well as a dummy variable 
representing the round of the ESS that the women were interviewed for (the 
last variable is only used in the regression and is not reported in the results).  
Although some of the individual-level control variables introduce en-
dogeneity problems into the models, it should be pointed out that their inclu-
sion (women’s labor market status) and exclusion (religiousness and area of 
residence) do not alter the coefficients and standard errors of the (more relia-
ble) main variables in any important aspects (results not shown; available 
from the author on request). Thus, endogeneity is primarily a problem when 
it comes to interpreting the causal effect of some of the control variables. The 
main results presented below do not seem to be affected in any important 
sense. 
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Cross-level interactions 
In addition to the country and individual-level variables, some of the models 
also include a cross-level interaction between union status and the log of the 
dual-earner index. This interaction, which allows for the effect of the dual-
earner index to vary between women with different union statuses, is includ-
ed to test whether generous dual-earner policies reduce union instability’s 
negative effect on fertility.  
 
Sample restrictions 
As the purpose of the models is to test how union instability and the gener-
osity of family policies affect women’s fertility, the sample of women is 
restricted to include only women who were of fertile age during the three-
year period prior to the year of their interview for the ESS. In practice this 
means that only women who were older than 17 years and younger than 42 
years at the start of the period, and older than 20 years and younger than 45 
years at the end of the period are included in the models. First, I run models 
that include only women who were living in unions at the time of their inter-
view for the ESS. The reason for including only women with partners in the 
models is that a partner is a necessary condition for having children in most 
countries in Europe. However, to account for the problem of imperfect in-
formation on women’s past union histories, I also, as mentioned above, rerun 
all models without excluding women who did not live in a union at the time 
of their interview for the ESS, but who had done so at some point in their 
lives.   
 
Statistical models 
One advantage with multilevel modeling, in addition to the advantages men-
tioned in Chapter 5, is that multilevel modeling allows for the effect of spe-
cific variables to vary between contexts. In essence, this means that the slope 
of the coefficient of a variable, such as being married without having experi-
enced unmarried cohabitation, is allowed to differ between clusters. Signifi-
cant variance in the slope of being married without having experienced un-
married cohabitation indicates that there is systematic between-context varia-
tion worth exploring. Moreover, once I have introduced an interaction term 
for being married without having experienced unmarried cohabitation and the 
dual-earner index, the proportion of the remaining variance will present in-
formation about whether the interaction term picks up all systematic be-
tween-context variation in the effect of being married without having experi-
enced unmarried cohabitation. I will use this feature of multilevel modeling 
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when testing whether the effect of union instability varies between countries, 
due to the generosity of the dual-earner index (i.e., I will use it to test H3).   
The multilevel models of the likelihood of women aged 18 to 45 having a 
first or second child during the three-year period include 5365 women from 
22 countries. The multilevel models of the likelihood of women aged 18 to 
45 having a third- or higher-order child during the three-year period include 
4288 women from 22 countries. Formally, the first models measure the prob-
ability that individuals, i, nested within countries, j, have a child, Y=1, given 
a number of covariates, X1…Xn (below represented with their names) and an 
intercept B0. The models also include a random intercept, U0j, which repre-
sents country-specific likelihoods of women having a birth during the three-
year period, and a random coefficient, U1j, which allows for the effect of 
being married without having experienced unmarried cohabitation, to vary 
between countries.83  
 
 
 
For the same reasons discussed in Chapter 5, all units are weighted with 
design weights, but not with population weights. The questions guiding this 
chapter are whether the likelihood of women in unions having a(nother) child 
varies between countries and between women within countries, and to what 
extent can the potential variation be explained by union instability and family 
policies. The question is not how likely an average woman in a union, from 
the 22 countries included in my models, is to have a(nother) child.  
Summary statistics of all variables are presented in the results section 
separately for the models of the likelihood of women having a first or second 
child and the models of the likelihood of women having a third- or higher-
order children. 
                                                          
83
 Technical note: The models have been run with gllamm in Stata10 (see Rabe Hesketh, Skrondal & Pickles 
2004; Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal 2005).   
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The likelihood of women having a first and 
a second child  
Of the 5391 women in unions in the sample who had no children or one child 
at the start of the three-year period, 33 percent gave birth in the following 
three years. Women who had one child were somewhat more likely to give 
birth during this period than women who were childless.  
 
Table 8.2. Summation of variables  
Variable Observations Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
Experienced a birth 5391 .33 .47 0 1 
Age 5391 29.3 6.1 18 42 
Age*age 5391 896 370 324 1764 
Rural residence (ref.) 5391 .36 .48 0 1 
Urban residence 5391 .64 .48 0 1 
Low education (ref.) 5391 .66 .47 0 1 
High education 5391 .34 .47 0 1 
Partner low education (ref.) 5391 .71 .45 0 1 
Partner high education 5391 .29 .45 0 1 
Monthly church att. 5391 .23 .42 0 1 
Not attending church (ref.) 5391 .77 .42 0 1 
Religiosity 5391 4.6 2.9 0 10 
Protestant 5391 .15 .36 0 1 
Catholic 5391 .35 .48 0 1 
Orthodox 5391 .04 .19 0 1 
Other 5391 .05 .21 0 1 
Not belonging to church (ref.) 5391 .41 .49 0 1 
Have no children 5391 .59 .49 0 1 
Have one child 5391 .41 .49 0 1 
Cohabiting (ref.) 5391 .26 .44 0 1 
Married (cohabited) 5391 .29 .46 0 1 
Married (only) 5391 .45 .50 0 1 
(log)Dual-earner index 5391 3.33 .56 2.30 4.46 
(log)Benefits index 5391 1.76 .53 0 2.73 
(log)Part-time employment 5391 2.66 .73 .74 3.82 
(log)Unemployment rate 5391 1.85 .58 .64 2.94 
(log)FLFP 5391 4.07 .16 3.76 4.39 
(log)% Living with parents 5391 1.85 .62 .86 2.78 
Married (only) x (log)Dual-earner index 5391 1.26 1.56 0 4.46 
Comments: Unweighted means. Reference categories in italics. For construction of variables and 
sources of data: see Appendix C. 
 
The likelihood of women having a first and a second child varies considera-
bly with individual and country-level factors. The fixed part of Model 1 in 
Table 8.3, which includes only individual-level variables, shows that union 
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instability exerts a limited negative effect on the likelihood of women having 
a first child.  
 
Table 8.3. Odds ratios of women in unions having a first and second child  
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Individual level  
   
Age 1.83 (.15)*** 1.84 (.15)*** 1.83 (.15)*** 1.82 (.15)*** 
Age*Age .99 (.00)*** .99 (.00)*** .99 (.00)*** .99 (.00)*** 
Living urban  .80 (.07)* .79 (.07)** .79 (.07)* .81 (.08)* 
University education 1.03 (.05) 1.02 (.05) 1.02 (.05) 1.03 (.05) 
Partner university edu. 1.13 (.12) 1.13 (.12) 1.13 (.12) 1.13 (.12) 
Monthly church  1.17 (.11)+ 1.19 (.12)+ 1.18 (.12)+ 1.20 (.11)+ 
Religiosity 1.05 (.01)*** 1.04 (.01)*** 1.05 (.01)*** 1.04 (.01)** 
Protestant 1.17 (.12) 1.12 (.12) 1.12 (.12) 1.11 (.10) 
Catholic 1.04 (.07) 1.07 (.08) 1.06 (.07) 1.09 (.08) 
Orthodox .96 (.22) .97 (.20) .98 (.22) 1.00 (.23) 
Other 1.10 (.20) 1.10 (.19) 1.11 (.19) 1.12 (.20) 
Have no children .55 (.06)*** .56 (.06)*** .55 (.06)*** .55 (.06)*** 
Married (have cohabited) 2.90 (.31)*** 2.92 (.32)*** 2.97 (.33)*** 3.00 (.34)*** 
Married (only) 1.41 (.29)+ 1.45 (.29)+ 8.28 (4.99)*** 8.37 (4.72)*** 
Married (only) * 2.32 (.45)*** 2.29 (.45)*** 2.30 (.46)*** 2.29 (.44)*** 
Have no children     
     
Country level  
   
(log)Dual-earner index   1.43 (.10)*** 1.62 (.18)*** 1.60 (.13)*** 
(log)Benefits index        .95 (.09) 
(log)Part-time work        1.22 (.15) 
(log)Unemployment rate       .82 (.11) 
(log)FLFP       .46 (.26) 
(log)Living with parents       .92 (.12) 
     
Cross-level inter. 
    
(log)Dual-earner index *      .59 (.11)** .59 (.11)** 
Married (only)     
     
Random part  
   
Intercept level 2 .35 (.09)*** .22 (.09)* .22 (.08)** .00 (.04) 
Married (only)  .27 (.07)*** .35 (.07)*** .22 (.08)* .00 (.01) 
     
Observations 
    
Individuals  5391 5391 5391 5391 
Countries 22 22 22 22 
Log likelihood -3064.084 -3060.528 -3056.812 -3049.3 
AIC 6170.168 6165.057 6159.624 6154.599 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Cohabiting women have a considerably lower probability of having a child 
during the three-year period than women who are married. Married women 
who have not cohabited, however, are only slightly more likely than married 
women who have cohabited to have a first child, and they are actually less 
likely to have a second child than married women who have experienced 
unmarried cohabitation.  
This does not mean that union instability does not have the assumed nega-
tive effect on fertility that H1 proposes. The random part of Model 1 shows 
that the effect of being married without having cohabited varies considerably 
between countries. In some countries the effect is strong, whereas it is weak, 
or even nonexistent, in others. This leaves open the possibility that the nega-
tive effect of union instability on fertility is masked by generous dual-earner 
policies, as was argued in Chapter 4.  
The random intercepts at the country level also show that the overall like-
lihood of women having a child in the three-year period varies considerably 
and significantly between countries (with .35 standard deviations to be ex-
act). In other words, there is room for generous family policies to increase 
women’s likelihood of having a(nother) child.  
When the dual-earner index is added to the individual-level control varia-
bles in Model 2, two things happen. First, the between-country variation is 
reduced by more than a third of its original size. Dual-earner policies can, 
thus, explain a third of the between-country variation in the likelihood of 
women having a child. Second, the variation in the effect of being married 
without having experienced unmarried cohabitation increases, indicating that 
the effect is in some way linked with the generosity of dual-earner policies. 
The coefficient of the dual-earner index itself is, as expected, significant and 
positive. 
To test if there is an interaction effect between union instability and the 
generosity of dual-earner policies, as H3 proposes, in Model 3 I introduce an 
interaction effect between “being married without having experienced unmar-
ried cohabitation” and “the log of the dual-earner index.” This interaction 
effect allows for the effect of the dual-earner index to vary between married 
women who have not experienced unmarried cohabitation and women who 
live in less stable unions. The coefficient of the interaction effect is highly 
significant and negative.84 At the same time, the coefficient of the dual-earner 
                                                          
84
 The magnitude of the interaction effect in nonlinear models does not equal the marginal effect of the interac-
tion term, and the sign might also be different for different observations (Ai & Norton 2003). Moreover, the 
statistical significance cannot reliably be determined by the z-statistics reported in the regression output (ibid.). 
Because of this, I have checked the significance of the interaction effect with the command Inteff developed by 
Norton, Wang, and Ai (2004). Appendix B provides a graphic illustration of the significance and size of the 
interaction effects in all models in Chapter 8. The graphs show that the effects are significant for almost all 
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index, which now shows the effect of the dual-earner index among women 
who live in unstable unions, increases considerably. Together, these observa-
tions indicate that generous dual-earner policies have a strong effect on the 
likelihood of women who are living in unstable unions having a child, 
whereas it does not affect the fertility of women who are living in stable 
unions.  
Moreover, the variation in the slope of being married without having ex-
perienced unmarried cohabitation is cut by a third with the introduction of the 
interaction effect. The introduced interaction effect, in other words, explains 
a considerable part of the variation in the effect of the mentioned variable.  
The reduction in the variation in the slope of being married without hav-
ing experienced unmarried cohabitation comes together with a huge increase 
of the magnitude of the coefficient of the same variable. Its positive effect on 
women’s likelihood of having a(nother) child is much more accentuated in 
Model 3 than in Model 2. However, it should be pointed out that the coeffi-
cient in Model 3 only shows the effect of the variable when the log of the 
dual-earner index is set to 0. With each unit increase on the log of the dual-
earner index the positive effect of living in a stable union on fertility is re-
duced drastically. Thus, hypothesis H3, that the negative effect of union 
stability on fertility should be reduced by generous dual-earner policies, and 
its implication that the generosity of dual-earner policies should have a more 
accentuated effect on the fertility decisions of women who are living in un-
stable unions, seem to be confirmed.   
However, Model 3 does not include country-level control variables. 
When such controls are introduced, in Model 4, the coefficient of the dual-
earner index is reduced marginally; however, it remains highly significant 
and positive. Also, the interaction effect and the effect of being married with-
out having experienced unmarried cohabitation remain significant, with the 
signs of the coefficients going in the same direction as in Model 3. The ef-
fects of union status and the generosity of dual-earner policies on the likeli-
hood of women having a first child during the three-year period are illustrat-
ed in Figure 8.3. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                             
observations in the data and that the mean effects are similar in size and go in the same directions as those 
shown by the coefficients in the models presented in this chapter. 
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Figure 8.3. The likelihood of women in unions having a first child 
 
Comments. Builds on Model 4 in Table 8.3. The graph shows the effect of union status and the dual-
earner index on the likelihood of women having a first child when all other variables are held at the 
sample mean. The shaded areas show the 83-percent confidence intervals. This means that confi-
dence intervals that do not overlap show likelihoods that are significantly different from each other at 
the 5-percent level.  
 
The figure clearly confirms H1 and H2. In countries that lack generous dual-
earner policies, women who are married and have never experienced unmar-
ried cohabitation are significantly more likely to have a first child than wom-
en living in less stable unions. In the country with the least generous dual-
earner policies, about 38 percent of the women who are married and have 
never experienced unmarried cohabitation are predicted to have a first child 
during the three-year period. The corresponding predicted numbers of mar-
ried women who have experienced unmarried cohabitation and cohabiting 
women having a first child during the same period are 23 and 9 percent re-
spectively. This means that married women who have never cohabited are 
almost 70 percent more likely to have a first child compared to women who 
are married and have experienced unmarried cohabitation, and almost four 
times as likely to have a first child as cohabiting women.  
The difference in predicted probabilities, however, is reduced drastically 
with high scores on the dual-earner index. Women who are married and have 
experienced unmarried cohabitation cease to have a statistically significant 
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lower probability of having a first child when countries score above 3 on the 
log of the dual-earner index. In the country with the highest score on the 
dual-earner index, such women are actually more likely to have a first child 
than women who are married and have never experienced unmarried cohabi-
tation. However, the difference is not significant. Also, the gap between co-
habiting women and women who are married and have never cohabited is 
smaller in countries that score high on the dual-earner index. However, the 
gap never ceases to be significant, and even in the country with the most 
generous dual-earner policies, married women who have never experienced 
unmarried cohabitation have a predicted probability that is 60 percent higher 
(.35) than that of cohabiting women having a first child (.22).  
The fact that the differences in predicted probabilities between women in 
stable and unstable unions are smaller in countries with high scores on the 
dual-earner index can wholly be ascribed to the fact that generous dual-earner 
policies only increase the likelihood of women in unstable unions having a 
first child. The likelihood of women who are married and have never experi-
enced unmarried cohabitation having a first child is not significantly affected 
by the generosity of dual-earner policies. In contrast, the positive effect of the 
dual-earner index on the likelihood of women in unstable unions having a 
first child is strong and significant. Married women who have experienced 
unmarried cohabitation are almost twice as likely to have a first child during 
the three-year period in the country with the highest score on the dual-earner 
index as they are in the country with the lowest score on the dual-earner 
index (the predicted probabilities are .23 and .45 respectively). To put it an-
other way, each log-unit increase on the dual-earner index increases the pre-
dicted probability of women who are married and who have experienced 
unmarried cohabitation having a first child by .10, or almost 40 percent.      
The predicted probability of cohabiting women having a first child is also 
twice as high in the country with the highest score on the dual-earner index 
(where it is .22) compared to in the country with the lowest score on the dual-
earner index (where it is .09). In other words, each log-unit change on the 
dual-earner index increases the predicted probability of cohabiting women 
having a first child by .06, or 67 percent.  
Thus, both hypothesis H1, that union instability should reduce fertility, 
and hypothesis H2, that generous dual-earner policies should reduce the neg-
ative effect of union instability on fertility, are confirmed. In countries with 
low scores on the dual-earner index, union instability exerts a significant and 
strong negative effect on women’s likelihood of having a first child. Howev-
er, in countries with high scores on the dual-earner index, union instability 
does not exert a similar negative effect on women’s fertility. The reason is 
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that women who live in unstable unions are much more likely to have a first 
child in such countries than they are in countries with low scores on the dual-
earner index. Women who are married and have never experienced unmar-
ried cohabitation are, in contrast, no more likely to have a first child in coun-
tries with high scores on the dual-earner index. Generous dual-earner policies 
only have a positive effect on the fertility decisions of women who live in 
unstable unions. Despite this, cohabiting women in countries with generous 
dual-earner policies also have a lower predicted probability than married 
women of having a first child. Hence, generous dual-earner policies do not 
reduce all of union instability’s negative effect on women’s likelihood of 
having a first child.  
The results presented above do not, however, verify hypothesis H3, that 
generous dual-earner policies should increase fertility. Generous dual-earner 
policies do not seem to have a general positive effect on women’s likelihood 
of having a first child in addition to the positive effect they have by reducing 
the negative effect of union instability on that likelihood. The likelihood of 
women who live in stable unions having a first child is not affected by the 
generosity of dual-earner policies. Neither do generous dual-earner policies 
raise the likelihood of women living in unstable unions having a first child 
above that of women living in stable unions. Thus, contrary to expectations, 
H3 is not verified.    
Does this mean that generous dual-earner policies do not have a positive 
effect on fertility? Not necessarily. Keeping in mind the difficulties of distin-
guishing between a positive effect on the timing and a positive effect of the 
quantum of fertility when studying only a three-year period, we can at least 
say that generous dual-earner policies encourage women who are living in 
unstable unions to have their children earlier in life. Even though generous 
dual-earner policies also increase the likelihood of women living in unstable 
unions, this positive effect likely contributes to women in general having 
their children earlier in life. The fact that cohabiting women have a lower 
predicted probability than married women of having a first child within the 
three-year period does not threaten this conclusion. As was shown in Chapter 
6, the alternative for those women who cohabit in countries with generous 
dual-earner policies is not to be within a marriage but to live as a single. 
Generous dual-earner policies, therefore, likely encourage women to have 
their first child earlier in life. Whether this effect also results in more children 
being born in countries with generous dual-earner policies is an open ques-
tion.   
In addition to its positive effect on the likelihood of women having a first 
child, generous dual-earner policies also have a significant positive effect on 
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the likelihood of women in unstable unions having a second child within the 
three-year period (the effect is illustrated in Figure 8.4). In contrast to the 
case of first births, however, it is obvious that the positive effect can be trans-
lated into a general positive effect on, at least, the timing of second births. 
This is because the positive effect of generous dual-earner policies on the 
likelihood of women in unstable unions having a second child clearly out-
weighs the negative effect of union instability on the same likelihood.  
 
Figure 8.4. The likelihood of women in unions having a second child 
 
Comments: Builds on Model 4 in Table 8.3. The graph shows the effect of union status and the dual-
earner index on the likelihood of women having a second child when all other variables are held at 
the sample mean. The shaded areas show the 83-percent confidence intervals. This means that 
confidence intervals that do not overlap show likelihoods that are significantly different from each 
other at the 5-percent level.  
 
As is shown in Figure 8.4, only cohabiting women are less likely than mar-
ried women who have not experienced unmarried cohabitation to have a 
second child in countries with low scores on the dual-earner index. The re-
spective predicted probabilities of the two groups having a second child in 
such countries are .17 and .31. This means that married women who have not 
experienced unmarried cohabitation are about twice as likely as cohabiting 
women to have a second child during the three-year period. This should be 
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compared to the fact that they are four times more likely than cohabiting 
women to have a first child during the same period. What is even more strik-
ing is that married women who have cohabited without being married are not 
less likely than married women who have not cohabited to have a second 
child. 
The observed reduction in the effect of union instability on the likelihood 
of having a child, which occurs sometime between the first and the second 
births, can likely to some extent be ascribed to the selection effect discussed 
in the methods section. The relatively few women who are living in unstable 
unions and who have had a first child in countries with low scores on the 
dual-earner index are likely to live in relatively stable “unstable” unions. A 
child also contributes to strengthening its parents union by making it costlier 
for both parents to dissolve the union. The reduction in the effect of union 
instability could also in part depend on the fact that women in unstable un-
ions, because they have their first children relatively late in life, must speed 
up their second births before it is too late for them to have children. As wom-
en in stable unions on average have their first children earlier in life, they 
need not rush to the same extent. In all, it is therefore not surprising that the 
negative effect of union instability, as it is operationalized, on fertility is 
reduced between the first and the second births.  
Moreover, the negative effect of union instability on fertility persisting in 
countries with generous dual-earner policies is reduced by generous dual-
earner policies. The difference in the predicted probability of having a second 
child between cohabiting women and women who are married and who have 
not experienced unmarried cohabitation ceases to be significant when coun-
tries score above 3.4 on the log of the dual-earner index. In countries with 
very generous dual-earner policies, the two groups are about equally likely to 
have a second child within the three-year period (the predicted probability 
that they have one is about .30). In other words, each log-unit change on the 
dual-earner index increases the predicted probability of cohabiting women 
having a second child within the three-year period by .08, or almost 50 per-
cent. It should be noted that this only means that cohabiting women proceed 
to a second birth as fast as married women who have not cohabited in the 
cases when both groups of women have had a first birth. It does not mean 
that they, in general, proceed to a second birth as fast as married women who 
have not cohabited. As, other things being equal, they tend to have their first 
child later in life than married women, overall, they proceed more slowly to 
their second birth, even in countries with generous dual-earner policies.   
Interestingly, in countries with generous dual-earner policies, married 
women who have cohabited are actually more likely to proceed to a second 
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birth during the studied period than married women who have not cohabited. 
The reason for this surprising finding is the strong positive effect that gener-
ous dual-earner policies exert on the likelihood of women who are married 
and have cohabited having a second child. In the country with the highest 
score on the dual-earner index, such women have a predicted probability of 
having a second child that is .25, or 70 percent, higher than the predicted 
probability of their having a second child in the country with the lowest score 
on the dual-earner index. Each log-unit change on the dual-earner index, thus, 
increases the predicted probability of married women who have cohabited 
having a second child by .11, or 32 percent. This means that such women are 
twice as likely as married women who have never cohabited to experience a 
second birth within the three-year period in the country with the most gener-
ous dual-earner policies. This does not automatically mean that they also 
proceed faster than married women who have never cohabited from being 
childless to having a second child. It should be remembered that all of them 
have cohabited before having their first child, which is why they might have 
progressed more slowly to having their first child than married women who 
have never cohabited. Women also tend to spend more of their fecund time as 
childless than as mothers of a child waiting on having a second child. Moreo-
ver, it should be noted that childless married women who have never cohab-
ited are definitely likely to proceed faster to a second birth than childless 
married women who have cohabited in countries with low scores on the dual-
earner index. Only in countries with very generous dual-earner policies is 
there a theoretical chance of childless married women who have cohabited 
proceeding faster to a second birth. Only by testing how fast women in the 
average unstable union (i.e., the average union in which either the partners 
cohabit or where the woman has cohabited without being married) proceed 
from a first to a second birth can it be determined whether the theoretical 
chance actually exists in the data. The answer to whether women in unstable 
unions proceed faster to a second birth in countries with generous dual-earner 
policies, therefore, has to wait until the robustness checks are completed, in 
which I do not distinguish between women who cohabit and women who are 
married and have previously cohabited.    
For similar reasons, the results from the robustness checks must be con-
sulted before it can be determined whether H3 is correct. It is possible that 
generous dual-earner policies have a direct positive effect on the likelihood 
of women in unstable unions having a second child, in addition to the posi-
tive effect they have by reducing the negative effect of union instability on 
the same likelihood. If that is the case, hypothesis H3, that generous dual-
earner policies should have a direct positive effect on fertility, would be par-
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tially verified for second births. However, as has been noted, it is impossible 
to determine whether this is the case without consulting the results from the 
robustness checks.    
As in the case with the effect on the likelihood of women having a first 
child, it is hard to tell whether the observed positive effect of generous dual-
earner policies on the likelihood of women having a second child is an effect 
on the timing or the quantum of fertility, or both.  
With regard to the individual-level control variables, age has the expected 
curvilinear association with the likelihood of women having both a first and a 
second child. 
Women who live in urban areas have a lower predicted probability of 
having a(nother) child than women who live in rural areas. As was discussed 
in the methods section, however, it is difficult to tell in which direction the 
effect goes, that is, if women who live in urban areas have relatively few 
children or if women who have relatively few children prefer to live in urban 
areas.  
Neither women’s nor their partners’ educations are near to being signifi-
cantly associated with the likelihood of women having a(nother) child. Given 
the expected negative association between women’s earning opportunities 
and fertility, the finding of a null association is rather surprising. Further 
regressions (not shown here; available from the author on request), however, 
show that when an interaction effect between women’s education and the 
number of children a woman has at the start of the three-year period is intro-
duced, the interaction is near to being statistically significant. The sign of the 
coefficient of the interaction term indicates that women’s education has a 
negative effect on their progression to a first birth, but a positive effect on 
their progression to a second birth. This can likely explain why no effect of 
women’s education is visible in the models that show the likelihood of wom-
en having a first and a second child together. Although the interaction term is 
only near to being statistically significant, this finding is in line with previous 
findings on how women’s educations affect their progression to a first and a 
second birth.  
The effect of the partners’ education does not show any sign of varying to 
the same extent, and is not near to having a statistically significant effect, 
neither on the progression to a first birth nor to a second birth.  
Women’s religiosity is positively associated with their likelihood of hav-
ing a first and a second child within the three-year period. The strongest 
positive association is that between women’s self-estimated religiousness and 
their likelihood of having a(nother) child. Women who attend church once a 
month or more are likelier to have a(nother) child than women who attend 
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church less often, although the effect is only significant at the 10-percent 
level. Given the problem of causality mentioned in the methods section, it is 
hard to tell in which way the effect goes. However, it is not unreasonable to 
assume that religiosity has at least a modest positive effect on women’s pro-
gression to a first and a second birth. Women’s denominational affiliation, 
however, does not have an impact on their likelihood of having a(nother) 
child. The aspect of religiousness that seems to matter for women’s decisions 
to have first and second children is their degree of religiousness and not the 
specific version of Christianity they adhere to.  
None of the country-level control variables significantly affect the pro-
gression to a first and a second birth. However, three variables are statistical-
ly significant at the 10-percent level in a one-tailed t-test, although they fail 
to achieve significance in a two-tailed t-test (tests not shown; available from 
the author on request). These are the availability of part-time work, the fe-
male labor force participation rate, and the unemployment rate. As expected, 
the availability of part-time work is positively associated with the likelihood 
of women having a(nother) child. This observation reinforces the impression 
that policies that help mothers retain contact with the labor market increase 
women’s willingness to have children, or at least their willingness to have 
them early in life. The female labor force participation rate is, also as ex-
pected, strongly negatively associated with women’s likelihood of having 
a(nother) child. Women’s earning opportunities seem to reduce their willing-
ness to have children, or at least their willingness to have them early in life. 
Finally, the unemployment rate is negatively associated with women’s likeli-
hood of having a first and a second child, confirming previous findings of a 
negative association between unemployment and women’s fertility (Adserà 
2004). 
Contrary to expectations, the benefits index does not have a significant 
positive effect on women’s progression to a first and a second birth. Neither 
does the average age on leaving the parental home affect women’s fertility 
decisions significantly. 
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The likelihood of women having third- and 
higher-order children  
Only 10 percent of the 4352 women in unions in the sample who had two or 
more children at the start of the three-year period experienced a birth in the 
following three years (see table 8.4). The likelihood of women experiencing 
third- and higher-order births, in other words, is considerably lower than the 
likelihood of women experiencing first and second births. Of course, this is 
only to be expected given that only a small minority of the women in con-
temporary Europe has three or more children. The small number of women 
who have had third- and higher-order children, however, makes it harder to 
detect factors affecting the progression to such births. This should be kept in 
mind when interpreting the results presented below.  
 
Table 8.4. Summation of variables  
Variable Observations Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
Experienced a birth 4352 .10 .30 0 1 
Age 4352 35.6 4.5 18 42 
Age*age 4352 1287 311 324 1764 
Rural residence (ref.) 4352 .45 .50 0 1 
Urban residence 4352 .55 .50 0 1 
Low education (ref.) 4352 .78 .41 0 1 
High education 4352 .22 .41 0 1 
Partner low educations (ref.) 4352 .78 .41 0 1 
Partner high education 4352 .22 .41 0 1 
Monthly church att. 4352 .34 .47 0 1 
Not attending church (ref.) 4352 .66 .47 0 1 
Religiosity 4352 5.2 2.9 0 10 
Protestant 4352 .16 .36 0 1 
Catholic 4352 .42 .49 0 1 
Orthodox 4352 .04 .20 0 1 
Other 4352 .05 .21 0 1 
Not belonging to church (ref.) 4352 .33 .47 0 1 
Have two children 4352 .66 .47 0 0 
Have three, or more, children 4352 .34 .47 0 1 
Cohabiting (ref.) 4352 .09 .28 0 1 
Married (cohabited) 4352 .31 .46 0 1 
Married (only) 4352 .60 .49 0 1 
(log)Dual-earner index 4352 3.32 .56 2.30 4.46 
(log)Benefits index 4352 1.79 .51 0 2.73 
(log)Part-time employment 4352 2.64 .75 .74 3.82 
(log)Unemployment rate 4352 1.84 .59 .64 2.94 
(log)FLFP 4352 4.07 .16 3.76 4.39 
(log)% Living with parents 4352 1.82 .61 .86 2.78 
Comments: Unweighted means. Reference categories in italics. For construction of variables and 
sources of data: see Appendix C. 
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The first result striking the observer of Model 5 in Table 8.5, which presents 
the results from a model that includes only individual-level variables, is that 
union instability does not have a significant impact on women’s progression 
to third- and higher-order births. 
 
Table 8.5. Odds ratios of women in unions having a third or higher-parity child  
 
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Individual level  
  
Age 1.64 (.28)** 1.63 (.28)** 1.62 (.28)** 
Age*Age .99 (.00)*** .99 (.00)*** .99 (.00)*** 
Living urban  .80 (.10)+ .80 (.10)+ .82 (.10) 
University education 1.16 (.21) 1.13 (.21) 1.13 (.21) 
Partner university edu. 1.63 (.26)** 1.62 (.26)** 1.59 (.26)** 
Monthly church  1.34 (.19)* 1.37 (.20)* 1.38 (.21)* 
Religiosity 1.05 (.02)* 1.05 (.02)** 1.05 (.02)** 
Protestant 1.30 (.17)* 1.26 (.18) 1.25 (.18) 
Catholic .80 (.16) .82 (.16) .84 (.15) 
Orthodox .36 (.19)+ .41 (.21)+ .47 (.22) 
Other 1.13 (.27) 1.12 (.27) 1.07 (.26) 
Have three children+ 1.40 (.17)** 1.40 (.17)** 1.40 (.17)** 
Married (have cohabited) .83 (.25) .84 (.25) .83 (.25) 
Married (only) .63 (.16)+ .65 (.16)+ .67 (.17) 
    
Country level  
  
(log)Dual-earner index   1.29 (.16)* 1.23 (.15)+ 
(log)Benefits index      .96 (.11) 
(log)Part-time work      1.37 (.20)* 
(log)Unemployment     .87 (.10) 
(log)FLFP     .79 (.59) 
(log)Living with parents     1.06 (.26) 
    
Random part  
  
Intercept level 2 .32 (.11)** .31 (.11)** .24 (.10)* 
    
Observations 
   
Individuals  4352 4352 4352 
Countries 22 22 22 
Log likelihood -1253.841 -1252.759 -1248.857 
AIC 2543.682 2543.519 2545.714 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+
 p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Married women who have never cohabited do not have a higher predicted 
probability of having a third- or higher-order child within the three-year peri-
od than women who live in less stable unions. Actually, the coefficient indi-
cates that the effect goes in the opposite direction and that union instability 
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has a positive effect on the likelihood of women having third- and higher-
order children, as married women who have not cohabited have a lower pre-
dicted probability than cohabiting women of having third- and higher-order 
children. However, the effect is significant only at the 10-percent level. 
Moreover, the effect of being married without having experienced unmarried 
cohabitation does not vary between countries (results not shown; available on 
request from the author). Both H1 and H2 are thus falsified for third- and 
higher-order children. Union instability does not have a negative effect on the 
likelihood of women having third- and higher-order children, and the gener-
osity of dual-earner policies does not mediate the (non-existing) effect of 
union instability on the likelihood of women having third- and higher-order 
children.  
This finding is likely connected with the finding that the negative effect 
of union instability, as I define it, on fertility is reduced between the first and 
the second births. The explanation for the reduction in the effect is likely to 
be the same in both cases; namely, that only women who live in relatively 
stable “unstable” unions progress to have higher-order children in countries 
that do not implement generous dual-earner policies. Women who live in 
unstable unions in countries that do not implement generous dual-earner 
policies simply do not have more than one child, or in very rare cases, two 
children. The arrival of a second child is also likely to stabilize the parents’ 
union so that it becomes more stable than it was before the child arrived. The 
relatively modest level of union instability remaining in countries that do not 
implement generous dual-earner policies after the first birth is likely to de-
crease significantly, and even disappear entirely, after the second birth. 
Women in unstable unions who have had two children must likely also pro-
gress faster than women in stable unions to having a third child if they want 
one, as their slower progression to first and second births make it likely that 
they will have fewer fecund years left than women in stable unions.  
The random intercepts at the country level, however, show that the overall 
likelihood of women having third- and higher-order children varies signifi-
cantly between countries. This means that it is still possible for generous 
family policies to have an effect on women’s likelihood of having higher-
order children. Even though H1 and H2 have been proven false, there is thus 
still room for H3 to be true; that is, generous family policies could have a 
positive effect on the progression to third- and higher-order births.  
When the dual-earner index is introduced in Model 6 (in Table 8.5) to test 
whether this is the case, it becomes significant and positively associated with 
the likelihood of women having a third child. The model fit is also improved 
according to the log likelihood and Aikike’s information criteria, even though 
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the index is able to explain only a small part of the between-country variation 
in the likelihood of women having a(nother) child. When the country-level 
control variables are introduced in Model 7, the strength of the effect de-
creases somewhat but remains significant at the 10-percent level. Thus, H3 is 
confirmed: Generous dual-earner policies have a positive effect on the likeli-
hood of women having third- and higher-order children. This effect is, more-
over, independent of women’s union status. 
The fact that generous dual-earner policies have a positive effect on the 
likelihood of women having third- and higher-order children could be inter-
preted as evidence that the generous dual-earner policies have a positive 
effect not only on the timing of fertility, but also on the quantum of fertility. 
As previously mentioned, third- and higher-order births are relatively rare in 
most countries in Europe. Most European women never progress to having a 
third child, and even fewer women progress to having four or more children. 
The third- and higher-order births that women experience within the three-
year period are, because of this, likely to be reliable indicators of the quan-
tum of fertility. This impression is reinforced by the observation that the 
mean age of women in the sample is almost 36 years old at the start of the 
three-year period and almost 40 when it comes to an end. Since very few 
women have children after they turn 40, women’s high mean age implies that 
rather few of them will have another child during their lives. With this in 
mind, it makes even more sense to interpret the found effect as an effect on 
the quantum of fertility.  
As is shown in Figure 8.5, the observed effect on third births is substan-
tial. The predicted probability of women in unions having a third child is 
about 75 percent higher in the country with the most generous dual-earner 
policies than it is in the country with the least generous dual-earner policies. 
In other words, each log-unit change on the dual-earner index increases the 
predicted probability of women in unions having a third child within the 
three-year period by about 35 percent. Despite this strong positive effect, 
third births are also relatively uncommon in countries that implement gener-
ous dual-earner policies: only about 7 percent of the women in unions who 
had two children at the start of the three-year period are predicted to have had 
a third child by the end of the period in such countries.  
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Figure 8.5. The likelihood of women in unions having a third child 
 
Comments: Builds on a version of Model 7 in Table 8.5, which excludes controls for women’s union 
status. The graph shows the effect of the dual-earner index on the likelihood of women having a 
third child when all other variables are held at the sample mean. The shaded area shows the 95-
percent confidence interval. The reason for representing the results of a model that excludes the 
effects of different union statuses is that they do not differ significantly from each other.  
 
Several individual-level control variables are significantly associated with the 
likelihood of women in unions having third and higher-order children. Age 
has the expected curvilinear association with higher-order births.  
More interesting is that women whose partners are university educated 
are more likely than women whose partners are not university educated to 
have a third child. Thus, in contrast to what is seen in the models of women’s 
progression to a first and second birth, we find the expected positive associa-
tion between men’s earning opportunities and women’s fertility decisions. 
For some reason, men’s earning opportunities seem to matter more for high-
er-order births than for first and second births. The educational attainment of 
the women themselves, however, does not have an effect on their likelihood 
of having a third child. 
Both regular church attendance and self-estimated religiousness are posi-
tively and significantly associated with the likelihood of women having third- 
and higher-order children. This finding reinforces the impression from the 
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models of the progression to a first and second birth that religiousness has a 
positive effect on fertility. Given that the positive association is found both 
for lower- and higher-order births, it is reasonable to interpret it as an effect 
both on the timing and the quantum of fertility. It should be remembered, 
however, that it is not possible to say with total certainty in which direction 
the effect goes. Women’s denominational belonging is not significantly asso-
ciated with their likelihood of having third- and higher-order children.  
Only one of the country-level control variables is significantly associated 
with women’s likelihood of having a third child: namely, the availability of 
part-time jobs. The strength of the positive association (illustrated in Figure 
8.6) is, on the other hand, considerable.  
 
Figure 8.6. The likelihood of women in unions having a third child  
 
Comments: The graph shows the effect of the availability of part-time jobs on the likelihood of wom-
en having a third child when all other variables are held at the sample mean. The shaded area 
shows the 95-percent confidence interval. Builds on a version of Model 7 in Table 8.5, which ex-
cludes controls for women’s union status. The reason for representing the results of a model that 
excludes the effects of different union statuses is that they do not differ significantly from each other.  
 
In the country with the lowest availability of part-time jobs, the predicted 
probability of women having a third child is only .03, whereas in the country 
with the highest availability of part-time jobs, the predicted probability of 
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women having a third child is .08. The predicted probability of women hav-
ing a third child in the three-year period is, in other words, 270 percent higher 
in the latter country. The fact that the availability of part-time jobs is posi-
tively associated with the likelihood of women having higher-order births 
reinforces the impression that policies that help mothers retain their attach-
ment to the labor market encourage women to progress faster to having 
a(nother) child. 
 
Robustness tests 
As was pointed out in the methods section, women’s union statuses are 
measured at the time of their interview for the ESS. Because of this, it is 
possible that the distinctions between different degrees of union stability used 
up to now do not entirely capture the circumstances under which fertility 
decisions were taken during the four years preceding the year of the respond-
ents’ interviews for the ESS. The problem is especially acute in the case of 
the distinction between women who are married and have cohabited and are 
cohabiting. It is likely that many married women who have cohabited have 
married during the period because they have had a child. If that is the case, 
the presented models overestimate the positive effect of being married and 
having cohabited, and underestimate the negative effect of cohabiting on the 
likelihood of women having a child in the three-year period. The problem of 
not knowing how much of the time during their unions married women who 
have cohabited have spent cohabiting also makes it impossible to determine 
whether the observed positive effect of generous dual-earner policies on the 
likelihood of these women having a second child means that they progress 
faster than married women who have not cohabited from being childless to 
having a second child in countries with generous dual-earner policies. In 
addition, the models presented above exclude all women who lived in unions 
that ended during the three-year period. The resulting models, thus, include 
only relatively stable “unstable” unions. To address these problems, below I 
rerun all models presented above with two corrections. First, in the new mod-
els, I do not distinguish between cohabiting women and married women who 
have cohabited. Second, I also introduce a new category of women in the 
models, which consists of all women in the data who were single at the time 
of their interview for the ESS, but who had lived with partners at some point 
previously. The idea is that the first correction will correct for the problem of 
distinguishing between cohabiting women and married women who have 
cohabited, whereas the second will correct for the exclusion of women who 
lived in unions that had broken up during the years prior to their interview for 
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the ESS. The results from the robustness test, presented in Models 8 to 11 in 
Table 8.6, largely confirm the expectations.  
 
Table 8.6. Odds ratios of women having a first and a second child   
 
Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
Individual level  
   
Age 1.80 (.14)*** 1.81 (.14)*** 1.80 (.14)*** 1.79 (.14)*** 
Age*Age .99 (.00)*** .99 (.00)*** .99 (.00)*** .99 (.00)*** 
Living urban  .79 (.07)** .79 (.07)** .79 (.07)** .80 (.07)* 
University education 1.02 (.05) 1.01 (.05) 1.01 (.05) 1.02 (.05) 
Partner university edu. 1.14 (.12) 1.14 (.12) 1.14 (.12) 1.14 (.12) 
Monthly church  1.22 (.11)* 1.23 (.12)* 1.23 (.12)* 1.24 (.12)* 
Religiosity 1.05 (.01)*** 1.05 (.01)*** 1.05 (.01)*** 1.05 (.01)*** 
Protestant 1.26 (.10)** 1.22 (.09)* 1.22 (.09)** 1.22 (.09)** 
Catholic 1.05 (.08) 1.07 (.08) 1.07 (.08) 1.09 (.08) 
Orthodox .97 (.19) 1.01 (.19) 1.01 (.20) 1.03 (.33) 
Other 1.14 (.19) 1.14 (.19) 1.15 (.19) 1.15 (.19) 
Have no children .51 (.05)*** .51 (.05)*** .51 (.05)*** .51 (.05)*** 
Unstable union 5.08 (.61)*** 5.07 (.61)*** 5.06 (.62)*** 4.97 (.61)*** 
Stable union 3.44 (.64)*** 3.49 (.65)*** 13.63 (.8.81)*** 13.78 (9.12)*** 
Stable union * 2.59 (.48)*** 2.57 (.48)*** 2.58 (.48)*** 2.57 (.47)*** 
Have no children     
     
Country level  
   
(log)Dual-earner index   1.27 (.07)*** 1.41 (.14)*** 1.37 (.16)** 
(log)Benefits index        1.03 (.22) 
(log)Part-time work        1.18 (.18) 
(log)Unemployment rate       .88 (.22) 
(log)FLFP       .41 (.41) 
(log)Living with parents       .90 (.17) 
     
Cross-level inter. 
    
(log)Dual-earner index *      .66 (.13)* .65 (.13)* 
Stable union     
     
Random part  
   
Intercept level 2 .29 (.07)*** .23 (.07)*** .23 (.07)*** .11 (19) 
Married (only)  .27 (.07)*** .31 (.07)*** .21 (.09)* .19 (.12) 
     
Observations 
    
Individuals  6787 6787 6787 6787 
Countries 22 22 22 22 
Log likelihood -3471.66 -3469.56 -3466.977 -3463.252 
AIC 6985.319 6983.121 6979.953 6982.504 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+
 p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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They are also in line with the findings from the models using the set of finer 
distinctions between women’s union statuses presented above: Women who 
are living in stable unions (i.e., married women who have not cohabited) are 
more likely than women who live in unstable unions (i.e., women who are 
cohabiting, or who are married and have cohabited in the past) to have a first 
child in countries with low scores on the dual-earner index. Women who live 
in unstable unions are, in turn, more likely than single women who have 
cohabited with a partner before or during the investigated period, to have a 
first child in such countries. The effects of the dual-earner index and union 
status on women’s likelihood of having a first child are presented in Figure 
8.7.   
 
Figure 8.7. The likelihood of women having a first child  
 
Comments: Builds on Model 11 in Table 8.6. The graph shows the effect of the dual-earner index 
and union status when all other variables are kept at the sample mean. The shaded areas show the 
83-percent confidence intervals. This means that confidence intervals that do not overlap show 
likelihoods that are significantly different from each other at the 5-percent level.  
 
As expected, the generosity of dual-earner policies is strongly correlated with 
the likelihood of women in unstable unions and women who are single hav-
ing a first child, whereas it is not correlated with the likelihood of women in 
stable unions having one. The effect is strong enough to reduce all of the 
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negative effect of living in an unstable union on the likelihood of having a 
first birth: in countries with very generous dual-earner policies, women in 
unstable unions are not less likely than women in stable unions to have a first 
child. Although they are not nearly as likely to have a first child as women in 
unions, single women who have lived with a partner are also significantly 
more likely to have a first child in countries with generous dual-earner poli-
cies.     
Also, in the case of second births, the pattern is similar to the one found 
in the models using the set of finer distinctions between women’s union sta-
tuses.   
 
Figure 8.8. The likelihood of women having a second child  
 
Comments: Builds on Model 11 in Table 8.6. The graph shows the effect of the dual-earner index 
and union status when all other variables are kept at the sample mean. The shaded areas show the 
83-percent confidence intervals. This means that confidence intervals that do not overlap show 
likelihoods that are significantly different from each other at the 5-percent level.  
 
Figure 8.8, which shows the effect of the dual-earner index and women’s 
union status, shows that women in stable and unstable unions are equally 
likely to have a second child in countries with low scores on the dual-earner 
index. However, in countries with generous dual-earner policies, women in 
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unstable unions are almost twice as likely as women in stable unions to have 
a second child. This means that H3 is partially confirmed. Generous dual-
earner policies have a direct positive effect on women’s fertility in addition to 
the positive effect they have by reducing the negative effect of union instabil-
ity on fertility. However, the effect is confined to women in unstable unions.  
Figure 8.8 also shows that single women are considerably less likely to 
have a second child than women in unions in all countries, even though the 
difference between such women and women in stable unions is smaller in 
countries that implement generous dual-earner policies. 
Overall, the found patterns confirm those found in the models using the 
set of finer distinctions of women’s union statuses. Union instability reduces 
women’s likelihood of having a first and, to some extent, also a second child. 
Generous dual-earner policies do reduce the negative effect of union instabil-
ity on women’s likelihood of having first and second children. In addition to 
this indirect positive effect, generous dual-earner policies also have a limited 
positive effect on the likelihood of women in unstable unions having a se-
cond child.  
As union instability was not shown to have a significant effect on wom-
en’s likelihood of having third- and higher-order children in the models pre-
sented above, there is no need to rerun the models of women’s likelihood of 
having third- and higher-order children with the new set of distinctions be-
tween women’s union statuses. The results would be the same either way. 
 
Concluding discussion 
The empirical results presented so far offer a more complicated picture than 
the one suggested by the hypotheses presented at the start of the chapter. 
Hypothesis H1, that union instability should reduce fertility, is only partially 
verified. Union instability has a strong negative effect on women’s likelihood 
of having a first child, but only a limited negative effect on women’s likeli-
hood of having a second child, and it has no effect at all on women’s likeli-
hood of having a third child. In the case of second births, only women who 
live in the least stable category of unions – that is, women who cohabit – 
show a significant tendency of progressing more slowly from having their 
first child to having a second one than women who live in the most stable 
category of unions, which is women who are married and have never experi-
enced unmarried cohabitation. Women in unions of medium stability – that 
is, married women who have cohabited – do not progress more slowly than 
women in the most stable unions from having their first child to having a 
second one in any country in the sample. The same picture emerges in the 
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models that only distinguish between two kinds of unions and that include 
women who were living on their own at the time of their interview for the 
ESS, but who had previously had a partner.  
Hypothesis H2, that generous dual-earner policies should reduce the 
negative effect of union instability on fertility, is only applicable in the case 
of first and second births, since union instability does not have a negative 
effect on the progression to having a third child. To the extent that it is appli-
cable, however, it is verified. The effect of union instability on women’s 
likelihood of having a first and a second child is effectively mediated by the 
generosity of dual-earner policies. In two out of three cases the effect is 
strong enough to reduce all of the negative effect of union instability on 
women’s likelihood of having a(nother) child, and in the third case it halves 
it. A similar picture emerges in the models including single women. 
Hypothesis H3, that generous dual-earner policies should increase fertili-
ty, is only partially verified. Generous dual-earner policies do not affect 
women’s likelihood of having a first child, above reducing the negative effect 
of union instability on the same likelihood. But they do have a limited posi-
tive effect on the likelihood of women having a second child and a strong 
positive effect on the likelihood of women having a third child. In the case of 
second births, generous dual-earner policies only make women in unstable 
unions progress faster to having a(nother) child.85 Married women who have 
not cohabited do not progress faster to having a second child in countries 
with generous dual-earner policies.  
Table 8.7, which sums up the empirical findings, shows that only hypoth-
esis H2, that “generous dual-earner policies should reduce the negative effect 
of union instability on fertility,” is fully verified. Hypothesis H1, that “union 
instability should reduce fertility,” and hypothesis H3, that “generous dual-
earner policies should increase fertility,” are only partially verified. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
85
 Generous dual-earner policies do, of course, also increase the likelihood of cohabiting women having a 
second child. However, they only do so by reducing the negative effect of union instability (cohabitation) on 
the same likelihood. Generous dual-earner policies, in other words, do not have an additional positive effect on 
the likelihood of cohabiting women having a second child in addition to the positive effect they have on the 
same likelihood because they reduce the negative effect of union instability on fertility.  
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Table 8.7. Summation of the empirical findings 
 
Hypotheses 
 
 
Likelihood of women 
having a first child 
 
 
Likelihood of women 
having a second child 
 
Likelihood of women 
having third- and higher-
order children 
H1: Union instability 
should reduce fertility 
 
 
 
Verified 
 
Partially verified 
 
Not verified 
H2: Generous dual-earner 
policies should reduce the 
negative effect of union 
instability on fertility 
 
Verified 
 
 
Verified/Not applicable 
 
Not applicable 
H3: Family policies should 
increase fertility 
 
Not verified 
 
 
Partially verified 
 
Verified 
 
The empirical pattern, consequently, does not entirely live up to the theoreti-
cal expectations. The digressions from the expected pattern follow two dis-
tinct patterns. The first is that the negative effect of union instability on fertil-
ity decreases for each child a woman has, until it ceases to exist when a 
woman has had two children. The second is that the positive effect of gener-
ous dual-earner policies on fertility increases for each child a woman has; it 
starts to have a positive effect on some women’s fertility after they have had 
one child, and it only affects the fertility of all women after they have had 
two children. The digressions from the theoretically expected pattern, thus, 
go in opposite directions.   
I have already offered a possible explanation for the first of these digres-
sions (i.e., the effect of union instability decreases for each child that a wom-
an has) in the discussion on the results. It is reasonable to assume that only 
women in relatively stable “unstable” unions have a first and, especially, a 
second child in countries that do not implement generous dual-earner poli-
cies. If this is the case, women who live in “unstable” unions in such coun-
tries constitute a more select group of women than – and thus cannot be com-
pared to – the women who live in unstable unions in countries with generous 
dual-earner policies. The unions of the latter group are likely to be more 
stable than the unions of the former group and are, therefore, less likely to be 
affected by the generosity of dual-earner policies than the former group. If 
only truly “unstable” unions survive the first and second birth in countries 
with generous dual-earner policies, it is not surprising that the negative effect 
of union instability on fertility becomes harder to detect for each child a 
woman has. No union instability survives to have an effect in countries that 
do not implement generous dual-earner policies, and the negative effect of 
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union instability surviving in countries with generous dual-earner policies is 
masked by the generosity of dual-earner policies. In addition, women in un-
stable unions probably need to progress somewhat faster than women in 
stable unions to higher-order births as they, particularly in countries that lack 
generous dual-earner policies, progress more slowly than women in stable 
unions to having a first child. In particular, the absence of a negative effect of 
union instability on women’s progression to third- and higher-order births is 
likely to depend on this “recuperation-effect.” The observed reduction in the 
effect of union “instability” on fertility, thus, does not threaten H1, but only 
its operationalization. Union instability does reduce women’s fertility. It is 
just that the validity of cohabitation and past experience of cohabitation as 
indicators of union instability are reduced for each child a woman has. 
The second digression from the expected pattern – that is, the fact that the 
direct positive effect of generous dual-earner policies on fertility seems to 
increase for each child a woman has – can likely be explained by the accumu-
lated costs of reproduction. The more children a family has, the fewer re-
sources it has to spend on new children and the quality of already existing 
children. Thus, the risk that having another child will exceed the limit of 
what a family is willing to spend on children increases with the number of 
children the family already has. One could therefore expect the effect of 
policies that reduce the costs of reproduction to increase in importance for 
every child a woman has. Most women who live in stable unions seem will-
ing and able to afford to have at least one, and perhaps two children in coun-
tries that do not implement generous dual-earner policies. However, they 
seem unwilling, or unable to afford, to have a third child in the absence of 
generous dual-earner policies. When the costs of children accumulate, it 
seems that no family can afford to neglect the cost-reducing effect of gener-
ous family policies on the costs of reproduction.86  
H3 should be reformulated, however. If the risk that the costs of repro-
duction will have a negative effect on the likelihood of women having 
a(nother) child increases for every child a woman has, H3 should be reformu-
lated to: 
 
H3. Generous dual-earner policies should increase fertility with an in-
creasing rate for every child a woman has.    
 
                                                          
86
 The only remaining puzzle is why generous dual-earner policies have a positive effect only on the likelihood 
of women who are married and who have experienced unmarried cohabitation having a second child, whereas 
they do not affect the same likelihood of married women who have not experienced unmarried cohabitation. 
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Although, the effect is only significant in a one-sided t-test in the models of 
the likelihood of women having a first and a second child, it should be point-
ed out that the availability of part-time work also increases the likelihood of 
women having children within the three-year period. The fact that no other 
policy, except a generous dual-earner policy, has a similar effect emphasizes 
the impression that family policies that help women reconcile work and chil-
dren increase women’s likelihood of having children more than other family 
policies. 
Despite the modest revision of H3, the overall conclusion of this chapter 
must be that the argument presented in Chapter 4 seems to be correct. Union 
instability does reduce fertility, if only the likelihood of women having a first 
and a second child. Generous dual-earner policies, moreover, reduce the 
negative effect of union instability on fertility. Finally, generous dual-earner 
policies have a direct positive effect on fertility, even though the effect is 
restricted to women’s likelihood of having second- and higher-order children.  
This conclusion means that the unstable unions that women form in coun-
tries with generous dual-earner policies are likely to increase the countries’ 
overall levels of fertility. The fear that the positive effect on fertility that 
comes with dual-earner policies’ positive effect on the likelihood of women 
living in unions will be offset by the increased union instability among mar-
ried women, which also comes with generous dual-earner policies, is not 
warranted. Married women who have cohabited are not less likely than mar-
ried women who have not cohabited to have a(nother) child in countries that 
have implemented generous dual-earner policies.  
Thus, it does not matter that cohabiting women are somewhat less likely 
than married women to have a first child even in the presence of generous 
dual-earner policies. The fact that they are more likely than single women to 
have children guarantees that the increase in the likelihood of women living 
in unions, as a result of generous dual-earner policies, will result in more 
children being born. The alternative for women who otherwise would have 
cohabited is not marriage, but life without a partner. All else being equal, 
women who live in cohabiting unions who have relatively few children con-
tribute more to increasing the overall fertility rate than single women who do 
not have children.  
Together with the fact that all women, disregarding the stability of the un-
ions they live in, are more likely to experience third- and higher-order births 
within the three-year period in countries with generous dual-earner policies, 
these observations seem to warrant the conclusion that generous dual-earner 
policies are likely to increase the overall level of fertility.  
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However, there is one caveat. It is not obvious whether the observed ef-
fects should be interpreted as effects on the quantum of fertility or only as 
effects on the timing of fertility. The studied period is only three years long. 
Because of this, it is possible that the found effects only are short-term effects 
on the timing of fertility. Women in countries that do not implement gener-
ous dual-earner policies might recuperate, at a later time, the first-, second-, 
third-, and higher-order births they do not have in the observed three-year 
period. Their ability to recuperate those births, however, decreases for each 
child they have had. Age sets a biological limit on women’s fecundity. The 
biological limit after which women cannot have more children is usually set 
around the age of 45. But women’s fecundity starts to fall long before that. 
Few women, for example, have children after they are 39 years old. This fact, 
together with the fact that women in the models of the likelihood of having 
third- and higher-order births on average are 39 years old at the end of the 
three-year period, makes it likely that at least the positive effect of of gener-
ous dual-earner policies on the likelihood of women having third- and higher-
order births can be interpreted as an effect on the quantum of fertility.  
The women in the models of the likelihood of a first and a second birth 
are considerably younger than the women in the models of third- and higher-
order births. It is thus possible for those women who have not had children at 
the end of the period to catch up on their sisters and have a first and a second 
child later in life, even though, for biological reasons, it is likely harder to 
catch up on a second than on a first child. Whether they actually do so is an 
open question. However, for each year they wait, their biological ability to 
have children decreases. Hence, it is likely that at least a part of the observed 
positive effect of generous dual-earner policies on fertility can be interpreted 
as an effect on the quantum of fertility.   
The part of this positive effect that is dependent on the fact that generous 
dual-earner policies reduce the negative effect of union instability on fertility 
would not have been discovered if the study had not controlled for the stabil-
ity of the unions women live in, and how that stability interacts with the gen-
erosity of dual-earner policies in shaping women’s fertility outcomes. As 
previous studies on the topic have not done so, it is fair to say that they have 
likely underestimated generous dual-earner policies’ positive effect on fertili-
ty. This conclusion is further strengthened by the finding that such policies’ 
positive effect on women’s likelihood of living in unions is likely to result in 
higher fertility.  
In order to further validate the hypotheses tested and confirmed in the 
chapter, in the next chapter I investigate whether union instability and the 
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generosity of dual-earner policies can also explain women’s fertility inten-
tions.  
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9 
Union instability and women’s 
fertility plans 
 
In the last chapter I showed that union instability reduces, and generous dual-
earner policies increase, the likelihood of women having had a child in the 
three years prior to the year of their interview for the ESS. In this chapter I 
ask whether union instability and generous dual-earner policies have similar 
effects on women’s likelihood of planning to have a child in the three years 
after their interview for the ESS. The chapter starts with a repetition of the 
refined hypotheses concluding Chapter 8. Thereafter, I discuss how to test the 
hypotheses on women’s fertility intentions. Then follows an empirical study 
in which I test them. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the results 
and their implications.  
 
Hypotheses 
Chapter 8 ended with three conclusions. First, it was concluded that union 
instability has a negative effect on the likelihood of women having a first and 
(to a more limited extent) a second child within the three years prior to the 
year of their interview for the ESS. Second, it was concluded that generous 
dual-earner policies reduce the negative effect of union instability on the 
likelihood of women having a first and a second child. Third, it was conclud-
ed that generous dual-earner policies have a positive effect on women’s like-
lihood of having second- and higher-order children, with an increasing rate 
for every child a woman had at the start of the period. In this chapter I test 
whether it is possible to trace similar effects of union instability and the gen-
erosity of dual-earner policies on women’s intentions of having a(nother) 
child within three years after their interview for the ESS. In line with the 
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argument put forward in Chapter 4 and refined in Chapter 8, I test three hy-
potheses. First I ask whether, 
 
H1. Union instability reduces women’s likelihood of planning to have 
a(nother) child.  
 
Second I ask whether, 
 
H2. Generous dual-earner policies reduce the negative effect of union in-
stability on women’s likelihood of planning to have a(nother) child. 
 
Third, I ask whether,  
 
H3. Generous dual-earner policies increase women’s likelihood of plan-
ning to have a(nother) child, with an increasing rate for every child that a 
woman already has.  
 
Thus, the main aim of this chapter is to test whether union instability and the 
generosity of dual-earner policies have the same effects on the likelihood of 
women planning on having children as they have on the likelihood of women 
having children.  
A problem with the models presented in Chapter 8 is that they only meas-
ure women’s fertility during the three years prior to the year the women were 
interviewed for their participation in the ESS. Because of this, it is hard to 
conclude whether the observed effects are effects on the timing or the quan-
tum of fertility. By also studying women’s fertility intentions it is possible to 
get a sense of women’s fertility behavior over a longer time period than the 
one investigated in the models presented in Chapter 8. Although this does not 
entirely solve the problem of how to disentangle effects on the timing of 
fertility from effects on the quantum of fertility, it makes it safer to talk about 
longer-term effects on the quantum of fertility.  
In addition, the chapter aims to overcome two potential methodological 
traps identified in the models of women’s fertility presented in Chapter 8. 
The first of these is the lack of fully reliable retrospective information on 
women’s union histories. The consequence of this lack of information is that 
it is hard to tell whether the set of finer-grained operationalizations of union 
instability that is used in some of the models in Chapter 8 in all cases reliably 
measures the distinctions in union instability it is supposed to measure. This 
problem is solved by studying women’s fertility intentions, as the ESS pro-
vides reliable information on women’s union status at the time of their inter-
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view. To the extent that union instability has an effect on women’s fertility 
intentions, it is thus possible to detect that effect with a higher degree of 
certainty than it is in the models in Chapter 8. This means that it is possible to 
test whether the effects of the set of finer distinctions of union instability 
used in Chapter 8 capture the real-world effects of union instability on fertili-
ty, by comparing them with the effects of union instability in the models of 
women’s likelihood of planning to have a(nother) child. If the effects of un-
ion instability are similar in both kinds of models, it is likely that the models 
in Chapter 8 capture real-world effects.87  
The second problem with the models presented in Chapter 8 is the lack of 
reliable retrospective information on some of the individual-level control 
variables. This problem is especially acute in the cases of women’s labor 
market attachment. The consequence is that it is difficult to fully test how 
women’s individual earning opportunities in the labor market affect their 
likelihood of having a(nother) child. It is only possible to test what effect 
women’s general earning opportunities in the labor market have on individual 
women’s likelihood of having a(nother) child. The lack of reliable retrospec-
tive information on other control variables is easier to live with, but prevents 
causal interpretations of the coefficients. These problems are solved by 
studying women’s fertility intentions, as the ESS provides reliable data on 
women’s labor market attachment and all other control variables at the time 
of their interview for the ESS.88     
To sum up, if union instability and the generosity of dual-earner policies 
affect women’s intention to have a(nother) child in the three years following 
their interview for the ESS in the same way as they affect the likelihood of 
                                                          
87
 The fact that the ESS provides reliable information on women’s union status at the time of their interview 
also makes it possible to test whether the effect of the dual-earner index varies between the three types of 
unions according to how stable they are. The results (not shown; available on request) from such a test largely 
confirm the expectations. The dual-earner index has no effect among married women who have not cohabited 
(i.e. among women in the most stable type of union), a moderate positive effect among married women who 
have cohabited (i.e. among women in unions of moderate stability), and a strong positive effect among cohab-
iting women (i.e. among women in the least stable type of union). The difference in effect size between the 
two latter groups, however, is only significant at the 10-percent level in a one-sided t-test (a fact that probably 
has to do with the small sample size).  
88
 The ESS also contains data on other factors that could potentially affect women’s fertility decisions and that, 
because of endogeneity problems, could not be tested in Chapter 8. Although I do not include it in the models 
presented in this chapter, I have checked the robustness of my results for one such variable – namely, men’s 
contribution to household labor. Much research shows that gender equality in the household has a positive 
effect on (especially working) women’s fertility (see Olah 2011 for a summary; also see Neyer 2011 for a 
more critical view). The inclusion of a variable measuring how large a share of the total household labor 
respondents’ men contribute, however, does not affect the main results. The included variable is not signifi-
cant. The coefficient does, however, go in the expected (positive) direction (results not shown; available from 
the author on request).    
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women having a(nother) child in the three years prior to the year they were 
interviewed, it would considerably strengthen the conclusions reached in 
Chapter 8. In other words, if the patterns discussed in Chapter 8 are revealed 
to be the outcome of conscious planning, it is more reasonable to assume 
women to actually act and reason in the way the presented hypotheses as-
sumes them to. Women’s fertility intentions and the factors affecting them 
are also interesting in themselves. 
 
Data and method  
Below I present multilevel logistic regression models of the likelihood of 
women in unions planning on having a(nother) child within the three years 
after their interview for the European Social Survey.   
 
The dependent variable 
The dependent variable is constructed from a question from round 2 of the 
ESS, which asks the respondent if she is planning on having a child within 
the next three years after the interview. The respondent has four answers to 
choose from: “definitely not,” “probably not,” “probably yes,” and “definite-
ly yes.” Women who are pregnant at the time of their interview are coded as 
belonging to the category “definitely yes.” I have used these categories of 
answers to construct two dependent variables. First, I have coded the depend-
ent variable as 1 if women answer “probably yes” or “definitely yes” and as 0 
if they answer “probably no” or “definitely no.” Second, I have coded the 
dependent variable as 1 if women answer “definitely yes” and as 0 if they 
answer “probably yes” or “probably no” or “definitely no.” The reason for 
constructing two alternative dependent variables is that it is of interest to 
distinguish between women who definitely plan to have a(nother) child and 
women who only tentatively plan to do so. It is reasonable to assume that 
women who definitely plan on having a(nother) child are more likely than 
women who only “probably” plan on having a(nother) child to realize their 
fertility plans. The second and more restrictive definition of the dependent 
variable, therefore, is likely to be a more reliable predictor of women’s future 
fertility behavior than the first and more inclusive definition. However, it is 
also likely that the more restrictive definition of the dependent variable risks 
underestimating women’s future fertility, as it does not count the plans of 
women who “probably” plan on having a child in the future as real. Although 
several of the women who say that they “probably” plan on having a child 
likely will not realize their plans, many of them will. The use of both defini-
tions of the dependent variable, thus, risks biasing results, although in oppo-
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site directions. Because of this, I have chosen to use both in the models pre-
sented below. I start with modeling the likelihood of women planning on 
having a child within the next three years with the more inclusive definition 
as the dependent variable. I then rerun the models with the more restrictive 
definition as the dependent variable. In that way it is possible to compare the 
results from the two different definitions. I also compare women’s fertility 
plans for the three years following their interview for the ESS with their 
achieved fertility in the three years prior to the year they were interviewed for 
the ESS, in order to estimate which of the definitions is closest to women’s 
realized fertility behavior.     
 
The design of the study  
The design of the study on women’s fertility intentions builds on the data on 
women’s fertility histories provided by the ESS. As was described in Chapter 
8, the ESS provides full retrospective data on women’s fertility histories. The 
data makes it possible to know how many children a woman had at the time 
of her interview for the ESS as well as when she gave birth to the children 
she has. I use this information to distinguish between women with different 
numbers of children at the time of their interview. This data is used to run 
separate models of women who have no children or one child and women 
who have two or more children. In the models of women planning on having 
a first or a second child I also include a dummy variable for measuring 
whether women had no children or one child at the time of their interview. In 
the models of women planning on having a third- or higher-order child, I 
include a dummy variable for controlling for whether women had two or 
three or more children at the time of their interview.  
In contrast to the study on women’s likelihood of having a(nother) child, 
the study on the likelihood of women planning on having a(nother) child is 
not a panel study, but a cross-sectional one. The focus is on how women’s 
individual and country-level characteristics at the time of their interview for 
the ESS are associated with their likelihood of planning on having another 
child within the three years following their interview. All individual-level 
variables are measured at the same time as the dependent variable. This, of 
course, makes it impossible to know what comes first – women’s fertility 
intentions or their other individual characteristics. However, it is more rea-
sonable to assume that the effect goes from women’s other individual-level 
characteristics to their fertility intentions, rather than in the opposite direc-
tion. To the extent that women adapt their lives and values to their fertility 
intentions, the adaptation is likely to take place after they have realized their 
intentions and have had a(nother) child. Before they have realized their fertil-
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ity plans they have little reason to adapt to them, as their lives will continue 
on as normal. Only after they have realized their plans must they adapt to 
them. This is true both for behavioral and value characteristics. A working 
woman who intends to have a(nother) child, for example, is not likely to 
leave her job until she has realized her intention and had the child. Women 
who adapt by becoming more religious when they have children are, similar-
ly, likely to become so only after, and not before, the children have been 
born. Thus, it is fairly safe to say that the effect goes from the other individu-
al-level characteristics to women’s fertility intentions and not in the opposite 
direction. Therefore, I below speak of “effects” when interpreting the regres-
sion coefficients.    
 
Individual-level independent variables 
All individual-level variables included in the models of the likelihood of 
women having a(nother) child in Chapter 8 and that are applicable are also 
included in the models of the likelihood of women planning on having 
a(nother) child.89 Age, age squared, women’s educational attainment, their 
partners’ educational attainment, women’s subjective religiousness, their 
frequency of church attendance, their denominational belonging, their area of 
residence, and dummies for their civil status are all included in the regres-
sions. All are defined in the same way as in Chapter 8. The only real differ-
ence is that there is no need to use two sets of variables to measure union 
instability, as we know for certain what kind of unions women live in at the 
time of their interview. Therefore, I only measure union instability by distin-
guishing between i) women who cohabit, ii) women who are married and 
have previously experienced unmarried cohabitation, and iii) women who are 
married and have never experienced unmarried cohabitation.   
In addition to the variables used in the models in Chapter 8 I have also in-
cluded two dummy variables measuring whether a woman is studying or 
working in the labor market in the models of women’s fertility intentions. 
The reference category consists of women who, for various reasons, are out-
side the labor market.  
 
Country-level variables 
All except one of the country-level variables included in the models in Chap-
ter 8 are also included in the models of the likelihood of women planning on 
having a(nother) child. The generosity of family policies is measured by the 
                                                          
89
 This means that all variables except those that measure how many years a woman has not lived with her 
current partner are included in the models.  
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dual-earner index, the benefits index, and the availability of part-time jobs. I 
have also included the unemployment rate and the percentage of women who 
live with their parents. The excluded variable is the female labor force partic-
ipation rate, which in Chapter 8 functioned as a proxy for women’s earning 
opportunities in the labor market. The models presented in this chapter con-
trol for women’s individual-level earning opportunities in the labor market; it 
would be unnecessary to control for women’s overall earning opportunities 
when direct controls for their individual-level earning opportunities can be 
used.     
 
Cross-level interactions 
As in the models of women’s likelihood of having a(nother) child, the models 
of the likelihood of women planning on having a(nother) child include an 
interaction term between the dual-earner index and married women who have 
not experienced unmarried cohabitation, which allows for the effect of the 
dual-earner index to vary with the stability of women’s unions.   
 
Sample restrictions 
All models are restricted to include only women in unions who were between 
18 and 42 years old at the time of their interview for the ESS. The reason for 
including only women who are younger than 43 years is that women’s bio-
logical ability to have children comes to an end somewhere in their mid-40s.  
 
Statistical models   
The models of women’s likelihood of planning on having a first or second 
child within three years following their interview for the ESS contain 2186 
women from 20 countries. The models of women’s likelihood of planning on 
having third- and higher-order children within the three years following their 
interview for the ESS contain 2673 women from 20 countries. Formally, the 
first models measure the probability that individuals, i, nested within coun-
tries, j, plan on having a child, Y=1, given a number of covariates, X1…Xn 
(below represented with their names) and an intercept B0. The models of the 
likelihood of women planning to have a first and a second child also include 
a random intercept, U0j, which represents country-specific likelihoods of 
women planning on having a child within the three-year period, and a ran-
dom coefficient, U1j, which allows for the effect of being married without 
having experienced unmarried cohabitation, to vary between countries.90  
                                                          
90
 Technical note: The models have been run with gllamm in Stata10 (see Rabe Hesketh, Skrondal & Pickles 
2004; Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal 2005).   
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All units are weighted with design weights, but not with population weights 
for reasons similar to those discussed in previous chapters. Summary statis-
tics of all variables are presented in the results section separately for the 
models of the likelihood of women planning on having a first and a second 
child and the models of the likelihood of women planning on having a third- 
and higher-order child.  
It should be noted that both the number of women (i.e., level-one units) 
and the number of countries (i.e., level-two units) included in the models are 
very small. No model contains more than 2673 women and 20 countries. In 
the case of the likelihood of women planning on having third- and higher-
order children, the dependent variable is also extremely skewed, as no more 
than between 5 and 10 percent of the women have such plans. Especially in 
the case of third- and higher-order births, there is thus very little variation to 
explore. This makes it difficult to estimate the random part of the models, 
and especially the included random slope. It is fully possible that a significant 
variation in the effect of being married without having experienced unmar-
ried cohabitation could go undetected in the random part of the models be-
cause of the small sample sizes. To include a random slope in the models is 
to stress the limits of the statistical analysis. Therefore, greater notice should 
be taken of the significance of the included variables than of the significance 
of the random parts of the models. However, the significance levels of indi-
vidual variables also suffer from the small sample sizes involved. Large con-
fidence intervals and low statistical power are unavoidable. The results pre-
sented below should therefore be interpreted with some caution. Null results 
could hide real effects that do not show up because of low statistical power. 
The problem is especially acute in the models of the likelihood of women 
definitely planning on having third- and higher-order children, but it affects 
all models. 
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The likelihood of women planning on having 
a first and a second child 
Of the 2186 women in unions in the sample who had no children or one child 
at the time of their interview for the ESS, 53 percent say that they plan to 
probably have a(nother) child within three years of their interview. However, 
only half of them (i.e., 25 percent of all women in unions) say that they defi-
nitely plan to have a(nother) child within the designated time. If these per-
centages are contrasted with the 33 percent of the women in unions who had 
a first or a second child in the three years prior to their interview for the ESS, 
it appears that those who say that they probably will have a(nother) child 
overrate their future fertility. But it also appears that women’s future fertility 
would be underestimated if only the fertility plans of those women who defi-
nitely plan on having a(nother) child are counted as real.  
At least some of the women who “probably” plan on having a(nother) 
child are likely to realize their plans and have a(nother) child. However, 
altogether it seems that the narrower definition of women’s fertility plans 
gives the most realistic picture of women’s future fertility, as its average 
diverges least from women’s average level of realized fertility in the three 
years prior to the year of their interview. Despite this, below I explore the 
effects of union instability and the generosity of family policies on both like-
lihoods. I start by exploring their effects if the dependent variable is con-
structed using the broader definition of women’s fertility plans.  
Model 1.1 in Table 9.2, which includes only individual-level variables, 
only partially verifies that union instability has a negative effect on women’s 
likelihood of planning on having a(nother) child. Only married women who 
have experienced unmarried cohabitation are more likely than cohabiting 
women to plan on having a(nother) child. This is not the case with married 
women who have not cohabited. However, the random part of the model 
shows that both the effect of being married without having experienced un-
married cohabitation and women’s overall likelihood of planning on having 
a(nother) child vary considerably between countries. Thus, there is room for 
union instability to have the expected negative effect on women’s likelihood 
of planning on having a(nother) child. 
 
 
 
 
 
BEDROOM POLITICS 
 
 224
Table 9.1. Summation of variables  
Variable Observations Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
Planning on having a child (wide def.) 2186 .53 .50 0 1 
Planning on having a child (narrow def.) 2186 .26 .44 0 1 
Age 2186 31.1 6.4 18 42 
Age*age 2186 1005 403 324 1764 
Rural residence (ref.) 2186 .33 .47 0 1 
Urban residence 2186 .67 .47 0 1 
Low education (ref.) 2186 .70 .46 0 1 
High education 2186 .30 .46 0 1 
Partner low educations (ref.) 2186 .74 .44 0 1 
Partner high education 2186 .26 .44 0 1 
Not attending church (ref.) 2186 .78 .41 0 1 
Monthly church att. 2186 .22 .41 0 1 
Religiosity 2186 4.6 2.9 0 10 
Protestant 2186 .17 .38 0 1 
Catholic 2186 .34 .47 0 1 
Orthodox 2186 .06 .24 0 1 
Other 2186 .04 .20 0 1 
Not belonging to church (ref.) 2186 .39 .49 0 1 
Have no children 2186 .47 .50 0 1 
Have one child 2186 .53 .50 0 1 
Outside the labor market (ref.) 2186 .27 .45 0 1 
In education 2186 .06 .25 0 1 
In paid work 2186 .67 .47 0 1 
Cohabiting (ref.) 2186 .33 .47 0 1 
Married (cohabited) 2186 .26 .44 0 1 
Married (only) 2186 .41 .49 0 1 
(log)Dual-earner index 2186 3.26 .59 2.30 4.46 
(log)Benefits index 2186 1.79 .49 0 2.73 
(log)Part-time employment 2186 2.56 .73 .74 3.82 
(log)Unemployment rate 2186 1.76 .63 .64 2.94 
(log)% Living with parents 2186 1.83 .59 .86 2.78 
Married (only) x (log)Dual-earner index 2186 1.24 1.53 0 4.46 
Comments: Unweighted means. Reference categories in italics. For construction of variables and 
sources of data: see Appendix C. 
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Table 9.2. Odds ratios of women in unions planning to have a first or second child  
 
Model 1.1 
Probably + Definitely 
Model 1.2 
Definitely 
Model 2.1 
Probably + Definitely 
Model 2.2 
Definitely 
Individual level 
    
Age 2.91 (.37)*** 2.17 (.28)*** 2.90 (.36)*** 2.19 (.29)*** 
Age*Age .98 (.00)*** .99 (.00)*** .98 (.00)*** .99 (.00)*** 
Living urban  .80 (.11) .79 (.07)* .80 (.11) .80 (.08)* 
University education 1.63 (.23)*** 1.46 (.23)* 1.61 (.21)*** 1.46 (.23)* 
Partner university edu. 1.59 (.29)** 1.42 (.21)* 1.61 (.28)* 1.42 (.21)* 
Monthly church  .94 (.18) .71 (.13)+ .95 (.18) .75 (.13)+ 
Religiosity 1.01 (.02) 1.04 (.03) 1.01 (.02) 1.04 (.02)+ 
Protestant 1.80 (.38)* 1.30 (.33) 1.79 (.39)* 1.35 (.27) 
Catholic 1.26 (.19) 1.22 (.23) 1.30 (.19)+ 1.28 (.25) 
Orthodox 1.75 (.55)+ 1.18 (.37) 1.44 (.36) 1.46 (.48) 
Other 1.18 (.29) 1.30 (.33) 1.23 (.28) 1.34 (.30) 
In education .28 (.07)*** .28 (.08)*** .28 (.06)*** .29 (.08)*** 
In paid work .80 (.10)+ .85 (.10) .80 (.10)+ .84 (.11) 
Have no children 1.44 (.30)+ 1.37 (.27) 1.44 (.28)+ 1.40 (.28)+ 
Married (cohab.) 1.40 (.22)* 1.79 (.30)*** 1.42 (.23)* 1.87 (.34)*** 
Married (only) .88 (.22) 1.33 (.31) 7.60 (5.0)** 6.61 (4.66)** 
Married (only)* no child 1.56 (.47) 1.37 (.27) 1.53 (.46) 1.85 (.34)*** 
     
Country level  
   
(log)Dual-earner index     1.47 (.11)*** 1.49 (.17)*** 
(log)Benefits index      .66 (.10)** 1.10 (.23) 
(log)Part-time work      .68 (.08)*** .72 (.11)* 
(log)Unemployment rate     .64 (.09)** .59 (.13)* 
(log)Living with parents     .85 (.13) .98 (.22) 
     
Cross-level inter. 
    
(log)Dual-earner index *      .51 (.10)*** .61 (.13)* 
Married (only)     
     
Random part  
   
Intercept level 2 .22 (.10)* .35 (.13)** .04 (.06) .02 (.12) 
Married (only)  .43 (.15)** .27 (.16)+ .07 (.10) .14 (.30) 
     
Observations 
    
Individuals  2186 2186 2186 2186 
Countries 20 20 20 20 
Log likelihood -1175.538 -1075.262 -1164.831 -1066.471 
AIC 2393.076 2192.524 2383.661 2186.942 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+
 p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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The pattern that appears when Model 1.1 is rerun with the narrower defini-
tion of women’s fertility plans as the dependent variable is similar to that 
which appears when the broader definition is used (see Model 1.2). Married 
women who have not experienced unmarried cohabitation are not less likely 
than cohabiting women to plan on having a(nother) child. However, the ran-
dom part of the model, once again, shows that both the overall likelihood of 
women planning on having a(nother) child and the effect of being married 
without having cohabited on the same likelihood vary significantly between 
countries The overall between-country variation is larger than in the model 
using the more inclusive definition of women’s fertility plans, whereas the 
variation in the effect of being married without having cohabited, in contrast, 
is somewhat smaller. The existing variation, however, allows for the effect of 
dual-earner policies and union instability on women’s fertility plans to vary 
in the expected way in both models.    
When the dual-earner index and the interaction between the dual-earner 
index and being married without having cohabited are introduced along with 
the control variables in the model using the broader definition of women’s 
fertility plans, the expected pattern emerges (see Model 2.1).91 The variation 
in the effect of being married without having cohabited is reduced drastically 
and ceases to be significant. The coefficient of being married without having 
cohabited increases in magnitude and becomes highly significant and posi-
tively associated with the likelihood of women planning on having a(nother) 
child. At the same time, the dual-earner index, which now represents the 
effect of generous dual-earner policies among women who live in unstable 
unions, becomes significantly positively associated with the same likelihood. 
Also, the interaction term is significant and strongly negatively associated 
with women’s plans to have a(nother) child.  
Together, these observations mean that union instability has the expected 
negative effect on women’s likelihood of planning on having a(nother) child 
in countries that do not implement generous dual-earner policies. They also 
mean that generous dual-earner policies, as expected, reduce the negative 
effect of union instability on women’s fertility plans. The reason why union 
instability does not have a significant negative effect on women’s fertility 
plans in Model 1 is that generous dual-earner policies conceal the negative 
effect. The introduced variables also reduce the between-country variations in 
the likelihood of women planning on having a first and a second child.  
However, several of the country-level control variables measuring the 
generosity of family policies are, surprisingly, negatively associated with 
                                                          
91
 For a graphic display and discussion of the size and significance of the interactions effect, see Appendix B. 
Overall, the results presented in the appendix confirm the findings discussed above. 
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women’s fertility plans. It is not surprising that the average age on leaving 
the parental home and the unemployment rate are negatively associated with 
women’s fertility plans. However, it is surprising that the availability of part-
time jobs and the generosity of the benefits index are also negatively associ-
ated with women’s fertility plans. If anything, we should expect a positive 
association between the latter two variables and the likelihood of women 
planning on having children.  
The fact that the signs of the two control variables diverge from the ex-
pected theoretical pattern indicates either that something is wrong with the 
theoretical expectations or that women who say that they “probably” will 
have a(nother) child within three years of their interview miscalculate their 
future fertility in a systematic way. Given that the more inclusive definition 
of the dependent variable seems to overestimate women’s future fertility 
radically, the latter option is probably the best explanation for the diverging 
results. The narrower definition would likely yield results more in line with 
the theoretical expectations. To test whether this is the case, I rerun Model 
2.1 with the narrower definition of women’s fertility plans, which includes 
only women who definitely plan on having a(nother) child, as the dependent 
variable. The results are presented in Model 2.2.  
As expected, the results from the model using the narrower definition of 
women’s fertility plans are much more similar to the results presented in 
Chapter 8 than are the results from the model using the broader definition of 
women’s fertility plans.  
All main variables are significant and go in the expected directions. The 
combined effects of union instability and the generosity of dual-earner poli-
cies on women’s likelihood of definitely planning on having a first child are 
illustrated in Figure 9.1. The figure clearly confirms hypothesis H1, that 
union instability has a negative effect on women’s likelihood of definitely 
planning on having a first child. It also confirms hypothesis H2, that gener-
ous dual-earner policies reduce the negative effect of union instability on 
women’s definite fertility plans. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BEDROOM POLITICS 
 
 228
Figure 9.1. The likelihood of women in unions definitely planning on having a first child 
 
Comments. Builds on Model 2.2 in Table 9.3. The graph shows the effect of union status and the 
generosity of the dual-earner index on the likelihood of women definitely planning on having a first 
child when all other variables are held at the sample mean. The shaded areas show the 83-percent 
confidence intervals. This means that confidence intervals that do not overlap show likelihoods that 
are significantly different from each other at the 5-percent level.  
 
In the country with the lowest score on the dual-earner index, only 12 percent 
of the women who live in the least stable type of union (i.e., women who 
cohabit) are predicted to definitely plan on having a first child within three 
years of their interview. This should be compared to the finding that 20 per-
cent of the married women who have cohabited and 35 percent of the married 
women who have not cohabited are predicted to do so. Women who are liv-
ing in the most stable type of union are, thus, three times as likely as women 
who live in the least stable type of union to plan on having a first child in the 
country with the lowest score on the dual-earner index, and they are almost 
twice as likely to do so as women who live in unions of average stability.  
However, in countries that score above 3 on the log of the dual-earner in-
dex, married women who have not cohabited cease to be significantly more 
likely than married women who have cohabited to plan on having a first 
child. In countries that score above 4 on the log of the dual-earner index, 
cohabiting women also cease to be significantly less likely than married 
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women who have not cohabited to plan on having a first child. This means 
that generous dual-earner policies can potentially reduce all of the negative 
effect of union instability on women’s definite plans to have a first child. In 
other words, the positive effect of generous dual-earner policies on the fertili-
ty plans of women who are living in unstable unions is so strong that it in-
creases their likelihood of planning on having a first child by over 80 percent. 
However, the effect is not strong enough to significantly raise the predicted 
probability of women who are living in unstable unions above that of women 
who live in more stable unions. Thus, generous dual-earner policies do not 
have a significant positive effect on women’s definite plans to have a first 
child in addition to the indirect positive effect they have by reducing the 
negative effect of union instability on women’s fertility plans.  
Overall, the associations between union instability, the generosity of dual-
earner policies, and women’s likelihood of definitely planning on having a 
first child follow a pattern that is almost identical to the one found in Chapter 
8. Women’s achieved fertility in the three years prior to their interview for 
the ESS almost perfectly mirrors their definite fertility plans for the three 
years after their interview. There is only one minor exception to the pattern 
discussed in Chapter 8, and that is that generous dual-earner policies reduce 
all of the negative effect of cohabiting women’s union instability on their 
likelihood of planning on having a first child, whereas they only reduce a part 
of the negative effect of cohabiting women’s union instability on their likeli-
hood of actually having a first child. Although this could mean that union 
instability does have a somewhat less accentuated negative effect on wom-
en’s fertility than the models in Chapter 8 indicate, there is another, more 
likely, explanation: that the low statistical power of the models of women’s 
likelihood of planning to have children results in large confidence intervals 
that hide the real effects. A larger N would likely have resulted in a signifi-
cant difference between the two groups even in countries with very generous 
dual-earner policies. The set of finer distinctions between different degrees of 
union instability used in Chapter 8, thus, likely reflects real-world distinc-
tions of union stability quite well, even though they do not measure women’s 
union status until the end of the three-year period. Overall, the results from 
the models of the likelihood of women planning on having children, thus, 
confirm the findings from Chapter 8 regarding the effect of union instability 
on fertility. 
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Figure 9.2. The likelihood of women in unions definitely planning on having a second 
child  
 
Comments. Builds on Model 2.2 in Table 9.3. The graph shows the effect of union status and the 
generosity of the dual-earner index on the likelihood of women definitely planning on having a 
second child when all other variables are held at the sample mean. The shaded areas show the 83-
percent confidence intervals. This means that confidence intervals that do not overlap show likeli-
hoods that are significantly different from each other at the 5-percent level.  
 
Also, in the case of women’s likelihood of planning on having a second 
child, the pattern has similarities to the pattern found in Chapter 8. However, 
as is illustrated in Figure 9.2, there are also more accentuated divergences.  
The most notable divergence is that cohabiting women only have a lower 
predicted probability of planning on having a second child than married 
women who have not cohabited in the country with the least generous dual-
earner policies. In other countries, they are not less likely to plan on having a 
second child. The most likely reason for this is, once again, the small N and 
the resulting large confidence intervals. It is probable that a larger N would 
have resulted in a similar pattern to that in the models of women having a 
second child presented in Chapter 8. Cohabiting women, however, are less 
likely than married women who have cohabited to plan to have a second 
child in all countries in the sample. Strictly statistically speaking, union in-
stability nevertheless has an even more limited effect in the models of wom-
en’s likelihood of planning on having a second child than in the models of 
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
Pr
e
di
ct
e
d 
pr
o
ba
bi
lit
y
2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5
(log)Dual-earner index
Confidence intervals
CohabitingMarried (have cohabited)
Married (have not cohabited)
UNION INSTABILITY AND WOMEN’S FERTILITY PLANS 
 231
women’s likelihood of having a second child. Thus, H1 finds somewhat less 
support in the models of the likelihood of women planning on having a se-
cond child. 
The other notable divergence is the fact that all women have much lower 
predicted probabilities of planning on having a second child than they have 
on actually having a second child. This can likely be explained by the fact 
that women’s definite fertility plans underestimate their future fertility. How-
ever, it is somewhat strange that the underestimation sets in first in the case 
of second births, whereas women do not seem to underestimate their first 
births to the same degree. This could be interpreted as evidence that women 
plan their first births more meticulously than their second births.  
Generous dual-earner policies, nonetheless, exert a strong positive effect 
on the likelihood of women in unstable unions definitely planning on having 
a second child, as such women are almost twice as likely to do so in the 
country with the most generous dual-earner policies as they are in the country 
with the least generous dual-earner policies. Each log-unit change on the 
dual-earner index, in other words, increases the predicted probability of 
women in unstable unions planning on having a second child by about 45 
percent. Less than 10 percent of the cohabiting women in the country with 
the least generous dual-earner policies are predicted to definitely plan on 
having a second child, whereas almost 20 percent of the cohabiting women in 
the country with the most generous dual-earner policies are predicted to do 
so.  
The fact that generous dual-earner policies increase the likelihood of 
women in unstable unions planning on having a second child, whereas union 
instability has only a marginally negative effect on the same likelihood, can 
be taken as a partial confirmation of H3, that generous dual-earner policies 
have a direct positive effect on the likelihood of women planning on having a 
second child. However, precisely as in the models of women’s likelihood of 
having a second child presented in the last chapter, H3 is only partially veri-
fied. Married women who have not cohabited are, for some reason, not posi-
tively affected by generous dual-earner policies in their definite fertility 
plans.  
The associations between individual-level control variables and women’s 
definite fertility plans diverge in some important respects from the pattern 
found in Chapter 8. The behavior of age, women’s subjective religiousness, 
and denominational membership is similar. However, women’s and their 
partners’ education and women’s church attendance behave quite differently.  
In contrast to all theoretical expectations, women’s educational attainment 
is significantly positively associated with their likelihood of definitely plan-
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ning on having a(nother) child. Their partners’ educational attainment is, 
also. This finding contrasts starkly with the null associations found in the 
models in Chapter 8. For some reason education seems to have a more accen-
tuated effect on women’s fertility plans than it has on their actual fertility 
behavior. The fact that the partner’s education increases women’s likelihood 
of planning on having children is only to be expected given the positive in-
come effect on the demand for children that comes with a raise in men’s 
income. But the fact that women’s educational attainment is positively asso-
ciated with the same likelihood is harder to explain, as an increase in wom-
en’s income increases not only the demand for children but also the oppor-
tunity costs of children. A possible explanation for the changing impact of 
education could be that highly educated men and women are more likely to 
plan their children in advance than are less educated men and women. If that 
is the case, and if less educated men and women have more unplanned chil-
dren than highly educated men and women, the changing impact of education 
between the models of women’s realized fertility and their fertility plans can 
readily be explained.  
The other divergence from the models of women’s realized fertility is that 
women’s church attendance does not have a positive effect in the models of 
women’s likelihood of planning to have children. Women who attend church 
regularly are even significantly less likely than women who do not attend 
church regularly to definitely plan on having a(nother) child. This could be 
seen as evidence that the positive association between women’s church at-
tendance and their likelihood of having a first and a second child, found in 
Chapter 8, can be explained by the fact that women who have children adapt 
by becoming more religious. However, church attendance could influence 
women’s fertility in more ways than affecting their fertility plans. For exam-
ple, religiousness has been argued to decrease the likelihood that women will 
use contraceptives and have abortions. None of these latter ways in which 
religiousness could affect fertility influence women’s likelihood of planning 
to have children. Therefore, it is hard to say with certainty why the results 
diverge so much between the models of women’s achieved and planned fer-
tility. 
In addition to the individual-level control variables included in the models 
presented in Chapter 8, the models of women’s likelihood of planning on 
having a first and a second child also include two variables controlling for 
women’s labor market attachment. They show that women who are students 
are significantly less likely than both working women and women who are 
outside the labor market to plan to have children. Working women, however, 
are not significantly less likely than women outside the labor market to plan 
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to have children, although they are close to being so. The theoretical expecta-
tion of a negative association between women’s labor market attachment and 
their fertility plans is, thus, only partially confirmed.  
Two of the country-level control variables are significantly negatively as-
sociated with women’s definite fertility plans: the unemployment rate and the 
availability of part-time jobs. The fact that the overall level of unemployment 
strongly reduces women’s likelihood of definitely planning on having chil-
dren is in line with the theoretical expectations, as well as previous findings 
of a negative association between the unemployment rate and women’s fertil-
ity (Adserà 2004) and the results from the models of the likelihood of women 
in unions having a first and a second child. In times of economic uncertainty, 
women seem to abstain from plans to have children.    
However, the negative association between the availability of part-time 
jobs and women’s definite fertility plans is more surprising and goes in the 
opposite direction of the expected pattern. There is no obvious reason why 
women in countries in which part-time jobs are widely available should be 
less likely to plan on having children than women in countries in which part-
time jobs are scarce. If anything, the availability of part-time jobs should 
reduce the opportunity costs of having children, and thus raise the incentives 
to have them. The found negative association also contrasts with the, admit-
tedly statistically weaker, positive association found in the models of wom-
en’s likelihood of actually having a first and a second child.  
Apart from this obscurity, the conclusion must be that the observed pat-
terns largely confirm the main findings from Chapter 8. Union instability 
reduces women’s likelihood of planning to have a first and, to some degree, a 
second child, and generous dual-earner policies reduce this negative effect of 
union instability on women’s fertility plans. Finally, generous dual-earner 
policies have a limited positive effect on women’s likelihood of planning to 
have a second child. The results also indicate that union instability is a better 
predictor of women’s fertility plans than is labor market status. Only the 
coefficients of the control variables measuring women’s religiousness and 
education differ from those found in Chapter 8. Overall, the divergences do, 
however, have reasonable explanations.  
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The likelihood of women planning on having 
third- and higher-order children  
Depending on the definition used, between 4 and 9 percent of the women in 
unions who had two or more children at the time of their interview for the 
ESS plan on having another child within three years.  
 
Table 9.3. Summation of variables  
Variable Observations Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
Planning on having a child (wide def.) 2673 .09 .29 0 1 
Planning on having a child (narrow def.) 2673 .04 .20 0 1 
Age 2673 36.2 4.8 19 42 
Age*age 2673 1337 335 361 1764 
Rural residence (ref.) 2673 .45 .50 0 1 
Urban residence 2673 .55 .50 0 1 
Low education (ref.) 2673 .79 .41 0 1 
High education 2673 .21 .41 0 1 
Partner low educations (ref.) 2673 .80 .40 0 1 
Partner high education 2673 .20 .40 0 1 
Monthly church att. 2673 .34 .47 0 1 
Not attending church (ref.) 2673 .66 .47 0 1 
Religiosity 2673 5.3 2.8 0 10 
Protestant 2673 .18 .38 0 1 
Catholic 2673 .41 .49 0 1 
Orthodox 2673 .07 .25 0 1 
Other 2673 .04 .20 0 1 
Not belonging to church (ref.) 2673 .30 .46 0 1 
Have two children 2673 .65 .48 0 1 
Have three children or more 2673 .35 .48 0 1 
Outside the labor market (ref.) 2673 .42 .49 0 1 
In education 2673 .02 .13 0 1 
In paid work 2673 .56 .50 0 1 
Cohabiting (ref.) 2673 .09 .29 0 1 
Married (cohabited) 2673 .31 .46 0 1 
Married (only) 2673 .60 .49 0 1 
(log)Dual-earner index 2673 3.26 .58 2.30 4.46 
(log)Benefits index 2673 1.83 .49 0 2.73 
(log)Part-time employment 2673 2.54 .77 .74 3.82 
(log)Unemployment rate 2673 1.75 .63 .64 2.94 
(log)% Living with parents 2673 1.80 .58 .86 2.78 
Comments: Unweighted averages. Reference categories in italics. For construction of variables and 
sources of data: see Appendix C. 
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If this is compared to the 10 percent of the women who actually had a third- 
or higher-order child in the three years prior to the year of their interview, it 
becomes obvious that the broader definition of women’s fertility plans seems 
to be a better indicator of women’s future fertility than the narrower defini-
tion. This observation is in line with the observation that women’s definite 
fertility plans reliably predict the percentage of women who have a first 
child, but underestimates the percentage of women who have a second child. 
In short, women’s probable fertility plans seem to be a more reliable predic-
tor of their future fertility after women have had their first child. There are 
several good reasons for believing that this should be the case. First, women 
should reasonably have a more realistic view of what it means to have a child 
after they have had one. Second, the leap from being childless to becoming 
the mother of a child involves a greater change in lifestyle than going from 
being the mother of one child to becoming the mother of two children.  
These assumptions should make us take the fertility plans of women who 
already have children more seriously than the fertility plans of childless 
women. It is uncertain whether childless women will pursue their fertility 
plans to the end when they start to realize what a child would actually mean 
for them and their life. Women who already have children are in all probabil-
ity more likely to follow through on their plans. There is also a third reason 
for taking the fertility plans of women with children more seriously than 
those of childless women, which is that women who have had a child with 
their partner can likely make a more realistic judgment of their partner’s 
fertility preferences and adjust their fertility plans accordingly. Together, 
these assumptions could explain why the narrower definition of women’s 
fertility plans seems to predict women’s first births better than the broader 
definition, whereas the broader definition seems to predict women’s higher-
order births better than the narrow definition. Nonetheless, below, I present 
models based on both definitions.  
Model 3.1, which uses the broader definition of women’s fertility plans 
and which includes only individual-level variables, shows that union instabil-
ity, surprisingly, has a positive effect on the likelihood of women planning on 
having third- and higher-order children. Cohabiting women are significantly 
more likely than married women who have cohabited to plan on having third- 
and higher-order children, and married women who have cohabited are, in 
turn, significantly (t-test is not shown; available from the author on request) 
more likely than married women who have not cohabited to plan on having 
another child. This means that the empirical pattern goes in the opposite 
direction of the theoretically expected pattern. Although it was only to be 
expected that the negative effect of union instability, as it is operationalized 
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in this study, on fertility should decrease for each child a woman has, it is not 
easy to explain why union instability has a positive effect on women’s plans 
to have third- and higher-order children. 
 
Table 9.4. Odds ratios of women in unions planning to have a third- or higher-parity 
child  
 
Model 3.1 
Probably + Definitely 
Model 3.2 
Definitely 
Model 4.1 
Probably + Definitely 
Model 4.2 
Definitely 
Individual level 
    
Age 1.58 (.42)+ 1.11 (.33) 1.58 (.41)+ 1.11 (.34) 
Age*Age .99 (.00)* .99 (.00) .99 (.00)* .99 (.00) 
Living urban  .84 (.11) .75 (.16) .85 (.11) .77 (.17) 
University education 2.11 (.69)* .99 (.27) 2.05 (.68)* .91 (.25) 
Partner university edu. 1.74 (.38)* 2.00 (.50)** 1.70 (.37)* 1.89 (.46)** 
Monthly church  1.36 (.32) 1.02 (.32) 1.37 (.33) 1.09 (.35) 
Religiosity 1.00 (.03) 1.05 (.04) 1.00 (.03) 1.04 (.04) 
Protestant .94 (.30) .87 (.21) 1.01 (.34) .84 (.22) 
Catholic .94 (.19) .95 (.20) 1.00 (.23) 1.03 (.23) 
Orthodox .70 (.23) .66 (.25) .80 (.32) 1.14 (.51) 
Other 2.37 (1.07)+ 2.18 .99+ 2.28 (1.02)+ 1.92 (.91) 
In education .56 (.28) .85 (.65) .56 (.28) .72 (.53) 
In paid work .75 (.19) .68 (.24) .75 (.19) .64 (.23) 
Have three children .71 (.13)+ .78 (.16) .71 (.13)+ .75 (.15) 
Married (cohab.) .54 (.14)* .59 (.17)+ .56 (.14)* .64 (.19) 
Married (only) .33 (.09)*** .29 (.10)*** .35 (.09)*** .36 (.13)*** 
     
Country level 
    
(log)Dual-earner index     1.44 (.19)** 1.45 (.25)* 
(log)Benefits index      .62 (.17)+ 1.03 (.27) 
(log)Part-time work      1.08 (.26) 1.25 (.33) 
(log)Unemployment rate     .59 (.15)* .83 (.16) 
(log)Living with parents     1.33 (.53) 1.20 (.34) 
     
Random part  
   
Intercept level 2 .44 (.12)*** .00 (.00) .29 (.13)* .00 (.00) 
     
Observations 
    
Individuals  2673 2673 2673 2673 
Countries 20 20 20 20 
Log likelihood -661.0948 -392.5308 -656.3658 -389.4428 
AIC 1358.19 821.0615 1358.732 824.8856 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+
 p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
The selection process that can explain why the negative effect of union insta-
bility decreases for each child a woman has cannot as readily explain why the 
effect turns positive after a woman has had two children. The only readily 
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available explanation is that cohabiting women, because they progress more 
slowly to their first births, must proceed faster than women in more stable 
unions to realize their fertility plans before it is too late for them to have 
children. In any case, hypothesis H1, that union instability should reduce 
women’s likelihood of planning to have third- and higher-order children, is 
not verified. This also means that it is not applicable to test whether generous 
dual-earner policies reduce the negative effect of union instability on wom-
en’s fertility plans. 
The random part of the model does, however, leave room for hypothesis 
H3, that generous family policies should have a general positive effect on 
women’s fertility plans, to be true. The overall likelihood of women planning 
on having third- and higher-order children does vary significantly and con-
siderably between countries.  
When Model 3.1 is rerun using the narrower definition of women’s fertili-
ty plans (results presented in Model 3.2), a similar pattern appears, but with 
one major exception: the overall likelihood of women planning on having 
third- and higher-order children does not vary significantly between coun-
tries. As noted in the methods section, this likely has to do with the low num-
ber of women definitely planning on having third- and higher-order children. 
Despite the found null variation, I therefore do not abstain from running the 
full model using the narrower definition of women’s fertility plans.   
When the country-level variables are introduced to test whether generous 
family policies have a positive effect on women’s fertility plans, the expected 
pattern appears (results presented in Models 4.1 and 4.2 in Table 9.4). The 
generosity of dual-earner policies becomes significantly positively associated 
with women’s fertility plans in both the model using the broader definition of 
women’s fertility plans and the model using the narrower definition. Most 
individual-level variables behave similarly to how they behave in the models 
excluding the country-level variables. The exception is that the positive effect 
of union instability decreases, so that the only difference in fertility plans 
remaining significant at the 5-percent level is that between married women 
who have not cohabited and cohabiting women. The effect of the generosity 
of dual-earner policies and women’s union status on the likelihood of women 
definitely planning on having a third child is illustrated in Figure 9.3. 
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Figure 9.3. The likelihood of women in unions planning on having a third child 
 
Comments: Builds on Model 4.2 in Table 9.3. The graph shows the effect of union status and the generosity of 
dual-earner policies on the likelihood of women definitely planning on having a third child when all other 
variables are held at the sample mean. Confidence intervals are not shown for illustrative reasons. Only the 
difference in predicted probabilities between married women who have not cohabited and women who cohabit 
is significant at the 5-percent level. All other differences in predicted probabilities between women with 
different union statuses are not significant.   
 
The figure shows that generous dual-earner policies have a strong positive 
effect on women’s likelihood of definitely planning on having a third child. 
Women in the country with the most generous dual-earner policies are more 
than twice as likely as women in the country with the least generous dual-
earner policies to plan on having a third child. Each log-unit change on the 
dual-earner index, thus, increases the predicted probability of a woman plan-
ning on having a third child by more than 45 percent.  
It is also interesting to note the strong positive effect of union instability 
(or rather cohabitation) on the same likelihood. Cohabiting women are more 
than twice as likely as married women who have not cohabited to plan on 
having a third child. The difference between cohabiting women and married 
women who have not cohabited is also large, but not significant. Given the 
positive association that exists between generous dual-earner policies and the 
likelihood of women in unions cohabiting, this means that generous dual-
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earner policies are actually more strongly positively associated with women’s 
likelihood of planning to have third- and higher-order children than the coef-
ficients of the dual-earner index in Models 4.1 and 4.2 indicate. If the models 
are rerun without controls for women’s union status, the effect of the dual-
earner index increases considerably (results are not shown; available from the 
author on request).  
Apart from the main variables, only one individual-level control variable, 
other than age, is significantly associated with women’s definite likelihood of 
planning to have third- and higher-order children at the 5-percent level in 
both models, namely, their partner’s educational attainment. Women whose 
partners have a university education are considerably more likely to plan on 
having a third- or higher-order child than women whose partners have lower 
levels of education. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that men’s 
incomes should have a positive effect on women’s fertility. In the model 
based on women’s more inclusive fertility plans, women’s educational at-
tainment is also positively associated with their likelihood to plan on having 
a higher-order child.  
No country-level control variables are significantly associated with wom-
en’s likelihood of definitely planning on having third- and higher-order chil-
dren. The benefits index and the unemployment rate, however, are negatively 
associated with women’s looser plans about having higher-order children. 
The fact that the unemployment rate is so associated is to be expected, and 
the result is also in line with the findings from the models of women’s likeli-
hood of planning to have a first and a second child. The negative association 
between generous family benefits and women’s more loosely defined fertility 
plans is more surprising. The found association, however, is significant only 
at the 10-percent level.  
Overall, the models are plagued by low statistical power. This is evident 
in that none of the full models show an improvement of the model fit in com-
parison with the models containing only individual-level variables. This is 
probably due to the models’ low N, in combination with the fact that so few 
women plan to have third- and higher-order children. This makes the inter-
pretation of the results problematic. However, to the extent that it is possible 
to trust the results, they largely confirm the findings from the models pre-
sented in Chapter 8. Generous dual-earner policies not only seem to have a 
positive effect on women’s realized third- and higher-order births, but also 
seems to positively affect women’s willingness to plan to have third- and 
higher-order children. The only really surprising finding is that part of the 
effect seems to go via the positive effect generous dual-earner policies have 
on women’s likelihood of cohabiting.  
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It should also be noted that women’s labor market status does not signifi-
cantly affect their likelihood of planning to have third- and higher-order chil-
dren. The signs of the coefficients do, however, go in the expected directions, 
and the null result could as well reflect the low statistical power of the mod-
els as a real null association.   
 
Concluding discussion 
The main aim of this chapter has been to test whether union instability and 
the generosity of dual-earner policies have the same effects on the likelihood 
of women planning on having children as they have on the likelihood of 
women having children. The results largely confirm that union instability and 
the generosity of dual-earner policies have a uniform effect on women’s 
realized and planned fertility (the results are summarized in Table 9.5). 
 
Table 9.5. Summation of the empirical findings 
 
Hypotheses 
 
 
Likelihood of 
women having a 
first child 
 
 
Likelihood of women 
having a second 
child 
 
Likelihood of women 
having third- and higher-
order children 
H1: Union instability should reduce 
fertility 
 
 
Verified 
 
Partially verified 
 
Not verified 
H2: Generous dual-earner policies 
should reduce the negative effect of 
union instability on fertility 
 
Verified 
 
 
Verified/Not appli-
cable 
 
Not applicable 
H3: Generous family policies should 
increase fertility 
 
Not verified 
 
 
Partially verified 
 
Verified 
 
The fact that the results are so similar to each other strengthens their reliabil-
ity. It is fairly certain that union instability and the generosity of dual-earner 
policies have the expected effects – at least on women’s planned and realized 
timing of fertility. But the similarity also makes it likelier that the effects will 
not dissipate as time goes by; that is, it makes it likelier that the observed 
effects represent not only effects on the timing, but also the quantum, of 
fertility. The total time covered by the models of women having a child in the 
three years before their interview for the ESS and the models of women 
planning to have a child in the three years after their interview is, after all, six 
years.     
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This chapter has also aimed to test how the methodological problems dis-
turbing the models in Chapter 8 affect the results. The main finding emanat-
ing from this test is that the set of finer distinctions of union instability used 
in Chapter 8 seems to capture real-world distinctions rather well. In all, the 
distinctions seem to behave similarly to the corresponding distinctions in this 
chapter. This observation makes the results in Chapter 8 more believable. 
When it comes to the control variables, one finding stands out, namely, that 
the effect of religiousness on fertility might be more ambiguous than the 
models in Chapter 8 suggest.92 Although women’s participation in organized 
religion, in the form of church attendance and denominational belonging, has 
a positive effect on their achieved fertility, it does not affect their planned 
fertility. This could mean that women become more religious after they have 
had children and that their participation in organized religion does not have 
an independent effect on fertility. However, an equally valid interpretation of 
the results is that women’s participation in organized religion increases their 
chances of having unplanned children, for example by reducing their likeli-
hood of using contraceptives and having abortions. Thus, the test neither 
confirms nor disconfirms the assumed positive association between women’s 
participation in organized religion and their likelihood of having children. 
But the models do confirm that women’s self-estimated religiousness seems 
to have a positive effect on both their planned and realized fertility.   
Equally interesting from a substantial point of view is the finding of a 
positive association between the experience of cohabitation and the likeli-
hood of women planning on having third- and higher-order children. Also, in 
the models of women’s achieved fertility, a similar tendency can be found, 
although it is not nearly as strong as that found for women’s fertility plans. 
The most likely explanation for this finding is that cohabiting women, be-
cause they progress more slowly to their first births, must proceed faster than 
women in more stable unions to realize their fertility plans before it is too late 
for them to have children. Another potential explanation could be that cohab-
iting women who have two or more children in most countries constitute a 
very select group of women with a strong desire to have children. The fact 
that they have had two children despite their relatively high risk of union 
disruption reveals a willingness to pay a relatively high price for having chil-
dren – especially in countries that lack generous dual-earner policies.  
Nonetheless, the finding that cohabiting women are more likely to plan to 
have and – also to a degree – to have third- and higher-order children consti-
                                                          
92
 It should also be noted that the set of finer distinctions of union instability that were used in Chapter 8 seem 
to capture real-world distinctions quite well, even though they are measured after the three-year period prior to 
their interview for the ESS. 
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tutes evidence that generous dual-earner policies not only have a direct posi-
tive effect on women’s likelihood to plan to have, and to actually have, third- 
and higher-order children. They also have an indirect positive effect on the 
same likelihood, via the positive effect they have on women’s likelihood of 
cohabiting, and cohabiting women’s likelihood of having a first and a second 
child. This finding only emphasizes the impression that generous dual-earner 
policies have a strong positive effect on the likelihood of women in unions 
having many children.  
To sum up, the fertility outcomes observed in Chapter 8 mirror the fertili-
ty plans found in this chapter. This close proximity between women’s fertili-
ty plans and their actual fertility behavior constitutes good evidence that 
women plan their children’s births in advance and with the risk of union 
disruption and its economic consequences in mind. In short, children do seem 
to be the planned results of rational decisions. This means that women’s 
fertility plans can be a good proxy for predicting their actual fertility behav-
ior. 
The fact that the results are so similar to each other strengthens their reli-
ability. It is fairly certain that union instability and the generosity of dual-
earner policies have the expected effects – at least on women’s planned and 
realized timing of fertility. But the similarity also makes it likelier that the 
effects will not dissipate as time goes by; that is, it makes it likelier that the 
observed effects represent not only effects on the timing, but also the quan-
tum, of fertility. The total time covered by the models of women having a 
child in the three years before their interview for the ESS and the models of 
women planning to have a child in the three years after their interview is, 
after all, six years.      
This chapter has also aimed to test how the methodological problems dis-
turbing the models in Chapter 8 affect the results. The main finding emanat-
ing from this test is that the set of finer distinctions of union instability used 
in Chapter 8 seems to capture real-world distinctions rather well. In all, the 
distinctions seem to behave similarly to the corresponding distinctions in this 
chapter. This observation makes the results in Chapter 8 more believable. 
When it comes to the control variables, one finding stands out, namely, that 
the effect of religiousness on fertility might be more ambiguous than the 
models in Chapter 8 suggest.93 Although women’s participation in organized 
religion, in the form of church attendance and denominational belonging, has 
a positive effect on their achieved fertility, it does not affect their planned 
                                                          
93
 It should also be noted that the set of finer distinctions of union instability that were used in Chapter 8 seem 
to capture real-world distinctions quite well, even though they are measured after the three-year period prior to 
their interview for the ESS. 
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fertility. This could mean that women become more religious after they have 
had children and that their participation in organized religion does not have 
an independent effect on fertility. However, an equally valid interpretation of 
the results is that women’s participation in organized religion increases their 
chances of having unplanned children, for example by reducing their likeli-
hood of using contraceptives and having abortions. Thus, the test neither 
confirms nor disconfirms the assumed positive association between women’s 
participation in organized religion and their likelihood of having children. 
But the models do confirm that women’s self-estimated religiousness seems 
to have a positive effect on both their planned and realized fertility.   
Equally interesting from a substantial point of view is the finding of a 
positive association between the experience of cohabitation and the likeli-
hood of women planning on having third- and higher-order children. Also, in 
the models of women’s achieved fertility, a similar tendency can be found, 
although it is not nearly as strong as that found for women’s fertility plans. 
The most likely explanation for this finding is that cohabiting women, be-
cause they progress more slowly to their first births, must proceed faster than 
women in more stable unions to realize their fertility plans before it is too late 
for them to have children. Another potential explanation could be that cohab-
iting women who have two or more children in most countries constitute a 
very select group of women with a strong desire to have children. The fact 
that they have had two children despite their relatively high risk of union 
disruption reveals a willingness to pay a relatively high price for having chil-
dren – especially in countries that lack generous dual-earner policies.  
Nonetheless, the finding that cohabiting women are more likely to plan to 
have and – also to a degree – to have third- and higher-order children consti-
tutes evidence that generous dual-earner policies not only have a direct posi-
tive effect on women’s likelihood to plan to have, and to actually have, third- 
and higher-order children. They also have an indirect positive effect on the 
same likelihood, via the positive effect they have on women’s likelihood of 
cohabiting, and cohabiting women’s likelihood of having a first and a second 
child. This finding only emphasizes the impression that generous dual-earner 
policies have a strong positive effect on the likelihood of women in unions 
having many children.  
To sum up, the fertility outcomes observed in Chapter 8 mirror the fertili-
ty plans found in this chapter. This close proximity between women’s fertili-
ty plans and their actual fertility behavior constitutes good evidence that 
women plan their children’s births in advance and with the risk of union 
disruption and its economic consequences in mind. In short, children do seem 
to be the planned results of rational decisions. This means that women’s 
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fertility plans can be a good proxy for predicting their actual fertility behav-
ior. 
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10 
Concluding discussion 
 
This study started out in the debate on whether generous family policies can 
raise the low fertility rates Europe is presently experiencing. Arguing that 
they can do so, the study is clearly critical of researchers who argue that low 
fertility is an inevitable consequence of the cultural change Europe has un-
dergone in recent decades. Thus, it agrees with the economists who argue that 
the ultimate source of low fertility is the increased costs of reproduction that 
have followed in the wake of women’s expanded opportunities in the labor 
market – and that policies can raise fertility by reducing these costs. Howev-
er, the study’s main message is that those scholars who are optimistic about 
policies’ ability to raise fertility have also underestimated their capacity to do 
so, because they have failed to fully acknowledge the individualized nature of 
many fertility decisions. 
Hitherto, most research on policies’ ability to affect fertility has been 
based on the new home economics assumption that fertility decisions are 
primarily taken within unions, by partners who altruistically share the bur-
dens and benefits of reproductive investments with each other. In line with 
this tenet, researchers have primarily focused on how policies that reduce 
altruistic partners’ costs of reproduction affect within-union fertility. Alt-
hough such a focus undoubtedly has its merits, this study has argued that it is 
too narrow to capture all of policies’ effect on fertility. The reason is that 
fertility decisions are often taken in situations in which the new home eco-
nomics assumption of family altruism is unlikely to hold, and where individ-
uals’ costs of reproduction do not necessarily coincide with families’ overall 
costs of reproduction. More specifically, I have argued that there are two 
such types of situations. The first is situations where two individuals who do 
not know each other well consider whether it would be a good idea to form a 
union together. The second is situations where individuals live in unstable 
unions. Individuals in such situations cannot be certain that their partners will 
altruistically share the burdens of raising potential children with them. As a 
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consequence, they are not likely to care about how policies affect altruistic 
spouses’ costs of reproduction. Rather, they should be concerned about how 
policies affect their costs of reproduction in the event they end up pregnant 
without an altruistic spouse to support them. Hence, the best way to increase 
their incentives to have children is to implement policies that compensate 
them individually for their costs of reproduction, so that they do not need to 
rely on their partners’ economic support. 
The only policies that can do so are paid parental leaves with high re-
placement rates and subsidized child care. Such dual-earner policies should 
have a positive effect on individuals’ incentives to form unions and have 
children in unstable unions. The empirical analysis also illustrates that there 
is a positive link between generous dual-earner policies on one side and 
women’s likelihood of living in unions and having children in unstable un-
ions on the other. The corresponding link between policies that only reduce 
families’ costs of reproduction and these likelihoods is considerably weaker. 
This suggests that policies’ ability to reduce individuals’ costs of reproduc-
tion is of greater importance for understanding their potential to raise fertility 
than is their ability to reduce altruistic partners’ costs of reproduction.  
Because of its focus on how policies that affect altruistic partners’ incen-
tives to have children affect within-union fertility, the previous research has 
missed both this and the fact that policies can affect women’s likelihood of 
forming unions and having children in unstable unions. Insofar as it has fo-
cused on individual-level fertility patterns, it has therefore underestimated 
policies’, and especially dual-earner policies’, impact on fertility. This can 
explain why previous studies based on individual-level fertility data have 
found it more difficult than studies based on aggregate-level fertility data to 
find a positive effect of generous dual-earner policies on fertility. Thus, the 
optimistic message conveyed by this study is that policy changes can be a 
more effective means for raising Europe’s low fertility rates than has been 
hitherto acknowledged even by researchers who are optimistic about policies’ 
ability to raise fertility.  
In this concluding chapter I discuss the broader implications of my argu-
ment and findings. I begin by reviewing my empirical findings in more detail 
and discussing what they mean for the debate on policies’ ability to raise 
fertility. I then go on to reflect on how my findings can inform culturally 
oriented theories of fertility decline. Thereafter, I consider my study’s broad-
er implications for the debate between different economic analyses of the 
family. Then, I discuss implications for the research on union formation and 
union dissolution. Finally, I discuss where to go from here.   
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Main findings 
The analyses and findings presented in this study reveal how much of family 
policies’ effect on fertility in fact goes via their effect on women’s incentives 
to form unions and have children in unstable unions. No study using individ-
ual-level fertility data is likely to accurately answer whether, or how, gener-
ous family policies can increase fertility without recognizing these causal 
paths in which policies can affect fertility. On a more practical level, the 
findings show that the most effective way to increase women’s incentives to 
enter unions and have children in unstable unions – and, thus, raise fertility – 
is to implement generous dual-earner policies.   
More specifically, Chapter 6 showed that women’s earning opportunities 
are negatively associated with their likelihood of living in unions. The chap-
ter also showed that generous family policies are positively associated with 
women’s likelihood of living in unions, and that the positive association can 
be ascribed to the fact that relatively many women with high earning oppor-
tunities live with partners in countries with generous family policies. Thus, it 
seems that women’s earning opportunities reduce their incentives to enter 
unions (H4), but that generous family policies can mediate this effect (H6) 
and in that way increase women’s likelihood of living in unions (H5). In 
short, generous family policies seem able to increase women’s incentives to 
enter unions, and it is especially true for women who have high earning po-
tentials. Because a union increases a woman’s likelihood of having children, 
it is probable that previous studies based on individual-level fertility data 
have underestimated the positive effect on fertility of generous family poli-
cies when they have concentrated on studying policies’ effect on within-
union fertility. The sizes of the found effects further imply that family poli-
cies’ impact on women’s union formation patterns is of a considerable mag-
nitude, and therefore, the underestimation is likely to be relatively large. For 
example, more than 30 percent more working women live in unions in the 
country with the most generous dual-earner policies than in the country with 
the least generous dual-earner policies.    
Chapter 7 found generous dual-earner policies to be positively associated 
with women’s likelihood of living in unstable unions (H8) (i.e., cohabiting) 
and that much, although not all, of the positive association can be ascribed to 
the fact that relatively many women with high earning opportunities live with 
partners in countries with generous dual-earner policies (H7). In fact, the 
chapter shows that all of generous dual-earner policies positive effect on 
women’s likelihood of living in unions can be ascribed to the fact that such 
policies’ increase women’s likelihood of cohabiting.  
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Table 10.1 Main findings: Family policies and union formation 
 
Hypotheses 
 
 
 
 
 
H4. Good earning opportunities for 
women should reduce their likelihood 
of living in unions 
 
Verified 
H5. Generous family policies should 
increase the likelihood of women 
living in unions…  
 
 
Verified 
H6. …by increasing the likelihood of 
women with good earning opportuni-
ties living in unions 
 
Verified 
H7. Women with good earning 
opportunities should be more likely to 
live in unstable unions 
 
Verified 
H.8 Generous dual-earner policies 
should increase the likelihood of 
women living in unstable unions 
 
Verified 
 
So far the data confirms the overall argument, as well as the specific hypoth-
eses following from it. The evidence on union instability’s and family poli-
cies’ effect on women’s fertility decisions, which were presented in Chapter 
8, offers a slightly more complicated picture. Hypothesis H1, that women 
who live in unstable unions have an incentive to self-insure against a union 
disruption by avoid having children, and that union instability should there-
fore reduce fertility, is partially verified. Union instability has a strong nega-
tive effect on women’s likelihood of having a first child, but only a limited 
negative effect on women’s likelihood of having a second child, and it has no 
effect at all on women’s likelihood of having a third child.  
Insofar as it is applicable, hypothesis H2, that generous dual-earner poli-
cies, because they reduce women’s negative incentives to have children in 
unstable unions, should reduce the negative effect of union instability on 
fertility, is verified. In two out of three cases the mediating effect is strong 
enough to reduce all of union instability’s negative effect, and in the third 
case it halves it.  
Hypothesis H3, that generous family policies, because they reduce the 
costs of reproduction for all families, should increase fertility, is partially 
verified. Generous dual-earner policies do not affect women’s likelihood of 
having a first child (above reducing the negative effect of union instability on 
the same likelihood). But they do have a limited positive effect on women’s 
likelihood of having a second child, and a strong positive effect on women’s 
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likelihood of having a third child. In contrast, the generosity of other family 
policies does not seem to have an effect on within-union fertility.  
The results from Chapter 9, on women’s fertility plans, largely confirm 
the findings from Chapter 8. With some minor exceptions, the independent 
variables have a similar effect on women’s likelihood of planning to have a 
child within three years after their interview for the ESS as they have on 
women’s likelihood of having had a child within the three years prior to the 
year of their interview for the ESS. This close proximity between women’s 
fertility plans and their actual fertility behavior constitutes evidence that 
women plan their children’s births with the risk of union disruption and its 
economic consequences in mind.  
 
Table 10.2. Main findings: Family policies and fertility 
 
Hypotheses 
 
 
Likelihood of 
women having a 
first child 
 
 
Likelihood of women 
having a second 
child 
 
Likelihood of women 
having third- and higher-
order children 
H1: Union instability should reduce 
fertility 
 
 
Verified 
 
Partially verified 
 
Not verified 
H2: Generous dual-earner policies 
should reduce the negative effect of 
union instability on fertility 
 
Verified 
 
 
Verified/Not appli-
cable 
 
Not applicable 
H3: Generous  family policies should 
increase fertility 
 
Not verified 
 
 
Partially verified 
 
Verified 
 
Thus, the findings largely verify the expectations. Union instability has a 
negative effect on fertility, even though the effect is confined to first and 
second births. Generous dual-earner policies reduce most of this effect, and 
in that way increase the fertility of women who are living in unstable unions. 
In addition, generous dual-earner policies have a positive effect on the fertili-
ty of all women, even if it is limited to second and, especially, higher-order 
births. Because of this it can be safely concluded that previous individual-
level studies, to the extent that they have not controlled for the higher level of 
union instability in countries with generous dual-earner policies, have under-
estimated the positive effect of dual-earner policies on fertility. This can 
explain why it has been more difficult to prove the effectiveness of dual-
earner policies at raising fertility with individual-level fertility data than with 
aggregate-level fertility data.  
To sum up, the empirical evidence seems to support the study’s main ar-
gument. Generous family policies’ – and especially generous dual-earner 
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policies’ – positive effect on fertility appears much clearer with individual-
level data when the intimate relationship between fertility decisions and deci-
sions about union formation and union dissolution is accounted for. Further, 
generous dual-earner policies have a much more positive effect than more 
traditionally oriented family policies on women’s fertility decisions in situa-
tions in which the new home economics assumption of family altruism is 
unlikely to hold. As such situations make up a significant part of all fertility 
decisions, it seems that the implementation of generous dual-earner policies 
is a relatively cost-effective means to increase Europe’s low fertility rates. 
 
Implications for the policy vs. culture debate 
This study started with the debate between economically and culturally ori-
ented explanations of fertility decline and its implications for policies’ ability 
to raise fertility. By now it should be obvious how the study places itself in 
this debate. The clear message is that economic incentives trump culture: 
policy changes can raise Europe’s low fertility rates even though the conti-
nent has undergone drastic cultural changes in recent years. The most im-
portant reason for this conclusion is the argument and the evidence that have 
been presented so far. However, the study also provides direct evidence of 
another sort that fertility decline is not an inevitable consequence of cultural 
change. As discussed in Chapter 5, my operationalization of union instability 
is largely based on the demographic footprints of the Second Demographic 
Transition. Because of this my study can also, with some modifications, be 
read as a study on how the SDT interacts with family policies in shaping 
fertility outcomes in Europe, and such a reading makes it obvious that poli-
cies can reduce cultural changes’ negative effect on fertility. 
In a recent article, Ron Lesthaeghe – who co-founded the theory of the 
SDT together with Dirk J. van de Kaa – points out that the theory over the 
years has been criticized for having “overemphasized the link between the 
transformation in family relationships (especially cohabitation) and [low 
fertility]” and for not being able to “account for the great variety in fertility 
levels [found in the developed world]” (Lesthaeghe 2010). For example, the 
theory seems unable to explain the reversal in the cross-country correlation 
between the cohabitation rate and the total fertility rate that took place in the 
late twentieth century (see Chapter 2).  
However, my study shows that there is little need to doubt the core of the 
theory of the SDT because of this criticism. The fact that fertility rates today 
are higher in countries where cohabitation is widespread than in countries 
where cohabitation is almost unheard of does not constitute evidence against 
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the theory. My study shows a clear negative correlation between cohabitation 
and past experience of cohabitation and achieved and planned fertility at the 
individual level. Thus, the founders of the theory of the SDT were not mis-
taken in assuming that values associated with cohabitation and past experi-
ence of cohabitation have a negative effect on fertility. They just did not take 
into account policies’ ability to reduce these values’ negative effect on fertili-
ty.  
Because they did not do so, we have every reason to look to the future 
with more hope than the founders of the theory of the SDT originally did, 
even from a cultural perspective. It does not seem that the rise in post-
materialist values Europe is currently experiencing must inevitably result in 
below-replacement fertility. If only states adopt policies that help people 
balance their needs for self-fulfillment and parenthood, people will go on 
having children. The fact that women in countries such as Sweden and 
France, on average, come close to having two children each during their 
lifetimes indicates that it is possible to achieve replacement fertility even in 
countries in which the SDT has advanced very far. It suffices that the adopted 
policies are generous and of the right type. In other words, the SDT only 
seems to have affected people’s fertility preferences to a minor degree. Inso-
far as it is responsible at all for Europe’s declining fertility rates, it has at 
least not affected people’s fertility preferences. Rather, it seems to have af-
fected other aspects of people’s family lives, aspects whose negative effects 
on fertility seem relatively easy to meet with policy changes. I would argue 
that if the SDT is responsible for Europe’s low fertility it is because it has 
brought about greater union instability. But the data remains open to other 
interpretations. Nonetheless, my study shows that whatever aspect of value 
change it is that causes women to cohabit, it seems possible to reduce its 
negative impact on fertility by implementing generous dual-earner policies. 
So even if value change is responsible for Europe’s low fertility rates, there is 
no need to be pessimistic about policies’ ability to raise fertility.  
Thus far, my findings do not threaten, but are actually compatible with, 
the SDT’s explanation of fertility decline. However, the positive correlation 
between generous dual-earner policies and women’s likelihood of cohabiting, 
which was discussed in Chapter 7, risks undermining the theory of the SDT. 
This is because it indicates that the rising generosity of dual-earner policies is 
a more likely explanation than value change for the spread of cohabitation in 
Europe. Most evidence points to the whole of Europe having undergone rapid 
value change in recent years. Despite this, there has only been a drastic rise in 
cohabitation in North-West Europe. No corresponding rise has taken place in 
Southern Europe and large parts of Central Europe. Thus, it does not seem 
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that a lack of ideational willingness prevents women in Southern and Central 
Europe from cohabiting. What really seems to prevent them from cohabiting 
is the lack of an institutional framework that reduces the economic risks of 
having children in unstable unions. At least, women’s willingness to cohabit 
varies more consistently with the institutional support states offer working 
mothers than with people’s value orientations. In other words, if my interpre-
tation of the evidence is correct, the demographic footprints of the SDT 
might to a large extent be the demographic footprints of generous dual-earner 
policies.  
This is not to say that value change has had no effect at all on women’s 
demographic behavior. The strong negative correlation between women’s 
religiousness and their likelihood of cohabiting, discussed in Chapter 7, sends 
a clear message. But it is to say that economic incentives are more important 
for shaping people’s demographic behavior than the founders of the SDT 
once assumed. Although it might provide a part of the picture, it is unlikely 
that the theory can provide the whole explanation for why demographic be-
havior has changed.94  
 
Implications for the debate between  
different economic models of the family  
Up until now, most studies on policies’ effect on fertility have focused on 
how policies that reduce altruistic partners’ costs of reproduction affect with-
in-union fertility. One of the fundamental contributions of this study has been 
to point to the shortcomings of this narrow focus. However, my findings do 
not mean that the new home economics assumption of family altruism must 
necessarily be wrong, and that game-theoretic bargaining models are always 
better suited for analyzing the family. Rather, the study shows that families 
are more heterogeneous, both in their internal workings and in their responses 
to policies, than any of the two models assume. In some situations, family 
                                                          
94
 Although they might not be directly related to demographic change, the SDT and other theories of value 
change might play a role in explaining states’ varying willingness to adopt the policies driving demographic 
change. States and municipalities that have a high proportion of elected women politicians have been shown to 
be more willing than states with few elected women politicans to adopt generous dual-earner policies and, then 
especially generous child care subsidies (Bratton & Ray 2002; Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler 2005; Svaleryd 
2009). One reason for this might be that women politicians differ from their male colleagues both in their 
values and their priorities in that they value gender equity higher (see for example Wängnerud 2000). Thus, the 
feminist movement might have contributed to demographic change indirectly by making states adopt more 
“women friendly” policies. To what degree the feminist movement has influenced the adoption of dual-earner 
policies is, however, a question that goes beyond the topic of this study.  
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altruism seems a warranted assumption, whereas game-theoretic bargaining 
models seem to describe other situations better. Below, I discuss in more 
detail my study’s implications for the debate between different economic 
models of the family.  
As such, the finding that policies that reduce the costs of reproduction in-
crease women’s likelihood of living in unions has no obvious implications 
for the debate between different economic models of the family. In essence, it 
only says that policies that increase the relative payoff from household pro-
duction (in this case, having and raising children) increase people’s incen-
tives to enter unions. Although this makes it likely that the previous research 
has missed much of policies’ effect on fertility when it has neglected to study 
policies’ effect on union formation, the finding does not threaten the previous 
research’s theoretical underpinnings. A focus on within-union fertility does 
not automatically follow from the new home economics assumptions. Rather, 
the theory has inspired ample research on how factors affecting the value of 
household production affect people’s willingness to engage in marriage. It is 
just that the insights from this research have not spilled over to the research 
on family policies’ effect on fertility. Thus, my finding of policies’ effect on 
women’s union formation is fully compatible with the new home economics 
analysis of the family.  
In isolation it could even be interpreted as indirect support for the new 
home economics analysis, as it indicates that what primarily matters for peo-
ple’s union formation decisions is families’ overall cost of reproduction, and 
not the intra-family distribution of said cost. If people were sensitive to how 
the costs of reproduction are distributed within the family they would likely 
be more affected by the generosity of dual-earner policies than by the gener-
osity of more traditional family policies in their union formation decisions. 
Therefore, the finding that generous policies of both types have a positive 
effect on women’s likelihood of living in unions can be interpreted as a sign 
that women expect their individual payoffs from starting a union to coincide 
with their potential families’ overall costs of reproduction. That is, it could be 
interpreted as a sign that women assume their potential unions to be charac-
terized by family altruism. This conclusion is further strengthened by the fact 
that many of the unions that result from generous benefits for families with 
children seem to be rather stable (i.e., marriages in which the woman has not 
cohabited before the marriage).     
However, the fact that most of generous dual-earner policies’ positive ef-
fect on women’s likelihood of living in unions can be ascribed to such poli-
cies’ positive effect on women’s likelihood of cohabiting complicates mat-
ters. As previously mentioned, unions built on cohabitation are not equivalent 
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to unions built on marriage. They are neither as stable nor do they signal the 
same degree of commitment as marriages. In many countries they even func-
tion as a kind of trial marriage, in which partners try to find out how compat-
ible they are before deciding whether it is worth marrying for life. With this 
in mind, it is implausible to interpret unions built on cohabitation as signaling 
the degree of stability that should reasonably distinguish unions characterized 
by family altruism. Partners who do not know how well they get along to-
gether, or whether they will stay together for life (or at least a longer time 
period), can hardly guarantee that they will act altruistically and compensate 
each other for investments that may have repercussions for their incomes and 
productivity for the rest of their lives. This makes it difficult to interpret dual-
earner policies’ effect on women’s likelihood of living in unions as evidence 
that women expect their future unions to be characterized by family altruism. 
It would only be reasonable to do so if the outcome were stable unions. Now, 
it is not. Therefore, it is more reasonable to interpret the found effect as evi-
dence that countries that implement policies that are sensitive to the distribu-
tion of the costs of reproduction increase women’s incentives to engage in 
household production without seeking guarantees that their partners will 
behave altruistically toward them. Thus, it would be wrong to assume all 
unions in countries with generous dual-earner policies to be characterized by 
family altruism. Dual-earner policies’ effect on women’s likelihood of living 
in unions can therefore be interpreted as evidence that game-theoretic bar-
gaining theories are more suitable for describing at least a share of the fertili-
ty decisions taken in countries with generous dual-earner policies. It should 
be emphasized that this does not mean that all unions in such countries func-
tion according to game-theoretic bargaining models – the remaining large 
number of stable unions could still be modeled according to the new home 
economics model of the family. Rather, it means that unions in countries with 
generous dual-earner policies are too different from each other to be de-
scribed by a single economic model of the family.  
To sum up, a reasonable interpretation of the evidence is that generous 
family policies, depending on their structure, can both increase women’s 
incentives to form unions that are, and unions that are not, characterized by 
family altruism. It also seems that at least unions in countries that implement 
generous dual-earner policies are too heterogeneous to be captured by a sin-
gle model of the family.  
The impression that families are too heterogeneous to be captured by a 
single economic model of the family is further strengthened by the finding 
that women in stable and unstable unions respond differently to the incen-
tives to have children that accompany generous dual-earner policies. The fact 
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that only women in unstable unions respond to such incentives by having 
more children – mainly up to the point where they become as likely as wom-
en in stable unions to have children – is telling. It is hard not to interpret this 
as evidence that the intra-family distribution of the costs of reproduction only 
matters for women who live in unstable unions. Women who live in stable 
unions do not seem to be sensitive to how the income under their personal 
control and their opportunities outside the family are affected by having chil-
dren. It is difficult to attribute this difference in behavior to the two groups 
that have different socioeconomic characteristics, for example, different 
degrees of labor market attachment, as the difference persists even after con-
trolling for such factors. The most reasonable alternative explanation is that 
women in the two groups have different horizons for their fertility decisions. 
Women in stable unions seem to expect their individual payoffs from having 
children to coincide with their families’ overall costs of reproduction, where-
as women in unstable unions seem to see their payoffs as dependent on how 
their personal incomes and labor market opportunities are affected by the 
arrival of a(nother) child. In other words, stable unions seem to be character-
ized by family altruism, whereas unstable unions seem to be characterized by 
game-theoretic bargaining between partners. This means that researchers 
should not stick to only one model of the family when analyzing policies’ 
effectiveness at raising fertility – or other aspects of family behavior, for that 
matter: Both the new home economics model and game-theoretic bargaining 
models of the family can contribute important insights into how individuals 
are likely to respond to policy incentives of various sorts. The theory of the 
SDT thus seems right in assuming families to differ in that members in some 
families are more individualistically oriented than members in others.  
Policy makers concerned with low fertility ought to bear this in mind: 
Policies aimed at increasing fertility should minimize the costs of reproduc-
tion for individuals in all kinds of family constellations. They should do so 
both for individuals who live in unions characterized by family altruism and 
for individuals who live in unions characterized by game-theoretic bargain-
ing. Neither should singles be forgotten.  
Thus, although the conclusion is that families work in heterogeneous 
ways and that policies should account for this, the trend undoubtedly seems 
to go toward more individualized fertility decisions. Union instability is on 
the rise in almost all of Europe and has been so for several decades. Also, the 
numbers of singles are increasing, especially in countries in which union 
instability is still low. As has been pointed out throughout the study, only 
subsidized child care and paid parental leave with high replacement rates can 
guarantee singles and people who live in unstable unions low costs of repro-
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duction in the long term. All policy strategies that aim at achieving replace-
ment fertility in today’s world must, therefore, build on a core of generous 
child-care subsidies and paid parental leaves with high replacement rates. 
Those that do not will in all likelihood fail to live up to their intentions. If 
people do not want to live in nuclear families for their entire lives, politicians 
must adapt to the situation and design policies that will help them to have and 
raise children in other family constellations. Otherwise, the risk is that people 
will choose not to have children. To continue relying on policies that reduce 
the costs of reproduction only for members in families characterized by fami-
ly altruism is not a viable option in a world characterized by rising heteroge-
neity in family patterns. However, the dual-earner policies that are needed to 
help people to have and raise children in such a world come at a price.  
 
Family policies and union formation 
One of my study’s most profound findings is that family policies affect not 
only women’s willingness to have children, but also their willingness to enter 
stable and unstable unions. The extent of the effect is, moreover, quite dras-
tic; if my models are correct, much of the variation in family arrangements in 
Europe can be explained by countries implementing different family policies. 
Below, I discuss this finding’s implications. 
Although it has long been an established truth that union formation deci-
sions are intimately related to fertility decisions, the literature on policies’ 
effect on fertility has largely neglected the possibility that policies that affect 
the costs of reproduction could affect people’s family arrangements. There is, 
however, one notable exception to this rule: the literature on lone mother-
hood. In this literature, several researchers have argued that welfare benefits 
targeted to reduce poverty among lone mothers as a side effect might increase 
the likelihood of women with low income prospects and poor prospects in the 
marriage market finding it attractive to become lone mothers (Moffitt 1994, 
2000; Hoynes 1997; Rosenzweig 1999; Becker 1991; Blau et al. 2004; Neal 
2004; González 2006; Anderberg 2008). In other words, if policy makers 
introduce welfare benefits to lone mothers, there is a greater chance that more 
women will become lone mothers. The analogy with my argument that gen-
erous dual-earner policies increase women’s incentives to enter unstable 
unions is obvious. The difference is that my argument does not only apply to 
potential welfare recipients, but also to women with relatively good earning 
opportunities.  
It is hard to see why “ordinary” women’s family formation – and espe-
cially cohabitation – decisions have not been analyzed with a logic similar to 
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that applied to potential welfare recipients’ family formation decisions. There 
are no principal differences between the two groups warranting different 
treatments of their family formation decisions. Also, women with relatively 
good earning prospects can, if the policy incentives are benign, afford to have 
children with a partner who is willing to assist with the conception, even if it 
is uncertain whether he will remain a partner for life. The main difference 
between the two groups is that the latter is likely to be affected mainly by the 
generosity of dual-earner policies, whereas the former is likely to be more 
sensitive to the generosity of welfare benefits. However, there is little princi-
pal difference between the two kinds of subsidies that are relevant to the 
decision of whether it is worth risking lone motherhood; both improve lone 
mothers’ welfare, although they do so for groups with different socioeconom-
ic characteristics. However, one difference is that dual-earner policies, in 
contrast to welfare benefits to lone mothers, also reduce the costs of repro-
duction for women who live with partners. This can explain why such poli-
cies increase the likelihood of women in unstable unions becoming mothers, 
and not only their likelihood of becoming single mothers. Dual-earner poli-
cies are neutral with respect to whether women form unions or remain single, 
whereas welfare benefits to lone mothers provide women with direct incen-
tives to not form unions (because they lose their welfare benefits if they do 
so). Yet, the profound message is the same in both cases: family policies 
affect women’s family formation decisions regardless of the women’s social 
status. The additional finding that more traditional family policies affect 
women’s likelihood of forming stable unions only emphasizes the message. 
“Ordinary” women do not function differently from women on welfare bene-
fits.  
Also, other factors than family policies, such as difficulties with finding 
adequate housing, or with finding work, have been found to affect people’s 
family formation decisions. However, this study makes it seem likely that 
previous research on union formation have not given family policies the 
attention they deserve. Thus, the study not only contributes to informing the 
literature on policies’ effect on fertility, it also contributes with important 
insights to the literature on union formation. This literature has focused pre-
dominantly either on the formation of marriages or the formation of cohabit-
ing unions. Only rarely have the two types of unions been analyzed together 
within a single framework. Although, this study confirms the different na-
tures of marriages and unions built on cohabitation, it also shows that they 
have one thing in common: the prevalence of both kinds of unions stands in a 
direct relation to how affordable it is to have children within them. This could 
be interpreted as evidence that a main, if not the main, purpose of both is the 
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production of children. Therefore, it is not only warranted, but necessary, to 
analyze them together in a single framework. Attempts to analyze them in 
isolation from each other risk leading to wrong and counterintuitive conclu-
sions. If one does not consider that marriages and unions built on cohabita-
tion can function as substitutes, for example, it is difficult to understand why 
the correlation between the marriage rate and the fertility rate was reversed in 
late 1980s at the same time as the correlation between the cohabitation rate 
and the fertility rate turned positive. Having said that, the two types of unions 
do not seem to be perfect substitutes. They also attract people with rather 
different characteristics in countries where it is economically feasible to have 
children in both types of unions. Therefore, it is warranted to treat them sepa-
rately in some respects. They are, at least partially, the product of different 
economic incentives and different ideational motivations, and they likely 
function according to different logics. They also have different consequences 
for the people who live, and grow up, in them. Yet, they fulfill a similar role 
for the groups of people who are attracted to them, however different they 
are. They give partners the economic opportunity to engage in the joint pro-
duction and rearing of children.     
This conclusion makes it clear that the distinction between the literatures 
on people’s union formation and policies’ effect on fertility is largely artifi-
cial. Fertility and union formation decisions are so intertwined that it is diffi-
cult to study one phenomenon in isolation from the other. In the same way as 
– at least at the individual level – it is difficult to establish policies’ effect on 
fertility without considering policies’ effect on union formation, it would be 
misleading to study union formation without considering family policies’ 
effect on the costs of reproduction. Both strategies risk leading to wrong 
conclusions. Only an integrated framework that takes the close interrelated-
ness between fertility and union formation decisions seriously seems able to 
fully appreciate policies’ effect on fertility and fully explain women’s incen-
tives to form different types of unions. Future studies on both topics should 
consider this. 
Policies’ ability to alter people’s incentives to form unions might at first 
glance seem a welcome gift for policy makers concerned with low fertility. 
However, the found policy effects might not entirely be those that policy 
makers would wish for. Although generous family policies’ positive effect on 
women’s overall likelihood of living in unions might be perceived as indis-
putably positive, dual-earner policies’ positive effect on women’s likelihood 
of forming unstable unions might be perceived as a more mixed blessing. It 
does not only mean that more children will be born in countries with gener-
ous dual-earner policies, it also means that more children will experience 
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stressful union dissolutions and grow up with lone parents in such countries. 
As has been pointed out above, children who grow up in the context of a 
union dissolution often (but not always) fare worse in various respects than 
children who grow up under more stable conditions. Children who grow up 
in the context of a union dissolution will of course suffer less economically in 
countries that have implemented generous dual-earner policies, but even 
though they will fare relatively well economically vis-à-vis children in simi-
lar situations in countries that lack generous dual-earner policies, they will 
not fare as well economically as children in their own countries who grow up 
in stable families. In addition, they will still suffer emotionally from the men-
tal stress that comes with a union dissolution. This can be perceived as a 
negative side effect of generous dual-earner policies. The fact that such poli-
cies seem to be the key to all successful policy strategies aimed at increasing 
fertility, therefore, presents policy makers with a dilemma. Either they can 
have high fertility and high union instability, or they can have low fertility 
and low union instability. They cannot have both high fertility and low union 
instability at the same time. At least that is what my findings indicate. Thus, 
my study does not offer an easy solution to the problem of low fertility. On 
the contrary, it indicates that countries with low and lowest low fertility rates 
must accept a minor revolution in family arrangements if they want to raise 
fertility. It does not suffice that they accept the dual-earner family policy 
model; such countries must also accept the Nordic family model, entailing 
high cohabitation rates, low marriage rates, high extramarital fertility rates, 
and high union dissolution rates.  
Although some policy makers might disapprove of this, it is not certain 
that all of those most immediately concerned would do so to the same extent. 
After all, it seems that people prefer to cohabit and divorce their partners 
instead of marrying for life if they have the economic opportunity to do so. 
Generous dual-earner policies do not force people to enter unstable unions 
and divorce their partners. Also, people in countries with very generous sub-
sidies for child care and highly paid parental leave must pay a high economic 
price for leaving their partners. People, thus, seem willing to pay a rather 
high price for the union instability that some policy makers might perceive as 
a negative side effect of generous dual-earner policies. Many women seem to 
value their independence so much that they are ready to abstain from having 
children if the only alternative is to marry for life and become economically 
dependent on a husband.95 
                                                          
95
 Women policy makers seem to acknowledge how important dual-earner policies are for women’s ability to 
balance work and family life and live autonomous lives. There is, for example, evidence that the proportion of 
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Moreover, from a child’s perspective it is hard to complain about being 
born into an unstable union, when the alternative would be not to have been 
born. One thing this study has shown is that the main alternative to forming 
an unstable union and having children is to refrain from forming a union and 
having children. It is not to form a stable union and have children. The chil-
dren who are born into unstable unions in countries with generous dual-
earner policies would likely not have been born if said countries had lacked 
generous dual-earner policies. Therefore, they have little to complain about to 
their parents.  
 
Prospects  
As pointed out in the design chapter, the available data does not allow for 
flawless tests of my hypotheses. It is possible that future studies will find 
other explanations for the empirical patterns found in this study. Nonetheless, 
my arguments have enough evidence speaking in their favor to merit further 
attention. In particular, they should be tested in more detailed studies on how 
changes in the generosity of family policies affect union formation and fer-
tility patterns within countries over time. Data availability on the generosity 
of family policies is better for individual countries. It is also possible to find 
the longitudinal data that is needed to rigorously test my arguments’ causality 
assumptions regarding policies’ effect on women’s union formation decisions 
for individual countries. Therefore, the natural next step would be to test my 
arguments on data from one or more countries that in recent years have sig-
nificantly altered their family policies’ generosity. Although it has been 
pointed out that family policy regimes have been rather stable over the years, 
some noticeable changes have recently started to take place. In 2002, the 
European Commission took the initiative of inviting member states to “re-
move disincentives to female labor force participation and strive, taking into 
account the demand for childcare facilities and in line with national patterns 
of provision, to provide childcare by 2010 to at least 90% of children be-
tween 3 years old and the mandatory school age and at least 33% of children 
under 3 years of age” (Plantenga & Siegel 2004). Although not all member 
states have lived up to this challenge, several have increased support for 
working mothers in recent years. Some states have even, on their own initia-
tive, adopted generous dual-earner policies that are far more ambitious than 
the aims set up by the European Commission. The most striking example is 
Germany, which in 2007 adopted wage-dependent parental leave benefits 
                                                                                                                             
women elected representatives has a positive effect on child care coverage in Nowegian and Swedish munici-
palities (Bratton & Ray 2002; Svaleryd 2009).   
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similar to those in Nordic countries (Spiess & Wrohlich 2008). Germany still 
has a long way to go before the combined generosity of the state’s family 
policies reaches the level of support Nordic states offer working mothers, but 
the trend is clear. More and more states have shifted their family policies 
closer to the Nordic family policy model. If the arguments presented in this 
study are correct, we could expect this shift to be followed by a shift toward 
Nordic family patterns – that is, high cohabitation rates, high divorce rates, 
and, above all, relatively high fertility rates. Family policies seem to have a 
fundamental impact both on what people do in their bedrooms and with 
whom they do it. It is time policy makers concerned with low fertility take 
this potential for “bedroom politics” seriously.  
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Appendix A 
 
Several studies have shown generous dual-earner policies, and especially 
generous subsidies for child care, increase women’s labor market attachment 
(for overviews of the research see Gornick & Meyers 2003 and Jaumotte 
2003). It is often argued that this effect is dependent on the ability of dual-
earner policies to reduce the work-family conflict for mothers with small 
children. If this argument is correct, there is a simple solution to the problem 
of double causality, which threatens the estimation of the association between 
the generosity of dual-earner policies and the likelihood of working women 
living in unions. It suffices to exclude women with small children from the 
regressions to arrive at an unbiased estimation of generous dual-earner poli-
cies’ effect on women’s likelihood of union formation. It is reasonable to 
assume that children’s negative effect on their mothers’ labor force participa-
tion is reduced drastically when the children reach school age (i.e., when they 
are six to seven years old), as children who attend school during weekdays do 
not hinder their mothers from working. To test whether this is the case in the 
data used for this study, I run multilevel logistic regression models of the 
likelihood of women working. All variables are defined in the same way as 
those used in the models of the likelihood of women living in unions present-
ed in Chapter 6. The results are presented in Models 1 to 3 in Table A.1, 
below.     
Model 1 shows that women who have children under the age of six have 
60 percent lower odds of working than women who do not have children 
under the age of six. The random part of the model also shows that the odds 
of women with children under the age of six working vary significantly and 
widely between countries (with .54 standard deviations).  
When the dual-earner index is introduced in Model 2, it becomes signifi-
cant, albeit only at the 10-percent level. The coefficient shows that each log-
unit change on the dual-earner index is associated with an 11 percent increase 
in the odds of a woman working. This means that a woman in the country 
with the highest score on the dual-earner index is approximately 25 percent 
more likely to work than one in the country with the lowest score on the dual-
earner index.  
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To test whether the association between the dual-earner index and the likeli-
hood of women working is stronger among women with children under the 
age of six, an interaction term between the dual-earner index and said group 
is introduced in Model 3.  
 
Table A.1. Odds ratios of women (aged 18 to 45) working 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Individual-level variables       
Age 1.73 .04*** 1.72 .04*** 1.72 .04*** 
Age*Age .99 .00*** .99 .00*** .99 .00*** 
Living in urban area 1.08 .04+ 1.07 .04+ 1.07 .04+ 
University education  2.06 .09*** 2.07 .09*** 2.07 .09*** 
Attending church 1/month .81 .04*** .81 .04*** .81 .04*** 
Religiosity .99 .01 .99 .01 .99 .01 
Protestant 1.05 .07 1.06 .07 1.06 .07 
Catholic 1.09 .06+ 1.09 .06 1.09 .06 
Orthodox .60 .08*** .52 .06*** .52 .06*** 
Other .61 .06*** .62 .06*** .62 .06*** 
Children under 6 .40 .05*** .40 .05*** .05 .03*** 
       
Country-level variables       
Dual-earner index   1.11 .06+ 1.04 .05 
Benefits index    .85 .04*** .86 .04*** 
Part-time work    .87 .04*** .87 .04*** 
Unemployment rate   .85 .04** .85 .04** 
       
Cross-level interactions 
      
Dual-earner index *     1.82 .30*** 
children under 6       
Random part       
Intercept level 2 .09 .03*** .04 .02* .02 .02 
Children under 6 .54 .09*** .54 .09*** .40 .07*** 
       
Observations 
   
Individuals  14834 14834 14834 
Countries 22 22 22 
Log likelihood -8833.1775 -8827.6823 -8822.6779 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+
 p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
The interaction term enters highly significant and positive.96 Together with 
the coefficient of the dual-earner index, it shows that each log unit change on 
the dual-earner index is associated with an 82 percent increase in the odds of 
                                                          
96
 The magnitude and significance of the effect has been checked with the program Inteff. The results (not 
shown; available from the author on request) are very similar to the ones revealed in Model 3.   
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women with children under the age of six working. At the same time, having 
children under the age of six now reduces a woman’s odds of working by 95 
percent. The conclusion is obvious. Generous dual-earner policies have a 
strong positive effect on the likelihood of women with children below school 
age working (see Figure A.1). Actually, women with small children are more 
than twice as likely to work in the country with the most generous dual-
earner policies compared to in the country with the least generous dual-earner 
policies.  
 
Figure A.1. The likelihood of women (aged 18 to 45) working  
 
Comments: Builds on Model 3 in Table A.1. The graph shows the predicted effect of the dual-earner 
index on women’s likelihood of working when all other variables are kept at the sample mean. 
 
In contrast, the generosity of dual-earner policies is not associated with the 
odds of women who do not have children below school age working. This 
means that the risk of confounding dual-earner policies’ effect on the likeli-
hood of working women living in unions with dual-earner policies’ effect on 
the likelihood of women working is minimal in the case of women who do 
not have children under the age of six. Dual-causality is only a problem 
among women who have children below school age.  
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Appendix B  
 
Interaction effects in logit cannot be interpreted directly from the regression 
output. The size, the sign, and the standard error of the interaction effect can 
differ from those of the interaction term (Ai & Norton 2003). Moreover, 
effect sizes and standard errors can differ between observations. To verify 
that the interaction effect, between union stability and the generosity of the 
dual-earner index (which was found in Chapters 8 and 9) really exists, I have 
checked the size, strength, and significance of the interaction effect for each 
individual observation in the data with the help of the command Inteff (Nor-
ton, Wang & Ai 2004). The results from these checks are presented below.  
Figure B.1 shows that the interaction term in the regressions on women’s 
likelihood of having a first and second child, which were presented in Chap-
ter 8 (below labeled “incorrect marginal effect”), closely tracks the correct 
interaction effect revealed by Inteff. Although the effect differs somewhat 
between the individual observations, the deviations are evenly spread be-
tween over- and underestimations.  
The average effect size in the sample (–.11) does not differ drastically 
from the size of the interaction term found in the regressions presented in 
Chapter 8. It is therefore warranted to say that the results presented in the 
chapter closely mirror the true strength of the interaction effect(s).  
Further, Figure B.1 shows that the interaction effect(s) also is significant 
at the 5-percent level for all but a few (less than 5 percent) of the observa-
tions. The few observations for which the effect is not significant reflect 
women who have a predicted probability of having a(nother) birth that is 
extremely low (close to 0). In other words, their predicted probability cannot 
be reduced much, and therefore the absence of a significant negative interac-
tion effect is not surprising. The average standard error in the sample is –
3.15.   
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Figure B.1. Correct and incorrect interaction effects and standard errors of the correct 
interaction effect 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Comment: The graphs build on Model 4 in Table 8.3 in Chapter 8. 
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The test of the interaction effect found in the robustness checks in Chapter 8 
shows that the true interaction effect(s) deviates somewhat from the effect 
presented in the regression output (see Figure B.2). The dispersion of the 
strength of the effect is relatively large and it is not evenly spread between 
over- and underestimations. Overall, the interaction term presented in the 
regression output seems to overestimate the strength of the interaction effect 
somewhat. In particular, it does so for women whose predicted probability of 
having a(nother) child is higher than .3. This finding indicates that the differ-
ence in the effect of the dual-earner index between women who are living in 
stable unions and other women is somewhat weaker than indicated by the 
graphs in Chapter 8. In practice, this means that the slight negative correla-
tion between the likelihood of women in stable unions having a(nother) birth 
and high scores on the dual-earner index that is visible in the graphs most 
likely does not exist. However, the general pattern is not changed much: there 
is still a considerable difference in the effect of the dual-earner index between 
the two groups even if it is somewhat weaker for women whose predicted 
probability of having a(nother) child is over .3. The strength of the average 
interaction effect in the sample is –.08. 
Figure B.2 also shows that the interaction effect is significant at the 5-
percent level for almost all – and significant at the 10-percent for all – obser-
vations. The average standard error in the sample is –3.24. 
To sum up, the checks carried out with Inteff largely confirm the findings 
of Chapter 8. There is a strong and significant interaction effect between 
women’s union status and the generosity of dual-earner policies.    
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Figure B.2. Correct and incorrect interaction effects and standard errors of the correct 
interaction effect 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Comment: The graphs build on Model 4 in Table 8.3 in Chapter 8.  
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Figure B.3 shows that the interaction term in the regressions on women’s 
likelihood of definitively planning on having a first or a second child, which 
were presented in Chapter 9, closely tracks the correct interaction effects. 
Although the effect differs somewhat between the individual observations, 
the deviations are evenly spread between over- and underestimations. The 
average strength of the interaction effects in the sample is –.08. Thus, the 
findings presented in Chapter 9 are confirmed. 
As could be expected, given the low number of observations used in the 
regressions in Chapter 9, the interaction effects are bordering on being signif-
icant. Figure B.3 shows that only about half of the observations in the regres-
sion are significant at the 5-percent level in a two-sided t-test, and the stand-
ard error of the average interaction effect in the data is a mere –1.94. The 
lack of significance is especially an issue for women who have a predicted 
probability of .2 of definitely planning on having a(nother) child. However, a 
one-sided t-test yields a significant interaction effect at the 5-percent level for 
a large majority of the observations in the sample.  
Figure B.4 shows that the incorrect and correct interaction effects also 
track each other closely in the models using the broader definition of wom-
en’s fertility plans, and the deviations from the mean are evenly spread be-
tween over- and underestimations. The average interaction effect in the sam-
ple is –.12. This means that the results presented in Chapter 9 are reliable 
with respect to the strength of the interaction effect.  
In addition, Figure B.4 shows that almost all observed interaction effects 
in the sample are significant at the 5-percent level and all are significant at 
the 10-percent level in a two-sided t-test. The mean standard error in the 
sample is –2.69. Thus, the standard errors presented in Chapter 9 is also reli-
able.  
To sum up, the findings largely confirm the findings from Chapter 9.  
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Figure B.3. Correct and incorrect interaction effects for definitely planning on having 
a(nother) child and standard errors of the correct interaction effect 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Comment: The graphs build on Model 2.2 in Table 9.2 in Chapter 9.  
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Figure B.4. Correct and incorrect interaction effects and standard errors of the correct 
interaction effects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Comment: The graphs build on Model 2.2 in Table 9.2 in Chapter 9.    
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Appendix C 
 
 
Table C1. Country level variables description 
Variable Time period Source of data 
Dual-earner index Availability of child care: ESS2: Average of 2000 and 2005 
ESS3: 2005 
ESS2: OECD 2001 and OECD family database  
ESS3: OECD family database  
Cost of child care 2005 OECD family database  
Replacement rate and 
duration of parental leave 
ESS2: 2000-2003 
ESS3: 2002-2005 
Gauthier 2002, MISSOC and OECD family database 
Benefits index ESS2: 2000-2003 
ESS3: 2002-2005 
OECD:s tax-benefits calculator  
Availability of part-time work (as a percentage of the total work 
force )  
ESS2: 2000-2003 
ESS3: 2002-2005 
Eurostat 
Female labor force participation rate (as a percentage of the 
total workforce) 
ESS2: 2000-2003 
ESS3: 2002-2005 
Eurostat 
Percentage of women (aged 18-44) living with parents  Average of 2004 and 2006 European Social Survey (Aggregate of questions F1 and F4) 
Unemployment rate (as a percentage of the total work force) ESS2: 2000-2003 
ESS3: 2002-2005 
Eurostat (all countries except Iceland and Switzerland), CIA 
World Fact book (Iceland and Switzerland)  
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Table C2. Individual level variables  
Variable Questions used Scale Coding 
Living in a union F62: Current legal status?  
F65: Are you currently living with a partner? – only 
asked to women who are not married 
0-1 Coded as 1 if F62=Married=1 or F65=Yes 
Coded as 0 of F62=Separated/Divorced/Widowed/Never married and F65=No 
Cohabiting  F65: Are you currently living with a partner? – only 
asked to women who are not married 
0-1 Coded as 1 if F65=Yes 
Coded as 0 if F65=No 
Married (has cohabited) F62: Current legal status?  
F66: Have you ever lived with a partner without being 
married to them? 
0-1 Coded as 1 if F62=Married and F66=Yes 
Coded as 0 if F62= Separated/Divorced/Widowed/Never married or if F62=Married and 
F66=No  
Married (has not cohabi-
ted) 
F62: Current legal status? 
F66: Have you ever lived with a partner without being 
married to them? 
0-1 Coded as 1 if F62=Married and F66=No  
Coded as 0 if F62= Separated/Divorced/Widowed/Never married or if F62=Married and 
F66=Yes 
Single (has lived with a 
partner) 
F62: Current legal status?  
F65: Are you currently living with a partner? – only 
asked to women who are not married 
F66: Have you ever lived with a partner without being 
married to them? 
0-1 Coded as 1 if Living in a union=0 and F62=Separated/Divorced/Widowed and/or 
F66=Yes 
Coded as 0 if Living in a union=1 or if Living in a union=0, F62=Never married and 
F66=No 
Single (has not lived with 
a partner) 
F62: Current legal status?  
F65: Are you currently living with a partner? – only 
asked to women who are not married 
F66: Have you ever lived with a partner without being 
married to them? 
0-1 Coded as 1 if Living in a union=1, F62=Never married and F66=No 
Coded as 0 if Living in a union=1 or if Living in a union=0 and 
F62=Separated/Divorced/Widowed and/or F66=Yes 
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Table C2. Individual level variables - continued 
Number of children (ch. 8) ESS2: F1, F3, F4, G47, G49, G50, G51 
ESS3: F1, F3, F4, D8, D9, D10, D11 
0-11 Coded as the sum of all children the respondent had three years before the year preceding her 
interview 
Number of children (ch. 9) ESS2: F1, F3, F4, G47, G49, G50, G51 
ESS3: F1, F3, F4, D8, D9, D10, D11 
0-11 Coded as the sum of all children the respondent had a the time of her interview  
Experienced a birth ESS2: F1, F3, F4, G47, G49, G50, G  
ESS3: F1, F3, F4, D8, D9, D10, D1151 
0-1 Coded as 1 if year a child was born > the year preceding the respondent’s interview took place – 3, 
otherwise coded as 0 
Definitely planning on 
having a(nother) child  
G58: Do you plan to have a child within 
the next three years? 
0-1 Coded as 1 if G58=Definitely yes 
Coded as 0 if G58=Definitely not/Probably not/Probably yes 
Probably planning on 
having a(nother) child  
G58: Do you plan to have a child within 
the next three years? 
0-1 Coded as 1 if G58=Definitely yes/Probably yes 
Coded as 0 if G58=Definitely not/Probably not 
Age F3: In which year were you born? 18-44 Year interview took place-F3 
Urban Residence F5: Which best describes the area where 
you live? 
0-1 Coded as 1 if F5=A big city/Suburbs of a big city/A town or small city 
Coded as 0 if F5=A country village/The countryside 
High education F6: What is your highest level of educa-
tion? 
0-1 Coded as 1 if F6=First stage tertiary education/Second stage tertiary education 
Coded as 0 if F6=Not completed primary education/Primary education/Lower level secondary 
education/Upper secondary education/Post-secondary, non tertiary education 
Outside the labor market F8: Which of these descriptions best 
applies to what you have been doing the 
last 7 days? 
0-1 Coded as 1 if F8=Unemployed/Permanently sick or disabled/Retired/In community or military 
service/Doing housework, looking after children or other persons/Other 
Coded as 0 if F8=In paid work/In education 
In education F8: Which of these descriptions best 
applies to what you have been doing the 
last 7 days? 
0-1 Coded as 1 if F8= In education 
Coded as 0 if F8=In paid work/Unemployed/Permanently sick or disabled/Retired/In community or 
military service/Doing housework, looking after children or other persons/Other 
 
In paid work F8: Which of these descriptions best 
applies to what you have been doing the 
last 7 days? 
0-1 Coded as 1 if F8= In paid work 
Coded as 0 if F8=In education/Unemployed/Permanently sick or disabled/Retired/In community or 
military service/Doing housework, looking after children or other persons/Other 
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Table C2. Individual level variables - continued 
Variable Questions used Scale Coding 
Partner high 
education 
F36: What is the highest level of education 
your husband/partner has achieved? 
0-1 Coded as 1 if F6=First stage tertiary education/Second stage tertiary education 
Coded as 0 if F6=Not completed primary education/Primary education/Lower level secondary educa-
tion/Upper secondary education/Post-secondary, non tertiary education 
Religiosity C13/C21: How religious would you say you 
are? 
0-10 0=Not at all religious, 10=Very religious 
Protestant C9/C17: Do you consider yourself as belong-
ing to any particular religion or denomination? 
C10/C18: Which one? 
0-1 Coded as 1 if C10/C18=Prostestant/Anglican/Baptist/Methodist/Presbyterian/Congregational/ Free Presby-
terian/Brethren/Other Protestant 
Coded as 0 if C9/C17=No or if C10/18=Christian – no denomination/Roman Catholic/Greek or Russian 
Orthodox/Hindu/Sikh/Buddhist/Jewish/Islam/Other 
Catholic C9/C17: Do you consider yourself as belong-
ing to any particular religion or denomination? 
C10/C18: Which one? 
0-1 Coded as 1 if C10/C18=Roman Catholic 
Coded as 0 if C9/C17=No or if Protestant=1 or if C10/C18=Christian – no denomination/Greek or Russian 
Orthodox/Hindu/Sikh/Buddhist/Jewish/Islam/Other 
Orthodox C9/C17: Do you consider yourself as belong-
ing to any particular religion or denomination? 
C10/C18: Which one? 
0-1 Coded as 1 if C10/C18=Greek or Russian Orthodox 
Coded as 0 if C9/17=No or if Protestant=1 or if Catholic=1 or if C10/C18=Christian – no denomination/ 
Hindu/Sikh/Buddhist/Jewish/Islam/Other 
Other C9/C17: Do you consider yourself as belong-
ing to any particular religion or denomination? 
C10/C18: Which one? 
0-1 Coded as 1 if C10/C18=Christian – no denomination/ Hindu/Sikh/Buddhist/Jewish/Islam/Other 
Coded as 0 if C9/C17=No or if Protestant=1 or if Catholic=1 or if Orthodox=1 
Not belonging 
to church 
C9/C17: Do you consider yourself as belong-
ing to any particular religion or denomination? 
0-1 Coded as 1 if C9/C17=No 
Coded as 0 if C9/C17=Yes 
Attending 
church 
1/month 
C14/C22: Apart from special occasions such 
as weddings and funerals, about how often do 
you attend religious services nowadays? 
0-1 Coded as 1 if C14/C22=Every day/More than once a week/Once a week/At least once a month 
Coded as 0 if C14/C22=Only on special holy days/Less often/Never 
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Table C3. Summation of country level variables: ESS2 
Country Dual-earner index Benefits index Part-time employment Unemployment rate Living with parents Female labor force participation rate 
Austria  3.0 2.1 2.9 1.3 2.9 4.1 
Belgium  3.8 2.4 3.0 1.9 3.1 3.9 
Czech republic  2.8 1.1 1.6 2.1 2.9 4.0 
Denmark  4.5 2.1 3.0 1.5 2.1 4.3 
Finland  3.7 2.0 2.5 2.2 2.0 4.2 
Germany  3.1 2.2 3.0 2.1 2.7 4.1 
Greece 2.5 0.8 1.5 2.4 3.0 3.8 
Hungary 3.4 2.7 1.3 1.8 3.4 3.9 
Iceland 4.2 2.0 3.3 1.0 2.5 4.4 
Ireland 2.9 1.8 2.8 1.5 3.0 4.0 
Italy 3.0 1.3 2.2 2.3 3.4 3.8 
Luxemburg  3.4 2.5 2.4 0.8 3.3 3.9 
Netherlands 3.3 1.5 3.7 1.0 1.8 4.2 
Norway 4.2 1.8 3.3 1.2 2.1 4.3 
Poland 2.7 1.1 2.4 2.9 3.7 3.8 
Portugal 3.3 1.5 2.4 1.5 3.2 4.1 
Slovak republic 3.3 2.0 0.7 2.9 3.7 4.0 
Spain 3.0 1.0 2.1 2.4 3.6 3.8 
Sweden 4.2 2.0 3.1 1.6 2.3 4.3 
Switzerland 2.3 1.6 3.4 0.6 2.0 4.3 
Comment: All variables are presented with their natural logarithm  
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Table C4. Summation of country level variables: ESS3 
Country Dual-earner index Benefits index Part-time employment Unemployment rate Living with parents Female labor force participation rate 
Belgium  3.9 2.3 3.5 2.1 3.1 3.9 
Denmark  4.5 2.0 3.1 1.6 2.1 4.3 
France  3.7 2.0 2.8 2.2 2.2 4.1 
Germany  3.0 2.2 3.1 2.3 2.7 4.1 
Hungary 3.4 2.5 1.5 1.9 3.4 3.9 
Ireland 3.0 2.1 2.8 1.5 3.0 4.1 
Netherlands 3.6 1.5 3.8 1.5 1.8 4.2 
Norway 4.3 1.6 3.4 1.5 2.1 4.3 
Poland 2.7 0 2.4 2.9 3.7 3.8 
Portugal 3.5 1.6 2.4 1.9 3.2 4.1 
Slovak republic 3.3 2.1 0.9 2.9 3.7 3.9 
Spain 3.2 0.9 2.3 2.3 3.6 3.9 
Sweden 4.2 1.8 3.2 1.9 2.3 4.3 
Switzerland 2.7 1.6 3.5 1.2 2.0 4.3 
UK 3.2 1.7 3.2 1.6 2.1 4.2 
Comment: All variables are presented with their natural logarithm  
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